Runtime Enforcement

Runtime enforcement has emerged as a promising approach for ensuring the safety of autonomous and cyber-physical systems operating in uncertain and dynamic environments. Unlike traditional runtime verification, runtime enforcement actively intervenes during execution to prevent property violations by modifying unsafe system behaviors. Existing enforcement frameworks primarily focus on untimed or discrete-time specifications and are often limited to delaying or suppressing events, making them inadequate for reactive systems exhibiting complex continuous dynamics. In this paper, we propose a runtime enforcement framework where safety requirements are modeled using Hybrid Automata (HA). The framework combines discrete-event editing with continuous-time monitoring to support enforcement actions such as suppression, delay, and insertion of events at arbitrary time instants. Upon observing environmental inputs, the automaton is initialized, and runtime reachability analysis is used to synthesize safe corrective actions. We formally define the enforcement problem for safety hybrid automata, establish enforceability conditions, and present an online enforcement algorithm for reactive systems. A detailed case study on an Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) system demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed approach in maintaining safety properties under unsafe controller behaviors. Experimental results show that the framework introduces minimal computational overhead while ensuring continuous compliance with safety requirements in real time.

Agent skills let LLM agents reuse instructions, resources, tools, and workflows, but they also create a new place for malicious behavior to hide. A skill may look benign in its documentation or code while becoming harmful only when it is invoked with particular user requests, local assets, persistent state, or multi-step tool interactions. This makes purely static vetting brittle. We present Runtime Skill Audit (RSA), a dynamic analysis method that audits skills by asking what the skill-mediated agent actually does under targeted runtime conditions. Instead of testing every skill with the same generic tasks, RSA profiles risk-relevant interfaces, prepares the execution context needed to exercise them, and assigns security labels from the resulting trace evidence. We instantiate RSA on OpenClaw and evaluate it on 100 skills against representative static baselines. RSA achieves 90.0% accuracy with an 88.0% true positive rate and an 8.0% false positive rate, improving accuracy by 13.0 percentage points over the best static baseline. Under self-evolving attacks, static detectors collapse after one or two rounds, while RSA continues to detect 19--20 out of 20 malicious skills across rounds.

This paper studies runtime safety for autonomous driving when high-level driving commands become faulty or unreliable. Unlike conventional runtime-safety approaches that mainly focus on immediate vehicle safety, the proposed framework evaluates both driving safety and whether the vehicle can still successfully complete its mission before a command is executed. The framework extends highway-env with mission-level fault scenarios such as skipping required checkpoints, entering restricted areas, and generating future routes that can no longer complete the mission successfully. A runtime monitoring system is introduced to detect and reject unsafe or mission-infeasible commands before execution. For comparison, an adapted Simplex-Drive runtime-safety baseline with learning-based driving control, safety fallback control, and runtime controller switching is implemented using the public Simplex-Drive framework. Experimental results show that platform-level runtime safety alone cannot detect mission-level planning faults, while the proposed framework successfully rejects mission-infeasible commands and improves mission success under randomized fault conditions.

Future AI-integrated Radio Access Networks (AI-RAN) will combine open programmability with learning-enabled xApps, rApps, and control functions that act on shared parameters and key performance indicators (KPIs). For conflict monitoring, it is not enough to know which applications are deployed; the system must also know whether the parameter--KPI dependencies assumed by runtime diagnosis remain valid under the current operating regime. This paper studies a lightweight monitoring primitive for that purpose: tracking an interpretable dependency representation from streaming telemetry events. We represent active dependencies by a Boolean matrix and use Boolean matrix multiplication to check whether recent parameter-activity and KPI-response events are consistent with the current estimate. We propose a sliding-window inference procedure that reuses the estimate when it remains consistent and recomputes it when recent observations indicate structural change. The tracker is intended as an explainable signal for conflict diagnosis and slow-loop model refresh, not as an autonomous mitigation mechanism. Experiments on controlled Boolean event streams show efficient and accurate tracking under dependency changes and Boolean observation noise.

Designing neural architectures for time-series forecasting and anomaly detection remains a resource-intensive task that often requires substantial domain expertise. Traditional Automated Machine Learning (AutoML) systems typically rely on static, predefined search spaces, limiting their ability to adapt to diverse data characteristics. We present GenAutoML, an agentic framework that leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) as neural architects to bridge natural-language requirements and executable PyTorch implementations. The framework incorporates a Sandboxed Reflection Loop for autonomous code refinement and a Signature-Aware Runtime that enforces architectural consistency and execution safety. To improve robustness under non-stationary conditions, we further introduce a Dynamic Reversible Instance Normalization (Dyn-RevIN) wrapper. Experiments on the ETTh1, ETTm1, and Weather benchmarks demonstrate that GenAutoML can dynamically generate task-specific neural architectures tailored to dataset characteristics. Among the generated models, WaveInterferenceNet achieves inference latency below 0.01 ms per sample while maintaining competitive predictive performance. By emphasizing computational efficiency, architectural adaptability, and stable optimization behavior, GenAutoML enables the creation of ultra-lightweight neural networks suitable for resource-constrained and latency-sensitive Edge AI deployments.

Agent systems execute through runtimes with very different control points: local coding tools, framework SDKs, managed agent platforms, API gateways, and observer-only integrations. A high-risk action such as publishing data externally may therefore appear as a shell command in one runtime, a tool call in another, and a hosted session transition in a third. This makes it difficult to answer a basic governance question consistently: what action was authorized, under whose authority, with what approval semantics, and with what evidence after execution? This paper presents Proof-Carrying Agent Actions (PCAA), a runtime-neutral governance model centered on an action certificate rather than on a vendor-native session record. PCAA organizes control around five checkpoints: pre-action admissibility, action open, assumption capture, approval, and outcome closure. It binds these checkpoints to a portable action envelope, runtime and approval receipts, and replay-ready proof. The model is extended in two practical ways: the certificate is externality-aware, carrying boundary facts such as destination visibility and account provenance, and approval is described by explicit enforceability classes rather than by a single reviewed or unreviewed bit. We study the model through a reference implementation in a heterogeneous agent control plane and a disclosure-bounded evaluation protocol. On a protected benchmark expanded from 24 executable seeds to 96 traces across four runtime families, PCAA preserves route quality while exposing distinct failure modes under ablation. The paper contributes a systems formulation of runtime governance around certificate-bearing actions and an implementation-grounded account of how that formulation can remain portable under runtime churn without collapsing into vendor-specific control surfaces.

Large language model (LLM) agents are becoming long-running software actors rather than fixed tool users. They accumulate memory, activate skills, synthesize tools, fork children, attach remote resources, and commit checkpoints into reusable execution images. These mechanisms improve adaptability, but also create a systems-security failure mode: if exposing an action also grants the authority needed to perform it, self-evolution becomes a permission-escalation path. This paper presents Agent libOS, an agent-native library-OS substrate for capability-controlled self-evolving agents. Its central invariant is that model-visible affordances may evolve while resource authority changes only through explicit, audited runtime primitives. Agent libOS represents an agent as an AgentProcess with process identity, process-local Object Memory, message queues, a tool table, loaded Skills, process-local Deno/TypeScript JIT tools, child processes, budgets, checkpoints, and explicit capabilities. AgentImage objects define boot-time prompt and tool-table state; Skills and JIT tools extend the action surface; checkpoint-derived images make internal state reusable. None of these mechanisms grants filesystem, shell, human, memory, process, checkpoint, image, JSON-RPC, MCP, or PTY authority by itself. The prototype implements process-local namespaces, persistent runtime state, LLM-call observability, human approval queues, budgets, syscall-mediated JIT tools, trusted Runtime Modules, Object-bound PTY sessions, checkpoint restore/fork/commit, JSON-RPC and MCP providers, and a deterministic runtime-safety benchmark. On 27 versioned deterministic tasks, it completed the task plans while preventing all modeled unauthorized side effects, with a 7.0% conservative false-denial rate. Simple wrapper and sandbox baselines preserved task completion but failed most safety checks.

LLM-agent budget overruns are a documented production failure class: a single retry loop can spend thousands of dollars before an operator notices, and the in-process integrity properties that would prevent it (no aliasing, no double-spend, no use-after-delegation of a cost-bearing value) are enforced, if at all, by ad-hoc wrappers rather than by the type system. Our central contribution is empirical: a catalog of 63 confirmed production incidents from 21 orchestration frameworks (2023-2026), each backed by a quoted GitHub issue and, where reported, a dollar loss, organized into an eight-cluster failure taxonomy (inter-rater Cohen's kappa = 0.837, N = 113), plus 47 supplementary structural entries. As one mitigation evaluated against this taxonomy, we build token-budgets, an 1,180-line Rust crate (no unsafe) that operationalizes affine ownership so that cloning, double-spending, or using a budget after delegating it are compile errors rather than runtime hazards an operator must remember to avoid. The dollar cap is runtime arithmetic under an estimator assumption; the affine layer makes that arithmetic non-bypassable. On single-agent workloads a 4-line Python counter matches the crate at 0/30 overshoot, so the distinguishing value is non-bypassability under operator error in multi-agent delegation: the delegation-fanout race documented in 11 incidents is rejected by the borrow checker at compile time, while the same pattern under asyncio overshoots 30/30 and three disciplined alternatives overshoot 0/30. Across five runtimes, three providers, and a temperature-stratified live-API test (N = 160), the approach reports zero cap violations and zero false refusals, at operational parity with concurrent work. Static over-reservation is 4-6x (2.11x adaptive). Binary-level cap-soundness on the running binary is left open.

Open agent platforms allow community contributors to publish reusable skills that agents can invoke at runtime. This extensibility also creates a supply-chain risk: malicious contributors can hide harmful behavior inside skills that appear benign under superficial inspection. However, existing defenses are hard to evaluate because there is no benchmark that measures both malicious-skill detection and runtime verification. We present SkillVetBench, a two-stage security vetting benchmark for open agentic skill ecosystems. The first stage performs semantic vetting over each skill's natural-language specification to detect hidden malicious intent. The second stage executes flagged skills in an instrumented sandbox to observe runtime behavior and collect auditable evidence. We build a benchmark from confirmed malicious skills in the live OpenClaw ecosystem, including samples from the recent ClawHavoc supplychain campaign. Unlike static-only methods, SkillVetBench verifies detected threats with execution traces. Our experiments show that: (1) semantic-only and signature-based baselines are insufficient, missing up to 89% of malicious skills whose threats arise from natural-language instructions, multicomponent logic, or cross-component interactions; (2) runtime attacks are concentrated in a small set of high-permission primitives, especially exec, write_file, install_skill, and spawn; and (3) SkillVetBench provides case studies in which sandbox execution directly supports malicious verdicts with concrete runtime evidence.

Training stability is a key bottleneck in low-precision language model training: efficient low-cost paths can still produce short-lived numerical risks at a small set of operators. We formulate this as runtime stability control and present Gradient Norm-to-Mean Ratio (GNMR), a lightweight controller that compares each recoverable unit's current gradient norm with its historical mean. Together with $Δ$-GNMR for abrupt short-window increases, GNMR maps local risk signals to bounded recovery actions under a hard $\mathrm{maxO}$ budget and a short lock interval, without changing the numerical format, kernel, or backend recipe. Across activation-quantization stress, DeepSeek-style recipe-level training, and LLaMA-2 13B fine-tuning, GNMR preserves high-fidelity quality with sparse, budgeted recovery. These results support GNMR as a backend-agnostic controller to improve low-precision training stability while preserving low-cost execution.

Formal methods provide rigorous accounts of program behavior, but practical software engineering often works through executable libraries, tests, and incremental design. This paper presents SEMBridge, a small tagless-final framework for generating weakest-precondition and bounded-checking interpretations from the same executable object programs. Instead of committing a program semantics to one abstract syntax tree and then writing separate traversals, object programs are written once against a semantic interface and interpreted into multiple meanings: readable code, concrete execution, predicate transformers, bounded counterexample search, and future proof-assistant or SMT back ends. The Python prototype implements a loop-free imperative core with assignments, conditionals, assumptions, and assertions. Across five example programs, the same tagless-final definitions generated executable state transformers and verification conditions that passed bounded checking over domains up to 729 states. The contribution is not a Scala code-generation system or a new verifier, but a compact architecture for keeping executable semantics, weakest-precondition artifacts, and bounded validation synchronized.

Task success can hide process anomalies in real-world agent executions. An agent may pass the final task oracle while still accumulating unresolved ambiguity, unsafe external writes, ignored errors, weakly grounded commitments, or capability-boundary overcommitment. We study this mismatch as the Outcome-Process Gap and introduce OpenClawBench, a large-scale dataset for measuring and supervising process-side anomalies in real agent execution processes. OpenClawBench is built from BFCL-driven OpenClaw sessions produced by 6 source models and contains 31,264 annotated trajectories. It aligns task-oracle outcomes with structured process evidence. FullTax converts the aligned trajectories into structured anomaly supervision: binary labels, supporting evidence, onset/span localization, severity, recoverability, and a 5-class anomaly taxonomy. Using OpenClawBench, we make the Outcome-Process Gap measurable. Among 31,135 oracle-passing executions, 2,904 are still labeled process-anomalous under FullTax. These results show that success-only evaluation misses a concrete class of process-side failures in real agent executions. A LoRA-fine-tuned Gemma 3 12B detector trained on the high-confidence FullTax supervised pool reaches binary F1=0.729 on the cleaner-labels held-out test split. Together, OpenClawBench turns real agent execution logs into auditable and reusable supervision for studying, diagnosing, and operationally monitoring runtime agent reliability.

LLM agents increasingly act by writing code, yet a split persists between the runtime that drives the agent and the code the model writes. The runtime owns the loop, context, and control flow, and the model has little say over any of them. Letting model-written code shape the runtime itself would make agents more expressive, but it would also sharpen safety problems. A model can be diverted by a prompt injection, call the wrong tool, or fail partway and leave an inconsistent state, and each such failure reaches further when the code shapes the runtime than when it expresses a single action. We present LACUNA, a programming model for agents that closes this split while preserving safety. Each agent action is a typed call $\texttt{agent[T](task)}$ that the LLM fills with code when execution reaches it, and the code is type-checked against the surrounding program before it runs. Because each action is accepted or rejected as a whole, a rejected one leaves the environment untouched, and its compiler diagnostics drive a retry. The same check also bounds which tools and data an action may use and how they flow. Our primitive expresses ReAct loops, sub-agents, skills, parallel decomposition, and multi-model planning as ordinary control flow. We evaluate LACUNA on a collection of test cases, BrowseComp-Plus, and $τ^2$-bench. On BrowseComp-Plus, $8.6\%$ of generations are rejected before execution, with 0.7 retries per query on average, and the agent reaches $27.1\%$ accuracy. On $τ^2$-bench, LACUNA solves $76.0\%$ of $392$ tasks across four domains with a capable model, on par with the baseline agent.

Recent advances in agentic systems increasingly treat code as an executable operational substrate rather than as a disposable output artifact. Prior work such as \emph{Code as Agent Harness} frames validated agent-generated artifacts as runtime entities that can be created, executed, revised, persisted, and reused within long-running cognitive loops. However, the governance, lifecycle management, and operational evolution of such artifacts remain under-specified. This paper proposes a framework for governed runtime evolution in multi-agent systems through executable operational cognition. We formalize agent-generated artifacts as persistent runtime capabilities that progressively become part of the operational substrate rather than transient intermediate outputs. Building on this perspective, we introduce \emph{HarnessMutation} as a governed mechanism for lifecycle-aware runtime adaptation operating under explicit validation, traceability, evaluation, and rollback constraints. Rather than treating runtime adaptation as unrestricted self-modification, the proposed framework models evolution as a bounded and observable process over persistent operational memory. It further shows how these ideas can be operationalized over modern agent runtimes and governance-oriented orchestration systems, providing a conceptual foundation for adaptive infrastructures whose evolution remains explicit, auditable, and constrained.

AI safety is still largely framed as alignment: training models to follow human preferences, safety policies, and normative constraints. That framing has improved the behavior of modern language models, but aligned behavior does not by itself guarantee that a deployed agent can be stopped, overridden, or constrained once it operates in open-ended, interactive, and tool-using environments. A system may be safe in expectation and still fail to yield to explicit runtime authority under conflicting instructions, long-horizon execution, adversarial inputs, or risky tool use. This position paper argues that AI safety therefore requires controllability as a first-class objective. We define \emph{controllability} as the ability of an AI system to remain reliably interruptible, overridable, redirectable, and constrainable by explicit control signals at runtime while preserving ordinary utility when such signals are absent. To study this gap, we introduce \controlbench{}, a benchmark for evaluating controllability failures in high-risk agentic scenarios. Experiments with OpenClaw-based agents show that current alignment and guardrail mechanisms reduce risk, but often fail to provide persistent, authoritative, and enforceable runtime control. We therefore propose a control-centric architectural framework that highlights explicit control planes, runtime intervention pathways, persistent control states, and auditable decision interfaces as key design principles for future controllable AI systems.

We propose a foundational runtime actuarial layer for autonomous AI agents in which every side-effect-bearing action carries a time-consistent, counterfactual risk toll computed against a contractually fixed safe default, inside an explicit underwriting boundary. The framework treats per-action insurance as the primary unit of analysis and replaces post-hoc annual liability cover with a pre-action transaction layer. The paper establishes four structural results: (i) a well-defined counterfactual toll under a chosen safe-default mapping and continuation policy, with explicit non-uniqueness; (ii) a no-splitting property within an underwriting boundary that telescopes path-decomposed actions into a boundary potential, with a corollary tying gaming-resistance to boundary design; (iii) an irreversible-authority premium, split into a strictly positive action-level component and an if-and-only-if characterisation of the set-level robust capital increase; and (iv) a conservative runtime gating theorem that translates high-probability toll envelopes into an executed-action budget guarantee. The result is the mathematical base layer for a broader program: an empirical companion instantiates the runtime through an Actuarial Action Interface and authority-frontier experiments; a mechanism-design companion studies strategic operator incentives and cross-boundary aggregation; and a dynamic-underwriting companion studies experience rating and audit-replay calibration. The present paper states the primitive contract, the toll identity, the within-boundary no-arbitrage result, and the budget guarantee on which those later layers depend.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly issue side-effect-bearing actions: database mutations, refunds, payments, external commitments. We propose the Actuarial Action Interface (AAI), a deterministic runtime contract that prices each such action against a contractually fixed safe default under a time-consistent risk mapping, and gates execution against a per-boundary reserve capital budget. We then develop the Authority Frontier, an evaluation primitive measuring how much autonomous authority the runtime releases at each level of reserve capital. The framework provides (i) a deterministic quote-bind-commit protocol with toll-bounded capability tokens; (ii) a universal seven-class action taxonomy mapping heterogeneous tool calls to comparable authority units; (iii) replay determinism and pathwise reserve coverage under alpha-spending; (iv) cross-domain normalization via full reserve demand C_full and capital metrics Capital@k. We instantiate AAI across four agentic environments (database mutation, customer-service refund, and the public tau-bench retail and airline tool-use traces) and report a live Postgres panel in which three Azure-hosted models propose actions through the same contract. The frontier exhibits a common low-reserve refusal and intermediate-release pattern across domains, with saturation only where the budget grid reaches full reserve demand; required reserve capital varies by 22x (Capital@50 from 289 to 6457). The framework does not force domains into the same shape; it surfaces each domain's actuarial geometry. In the live panel the contract prevents realized loss across all three models at low budget while differing in underwriting persistence under denial: model identity is an actuarial underwriting variable. The contribution is a benchmark-ready evaluation framework for runtime actuarial control of autonomous-agent side effects.

Runtime fairness is not a one-time constraint but a dynamic property evaluated over a sequence of decisions. To ensure fairness at runtime, it is necessary to account for past decisions, information neglected by conventional, static classifiers. Traditional fairness shields enforce runtime fairness abruptly, by intervening \emph{deterministically} whenever a sequence of decisions violates the target for a running fairness measure. This motivates our \emph{main conceptual contribution: \textbf{energy shields}.} An energy shield is a novel, lightweight, adaptive controller that monitors a sequence of decisions and intervenes \emph{probabilistically} to ensure runtime fairness smoothly, by utilizing physics-inspired energy functions to nudge the sequence toward fairness: the more unfair the decisions, the stronger the nudging force becomes. This makes energy shields the \emph{\textbf{first}} fairness shields to provide both \emph{short-term safety and long-term liveness guarantees}. Safety ensures that the running fairness measure stays within a running target interval with high probability, and liveness ensures that the limit of the fairness measure lies within the limit target interval. Intuitively, the short-term specifies the tolerated fairness values and the long-term specifies the desired fairness values. We also provide a synthesis procedure for constructing the least intrusive energy shield for a given target specification, and demonstrate its efficiency experimentally. We evaluate our energy shields against existing fairness shields through the lens of short- and long-term fairness.

Physical AI systems increasingly map multimodal observations, language instructions, and learned world representations into physically consequential actions. Robotics foundation models, vision-language-action models, and world-model-based autonomous systems can condition decisions that move vehicles, robots, drones, and industrial machines. This transition exposes a safety problem that is not fully captured by conventional AI content moderation or by classical robot safety alone: a black-box model may issue a physically consequential action while appearing confident, plausible, and semantically aligned. The resulting failure can be silent, arising from sensor drift, occlusion, state-estimation error, distribution shift, hallucinated affordances, or invalid physical assumptions before downstream hardware controllers detect a violation. Across embodied foundation models, world models, robotics simulation, embodied safety benchmarks, safe control, runtime assurance, uncertainty estimation, verification, and guardrail evaluation, model capability and safety mechanisms have advanced along largely separate technical tracks. A recurring gap synthesized here is that no single stream surveyed in this review supplies a complete runtime authorization boundary between black-box Physical AI models and physical execution. The resulting analysis develops a bounded problem formulation, a definition of silent physical-action failure, a taxonomy of runtime guardrail functions, and evaluation requirements for comparing guardrails as Physical AI assurance mechanisms.

When a structured tool agent fails mid-execution, the runtime faces a dilemma: replaying the entire task is safe but wasteful, while restoring from a local checkpoint is efficient but can leave committed downstream work tied to an upstream history that no longer exists. This tension is acute in commitment-sensitive settings, where rollback targets a single failed instance yet downstream consumers have already acted on its output. Existing recovery approaches provide mechanical rollback but no criterion for whether a local restore remains semantically valid after downstream commitment. We formalize this gap as semantic recoverability and address it in DART, a modular runtime that localizes the failed instance, certifies semantically recoverable boundaries of that instance, aligns checkpoints to those boundaries, and selects an admissible restore point that preserves committed downstream work under dependency and effect constraints-or blocks otherwise. Across three LLM-driven domains and external validation on a LangGraph-based substrate, DART correctly recovers all evaluated commitment-sensitive cases where baseline local recovery fails, and a five-domain safety audit finds no unsafe admitted rollbacks. These results show that controller legality does not imply semantic validity, and that sound local recovery requires an explicit admissibility check.

Distributed LLM agent workflows should not be monitored as if they produced a single sequential log. In an asynchronous execution, a decision can only depend on events that are causally visible to the lifeline that makes it: an event that appears earlier in some log may still be unknown locally. We extend the ZipperGen agent-workflow framework with Causal Past Logic (CPL), a small past-time temporal logic for guards in conditionals and while loops. In addition to standard past-time modalities such as previous and since, a guard can inspect the latest causally visible event of another lifeline and selected variables stored there. The formula is a source-level guard: it is evaluated online by the owner lifeline and can influence control flow at runtime. We give a vector-clock monitor with latest-value views and prove that the locally computed monitor value coincides with the denotational semantics of the guard at the current event. Thus runtime verification becomes part of the coordination language itself, rather than a post-hoc check over an execution log.

A local specialist LLM, fine-tuned with reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) on operator-local data, is installed in a regulated organization with per-deployment error budget $α$. The operator needs a safety certificate for this deployment's stream at every round: no pooling across deployments, no waiting for a long-run average. Existing wrappers cannot deliver this on adaptive, online-updated streams: offline conformal-risk methods require exchangeability; online-conformal methods bound only long-run averages; non-exchangeable extensions are marginally valid; and the closest anytime wrapper, A-RCPS, controls marginal rather than selective risk. Using a (test statistic, validity guarantee, deployment rule) framework, we identify one empty cell forced by deployment requirements: e-process per threshold, selective risk, anytime-pathwise validity, max-certified-threshold rule. Conformal Selective Acting (CSA) fills it as a per-round wrapper maintaining a Ville-type e-process per threshold on a Bonferroni grid, evaluated against the RLVR filtration. Under predictable updates and isotonic-calibrated monotone risk we prove (i) an anytime-pathwise selective-risk bound $R_T^{\mathrm{act}}\leα+O(N_T^{-1/2})$, (ii) rate-optimal certification matching $Θ(\barη^{-2}\log(1/δ))$, and (iii) a horizon-independent release-rate gap. Across eight specialist benchmarks ($480$ streams), sixteen adversarial distribution-shift cells ($160$ streams), and five live Expert-Iteration RLVR cells with online LoRA over four base models in three architecture families ($10{,}300$ rounds), CSA is the only method among ten compared that satisfies pathwise validity and non-refusing deployment on every cell. We do not propose a new LLM, training algorithm, or policy class; CSA is the deployment-side complement, orthogonal to the model, for operators who cannot use a frontier API.

As multi-agent systems move from short interactions to tool-using workflows with specialized roles and persistent state, completion becomes a runtime-control problem rather than a purely generative one. This preprint studies verify-gated completion as an admission-control pattern for governed multi-agent runtimes: agents may propose completion, but a read-only verifier decides whether the claim is admitted. Ambiguous or weakly evidenced cases resolve fail-closed, while packetized state and event traces preserve an audit path. We examine one bounded reference implementation and ask what the released evidence can support about auditable, verify-gated completion. In the released verify-completed slice, the known-outcome invoked-event verify success share was 1,791/1,800 = 99.5%. This is an accounting measure over invoked verification events, not a task-completion, production-reliability, or benchmark-success rate. Task-level verify coverage is not computable; 1,762/1,801 rows came from one high-volume reporting cluster; and only 17 events were production-classified. A shadow Policy/Governance Verifier evaluation showed 1,526/1,548 = 98.58% rule agreement, 0/1,526 false-success among safe-to-proceed predictions, and blocked precision of 2/518 = 0.39%, so it remains advisory. The evidence supports a narrow conclusion: under observed conditions, a read-only verify gate plus packetized admission records made completion decisions inspectable and fail-closed. Claims about deployed operation, safety guarantees, outcome gains, task-level coverage, recovery effectiveness, or external validity remain outside scope.

As autonomous agentic systems scale across regulated critical infrastructures, the lack of mechanistic, hardware-rooted enforcement for high-frequency policy updates presents a fundamental safety gap. We present Ethical Hyper-Velocity (EHV), a governance-aware runtime enforcement architecture for agentic systems that combines Grammar-Constrained Decoding (GCD) for inline policy-constrained token generation, Causal Graph CRDT-based policy synchronization with vector-clock ordering, hardware-attested execution in Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), and OSCAL-formatted machine-readable audit logging. Unlike retrospective auditing frameworks (ISO/IEC 42001, NIST AI RMF) that introduce 14-30 day policy latencies, EHV relocates the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) into the inference pipeline via a Governance-Aware Just-In-Time (JIT) Compiler. Under explicitly stated assumptions, the architecture reduces enforcement latency, improves traceability, and supports formal verification of safety invariants in a bounded model. We demonstrate via TLA+ model checking that non-compliant agentic actions were unreachable in the verified bounded operating state space (1,738 states generated, 324 distinct, depth 8, zero violations). Under these conditions, O(1) runtime enforcement reduces the traditional trade-off between deployment velocity and governance integrity, targeting Governance Latency from O(days) toward O(1). EHV's differentiating contribution is the integration of GCD, Causal CRDT, TEE attestation caching, and bounded formal verification into a single, hardware-rooted enforcement architecture -- a combination not achieved by any contemporaneous system. The architecture is demonstrated through a pediatric oncology dosage use case, with applicability to regulated critical infrastructures including healthcare, financial compliance, and critical infrastructure control.

As software systems grow increasingly complex, automated vulnerability repair (AVR) remains difficult because the materials available to a repair system are usually failure artifacts rather than repair guidance. Traditional analysis techniques can provide suspicious locations, reduced triggers, or constraints, but they are costly to configure across repositories and seldom directly actionable for patch generation. Recent LLM-based agents can edit and validate repository-level patches, and experience-based systems can reuse prior repair traces or demonstrations, but they still need current-instance evidence that turns a broad, symptom-level failure report into a concrete repair decision. We present ContraFix, an agentic AVR framework that constructs such evidence through contrastive runtime analysis. Starting from a failing witness, ContraFix generates nearby failing and non-failing variants, executes them through aligned probe sites, and compares their runtime states to infer the repair boundary and guide source-level patching. Each candidate patch is accepted only after build and validation. ContraFix also stores validated repair episodes in a dual-track skill base, reusing mutation skills to construct useful variants and correction skills to refine failed patches. On SEC-Bench, ContraFix with GPT-5-mini achieves resolution rate of 92.0% over three repeated runs and an average resolution rate of 91.8% +/- 0.8. On PatchEval, it resolves 73.8% of 225 Go, Python, and JavaScript instances. A semantic audit of benchmark-validated SEC-Bench patches shows that 58.2% of ContraFix's patches are semantically correct, compared with 31.3% for the strongest baseline, indicating that the proposed framework improves semantic correctness beyond benchmark validation.

LLM agents increasingly run inside execution harnesses that dispatch tools, allocate resources, and route messages between specialized components. However, a harness can return a correct, benign answer over a trajectory that accesses unauthorized resources or leaks context to the wrong agent. Output-level evaluation cannot see these failures, yet most safety benchmarks score only final outputs or terminal states, even though many violations occur mid-trajectory rather than at termination. The central question is whether the harness respects user intent, permission boundaries, and information-flow constraints throughout execution. To address this gap, we propose HarnessAudit, a framework that audits full execution trajectories across boundary compliance, execution fidelity, and system stability, with a focus on multi-agent harnesses where these risks are most pronounced. We further introduce HarnessAudit-Bench, a benchmark of 210 tasks across eight real-world domains, instantiated in both single-agent and multi-agent configurations with embedded safety constraints. Evaluating ten harness configurations across frontier models and three multi-agent frameworks, we find that: (i) task completion is misaligned with safe execution, and violations accumulate with trajectory length; (ii) safety risks vary across domains, task types, and agent roles; (iii) most violations concentrate in resource access and inter-agent information transfer; and (iv) multi-agent collaboration expands the safety risk surface, while harness design sets the upper bound of safe deployment.

In a long conversation, an LLM can produce a plausible continuation that rests on premises the conversation has already abandoned. No runtime check ties its output to what the conversation has established, a gap that context-manipulation attacks on deployed agents exploit. We close this gap with a runtime verifier: an LLM Interpreter classifies each utterance into one of eight epistemic operations, and a symbolic engine applies them to a dependency map that records what every claim rests on and whether it still stands. Whether a continuation is grounded reduces to a walk over the map, linear in its size, with no LLM call. Retraction propagates through the same map with a conflict-free guarantee, flagging exactly the conclusions that lose support. On ReviseQA for belief revision and MemoryAgentBench's fact-consolidation split, two third-party benchmarks where earlier premises are superseded, the verifier leads a budget-matched retrieval baseline across five QA models and lifts MemoryAgentBench single-hop accuracy from 0.46--0.95 to 0.93--0.98. With the verifier, even the 7B model overtakes unaided GPT-4o. These runs feed the engine the benchmarks' own structured updates. When a GPT-4o Interpreter extracts every update from raw text instead, accuracy is statistically unchanged. Per-query cost is flat in conversation length, prompts staying near 0.8k tokens where full context reaches 114k and retraction queries under a microsecond at 2000 turns.

We study certified runtime monitoring of past-time signal temporal logic (ptSTL) from visual observations under partial observability. The monitor must infer safety-relevant quantities from images and provide finite-sample guarantees, while being \emph{reusable}: once trained and calibrated, it should certify any formula in a target fragment without per-formula retraining. For fragments induced by a finite dictionary of temporal atoms, we prove that the \emph{semantic basis}, the vector of atom robustness scores, is the minimum prediction target within the class of monotone, 1-Lipschitz reusable interfaces: any formula is evaluated by a deterministic decoder derived from the parse tree, and a single conformal calibration pass certifies the entire fragment with no union bound. We also introduce a \emph{rolling prediction monitor} that predicts only current predicate values and reconstructs temporal history online; this is easier to learn but grows conservative at long horizons. On a pedestrian-crossroad benchmark, rolling achieves tighter certified bounds at short horizons while the semantic-basis monitor is up to 4-times tighter at long horizons. We validate the presented monitors on real-world Waymo driving data, where both monitors satisfy the conformal coverage guarantee empirically.

This paper introduces language-based agent control (LBAC), a new programming model for agentic applications that brings techniques from programming languages and language-based security to the problem of agent control. In conventional programming, combinations of static typing and runtime enforcement have long been used to guarantee that well-typed programs satisfy user-specified policies, including policies for access control, information flow, data provenance, and more. The key idea behind LBAC is to extend these guarantees to agentic applications by requiring agents to generate programs that are themselves well typed in the context of the surrounding scaffolding code. Unsafe programs are rejected by the type-checker before execution, allowing policies to apply uniformly across the entire application, including both agent-generated behavior and developer-written scaffolding. At the same time, LBAC preserves substantial expressiveness: agents may perform arbitrary side-effect-free computation and recursively invoke subagents, which retain full tool access subject to the same -- or potentially more restrictive -- policies. We demonstrate LBAC with three case studies: I/O sandboxing via filesystem capabilities, data provenance, and information-flow control.

Safe reinforcement learning (RL) typically asks $\textit{what}$ an agent should do. We ask $\textit{when}$ it needs to act, and show that a single policy can jointly learn control inputs and communication-efficient timing decisions under a pointwise Lyapunov safety shield. We focus on stabilization around a known equilibrium, where CARE-based LQR backups, Lyapunov certificates, and classical Lyapunov-STC are well defined, enabling clean comparison against analytical baselines. A run-time assurance (RTA) layer overrides the policy via a one-step-ahead Lyapunov prediction and a precomputed LQR backup, providing a strictly stronger guarantee than constrained MDP methods that enforce safety only in expectation. On an inverted pendulum, cart--pole, and planar quadrotor, the learned policy achieves $1.91\times$, $1.45\times$, and $3.51\times$ higher mean inter-sample interval (MSI) than a Lyapunov-triggered baseline; a fixed LQR controller at the same average rate is unstable on all three plants, showing that adaptive timing, not a lower average rate, makes sparsity safe. A CARE-derived Lyapunov reward transfers across environments without redesign, with a single weight $w_c$ controlling the stability--communication tradeoff; ablations confirm the RTA shield is essential, with its removal reducing MSI by $1.27$--$1.84\times$ and degrading state norms. A preference-conditioned extension recovers the full tradeoff frontier from one model at $\tfrac{2}{11}$ of training compute, and SAC experiments show the results are algorithm-agnostic across discrete and continuous domains. A 12-state 3D quadrotor case study extends the framework to higher-dimensional systems where classical STC is intractable, and robustness to $\pm30\%$ mass variation and disturbances shows graceful degradation, with the RTA absorbing what the learned policy cannot.

Closed-loop tool-using agents are increasingly evaluated in executable web, code, and micro-task environments, but benchmark reports often conflate workloads, action-generating drivers, and the evidence admitted for systems-facing claims. We present an executable benchmarking suite that makes these objects explicit under a shared evidence-admission contract. The suite connects WebArena Verified, a SWE-Gym slice with SWE-bench-compatible verification, and MiniWoB++ through common workload adapters, task manifests, event schemas, replay/freeze policy, declared drivers, and reporting pipelines. In the canonical release, the gate separates paper-facing evidence from preflight, fixture, smoke, and diagnostic rows while preserving non-admitted artifacts for audit and onboarding. The admitted evidence records latency, invalid-action behavior, patch-generation cost, verifier metadata, replay bindings, and provenance under one auditable contract. The gate is decision-relevant rather than merely clerical: in a separate WebArena Verified controller study, clean-baseline and medium live-stressed evaluation select different fixed controller variants under the same workload and admission contract. The release is scoped as a benchmarking suite and admitted evidence, not a new agent policy, model leaderboard, backend comparison, or autonomous SWE-bench solver.

Iterative self-refinement is a popular inference-time reliability technique, but its effectiveness in code-mode tool use depends heavily on the structure of the feedback signal: unstructured critique helps inconsistently across models, and even revision with real execution feedback improves only modestly. The dominant failures are inter-tool contract violations (wrong output shape, incorrect tool routing, broken argument provenance) that run to completion without raising errors, making runtime feedback insufficient. We introduce RubricRefine, a training-free method for pre-execution contract checking that generates task- and registry-specific rubrics, scores candidate code against explicit contract checks, and iteratively repairs failures before any execution occurs. RubricRefine reaches $0.86$, averaged across seven models, on M3ToolEval with zero execution attempts, improving over prior inference-time baselines at lower latency than rubric-guided reranking. Performance remains flat on the predominantly single-step API-Bank, consistent with the method's reliance on inter-tool contract structure. Results on AppWorld demonstrate that our method maintains an advantage in the multi-turn setting. Because the rubric is derived from the supplied tool documentation, the method's advantage survives incomplete documentation but reverses under incorrect documentation. A rubric-category ablation identifies which rules are load-bearing, and top-bin calibration enables early stopping even where aggregate calibration is poor.

This paper studies runtime monitoring for persistent surveillance by autonomous robots when the autonomy stack is a black box. The environment is partitioned into finitely many parts, each carrying an uncertainty state that decreases when observed and increases otherwise. We model the closed loop as a state-dependent hybrid system with linear parameter varying dynamics and design a monitor based on an invariant computed offline. As this invariant is typically hard to obtain for large to-be-surveyed spaces, we propose a compositional monitor obtained by decentralized computation of low-dimensional invariant sets for each uncertainty region, and checking their conjunction online. Under common independence assumptions, the compositional monitor is sound and complete with respect to the full-system invariant. The approach is applied in a case study with a real robot persistently monitoring a labyrinth, emphasizing its applicability in practice.

LLM agents rely on prompts to implement task-specific capabilities based on foundation LLMs, making agent prompts valuable intellectual property. However, in untrusted deployments, adversaries can copy and reuse these prompts with other proprietary LLMs, causing economic losses. To protect these prompts, we identify four key challenges: proactivity, runtime protection, usability, and non-portability that existing approaches fail to address. We present PragLocker, a prompt protection scheme that satisfies these requirements. PragLocker constructs function-preserving obfuscated prompts by anchoring semantics with code symbols and then using target-model feedback to inject noise, yielding prompts that only work on the target LLM. Experiments across multiple agent systems, datasets, and foundation LLMs show that PragLocker substantially reduces cross-LLM portability, maintains target performance, and remains robust against adaptive attackers.

Modern AI agents execute real-world side effects through tool calls such as file operations, shell commands, HTTP requests, and database queries. A single unsafe action, including accidental deletion, credential exposure, or data exfiltration, can cause irreversible harm. Existing defenses are incomplete: post-hoc benchmarks measure behavior after execution, static guardrails miss obfuscation and multi-step context, and infrastructure sandboxes constrain where code runs without understanding what an action means. We present AgentTrust, a runtime safety layer that intercepts agent tool calls before execution and returns a structured verdict: allow, warn, block, or review. AgentTrust combines a shell deobfuscation normalizer, SafeFix suggestions for safer alternatives, RiskChain detection for multi-step attack chains, and a cache-aware LLM-as-Judge for ambiguous inputs. We release a 300-scenario benchmark across six risk categories and an additional 630 independently constructed real-world adversarial scenarios. On the internal benchmark, the production-only ruleset achieves 95.0% verdict accuracy and 73.7% risk-level accuracy at low-millisecond end-to-end latency. On the 630-scenario benchmark, evaluated under a patched ruleset and not claimed as zero-shot, AgentTrust achieves 96.7% verdict accuracy, including about 93% on shell-obfuscated payloads. AgentTrust is released under the AGPL-3.0 license and provides a Model Context Protocol server for MCP-compatible agents.

RL-based controllers achieve strong average-case performance in networking tasks such as congestion control and adaptive bitrate streaming. Yet their performance can degrade severely under network conditions where strong performance is still achievable. Identifying such conditions and quantifying the resulting performance gap is intractable by enumeration, while the sequential and closed-loop nature of RL controllers makes formal verification methods impractical. We present ReGuard, a framework that discovers worst-case scenarios for a given RL controller and protects it against them at inference time without retraining. Discovery is formulated as a bilevel regret-maximization problem, which yields a certified lower bound on the worst-case performance gap. The discovered trajectories are then analyzed as counterfactuals and compiled into lightweight logic rules that intervene only when a risky state is detected, leaving the controller's behavior unchanged otherwise. We evaluate ReGuard across three RL-based network controllers: Pensieve, Sage, and Park. ReGuard discovers scenarios in which the controller's performance is 43$-$64% worse than what is achievable. ReGuard not only discovers gaps 57% to 6$\times$ larger than those found by the strongest baselines but also shrinks them by 79$-$85% via lightweight rule-based protection while preserving nominal performance. ReGuard's protection extends beyond the scenarios it discovers, improving performance across a wider range of network conditions.

Autonomous systems increasingly rely on machine-learning (ML) components for safety-critical tasks such as perception and control in autonomous vehicles (AVs). While ML enables essential capabilities, it inevitably exhibits long-tail faults that make it unsuitable for safety-critical tasks. Runtime assurance (RTA) mitigates this issue by pairing ML components with verifiable safety monitors, e.g., Control Simplex and Perception Simplex architectures. However, the limited performance of safety monitors remains a major bottleneck. The Synergistic Simplex (SS) architecture improves system performance by enabling bidirectional integration between ML components and safety monitors while preserving formal safety guarantees. The key innovation here is allowing safety monitors to use ML outputs, which is typically prohibited in RTA systems. We formally derive conditions under which this integration preserves safety and demonstrate the performance benefits. We present the design, analysis, and evaluation of SS for AV obstacle detection.

AI systems increasingly synthesize executable structure at runtime: LLMs generate programs, agents construct workflows,self-improving systems modify their own behavior. In classical homoiconic and staged languages, the transition from code representation to execution is unrestricted. eval is a language primitive, not a governed operation. We argue that in governed intelligent systems, this transition is an authority amplification: it converts symbolic structure into executable authority and must be mediated like any other effect. We present governed metaprogramming, a language design where program representations (machine forms) are first-class values, form manipulation is pure computation, and materialization (the transition from form to executable machine) is a governed effect subject to structural inspection. The governance system analyzes the proposed program's capability requirements, policy compliance, and resource estimates before permitting execution. We formalize two judgments: pure form evaluation (which emits no directives) and governed materialization (which emits exactly one governed directive). We prove three properties: purity of form manipulation, the no-bypass theorem, and boundary preservation. We implement the design in mashinTalk, a DSL for AI workflows compiling to BEAM byte code, and report on integration with 454 existing machine-checked Rocq theorems. The central contribution is reclassifying eval from a language primitive into a governed effect.

Agentic artificial intelligence (AI) shows promise for automating O-RAN wireless supervisory control, but translated intents still require an executor-side decision before live network actuation. Existing control flows lack explicit semantics for whether an intent should commit, gate for evidence, or reject under stale telemetry, concurrent policies, deadline and bandwidth limits, and rollback constraints. We propose Progressive Risk-Gated Actuation (PRGA), an executor-side contract for risk-gated wireless intent execution. PRGA structures each intent into executable local triage (C0), on-demand coordination evidence (C1), and post-hoc provenance support (C2), with C2 kept off the online safety path. A deterministic two-stage policy checks expiry, freshness, rollback-handle validity, local conflict, blocking preconditions, and planner-executor risk divergence from C0, then retrieves C1 only for gated intents when deadline and bandwidth budgets allow; evidence-mandatory gates reject when required C1 is unavailable. On two 3GPP-parameterized energy-saving and slice-SLA benchmarks, PRGA reduces time-to-first-safe-action by 23.3-27.4% and per-commit control-plane bytes by 52.7-54.2% against a decision-identical eager full-evidence cost-overlay comparator, thereby isolating retrieval-cost accounting; remains non-inferior within a pre-declared 0.5 percentage-point unsafe-action margin against an invariant-respecting static-threshold comparator; and rejects 100% of injected over-threshold stale inputs in the stale-state fault campaign. On these benchmarks, PRGA improves supervisory responsiveness and control-plane efficiency within the evaluated unsafe-action boundary.

An agentic-AI runtime issues tool calls, sends messages, and actuates devices on behalf of an LLM. Catching the four ways an action can diverge from its audit record -- F1 gate-bypass, F2 audit-forgery, silent host failure, F4 wrong-target, -- is a load-bearing safety property of any such runtime. We show that upstream OpenClaw, the most engineered single-user agentic-AI gateway in public release, catches none of them: recall is 0.000 on every cell of every confusion matrix, on a 1600-sample template baseline through OpenClaw's actual production command-line interface (CLI) and on a ten-LLM cross-model generalisation run. Detecting F1--F4 requires seven specific runtime structures absent from OpenClaw's source tree: a biconditional checker, a hash-chained audit log, an extension admission gate, a two-layer egress guard, a Bell-LaPadula classification policy, a module-signing trust root, and a bootstrap seal. enclawed-oss -- an MIT-licensed drop-in fork that ships all seven -- reaches $P = R = F_1 =$ accuracy $= 1.000$ on the same input. The gap is structural, not parametric: a six-line append-only widening of enclawed-oss's data-loss-prevention (DLP) regex catalog raises per-channel F3 detection by 14.6% net at unchanged precision; the same edit on OpenClaw has nowhere to land. The harness deliberately exercises real Discord and Telegram channels -- plugin categories the first enclawed release deleted as unsafe -- to show F1--F4 detection extends to those previously-unsafe extensions. With architectural superiority for security and feature parity for extensions, we argue that unhardened agentic-AI runtimes are architecturally obsolete: a strictly better alternative exists, is adoptable today, and the gap requires re-architecture rather than configuration. We invite reviewers to apply the harness to any candidate runtime.

We present a certified purity architecture that converts governance enforcement in cognitive workflow systems from a runtime convention into a structural capability boundary. A prior three-layer governance architecture proves governance completeness, provenance completeness, and the impossibility of ungoverned effects, conditional on the pure module constraint: that step executors cannot perform effects. That constraint was enforced by module import graph analysis, which is insufficient against adversarial bypass on the BEAM virtual machine. This paper closes the gap through four mechanisms: (1) a restricted WebAssembly compilation target where effect-producing instructions are structurally absent; (2) purity certificates, cryptographically signed proofs binding executor binaries to their import classifications; (3) a runtime verification gate that rejects uncertified executors before they enter the governance pipeline; and (4) portable governance credentials via remote attestation for cross-organizational verification. We prove four theorems: structural purity by construction, bypass elimination for all five BEAM bypass classes, certificate integrity, and gate completeness. The guarantee holds relative to an explicit Trusted Computing Base. Evaluation on four implemented executors shows verification latency of 39--42 us, full plan cycle under 400 us, runtime overhead under 0.4% of a 100 ms HTTP request, and zero determinism divergences across repeated invocations.

We present an algebraic semantics for governed execution in which governance is axiomatized, compositional, and coterminous with expressibility. The framework, mechanized in 32 Rocq modules (~12,000 lines, 454 theorems, 0 admitted), is built on interaction trees and parameterized coinduction. A three-axiom GovernanceAlgebra record (safety, transparency, properness) induces a symmetric monoidal category with verified pentagon, triangle, and hexagon coherence, where every tensor composition preserves governance. An algebraic effect system constrains the handler algebra so that only governance-preserving handlers can be constructed in the safe fragment; programs in the empty capability set provably emit only observability directives. Capability-indexed composition bundles programs with machine-checked capability bounds, and a dual guarantee theorem establishes that within_caps and gov_safe hold simultaneously under all composition operators. The capstone result is the coterminous boundary: within our formal model, every program expressible via the four primitive morphism constructors is governed under interpretation, and every governed program is the image of such a program. Turing completeness is preserved inside governance; unmediated I/O is excluded from the governed fragment. Governance denial is modeled as safe coinductive divergence. The governance algebra is parametric: any system instantiating the three axioms inherits all derived properties, including convergence, compositional closure, and goal preservation. Extracted OCaml runs as a NIF in the BEAM runtime, with property-based testing (70,000+ random inputs, zero disagreements) confirming behavioral equivalence between the specification and the runtime interpreter.

Autonomous agents act through sandboxed containers and microVMs whose state spans filesystems, processes, and runtime artifacts. Checkpoint and restore (C/R) of this state is needed for fault tolerance, spot execution, RL rollout branching, and safe rollback-yet existing approaches fall into two extremes: application-level recovery preserves chat history but misses OS-side effects, while full per-turn checkpointing is correct but too expensive under dense co-location. The root cause is an agent-OS semantic gap: agent frameworks see tool calls but not their OS effects; the OS sees state changes but lacks turn-level context to judge recovery relevance. This gap hides massive sparsity: over 75% of agent turns produce no recovery-relevant state, so most checkpoints are unnecessary. Crab (Checkpoint-and-Restore for Agent SandBoxes) is a transparent host-side runtime that bridges this gap without modifying agents or C/R backends. An eBPF-based inspector classifies each turn's OS-visible effects to decide checkpoint granularity; a coordinator aligns checkpoints with turn boundaries and overlaps C/R with LLM wait time; and a host-scoped engine schedules checkpoint traffic across co-located sandboxes. On shell-intensive and code-repair workloads, Crab raises recovery correctness from 8% (chat-only) to 100%, cuts checkpoint traffic by up to 87%, and stays within 1.9% of fault-free execution time.

As large language model (LLM) agents are deployed in high-stakes environments, the question of how safely to delegate subtasks to specialized sub-agents becomes critical. Existing work addresses multi-agent architecture selection at design time or provides broad empirical guidelines, but neither provides a runtime mechanism that dynamically adjusts the safety-efficiency trade-off as task context changes during execution. We propose Safe Bilevel Delegation (SBD), a formal framework for runtime delegation safety in hierarchical multi-agent systems. SBD formulates task delegation as a bilevel optimization problem: an outer meta-weight network phi learns context-dependent safety-efficiency weights lambda(s) in [0,1]; an inner loop optimizes the delegation policy pi subject to a probabilistic safety constraint P(safe) >= 1-delta. The continuous delegation degree alpha in [0, 1] controls how much decision authority is transferred to each sub-agent, interpolating smoothly between full human override (alpha=0) and fully autonomous execution (alpha=1). We establish three theoretical results: (1) Safety Monotonicity--higher outer safety weight produces a weakly safer inner policy; (2) Inner Policy Convergence--projected gradient descent on the inner problem converges linearly under standard smoothness assumptions; (3) an Accountability Propagation bound that distributes responsibility across multi-hop delegation chains with a provable per-agent ceiling. We instantiate SBD in three high-stakes domains--medical AI (MIMIC-III), financial risk control (S and P 500), and educational agent supervision (ASSISTments)--specifying datasets, safety constraint sets, baselines, and evaluation protocols. This manuscript presents the formal framework and theoretical results in full; empirical validation following the protocols described herein is planned and will be reported in a forthcoming revision.

We present five results in the theory of structural governance for cognitive workflow systems. Three are mechanized in Coq 8.19 using the Interaction Trees library with parameterized coinduction; two are proved on paper with explicit reductions. The Coinductive Safety Predicate (gov_safe) is a coinductive property that captures governance safety for infinite program behaviors, indexed by a boolean permission flag that is provably false for ungoverned I/O and true for governed interpretations (mechanized). The Governance Invariance Theorem establishes that governance is uniform across the meta-recursive tower: governance at level n+1 reduces to governance at level n by definitional equality of the type (mechanized). The Sufficiency Theorem proves that four atomic primitives (code, reason, memory, call) are expressively complete for any discrete intelligent system, formalized as compositional closure of a Kleisli category (mechanized). The Alternating Normal Form provides a canonical decomposition of any machine into alternating code and effect layers, with a confluent rewriting system (paper proof). The Necessity Theorem proves via explicit reduction to Rice's theorem that an architecturally opaque component (the reason primitive) is mathematically necessary for problems requiring semantic judgment (paper proof). A sixth contribution connects the abstract model to the deployed runtime: the Verified Interpreter Specification formalizes the BEAM runtime's trust, capability, and hash chain logic in Coq, then tests the running system against this specification using property-based testing with over 70,000 randomly generated directive sequences and zero disagreements. The mechanization comprises approximately 12,000 lines across 36 modules with 454 theorems and zero admitted lemmas.

Autonomous AI agents extend large language models into full runtime systems that load skills, ingest external content, maintain memory, plan multi-step actions, and invoke privileged tools. In such systems, security failures rarely remain confined to a single interface; instead, they can propagate across initialization, input processing, memory, decision-making, and execution, often becoming apparent only when harmful effects materialize in the environment. This paper presents AgentWard, a lifecycle-oriented, defense-in-depth architecture that systematically organizes protection across these five stages. AgentWard integrates stage-specific, heterogeneous controls with cross-layer coordination, enabling threats to be intercepted along their propagation paths while safeguarding critical assets. We detail the design rationale and architecture of five coordinated protection layers, and implement a plugin-native prototype on OpenClaw to demonstrate practical feasibility. This perspective provides a concrete blueprint for structuring runtime security controls, managing trust propagation, and enforcing execution containment in autonomous AI agents. Our code is available at https://github.com/FIND-Lab/AgentWard .

Large language models deployed at runtime can misbehave in ways that clean-data validation cannot anticipate: training-time backdoors lie dormant until triggered, jailbreaks subvert safety alignment, and prompt injections override the deployer's instructions. Existing runtime defenses address these threats one at a time and often assume a clean reference model, trigger knowledge, or editable weights, assumptions that rarely hold for opaque third-party artifacts. We introduce Layerwise Convergence Fingerprinting (LCF), a tuning-free runtime monitor that treats the inter-layer hidden-state trajectory as a health signal: LCF computes a diagonal Mahalanobis distance on every inter-layer difference, aggregates via Ledoit-Wolf shrinkage, and thresholds via leave-one-out calibration on 200 clean examples, with no reference model, trigger knowledge, or retraining. Evaluated on four architectures (Llama-3-8B, Qwen2.5-7B, Gemma-2-9B, Qwen2.5-14B) across backdoors, jailbreaks, and prompt injection (56 backdoor combinations, 3 jailbreak techniques, and BIPIA email + code-QA), LCF reduces mean backdoor attack success rate (ASR) below 1% on Qwen2.5-7B and Gemma-2 and to 1.3% on Qwen2.5-14B, detects 92-100% of DAN jailbreaks (62-100% for GCG and softer role-play), and flags 100% of text-payload injections across all eight (model, domain) cells, at 12-16% backdoor FPR and <0.1% inference overhead. A single aggregation score covers all three threat families without threat-specific tuning, positioning LCF as a general-purpose runtime safety layer for cloud-served and on-device LLMs.

Current AI systems increasingly operate in contexts where their outputs directly trigger real-world actions. Most existing approaches to AI safety, risk management, and governance focus on post-hoc validation, probabilistic risk estimation, or certification of model behavior. However, these approaches implicitly assume that once a decision is produced, it is eligible for execution. In this work, we introduce the Right-to-Act protocol, a deterministic, non-compensatory pre-execution decision layer that evaluates whether an AI-generated decision is permitted to be realized at all. Unlike compensatory systems, where high-confidence signals can override failed conditions, the proposed framework enforces strict structural constraints: if any required condition is unmet, execution is halted or deferred. We formalize the distinction between compensatory and non-compensatory decision regimes and define a pre-execution legitimacy boundary. Through a scenario-based case study, we demonstrate how identical AI outputs can lead to divergent outcomes when evaluated under a Right-to-Act protocol, preserving reversibility and preventing premature or irreversible actions. The proposed approach reframes AI control from optimizing decisions to governing their admissibility, introducing a protocol-level abstraction that operates independently of model architecture or training methodology.

Agent systems increasingly execute rather than advise. When an AI agent queries regulated data, invokes effectful tools, and mutates persistent state, correctness is not captured by whether a terminal output looks plausible. The operative questions are whether each step was authorized under a contract, whether the recorded history is tamper-evident, and whether the trajectory can be reconstructed deterministically. We formalize this as runtime proof of execution. An execution is a triple $x = (C, T, R)$: a contract $C$, an Execution Causal Event Stream (ECES) $T$, and a replay context $R$. A well-formedness predicate and five validator-checkable invariants form the PoE validity predicate. Five semantic guarantees describe authorization, path compliance, null effect on deny, history integrity, and replayability. We prove soundness under explicit cryptographic and deployment assumptions: any PPT adversary that produces a PoE-valid execution violating a semantic guarantee yields a signature forgery, a hash collision, or a quantified deployment-failure event. The Prime Execution Model (PEM) separates planning, enforcement, effect, and recordkeeping into distinct authority planes; a lemma reduces trace completeness to Effector-exclusive credentialing. An Execution Attestation Certificate is issued only when PoE = 1. In a single-node TypeScript prototype, PoE adds approximately 2.7 ms on a minimal flow and 4.4% overhead on concurrent batch workloads; a standard eight-event trace compresses to approximately 1.1 KB; injected Gateway-bypass and trace-mutation attacks are rejected. PoE does not replace consensus, TEEs, or zkVMs; it binds authorization, effect, history, and replay into a single runtime-checkable object so that governed execution becomes attestable under contract.

Autonomous agent systems fail not only due to incorrect decisions, but due to executing decisions whose authority no longer holds at runtime. Prior work defined Reconstructive Authority (RAM) as a condition for valid execution: actions are permitted only if authority can be constructed from current state. This paper addresses enforcement at runtime: how to enforce this condition in a running system. We introduce a runtime execution model in which authority is evaluated at action time and execution is conditioned on its constructibility. This extends the execution state space beyond admit/deny with a third state, halt, representing cases where authority is undefined due to incomplete or uncertain observability. We define a concrete execution protocol including dynamic dependency resolution, authority reconstruction, and explicit decision semantics. We further introduce a Recovery Loop that integrates drift detection (IML) with execution control (ACP), allowing the system to suspend execution, acquire missing information, and re-attempt authority reconstruction. We show that this model guarantees safety -- no action is executed without constructible authority -- and conditional liveness: execution resumes when authority-defining variables become observable. This work operationalizes reconstructive authority as a runtime enforcement mechanism, providing the execution semantics required to apply RAM in real systems.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly issue API calls that mutate real systems, yet many current architectures pass stochastic model outputs directly to execution layers. We argue that this coupling creates a safety risk because model correctness, context awareness, and alignment cannot be assumed at execution time. We introduce Sovereign Agentic Loops (SAL), a control-plane architecture in which models emit structured intents with justifications, and the control plane validates those intents against true system state and policy before execution. SAL combines an obfuscation membrane, which limits model access to identity-sensitive state, with a cryptographically linked Evidence Chain for auditability and replay. We formalize SAL and show that, under the stated assumptions, it provides policy-bounded execution, identity isolation, and deterministic replay. In an OpenKedge prototype for cloud infrastructure, SAL blocks 93% of unsafe intents at the policy layer, rejects the remaining 7% via consistency checks, prevents unsafe executions in our benchmark, and adds 12.4 ms median latency.

The transition of agentic AI from brittle prototypes to production systems is stalled by a pervasive crisis of craft. We suggest that the prevailing orchestration paradigm-delegating the system control loop to large language models and merely patching with heuristic guardrails-is the root cause of this fragility. Instead, we propose Arbiter-K, a Governance-First execution architecture that reconceptualizes the underlying model as a Probabilistic Processing Unit encapsulated by a deterministic, neuro-symbolic kernel. Arbiter-K implements a Semantic Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) to reify probabilistic messages into discrete instructions. This allows the kernel to maintain a Security Context Registry and construct an Instruction Dependency Graph at runtime, enabling active taint propagation based on the data-flow pedigree of each reasoning node. By leveraging this mechanism, Arbiter-K precisely interdicts unsafe trajectories at deterministic sinks (e.g., high-risk tool calls or unauthorized network egress) and enables autonomous execution correction and architectural rollback when security policies are triggered. Evaluations on OpenClaw and NanoBot demonstrate that Arbiter-K enforces security as a microarchitectural property, achieving 76% to 95% unsafe interception for a 92.79% absolute gain over native policies. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/cure-lab/ArbiterOS.

Large language model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks that propagate through multi-step workflows, tool interactions, and persistent context, making input-output filtering alone insufficient for reliable protection. This paper presents SafeAgent, a runtime security architecture that treats agent safety as a stateful decision problem over evolving interaction trajectories. The proposed design separates execution governance from semantic risk reasoning through two coordinated components: a runtime controller that mediates actions around the agent loop and a context-aware decision core that operates over persistent session state. The core is formalized as a context-aware advanced machine intelligence and instantiated through operators for risk encoding, utility-cost evaluation, consequence modeling, policy arbitration, and state synchronization. Experiments on Agent Security Bench (ASB) and InjecAgent show that SafeAgent consistently improves robustness over baseline and text-level guardrail methods while maintaining competitive benign-task performance. Ablation studies further show that recovery confidence and policy weighting determine distinct safety-utility operating points.

Automated evaluation of tool-using large language model (LLM) agents is widely assumed to be reliable, but this assumption has rarely been validated against human annotation. We introduce AgentProp-Bench, a 2,000-task benchmark with 2,300 traces across four domains, nine production LLMs, and a 100-label human-validated subset. We quantify judge reliability, characterize error propagation, and evaluate a runtime mitigation. Substring-based judging agrees with human annotation at kappa=0.049 (chance-level); a three-LLM ensemble reaches kappa=0.432 (moderate) with a conservative bias. Under validated evaluation, a parameter-level injection propagates to a wrong final answer with human-calibrated probability approximately 0.62 (range 0.46-0.73 across models). Rejection (catching bad parameters) and recovery (correcting after acceptance) are independent model capabilities (Spearman rho=0.126, p=0.747). A tuned runtime interceptor reduces hallucination on GPT-4o-mini by 23.0 percentage points under a concurrent n=600 control, but shows no significant effect on Gemini-2.0-Flash, whose aggressive parameter rejection eliminates the target failure mode. All code, data, traces, and human labels are released at https://github.com/bhaskargurram-ai/agenthallu-bench.

Generated operational programs are often validated with either a few hand-written examples or exhaustive regression suites. The former can miss sparse boundary and interaction faults, while the latter can be unnecessarily expensive. We introduce FaultLens, a method for learning compact behavioral test suites while preserving an auditable connection to executed evidence. It executes a rich probe domain once, stores the fault-probe kill relation as a sparse outcome cache, and learns probe orderings only from earlier program generations. A fault-driven greedy component exploits known kill structure, while a mutation-independent diversity component covers probe families, cases, templates, and temporal bins. Their alternating hybrid remains useful when a new program contains a fault mechanism absent from ordering construction. We evaluate twenty generated operational policies across four environments, ten execution seeds, 1,200 measured run summaries, 2,160 controlled program transformations, and 4,120,200 executed program-probe pairs. Of 1,960 intended faulty transformations, 1,779 alter a contract or output somewhere in the finite audit domain; 200 additional controls preserve behavior. A 32-probe hybrid learned on generations 1-3 covers 576/582 (99.0%) dynamically killable faults in generations 4-5 using 1.2-2.0% of the exhaustive domain. With an entire fault family withheld from training, diversity raises scenario-family macro coverage from 84.6% to 94.9%. In a downstream deployment study, a conservative admission rule reduces severe tail regressions from 15/20 program-environment groups to 0/20. FaultLens provides a prioritized evidence mechanism, not a proof of correctness, and makes its budget, evidence source, generalization split, and misses explicit.

Industrial agentic AI systems increasingly exhibit a gap between prototype capability and production deployment. In particular, adaptive agents may generate plausible outputs while remaining difficult to verify under non-determinism, confidentiality constraints, limited context, and weak observability. This paper formulates a bounded verification protocol for adaptive agentic controllers represented by finite symbolic rules, explicit diagnostic predicates, explanation logs, and held-out re-evaluation. The central research question is: when an adaptive agentic controller is represented through finite rules, explicit diagnostic predicates, explanation logs, and held-out re-evaluation, which classes of controller failure can be detected, locally repaired, or rejected without relying on unrestricted human-in-the-loop judgment? The proposed framework treats the controller as a finite revisable object. Diagnostic failures are mapped to predefined rule-level edits, including rule addition, rule deletion, and priority revision. Repaired controllers are then evaluated on held-out simulation seeds or cloned initial states. Experiments in a stylized financially constrained inventory-control benchmark show three outcomes: resource-induced failures that remain non-repairable by one rule edit, partial repairs that are rejected because they violate thresholds or guardrails, and a local one-step repair of an order-volatility failure induced by removing a smoothing rule. The contribution is methodological and provides a simulation-compatible procedure for testing whether specific controller-level failures can be made observable, explainable, locally revisable, and empirically re-tested under controlled conditions.