Prices

Evolutionary agent-based markets (ABMs) couple several mechanisms -- who reproduces, how price forms, how biased the agents are, how consensus propagates -- yet these are usually fixed by convention, so it is unclear which mechanism controls which emergent property. In a coevolving, endogenous-price simulator with 120 heterogeneous behavioral agents, we make four mechanisms pluggable and run matched 3x20-seed interventions. We find the levers are largely separable. (1) Selection -> diversity: a Quality-Diversity (QD/MAP-Elites) operator robustly raises strategy-mix entropy over truncation top-k (paired Delta entropy +0.27 to +1.12 bits; sign-test p<0.001; CIs exclude 0) and sustains more strategy cycling (strongest in crisis: Delta=+0.070, p=0.0004). (2) Selection does not improve realism: even a per-agent realism reward that provably steers selection does not raise 5-fact realism (Delta_5=-0.11,-0.08,+0.03; not significant). (3) Microstructure -> realism: enabling reflexive price feedback does raise realism (Delta_5=+0.13,+0.20,+0.20; crisis/bull p<0.05, all CIs positive). (4) Behavior -> fragility: amplifying behavioral bias raises a genomic fragility proxy (Delta=+10.5,+11.1,+14.4; bull p<0.001, all CIs positive) while leaving realism flat. The remaining mechanism -- consensus network topology -- shows no robust effect (honest null). The contribution is a decomposition: in these single-mechanism sweeps the mechanisms behave as approximately distinct control knobs over diversity, realism, and fragility.

Adaptive stochastic convex optimization (SCO) methods face a fundamental ``price of adaptivity'' barrier: under the standard set of assumptions, they cannot efficiently adapt to large uncertainty in both the initial distance to optimality and the Lipschitz constant. We circumvent this barrier by requiring a small amount of additional structure common to many learning problems. Specifically, we assume that the objective decomposes into a model and a loss function, enabling us to intervene by modifying the model's output before it passes to the loss function. Under this assumption, we design a method that clips the learned model output in tail events where it deviates too much from the output of a fixed reference model. Our method matches the optimal bounds for known-parameter SCO up to logarithmic factors in the uncertainty in the distance and Lipschitz parameters, thus efficiently adapting to large uncertainty in both.

Current evaluations of Large Language Models (LLMs) on logical fallacy detection focus on predicted labels, but do not establish whether those labels are supported by the reasoning the models provide. We propose ForEx (Formal Verification for Explainable Reasoning), a framework that translates LLM-generated explanations into Lean4 and verifies whether the translated rationale is derivable under encoded premises, not the logical validity of the original natural language argument. To distinguish prediction outcomes from the formal status of the supporting reasoning, we introduce the LLM Argument Verification Matrix, which separates label consistency from formal verification status. Experiments on LOGIC-Climate show that over 90% of LLM outputs can be translated into formal reasoning chains that pass verification, while agreement with human annotations remains around 20%. These results expose a systematic gap between formal derivability and label agreement, a distinction invisible to prediction-based metrics. ForEx moves LLM evaluation beyond label correctness toward machine-checkable analysis of formalized reasoning chains.

We study a multi-agent multi-armed bandit problem in the competitive setup with two-sided matching markets under a human centric decision making model. To capture human preferences, we use cumulative prospect theory (CPT) that weighs the actions of the agent in a nonlinear fashion using a ($α$-Hölder continuous) weight function. CPT has been widely used in behavioral economics and risk sensitive machine learning to emulate human preferences. We analyze the state-of-the-art learning algorithm with CPT weight distorted rewards and obtain a player optimal regret of $\mathcal{O}(K\log T \left(\frac{1}Δ\right)^{2/α})$, where $K$ denotes the number of arms, $T$ is the learning horizon, and $Δ$ represents (suitably defined) players' minimum preference gap. Noticing the dependence on $Δ$ to be sub-optimal, we further improve this regret by judiciously selecting the active set of arms during exploration, which removes the dependence on $K$ in the dominant term and achieves an improved (optimal) regret guarantees in the setting where the number of arms $K$ is significantly larger than the number of players $N$. In addition, we consider adversarial markets where the observed rewards of the agents may be corrupted. We propose and analyze algorithms for robust markets with CPT as risk sensitive measure in both settings where the total corruption budget is known and where it is unknown, and establish logarithmic player-optimal regret guarantees in both cases.

Valuable critique of generative image models within visual culture and the humanities has emphasized the role of datasets in shaping the images they produce. Yet, close studies of the ideological positions embedded into the mechanism of the models have been neglected, leaving them imagined as "black boxes." In a bid to expand, rather than replace, dataset critique, this paper examines the mechanisms of the latent diffusion model in terms of the problems they were brought in to solve on behalf of computer vision engineers, and the decisions each component was tasked with automating. I interpret that ensemble through the histories of its parts and the theory of vision the system inscribes into every generated image. Drawing on Impett and Offert's notion of neural exchange value, I offer this analysis to argue that the model operates as a neural economy: a contained symbolic system that abstracts social communication into commensurable vectors as it transfers the social sphere into parcels for sale. Tracing the training and generation pipelines component by component reveals what each operation displaces, and how it further entrenches the logics of platform and attention economies over social communication. The paper warns that any critique fixated exclusively on copyright and commodity defenses risks reaffirming the very fetishism the model produces, and argues instead for centering social exchange.

Electricity markets are inherently complex systems characterised by strong nonlinearities, high-dimensional interactions, and increasing interdependence across regions. While deep neural networks (DNNs) have demonstrated strong predictive capabilities for electricity prices, their lack of interpretability limits their usefulness for understanding the underlying drivers of price formation. This paper addresses this gap by combining DNN models with explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) techniques to analyse the determinants of electricity prices across 39 European bidding zones. We employ SHAP (SHapley Additive exPlanations) to quantify feature contributions and apply and extend SSHAP, an aggregation framework to improve interpretability in high-dimensional settings. The analysis identifies that renewable energy sources, particularly solar, play a disproportionately important role in price formation despite their lower share in total power generation. Gas prices remain a dominant and consistent driver across electricity markets, while interconnections significantly shape price dynamics, highlighting the strong interdependence of European electricity systems. In addition, a synthetic EU-wide electricity market is constructed to explore the counterfactual scenario of a fully integrated market with a single price.

Decision making in lithium production is challenging, whether from an investor's perspective or a strategic production standpoint. Determining which mines to open and when to open them involves not only geological and price uncertainties, but also complexities around the choice of extraction method, from direct lithium extraction to hard rock mining. Prior work explored models of this problem and different methods to optimize mining decisions; these models did not account for uncertainty in pricing, uncertainty in demand, or different mining technologies to extract lithium. Incorporating different pricing models and extraction technology into these models enables more robust strategies for determining not only when and where to open a mine, but also which method of production to pursue. We frame the problem as a partially observable Markov decision process (POMDP) and solve using belief state planning methods to get optimal decision making. In our study, we show that POMDP solvers outperform human inspired heuristics by dynamically adapting to shifting lithium price regimes (static, linear, exponential, and stochastic) through belief state planning and explicit uncertainty management. By optimally sequencing exploration, production, and technology choice, the framework achieves higher demand fulfillment and more balanced economic environmental outcomes over the projects lifetime in all different pricing and deposit scenarios.

Data acquisition is a major bottleneck for learning in real-time streams: analysts must decide on the fly which labels to purchase while respecting a rolling budget. However, existing online active learning rarely unifies pricing, information gain, and rolling budget constraints under concept drift. We introduce QueryMarket, a market-inspired framework that queries each incoming data point based on its estimated utility to the model and its price. Within this framework, we propose OVBAL (online variance-based active learning), which integrates data pricing with information-driven selection by estimating each sample's marginal utility via a D-optimality criterion with exponential forgetting and executing cost-aware purchases under rolling budget constraints. OVBAL yields a simple, fully online decision rule that adapts to nonstationary streams and heterogeneous label costs. Experiments on synthetic data and a real-world solar power generation forecasting task show that OVBAL is particularly effective under seller-centric pricing and yields a more favorable long-run error-cost trade-off in the real-world task under both pricing schemes.

Automated Driving System deployments create a foundational ratemaking challenge: sparse experience, shifting operational design domains, and non-stationary risk across software releases. We propose a hierarchical Bayesian credibility framework pooling across cities, software versions, and territories via a learned ODD-similarity kernel, nesting Buhlmann-Straub as a limiting case. Demonstrated on 648 verified-engaged Waymo crashes across four U.S. metros from the NHTSA Standing General Order database against 116 million matched miles, city-aggregate credibility weights are moderate (0.12-0.46), partial pooling decisively outperforms no pooling, and a power analysis shows the learned kernel's advantage becomes detectable at approximately twelve deployed cities.

AI agents can now take irreversible actions in operational systems, but agent-caused losses are still not clearly assigned, priced, or transferred. Providers often disclaim consequential damages, users are left with uncompensated losses, and default human review limits the efficiency gains of automation. We ask when autonomous AI deployment can become economically acceptable despite failure risk. Our answer is to quantify risk at the customer-task-trace episode level and transfer it through insurance. Automation is acceptable when its expected benefit exceeds the premium, control cost, and remaining risk. This requires a defined role with bounded permissions and comparable traces. We introduce trace-economic underwriting, which maps tool-use traces to customer exposure and claimable loss, then uses this representation for pricing, control, and risk transfer. It uses deterministic economic labels rather than an LLM judge. In our trace-to-loss testbed, trace-economic pricing reduces pricing MAE from $17.7K to$569 and removes regressive cross-subsidy. A 300-trace expert audit accepts 295 labels unchanged. On 1,000 real SWE-smith traces, trace-conditioned controls reduce CVaR95 by 72%. Theorem~1 gives a finite-sample scope condition. We release code, labels, and audit sheets.

We develop an LLM-powered virtual population model that simulates demand for pricing decisions, in settings where products are described by rich unstructured information, such as text descriptions and images, and where decision makers need not only mean-demand predictions but also uncertainty estimates for counterfactual prices. Our model represents exposed customers as draws from a finite mixture of customer personas. For each persona, product, and candidate price, an LLM elicits a persona-level purchase probability using both structured persona information and unstructured product information. These probabilities are aggregated through calibrated mixture weights to form a predictive distribution of aggregate demand. The resulting simulator can evaluate counterfactual prices under various pricing objectives, including expected revenue and risk-aware criteria such as conditional value at risk. We test the framework on an online H&M fashion dataset with product descriptions and images. The calibrated LLM-based simulator achieves the best overall predictive performance among the models considered, and supports sample-efficient pricing decisions. Our framework provides a practical way to use LLMs as demand simulators for products with limited historical demand data but rich product information. By producing a full predictive demand distribution rather than only a point forecast, it enables managers to compare candidate prices, quantify demand uncertainty, and choose prices that target either average-case revenue or risk-aware objectives.

We study repeated bilateral trade from a fairness perspective. At each round, a fresh seller-buyer pair arrives, and the platform posts a price before observing the traders' valuations. Trade occurs only if both agents accept the price. Rather than maximizing only the gain from trade, we consider platforms that seek balanced divisions of the generated surplus. We show that natural fairness desiderata lead to a one-parameter Rawls-to-Nash family of fair-gain objectives, obtained by aggregating the seller's and buyer's net gains through nonpositive Hölder means. Unlike the standard gain-from-trade objective and the Rawlsian fair-gain objective studied in prior work, our proposed objectives induce a new statistical structure in which expected rewards are recovered from threshold feedback through a two-dimensional singular-kernel integral identity. This leads to a nonstandard pure-exploration problem whose natural estimators are rectangular double sums with row-column dependence and singular weights. Assuming independent i.i.d. seller and buyer valuation sequences with arbitrary unknown marginals, we characterize the optimal learning rates for the whole Rawls-to-Nash family of fair-gain objectives, giving matching fixed-confidence sample-complexity and regret bounds up to polylogarithmic factors.

High-quality data drives machine learning advances across industries. Recognizing the value of data, data transactions are increasingly common, giving rise to many data marketplaces, e.g., AWS Marketplace, Databricks, and Datarade. However, determining the appropriate prices for data products remains a significant challenge due to the unique properties of data products. Traditional pricing methods in economics can be categorized into the cost approach, the income approach, and the sales comparison approach. The cost approach fails in data pricing due to near-zero marginal cost from data replication, and the income approach fails due to inherently unpredictable data revenue. The sales comparison approach remains viable, yet its application is hindered by the absence of standardized pricing benchmarks for data products across marketplaces. To address this challenge, we introduce \texttt{DaDaDa}, the first dataset for data product pricing, containing metadata for 16,147 data products from 9 major data marketplaces worldwide. \texttt{DaDaDa} enables the training of pricing models, thereby establishing price benchmarks for new data products. In addition, \texttt{DaDaDa} can be utilized for other important tasks in data markets, such as data product classification and retrieval. Experiments and a retrieval prototype demonstrate the effectiveness of \texttt{DaDaDa} for pricing, classification, and retrieval of data products. The dataset and code are available at https://github.com/ZJU-DIVER/DaDaDa.

Fairness in insurance pricing remains a long-standing and deeply debated puzzle. On one hand, insurers, driven by profitability considerations, set premiums that differentiate across individual risks to achieve actuarial fairness. On the other hand, insurance serves a critical societal function by pooling risks across a population, motivating cross-subsidization among groups to promote solidarity fairness. The tension between these two competing notions of fairness makes insurance pricing inherently complex, particularly in modern settings where granular data allow for increasingly fine risk differentiation and regulators face growing pressure to protect vulnerable groups. To address this challenge, we propose an $α$-\textbf{F}air \textbf{I}ndividual \textbf{S}olvent \textbf{P}remium ($α$-FISP) framework for insurance pricing that explicitly captures the trade-off between actuarial and solidarity fairness while guaranteeing solvency, a fundamental requirement in insurance operations. We formulate the pricing problem as a constrained optimization task, where actuarially fair premiums are adjusted subject to budget constraints on cross-subsidization within each risk class. This formulation naturally yields a family of solutions parameterized by $α$, tracing a continuum between purely actuarial and purely solidarity-based pricing and enabling decision-makers to select an operating point along this fairness spectrum. We derive theoretical guarantees for the proposed framework. Numerical experiments show that $α$-FISP is computationally tractable and aligns well with the U.S. regulatory regimes featuring heterogeneous state-level fairness requirements.

Auto-bidding is a core component of real-time advertising systems, where decisions must optimize long-term performance under budget and cost constraints, while online exploration is prohibitively risky. Offline reinforcement learning and, more recently, Transformer-based sequence modeling have shown promise for learning bidding policies from logged data, but their unimodal and purely parametric formulations often collapse multiple effective bidding strategies into suboptimal averaged actions and perform unreliably under sparse or long-tail traffic. To mitigate these limitations, we propose DRIVE (Distributional and Retrieval-Augmented Bidding with Value Evaluation), a unified Transformer-based framework that decouples candidate action generation from decision making for offline auto-bidding. DRIVE combines distributional action modeling, retrieval-augmented candidate generation from high-quality historical decisions, and value-based evaluation to select the most promising bid at inference time. Extensive experiments on AuctionNet and additional offline reinforcement learning benchmarks demonstrate that DRIVE consistently improves bidding performance and generalizes well across multiple Transformer-based methods.

Disaggregated inference architectures physically separate prefill and decode phases onto distinct GPU pools, creating competing "agents" that share a fixed hardware budget. We provide, to our knowledge, the first formal game-theoretic analysis of this architecture, using NVIDIA Dynamo as a concrete case study. We model disaggregated serving as three coupled games: a two-player resource game between prefill and decode pools, a selfish caching game over the hierarchical KV cache, and a congestion game with positive externalities for request routing. We empirically validate the latter two; the P/D resource game is treated analytically (Section 9.2). We characterize how GPU saturation induces regime transitions that shift the game's payoff structure: below saturation, selfish behavior has bounded Price of Anarchy (PoA); at saturation, superlinear latency and cache externalities drive our empirical estimator PoA-hat (defined in Section 6.4) upward. Based on this analysis, we design an adaptive controller that detects saturation transitions in real time and adjusts routing parameters accordingly, shifting from cache-affinity exploitation to load-balanced congestion avoidance. We instantiate our framework on a 3-node NVIDIA B200 cluster running Dynamo with two models, Nemotron-4-340B (TP=8, full-node workers with cross-InfiniBand KV transfers) and Llama-3.1-70B (TP=4), and find the same three-regime PoA-hat structure with the same first post-knee grid point (C=128) on both models. Adaptive routing shifts each model to a better operating point. Our strongest result is on the 70B 1P/5D topology, where PoA-hat drops 3.1x (66.4 to 21.5) in the saturated phase at a 13% throughput cost. On the 70B 1P/2D, PoA-hat drops 2.2x and TTFT P99 drops 7.6x (see Section 8.5).

Web agents driven by large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world environments, where they operate over untrusted web content and execute actions with direct consequences. This makes them vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks, in which seemingly benign content embeds adversarial instructions that manipulate agent behaviour. Existing security benchmarks adopt an \textit{attack-centric} perspective, focusing on the technical feasibility of injections while overlooking the nuanced distribution of resulting harms. In practice, however, prompt-injection risk is victim-dependent: a single exploit can produce asymmetric consequences for different stakeholders, and the same attack pattern may exhibit substantially different effectiveness depending on whom it targets. To capture these properties, we introduce \textbf{\sysname}, a \textit{stakeholder-centric} benchmark to systematically categorize and attribute harm in real-world web agent systems. It distinguishes between affected entities (e.g., user, seller, platform), decomposes the attacks into concrete objectives, and evaluates each case with complementary outcome- and process-level metrics. Our results reveal substantial and heterogeneous vulnerabilities: not a single attack objective is reliably resisted by current agents, and failures distribute across qualitatively distinct modes ranging from \emph{stealthy parasitism} (attack succeeds without disrupting the user's delegated task) to \emph{misaligned disruption} (task disrupted without attack success) and \emph{compounded failure} (both adversarial objective and task integrity simultaneously violated). These patterns are missed by conventional evaluation, highlighting the need for stakeholder-aware assessment of LLM-based agents in real-world deployments. Benchmark is available at https://github.com/StakeBench/SBC.

This paper presents the design, development, and implementation of a specialized forecast-then-optimize algorithmic pricing tool for sales campaigns in fashion e-commerce. Sales events present unique challenges for pricing including volatile demand patterns, rapid pricing decisions, and the need to balance short-term revenue with long-term profitability. We describe our approach combining daily-resolution demand forecasting using gradient-boosted trees with a multi-objective optimization framework that maximizes both long-term profit and net merchandise value for more than 5 million articles. Our solution addresses key limitations of existing weekly-granularity systems by implementing a forecast-then-optimize architecture that reduces pricing decision time from hours to minutes. We validate our approach through 23 A/B tests across 12 markets during 2023-2024 sales campaigns at Zalando, one of Europe's leading online fashion retailers. Experimental results demonstrate that the new pricing system achieves approximately 6% higher profit while maintaining equivalent performance on sales and revenue compared to the previous manual-algorithmic hybrid approach. Based on these results, the algorithm was successfully deployed to production and now handles the majority of algorithmic pricing decisions for sales campaigns at the company.

We present an interpretable machine learning pipeline to decompose Cross-Sectional Equity Return Predictability into auditable factor contribution. We apply an XGBoost model with TreeSHAP attribution and conduct stress testing on 3632 Chinese A-share stocks from 2009 until 2019. Using 60-month, rolling windows over 55 months of out-of-sample data, XGBoost obtains a mean AUC of 0.547 and +2.38%/month (Newey-West t = 5.94; Annualized Sharpe 2.23) long-short spread for the top vs bottom quintiles. This alpha is persistent after adjusting for the Carhart four-factor model (+2.31%/month; t = 7.48). SHAP Decomposition indicates that behavioral signals (turnover and momentum) account for 58.2% of predictive attribution compared to 10.7% for valuation ratios, on average, across 55 industry groups. Ablation analysis serves to cross-validate this ranking and provides evidence that SHAP and ablation diverge in a manner that highlights feature substitutability structure that is largely invisible to either method used in isolation.

How can we design a market of human-generated content for use in training AI models that both enables technological progress and preserves individual incentives for high-quality content creation? Existing approaches take polar positions: a "free-for-all" model based on fair use and a "strong intellectual property rights" model. We show that both fail: Free-for-all does not compensate creators, and -- by modeling as a static Stackelberg game -- strong intellectual property rights also underpower creative incentives. We find this especially true for more innovative creators, a phenomenon we term the "originality penalty." Extending this insight to a dynamic model, we find another market failure undermining AI model performance, even for an initially good model: Such a model induces greater reliance by humans on AI-assisted creation, resulting in homogenized content feeding back into training, which degrades the model performance -- a "curse of precision." We further propose a market design with a data intermediary internalizing cross-creator externalities and subsidizing innovative contributions, thereby restoring efficiency.

Can financial news reliably predict short-term stock movements? Despite advances in large language models, this question remains unresolved. We revisit this problem using a zero-shot natural language processing framework, investigating whether models can extract actionable signals from financial news without domain-specific training. We design a structured pipeline that combines zero-shot natural language inference with temporal aggregation, explicitly modelling recency and event-dependent impact horizons when integrating information across articles. To address the need for transparency in high-stakes settings, we introduce a multi-layered explainability framework that links predictions to token-level, article-level, and aggregate evidence, and produces grounded natural language rationales. Across multiple models and prediction horizons, we find that zero-shot approaches consistently fail to outperform simple baselines, with particularly weak performance on negative movements, suggesting deeper structural limitations in mapping news sentiment to short-term price dynamics. However, explainability signals reliably distinguish between trustworthy and unreliable predictions, offering practical value even when accuracy is limited. These findings highlight the limits of zero-shot financial NLP and motivate a shift toward decision-support systems that prioritise transparency and uncertainty awareness. Code: https://github.com/alimert05/zero-shot-stock-xai

Tokens have become the practical accounting unit for modern foundation model services, linking information processing, computation, memory use, energy expenditure, pricing, and economic value. This paper develops a framework for AI tokenomics: the study of how tokens are generated, consumed, priced, allocated, and optimized across AI systems. We connect token-level technical costs to workflow-level production functions, enterprise resource allocation, measurement and instrumentation methods, and emerging market-design questions. The framework shows that token expenditure and economic value are distinct: value depends on marginal productivity, workflow position, hidden reasoning activity, risk, and downstream propagation effects. The paper concludes by identifying open research directions in hidden-token measurement, empirical calibration, token productivity, dynamic allocation, and token-based markets.

We develop a decision-calibrated conformal framework for pacing decisions in streaming advertising. Pacing depends on uncertain future inventory, demand pressure, incremental response, and member-experience load. Instead of calibrating a generic forecast residual, the framework measures forecast error by its largest impact on the policies that could actually be deployed. The main theorem shows that the proposed score is the smallest valid uncertainty measure that uniformly protects all deployable pacing policies. Geometrically, it is the support function of the signed policy sensitivity set. Split conformal calibration gives finite-sample coverage for this score. A high-dimensional separation theorem shows that traditional residual calibration can be arbitrarily more conservative by paying for nuisance inventory dimensions, and a robust pacing result combines inventory, response, and experience uncertainty. On public-data-calibrated pacing replays built from Criteo Uplift and KuaiRand datasets, traditional conformal pacing remains unresolved with high residual radii of 7236.7 on Criteo and 4629.4 on KuaiRand. With the proposed decision calibration approach, the uncertainty radii are reduced to 18.4 and 278.6 respectively, with separate margins for value, delivery, budget, and member load. On Criteo, the proposed method certifies a less aggressive pacing policy than the point-forecast baseline, and reduces held-out any-violation rate from 16.7% to 3.3%, with zero budget and member-load violations. On KuaiRand, the choice remains unresolved. In a nutshell, the paper establishes that forecasts, response estimates, and member-experience models should be judged by whether they shrink the uncertainty that the pacing decision uses, as this leads to confident decisions that are not overly conservative.

Characterizing revenue-optimal auctions for multi-item, multi-bidder settings remains a fundamental open problem, with no known closed-form solution existing beyond restrictive binary-type instances. This has motivated interest in computational approaches to optimal auction design. In this paper, we introduce the first computational framework that directly tackles the dual problem for multi-item, multi-bidder auctions and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility (DSIC), generating certified revenue upper bounds. Our approach parametrizes Lagrange multipliers with a structurally guaranteed strict flow-conservation property using neural networks, enabling efficient optimization over feasible dual solutions via gradient descent. To bridge the gap between discrete computational methods and theoretical guarantees for continuous types, we develop a novel lifting technique that maps dual certificates from coarse discretizations to fine refinements. We prove that lifting gives valid revenue upper bounds for multi-item, multi-bidder auctions with continuous uniform valuations. Furthermore, we give a generalized lifting construction for arbitrary continuous distributions and demonstrate that these lifted duals converge to the revenue of the original continuous problem in the discrete limit. We validate this computational framework for the dual auction design problem by recovering known analytical mechanisms for canonical instances. For multi-item multi-bidder problems, our framework establishes a small gap between the optimal revenue and best-known DSIC mechanisms, providing computational certificates of near-optimality.

Speech Large Language Models (Speech LLMs) lack a principled mechanism for streaming inference: their label-synchronous generation has no acoustic-frame alignment, making real-time decoding and end-of-utterance detection difficult. We propose TRADE TRansducer-Augmented DEcoder, which augments a multimodal LLM with a transducer branch that shares the audio encoder and uses the LLM's hidden states directly as the prediction network -- coupling frame-synchronous acoustic alignment with the LLM's linguistic reasoning. Three design choices make the system accurate, streamable, and long-form capable: (1)Tightly coupled dual vocabularies -- a compact transducer vocabulary derived from the LLM vocabulary, enabling zero-cost score fusion; (2)Chunk-synchronized streaming training with gradient stopping, eliminating the train-inference mismatch at offline-equivalent memory cost; and (3)Localized Decoder Audio Attention (LDAA), a causal sliding window that caps KV-cache memory independently of utterance length. A single TRADE checkpoint supports offline and streaming decoding across a continuous range of latency operating points. TRADE achieves 6.71% average WER on the Open ASR Leaderboard, while the streaming recognition with 960ms chunk size reaches 8.40% from the same checkpoint. On long-form speech, it obtains 3.64% WER on TED-LIUM and 10.88% on Earnings-22 without external segmentation. TRADE provides sentence-end punctuation timestamps that, when combined with acoustic voice activity detection (VAD), improve end-of-utterance detection by +0.03 F_1 over acoustic VAD alone.

This study addresses the optimal execution of large stock sell programs by introducing TT-DAC-PS (Twin-Target Deterministic Actor-Critic with Policy Smoothing), a deterministic actor-critic architecture that combines twin exponential-moving-average critic targets with pessimistic min backup, TD3-style target policy smoothing noise, delayed actor updates, and conservative Q regularisation to curb overestimation. Exploration uses Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) noise with a hybrid schedule: deterministic episode-wise decay, variance-guided adjustment based on recent reward dispersion, and a Soft Actor-Critic (SAC)-style temperature that is learned and mapped to the noise scale. The environment integrates Almgren-Chriss (AC) trade impact with Limit Order Book (LOB) prices and volumes, normalised state features, per-step volume participation caps, and a utility-based reward. The trade execution algorithm is applied to LOB data for ten U.S. stocks. Performance is assessed against reinforcement-learning baseline algorithms, including Proximal Policy Optimisation (PPO), Soft Actor-Critic (SAC), and Advantage Actor-Critic (A2C), as well as alternative trade execution algorithms, including Time-Weighted Average Price (TWAP), Volume-Weighted Average Price (VWAP), and AC. The proposed model consistently reduces mean implementation shortfall percentage with competitive variance, outperforming classical baselines and standard reinforcement-learning benchmark models.

Data-driven pricing is increasingly prevalent in sectors such as airlines, lending, insurance, and retail. By learning demand models from customer features and setting prices accordingly, these systems may generate discriminatory outcomes that raise fairness concerns. This leads to fundamental questions - how and where should systems incorporate fairness considerations in the pricing pipeline, and how does it ultimately affect societal outcomes? To answer these, we study a stylized model where a seller has a two-stage decision pipeline comprising linear demand model estimation followed by price optimization. The seller considers fairness notions in training loss, price, and demand, under both parity-wise and Rawlsian perspectives. We show that equalizing training loss across consumer groups leads to multiple solutions, which in turn can result in undesirable outcomes despite being a standard approach in fair machine learning. Focusing instead on fairness applied directly to prices or demand, we compare two strategies that enforce fairness in either the demand estimation stage or the price optimization stage. For parity-wise fairness, we characterize when each strategy yields higher social welfare under small fairness levels. We show that when market sizes and prices in the dataset are similar, imposing price fairness in the estimation stage is more beneficial to consumers, whereas imposing demand fairness in the optimization stage yields better consumer outcomes. For Rawlsian fairness, the two strategies coincide exactly. Lastly, we extend our model to alternate demand functions and conduct a case study using real-world vaccine pricing data.

In modern online advertising platforms, Guaranteed Delivery (GD) contracts coexist and bid with Real-Time Bidding (RTB) auctions. Recent approaches either decouple GD and RTB optimization or rely on heuristic priority rules, and thus fail to effectively balance short-term revenue maximization with long-term contract delivery under complex multi-slot delivery and impression constraints. To address these challenges, we propose HMAF (Hierarchical Multi-Slot Allocation Framework), a unified framework designed to optimize impression allocation in GD--RTB advertising platforms. HMAF employs the Plan--Calibrate--Execute paradigm as its core structure, and integrates offline constraint optimization with online decision-making, balancing offline GD resource planning, dynamically calibrating GD--RTB competitiveness, and making real-time listwise rank decisions across multi-slot environments. HMAF has been implemented in multiple marketing scenarios at Meituan, one of the world's largest online food delivery platforms, leading to a 3.72% increase in GD delivery rate and a 1.59% increase in total advertisement revenue.

Two-sided matching markets often involve information that unfolds over time through interviews, repeated interaction, learning, and separation. Existing matching models typically reduce this process to immediate sub-Gaussian feedback about fixed preferences, missing settings where payoff-relevant information is revealed gradually and changes future matching decisions. We introduce a framework with temporally extended feedback, that formulates two-sided matching as a partially observable Markov game with costly pre-match screening, noisy post-match observations, evolving latent profiles, and endogenous continuation or dissolution. We instantiate this framework in Learn2Match, a multi-agent reinforcement-learning benchmark for dynamic matching markets. Learn2Match supports decentralized decision making over whom to interview, whom to match with, and when to dissolve a match, while evaluating policies using regret, social welfare, and an information-friction loss that measures the welfare gap caused by incomplete revelation of latent preferences. We find that independent PPO achieves higher cumulative social welfare and lower cumulative regret than the bandit-style CA-ETC baseline under temporally extended feedback, demonstrating the promise of MARL for dynamic matching markets. However, PPO still incurs higher information-friction loss, revealing that end-to-end MARL does not yet provide the coordinated exploration structure of matching-bandit methods. These results position Learn2Match as a benchmark for developing the next generation of matching-market algorithms: methods that are adaptive like RL agents, statistically disciplined like bandit algorithms, and structurally aware like stable-matching mechanisms. Please refer to https://sites.google.com/view/learn-to-match/home for the official website and the code link.

Many real-world competitive systems require multiple decision-makers to act simultaneously under shared constraints, limited information, and repeated interaction, as in auctions, resource allocation, and security competition. We study multi-turn simultaneous bidding as a controlled testbed for such problems and propose DNQ, a solver-in-the-loop equilibrium supervision framework for training bidding agents. DNQ alternates between trajectory collection, critic-based payoff estimation, equilibrium computation, and policy imitation. At each visited state, a shared critic predicts either pairwise payoff matrices or an exact N-player payoff tensor, an external solver computes equilibrium strategies, and the agents are trained by minimizing the KL divergence between their masked policies and the solver-derived equilibrium targets. We focus on a scalable pairwise formulation that greatly reduces equilibrium-solving cost and training time compared with the exact formulation, while the shared critic amortizes payoff learning across agents and states. Experiments compare the pairwise and exact variants using critic loss, policy entropy, bidding resource usage, and training cost, showing that the pairwise method scales to larger numbers of agents, whereas the exact method becomes computationally impractical as the joint game grows. These results illustrate the trade-off between strategic fidelity and scalability in repeated competitive environments.

Modern option-learning systems operate in two coordinates: price space, where markets quote and no-arbitrage constraints are most naturally enforced, and implied volatility (IV) space, where volatility surfaces are smoothed, regularized, and evaluated. The bottleneck is interface, not approximation: Jäckel's seminal "Let's Be Rational" (LBR) solver already inverts the Black-Scholes price to machine precision efficiently. What is missing is a differentiable layer that preserves LBR in the forward pass and avoids backpropagating through its branch logic. Such a layer must also confront the unavoidable singularity of the inverse map in the low-vega regime, where the sensitivity 1/vega diverges as vega -> 0. We close this gap with PIVOT, the Price-Implied-Volatility Objective Translator. PIVOT keeps the LBR forward pass intact and supplies the backward pass by implicit differentiation through the smooth Black-Scholes/Black-76 price map, with an explicit gating contract: invalid domains return NaN, well-conditioned rows receive the exact 1/vega gradient, and low-vega rows are attenuated rather than silently regularized. On a single H100, a fused Triton kernel reaches 1.79e9 IV/s at machine precision (9.3e-14 max relative error vs. the reference C solver); end-to-end label generation sustains 48.9M/s on synthetic chains and 16.6M/s on SPX OptionMetrics. In a HyperIV-style one-day reproduction on SPX, PIVOT-augmented objectives Pareto-dominate the baselines, reducing held-out price MAE by up to 43.4% and the strongest three-seed gated objective improving price MAE by 38.8% and IV MAE by 21.3% jointly; cross-asset results on RUT, VIX, and NDX show directional price-MAE gains of 40.1%, 24.2%, and 16.7%, while an ungated IV-roundtrip control collapses to a degenerate near-zero surface, confirming the gate as a correctness contract rather than a tuning knob.

On a platform with many sellers, should a pricing algorithm explicitly model competitors' prices when learning demand? Classical learning arguments suggest an affirmative answer: ignoring competitors induces model misspecification and inefficiency. In contrast, recent work on algorithmic collusion suggests that strategic obliviousness -- deliberately ignoring competitor prices -- may facilitate collusive outcomes and improve profits. We study this modeling choice in a stylized competitive market with unknown noisy demand, in which multiple sellers repeatedly set prices and estimate demand via iterated least squares, and either incorporate competitors' prices into their demand models (informed) or ignore them (oblivious). We first show that, relative to a monopolist, an oblivious seller in a competitive market must explore more aggressively to compensate for the loss of dynamic competitor information. Building on this insight, we characterize market dynamics when all sellers are oblivious and show that prices converge to the competitive outcome under sufficient exploration, while a continuum of pseudo-equilibria arises when exploration decays. Analyzing the resulting price trajectories, we uncover an excursion phenomenon that gives rise to transient collusive patterns that dissipate as learning progresses. In markets with both oblivious and informed sellers, the informed strictly out-earn the oblivious. Read as a strategy game, the modeling choice has a unique Nash equilibrium: the all-informed market, in which prices converge to the competitive outcome efficiently. Overall, our results indicate that collusive patterns are not robust and are not sustained by oblivious modeling; therefore, incorporating competitor information, together with sufficient price exploration, remains a reliable strategy for sellers in competitive markets.

Worker utility is not observed -- only its consequence is. Each gig transaction produces a single bit: accepted or rejected. We argue this structure points directly to the Preisach hysteresis model as the natural representation of latent worker preferences. The Preisach operator models aggregate output as an integral over a population of binary threshold elements -- precisely the structure that emerges when heterogeneous workers each carry a private acceptance wage. We estimate two latent utility surfaces: acceptance utility U_1(X) and rejection utility U_0(X), via a dual-output neural network (shared layers 256->128, margin loss enforcing U_1 >= U_0). Classification reduces to the Preisach gap U_1(X) - U_0(X), passed into an XGBoost classifier alongside clip-stabilised price-to-threshold encodings. On 36,891 gig transactions, this pipeline achieves Jaccard = 0.827 and ROC AUC = 0.799. The price-to-threshold encoding accounts for +11.0 pp AUC over raw utility features. The model confirms the directional asymmetry hysteresis predicts: price decreases depress completion rates more than equivalent increases raise them. Applied to the full dataset, the model's recommendations simultaneously reduce the total wage bill by 21.3% and increase expected fill rate by 9.7 pp. For 74.2% of transactions, P(accept) already exceeds 0.80; reducing the wage keeps it above threshold (mean post-cut P = 0.972), releasing cost savings (median 31%). For the remaining 25.4%, a median 7% wage increase recovers +43 pp acceptance. A model without an explicit indifference zone cannot execute both moves simultaneously.

We study two reproducible failure modes of deep multi-agent reinforcement learning in continuous-time pricing markets: (i) tacit cartel formation between competing DDPG agents, and (ii) actor--critic instability at high event rates. We instantiate both inside a single CT-MARL benchmark (Poisson-clocked price updates, observation latency $δ$, interior-optimum logit demand), show that synchronous DDPG agents reliably trigger Failure Mode 1 with collusion index $Δ= 0.69 \pm 0.11$, and quantify a partial microstructure fix: asynchrony alone cuts collusion by 48% and adding latency drives it to a minimum of $Δ= 0.28$. The fix has clearly documented costs: it is partial ($Δ$ remains supra-Bertrand), it is non-monotone in $δ$, and it does not survive Failure Mode 2, which emerges as DDPG critic divergence at $λ= 5$ and corrupts the phase-diagram cell at $(λ{=}5, δ{=}1)$. We accompany the scalar collusion index with trajectory-level trace diagnostics that expose the within-episode signalling collapse and the post-shock non-recovery.

We show every multi-group learner in the transductive setting may incur a multiplicative penalty in its error rate on some group relative to the error rate achievable in the single-group setting, and the penalty can increasing linearly with the number of groups, up to roughly the square-root of the sample size. This stands in stark contrast to optimal multi-group learners in an analogous (group-realizable) statistical setting, where the penalty is always at most logarithmic in the sample size and independent of the number of groups.

Resource-constrained pricing controllers can make fixed-price inference impossible: the controller's resource state may remove the target price neighborhood from the feasible set, even when every realized action has a known positive density. We formalize this support-exclusion failure through a local non-identification result and a realized information clock. We then design a target-aware pricing controller that certifies feasible target bands and logs continuous local densities. Localized debiasing gives studentized intervals whose width is governed by this clock. The resulting regret--information accounting, stated up to pilot re-solving error, shows that cheap exploration can be insufficient for inference: polynomial target mass gives polynomial rates, while a pure $1/t$ target branch does not yield shrinking fixed-target intervals without additional local movement. Experiments show calibration in certified bands and diagnostic abstention when the resource state collapses target support.

Inference-time scaling has emerged as a critical avenue for enhancing Large Language Models' performance, yet real-world deployment is constrained by strict computational budgets. In this work, we formulate inference budget allocation as a global constrained optimization problem governed by economic principles. By modeling per-query reasoning utility with a shifted-surge function, we derive an optimal allocation policy based on a global shadow price that equilibrates marginal utility under resource scarcity. Based on this theory, we propose Constrained Latent-utility Equilibrium Allocation for Reasoning (CLEAR). It performs rational abandonment and reallocates resources from insolvent queries to solvable queries near their emergence thresholds. Extensive experiments on several reasoning tasks with different traffic streams demonstrate that CLEAR significantly improves the Pareto frontier of total token cost versus mean accuracy. In resource-scarce regimes, CLEAR achieves up to a 3x improvement in global accuracy compared to uniform allocation.

Coding-agent benchmarks evaluate whether a single uninterrupted agent can resolve a repository issue. Real software work is messier: tasks are interrupted, reassigned, reviewed, and resumed from partial states left by another agent or engineer. We study this missing dimension through handoff debt: the rediscovery cost imposed when a predecessor's work is opaque or incomplete. Our takeover protocol interrupts a coding agent at deterministic handoff points, freezes the repository, and evaluates successor agents under four handoff views: repository state only, raw trace, summary notes, and structured notes. Across 75 source tasks, the protocol generates 181 handoff-point tasks and 724 takeover runs per successor model. Across three successor models, context-bearing handoffs reduce median agent events by 20-59% and cumulative prompt tokens by 42-63% relative to repository-only takeover. Solved-rate effects are smaller and model-dependent, but efficiency gains are consistent. These findings suggest that coding-agent evaluation should report not only whether a task is solved, but also how costly that work is for another agent to resume.

Consumer-price measurement increasingly draws on alternative data sources -- scanner, web-scraped, and transaction/receipt data -- whose product descriptions are short, noisy, and carry no standard product code, so each item must first be mapped to a consumption classification (e.g., the UN COICOP scheme) before prices can be compared. This paper studies that mapping as a general, reproducible method. The pipeline is: (i) text normalization and tokenization of noisy item names; (ii) a prefix-tree (trie) rule-based pre-classifier driven by per-category key-phrases and stop-phrases; and (iii) a per-category binary confirmation model. For labels at scale we use a human-in-the-loop protocol in which annotators give a binary valid/reject judgment aggregated by a dynamically updated reliability weight; the model joins the same rule, enabling continual fine-tuning. On a reproducible synthetic benchmark of six COICOP-like categories, under one matched protocol, cheap models win and order-sensitive ones do not help: a character n-gram logistic regression tops every category (mean F1 = 0.997), word-order features add nothing, and small CNN/LSTM models are the weakest in this small-data regime. The trie alone admits only 32-50% of items, so the learned stage is necessary, and about 66 labels per category suffice. A Monte-Carlo study of the labeling protocol is self-critical: the reliability-weighted vote barely beats plain majority while Dawid-Skene recovers labels markedly better. No proprietary or production data are used; all code and synthetic data are released at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.20909563

The standard generalization bounds assume that the training and deployment distributions are the same, or are static, and don't consider regime switching environments where the ratio of calm vs crisis states is different. This paper proposes a framework that generalizes regime-aware models by quantifying the extra risk due to regime composition mismatch, when distribution shifts are Markov-switching. We obtain an exact decomposition, separating regime mismatch from regime sensitivity; we extend the bound to beta-mixing data using the effective sample size corrected for the spectral gap; and we show a minimax lower bound for synthetic data and on 25 years of global equity indices. The proposed penalty is an ex post realized generalization gap, whereas the training-only estimator does not show significant correlation: the feature geometry of crises can be detected, but not the temporal arrival. Thus, the framework is not a forecast machine. Forecasting the composition of the future regime is an open question in the rare cases of regime change.

We develop a game-theoretic framework that compares welfare efficiency across three market mechanisms: continuous double auctions with transparent order books (lit exchanges), opaque order books (dark pools), and periodic batch auctions. Each mechanism is modeled as a queuing system where heterogeneous traders face trade-offs between the execution price, waiting costs, and transaction costs. Our main result establishes that under moderate arrival rates and bounded adverse selection, dark pools dominate both alternatives in aggregate ex-ante welfare. Observable order books create costly strategic timing games in which traders delay or rush submissions to optimize their position in the queue, generating wasteful social waiting costs. Opaque order books eliminate these timing games through information design. We formally characterize the equilibrium strategies in each mechanism and prove the welfare ranking $W^{DARK} > W^{LIT} > W^{BATCH}$. Extensions incorporate asymmetric information and endogenous venue choice. The results demonstrate how the information structure and the discipline of the service jointly determine efficiency in strategic matching environments.

Bidding in the European Frequency Containment Reserve (FCR) market is challenging for flexibility providers because competing offers are hidden and bidders observe only partial feedback form the market, such as, clearing price and awarded quantity. For a participant active in a single country, we show that the multi-country FCR clearing problem can be recast as a repeated multi-unit uniform-price auction against an endogenous vector of opposing bids. This reformulation yields an online learning problem and allows us to adapt a Best-of-Both-Worlds combinatorial semi-bandit algorithm implementable from this standard market feedback. The resulting bidder achieves logarithmic pseudo-regret in stochastic environments and $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret in adversarial ones. Synthetic experiments confirm the expected scaling, and backtests on historical European FCR data show competitive performance in practice: the method performs especially well on stable products, while EXP3-type baselines can be safer under stronger non-stationarity. Overall, the results show that learning-based bidding in FCR markets is theoretically grounded and practically useful when the learning rule matches product-level market stability.

Online advertising platforms rely on machine learning models to predict click-through rates (pCTR) and conversion rates (pCVR) for auction mechanisms. We introduce a novel framework to study the interaction between recommender system model quality, auction format, and autobidder behavior. We formalize when model improvements -- defined via a refinement relation inspired by filtrations in probability theory -- lead to improvements in platform-level Evaluation Criteria Metrics (ECM) such as revenue, welfare, or liquid welfare. Our main contributions are: (1) a formal definition of model improvement based on cluster refinement, and (2) a systematic characterization of ECM monotonicity across different combinations of bidder types (tCPA, max-CPA), auction formats (first-price, second-price, VCG), and budget constraints. We show that first-price auctions with uniform bidding guarantee revenue monotonicity for tCPA bidders without budgets (via Jensen's inequality), while second-price auctions and budget constraints can break this property. We provide full numerical constructions for the non-monotonicity results. Our findings have practical implications for advertising platforms seeking to align model improvements with business outcomes.

Existing LLM moral benchmarks usually ask which isolated moral act, value, or foundation a model prefers. This is useful but incomplete. Realistic judgments often require a model to combine several moral signals within the same option. We introduce Moral Trolley Arena, a two-stage blind ELO benchmark for measuring how LLMs compose moral evidence. The single-scene arena first calibrates individual moral acts from a 229-scenario corpus across five Moral Foundations Theory foundations; the composite arena then combines calibrated acts into two-act moral items over a controlled intensity grid and measures the resulting composite preferences. Across ten frontier models, composite judgments are largely predicted by component act strength, but the relation is consistently compressed rather than simply additive. Models also show non-additive intensity anchoring, bounded foundation-specific residuals after component control, and highly convergent composite preference surfaces across providers. These results suggest that moral audits should measure composition rules for moral evidence, not only rankings over isolated acts.

Forecasting agricultural commodity prices in emerging economies is difficult due to high volatility, frequent supply disruptions, and strong cultural influences on demand. This study introduces the Kalimati Vegetable Price Index (KVPI), a new inverse-volatility weighted composite index that aggregates 135 daily wholesale commodities from Kathmandu over ten years (2013-2023). By creating a stable macro-level signal, the KVPI reduces the noise inherent in modelling individual crops. A rich set of 64 causally valid features was developed, including festival lead-lag effects, rolling statistics, and calendar variables. Fourteen forecasting models spanning statistical, tree-based, deep learning, hybrid, and transformer architectures were rigorously evaluated across short (7-day), medium (14- and 30-day), and long-term (90-day) horizons. Tree-based ensembles proved notably robust, while classical statistical models and complex transformers struggled with the noisy dataset. The proposed Momentum-Corrected Online Stacking Ensemble achieved the strongest performance, yielding a Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) of 1.771, an exceptionally low Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) of 0.68%, and explaining 84.5% of the variance (R-squared = 0.845) at the 90-day horizon. This open-source pipeline provides policymakers and supply chain actors in Nepal and similar markets with a practical, reliable tool for anticipating price movements and strengthening food security.

Traditional multi-modal financial forecasting often relies on scalar sentiment scores, which fail to capture the nuances of financial news. To address this information loss, this paper explores high-dimensional representation learning by replacing discrete polarity ratings with dense FinBERT embeddings within a Transformer-based forecasting architecture. We benchmarked various embedding strategies on the FNSPID dataset, including raw embeddings, attention-weighted aggregation, and a custom Siamese network. While the attention-based mechanism struggled with the low signal-to-noise ratio typical of financial data, the integration of Siamese-optimized embeddings outperformed both the scalar baseline and raw embedding approaches, demonstrating that preserving high-dimensional narrative context yields improved predictive accuracy for short-term stock price movements.

We study the subclass of potential mean-field games in which the running interaction cost and the terminal target cost are both expressed through reproducing-kernel maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) penalties, and develop a computational framework that exploits this kernel structure. Both costs are estimated from finite-sample empirical distributions using a random Fourier U-statistic representation that is unbiased and has linear cost in the batch size. The drift of the controlled diffusion is parametrized by a neural network and trained via stochastic gradient descent. For population near-minimizers we prove convergence to the terminal-constrained problem as the penalty diverges, and show that the same limit is recovered almost surely when the learned controls are evaluated on independent finite samples under explicit coupling conditions on the penalty, random-feature count and sample size. The framework includes the kernel-MMD-penalty Schr{ö}dinger bridge problem as the special case of a vanishing interaction cost. Numerical experiments illustrate the method on the Schr{ö}dinger bridge problem in dimensions up to one hundred, and on an electric vehicle charging coordination problem with per-vehicle physical heterogeneity, where an aggregate-demand congestion cost represents price-feedback competition at the population level and the terminal MMD penalty shapes the state-of-charge distribution at the deadline.

Accurately forecasting the impact of salient financial events on markets is critical for investors and policymakers. However, existing multimodal time-series models typically fuse text and prices symmetrically, without an explicit way to decide when event text is truly predictive, and thus struggle to exploit the directional event-to-price structure and the heterogeneous roles of textual and price signals. In this work, we propose GS-Fuse, a multimodal event-based forecasting framework that employs (i) a Granger-supervised, causal-aware gated fusion module, which learns to open toward event text only when it provides incremental predictive value beyond historical prices, and (ii) a multi-granularity alignment mechanism that jointly aligns high-level event representations and fine-grained textual cues with future market trajectories. Built as a flexible, plug-and-play adapter on top of off-the-shelf large language models and time-series foundation models, GS-Fuse can be instantiated across diverse backbones and market settings. Extensive experiments on real-world financial datasets show that GS-Fuse consistently outperforms state-of-the-art time-series and multimodal baselines across multiple assets and forecasting horizons.

Evaluating whether large language model (LLM) agents can profit in capital markets is increasingly framed as end-to-end trading: place an agent in a historical market, let it trade, and measure portfolio returns. This setup is vulnerable to two evaluation failures. First, long backtests often overlap with the knowledge cutoffs of frontier LLMs, allowing memorized tickers, dates, prices, and market narratives to substitute for investment reasoning. Second, raw returns are a noisy proxy for stock-selection ability, since positive performance may come from market beta, style exposure, or favorable regimes rather than genuine alpha. We introduce KTD-Fin (Knowing-To-Doing Financial Benchmark), an end-to-end stock-market trading benchmark that addresses both issues. KTD-Fin uses a data-side masking protocol to anonymize key identifiers and calendar information consistently across prompts and tools, separating historical market memory from investment decision-making. It also incorporates a Barra-style performance attribution framework that decomposes portfolio returns into market, style, and stock-selection alpha components. Across ten frontier LLM agents evaluated on the Chinese CSI300 over a 2024--2026 window, masking substantially changes agent rationales, pushing them towards anonymized factor-based reasoning. Attribution analysis further shows that LLM agents' cumulative returns under leakage-controlled evaluation are largely explained by passive market and style exposure, with limited evidence of persistent stock-selection alpha. These findings suggest that financial LLM benchmarks should evaluate not only whether an agent makes money, but also whether the source of returns reflects transferable investment skill. We release KTD-Fin as a reproducible template for leakage-controlled and attribution-aware evaluation of LLM trading agents.

Traditional insurance pricing relies on risk-based principles that ensure actuarial fairness and solvency but do not explicitly account for policyholders' price sensitivity. We formulate insurance pricing as a decision-making problem and study it using tools from off-policy evaluation and stochastic control. We propose a kernelized inverse propensity score estimator that exploits local structure in the action space and yields variance reduction compared to the classical inverse propensity score estimator. Building on these value estimates, we investigate policy optimization and present two practical approaches for computing optimal pricing rules: an interpretable data-shared Lasso formulation and a flexible policy parameterization based on neural networks. Using a controlled synthetic travel insurance environment, we empirically confirm the theoretical results and show that neural networks outperform existing techniques for policy optimization.

We study bandit learning in matching markets, where players and arms constitute the two market sides, and the players' utilities are linear in the arm contexts. In each round, new arms arrive with observable contexts. Then, the algorithm matches them to players, aiming to minimize each player's regret against a stable matching benchmark. This contextual structure creates significant complexity: subtle context shifts can slightly alter one player's utility while completely reconfiguring the underlying benchmark, causing large regret spikes for others. We address this in two settings: stochastic contexts, drawn from a latent distribution, and adversarial contexts, which may be arbitrary. For the stochastic case, we introduce a novel minimum preference gap to capture learning difficulty and provide a fully adaptive algorithm with an instance-dependent poly-logarithmic regret upper bound. We also establish matching instance-independent regret upper and lower bounds under a mild distributional assumption. For the adversarial setting, we propose a tractable regret notion that remains valid under arbitrary contexts and achieves an instance-independent sublinear regret bound via an adaptive algorithm.

We study the problem of learning to bid when the bidder's value is dynamic, i.e., when the current value depends on past outcomes. Specifically, we consider a bidder participating in repeated second-price auctions whose value depends on the time elapsed since their last successful bid, with auctions arriving in continuous time and only aggregated feedback revealed at the end of the horizon. Such a bidder must (1) balance the immediate benefit of winning the current auction against its impact on future values and (2) learn unknown environmental parameters. We derive regret bounds for a class of learning methods that combine plug-in estimators with a differential-equation characterization of the optimal policy, and show that a specific confidence bound algorithm learns the optimal policy with a near optimal regret of $\widetilde{O}(\log N)$ for piecewise linear primitives, and $\widetilde{O}(N^{1/3})$ for general, smooth primitives, achieving these regrets without explicit randomization. These theoretical results are supported by numerical experiments.

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.

The edge-cloud computing continuum demands self-management mechanisms that scale across autonomous administrative domains while honouring tenant- and operator-specified data sovereignty. We present Neural Pub/Sub, a federated-broker autonomic substrate whose self-organising behaviour emerges from market-based price signals rather than centralised control. Its MAPE-K control loop closes over per-broker health and load monitoring, marginal-cost clearing-price analysis, placement planning over a polymatroidal feasibility region, federated cross-domain dispatch, and shared peer subscription summaries with bounded-staleness price signals. The Plan step is anchored in a Walrasian convergence proposition: under gross-substitutes valuations on tree and series-parallel service-dependency DAGs, decentralised price-based allocation matches the welfare of a centralised oracle. We evaluate the substrate on a 4-VM, 4-domain, 48-worker federated edge-cloud testbed (single data centre, 50 ms emulated WAN) in a 1005-run campaign augmented by a fair-process-count sharded-oracle comparator. The federated market dominates a single-process oracle by 2-4% with 45 of 45 per-seed wins (sign-test p ~ 2.8e-14, Hodges-Lehmann median -39.6 ms); against a four-shard centralised orchestrator at equal process count the gap stays within +/-1.5% across all nine (pipeline, load) cells. Round-robin completion rate collapses 98.8% -> 22.4% -> 3.3% across arrival rates 5/10/15 pps while the market preserves completion; the advantage decomposes into three Walrasian properties (information completeness, admission control, price discovery). Federation withstands broker death and network partition (completion rate >= 98.7% across 75 cells), and sovereignty enforcement adds no measurable runtime overhead across 60 governance-grid runs. Heterogeneous-domain stressors and cross-site WAN deployment remain future work.

Existing financial NLP benchmarks often rely on labels supplied by outside observers, measuring how language is perceived rather than what speakers have committed to in the market. We introduce StakeBench, an evaluation framework for language understanding grounded in market commitment. StakeBench links 560,876 comments from 2,261 resolved markets to verified position, action, and market-odds records across Polymarket and Manifold. Supervision is derived from observable market behavior. Position sides, post-comment trading actions, and market-odds trajectories replace human annotation. Four diagnostic tasks test whether models detect market commitment, identify the revealed side, anticipate future action, and perform collective odds projection. Three commitment-aware metrics measure alignment with revealed preferences rather than perceived sentiment. Validity audits and explicit interpretation boundaries help distinguish observable commitment signals from latent belief and causal market-odds impact. Across 15 LLMs and 18 topics and platform settings, models partially recover position-side signals, with Directed Accuracy from 0.506 to 0.599, but show structural failures on later tasks. Ten of the fifteen models collapse to one or two action labels in future action anticipation, and no model consistently improves on the naive odds-direction baseline in collective odds projection. Model scale is not correlated with performance, finance-domain tuning does not improve revealed-side identification, and platform incentives strongly shape higher-order results. StakeBench is packaged with evaluation code and dataset under CC-BY 4.0.

Predicting stock price movements during Earnings Announcements (EAs) is a significant challenge due to market noise and high-impact price discontinuities. In this study, we evaluate whether pre-announcement news sentiment, firm fundamentals, and recent market dynamics jointly predict the directional price movement of equities on EA days. We construct a multi-modal feature space combining 15 fundamental metrics, 3 price-based technical indicators and sentiment scores derived from financial news articles processed using FinBERT. We compare a Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) network and a Transformer-based architecture against a logistic regression baseline, and further assess all models with and without sentiment features to quantify their incremental value. Our results indicate that while the LSTM demonstrates higher precision through a conservative safe-bet strategy, the Transformer model exhibits superior sensitivity in identifying volatile movements, achieving a higher macro F1-score, with ablation experiments showing a consistent benefit from incorporating news sentiment.

Recursive Multi-Agent Trading System (RMATS) integrates four specialized agents -- Sentiment, Report, Analysis, and Risk -- coordinated through a recursive Manager Agent with iterative feedback loops. Experimental evaluation over a 561-trading-day period (January 2023 to March 2025) across a 24-asset multi-class universe demonstrates that RMATS achieves a maximum drawdown of 9.62%, lower than MVO (15.49%) and FinBERT Sentiment (15.28%), and exhibits the lowest event-period drawdown in 3 of 5 geopolitical stress scenarios tested. While RMATS underperforms return-maximizing baselines in a sustained bull market environment, ablation studies confirm the individual contribution of each agent component to downside protection. These results position RMATS as a risk-control-oriented architecture suitable for institutions prioritizing capital preservation under geopolitical uncertainty.

Dynamic pricing in short-term rental (STR) markets presents a distinctive challenge for online learning algorithms: pricing decisions carry significant financial risk, operators require explainability, and market feedback is sparse (one booking outcome per listed night). We introduce the Human-in-the-Loop Gated Bandit (HITL-GB) framework, in which a contextual bandit algorithm generates price recommendations but a human agent retains authority to accept, modify, or reject each recommendation before it is applied. We show that under this approval constraint, historical pricing data -- collected under a prior deterministic policy -- is structurally equivalent to on-policy warm-up data for initialising the bandit's posterior, bypassing the weeks-to-months cold-start period that renders pure online bandit learning impractical in sparse-feedback markets. We formalise the approval-gated reward signal, derive a regularised ridge-regression warm-up procedure from historical episodes, and validate the approach on real STR production data (anonymised urban market, 2 rooms, April 2022 -- April 2026, 1,461 nightly pricing episodes). Our warm-up procedure compresses effective cold-start from ~150 episodes to ~30 episodes when initialising agents from the Hierarchical Factored Thompson Sampling (HF-TS) family. We further argue that the structural equivalence result is domain-agnostic: any high-stakes domain where human approval is legally or operationally required -- including clinical drug dosing, credit origination, content moderation, and radiological diagnosis -- satisfies the same conditions and benefits from the same warm-up strategy. In regulated industries, mandatory human oversight is thus a statistical asset rather than a deployment constraint.

Temporal knowledge-graph data marketplaces face three coupled failures in static designs: stale hybrid index shortcuts reduce recall as edges evolve, stationary Shapley pricing misattributes value after distribution shifts, and uncoordinated agents over-consume a shared differential-privacy budget. We present CHRONOS, a three-layer architecture providing a unified treatment of these challenges with explicit public and private separation. Layer one applies neural-ODE temporal decay to shortcut edges, providing a per-query expected recall-loss bound of Big-O of Pq lambda delta t, with a monotone-envelope guarantee reducing bound looseness to 1.8 to 3.2 times observed loss. Layer two conditions Shapley valuation on detected changepoints and provides finite-sample error guarantees under noise. Layer three uses EXP3-IX to achieve Big-O of the square root of T log T regret while enforcing epsilon and delta differential privacy via moments accounting. CHRONOS releases a privatized affinity matrix per epoch using the Gaussian mechanism; all retrieval and ranking are post-processing, incurring no extra privacy cost. We provide multi-epoch settlement, scalability analysis for 500 sellers, and comparisons against accelerated baselines. Across four benchmarks, CHRONOS shows 0.937 recall at ten, 2.74 queries per second, 161 ms latency, and total epsilon of 4.25 at delta of 10 to the power of negative 6 under zCDP composition. These results indicate a competitive operating point. A limitation is that at this privacy level, released valuations remain noise-dominated; utility derives primarily from public index routing and adaptive scheduling driven by low-sensitivity statistics.

We introduce the Preisach Attention Layer (PAL), a novel sequence modelling architecture grounded in the classical Preisach hysteresis operator from mathematical physics. PAL replaces the softmax attention mechanism with a binary relay operator parameterised by learned activation and deactivation thresholds, maintaining a stack of local extrema as its internal state. A single-layer PAL-Transformer with O(1) depth is Turing-complete under arbitrary precision arithmetic, achievable through simulation of a two-stack pushdown automaton -- in contrast to the O(log n) depth required by standard hard-attention transformers. Second, we prove that the function classes computable by PAL and by the transformer are incomparable: PAL computes historical range statistics in O(1) layers that require O(log n) layers for transformers, while transformers support random-access retrieval that PAL cannot perform without auxiliary state. The separating property is rate-independence -- PAL responds only to the sequence of local extrema, not to absolute token positions or temporal spacing. Third, we show that the extremum stack constitutes a minimal sufficient statistic of the input history for all rate-independent functionals, providing a formal analogue of the wiping property in classical hysteresis theory. PAL is thus an efficient architecture for tasks with long episodic memory and weak positional dependence, with O(n log n) total inference cost versus O(n^2) for standard attention.