Artificial Intelligence Detection

We present a collaborative streaming anomaly detection system for high-speed data streams that explicitly integrates human analysts into the decision loop. The system combines heterogeneous detectors and aggregates their outputs through a normalization-based weighted consensus, complemented by artifact-aware rules to stabilize anomaly scoring under deployment. To improve interpretability, it derives surrogate models that approximate the ensemble consensus and expose human-readable sensor conditions associated with anomalous behavior. Analysts can actively intervene by reviewing anomaly episodes, adjusting consensus behavior, and refining surrogate rules used for anomaly prediction, producing a human-adjusted ensemble. We evaluate the approach on an industrial stream with 260,000 events and 3 anomalous episodes, showing robust detection and actionable human-AI interaction.

AI-native 6G networks have brought Intent-Based Networking (IBN) to the forefront, enabling high-level goals to be translated into network configurations. However, this abstraction opens new attack surfaces, primarily adversarial intent injection, where malicious policies are disguised within benign intent flows. The detection of attack instances might become significantly more difficult if the adversaries adopt a stealthy mode of malicious intent injection. With all these in mind, we first define a fine-grained threat model that facilitates the threat of malicious intent injection in an AI-native network. Alongside, we investigate four malicious intent injection strategies$-$ stealth-mode, random distribution, increasing frequency, and decreasing frequency- and propose a dual-path detection framework: (i) a CNN using TF-IDF features for supervised malicious intent detection, and (ii) an AutoEncoder trained exclusively on benign data for one-class malicious intent detection. Our evaluation demonstrates strong detection performance, with accuracy improving to 0.97 (~9% gain) and F1-score to 0.98 (~36% gain) over the state-of-the-art baseline.

Universal machine-learning interatomic potentials (u-MLIPs) aim to generalize across diverse configurations. Benchmarks enable reproducible evaluation but may not expose failures outside their predefined scope. Here, we show that physics-informed search can complement benchmark-based evaluation by uncovering hidden failure modes. We introduce MLIP Detective, an agentic framework for active failure mode discovery. Starting from benchmark evidence, MLIP Detective generates falsifiable, physics-informed failure hypotheses, screens them with inexpensive simulations, and escalates only the most suspicious cases to human experts together with proposed verification protocols. Without issue-specific prompting, MLIP Detective identified and characterized a systematic anomaly in MACE-MPA-0: the model predicted some relaxed adsorbate-surface systems involving O- or F-containing adsorbates to be higher in energy than their corresponding separated fragments. Using cross-model comparisons, MLIP Detective further inferred a likely training-data origin for the anomaly, consistent with recent reports.

Personally Identifiable Information (PII) detection is a foundational component of data protection infrastructure where missed entities constitute direct privacy and security risks. Although modern PII systems report strong performance on standard benchmarks, we show that these evaluations mask substantial robustness failures under realistic distribution shifts encountered in deployment. Rather than comparing state-of-the-art accuracy, we study how different PII detection paradigms fail under noisy, unstructured, and informal inputs. We construct a stress test benchmark spanning seven categories of natural distribution shift and evaluate representative systems from three widely deployed architectural families: encoder-based NER (SpaCy), rule-based hybrid detection (Presidio), and generative LLM extraction (Qwen2.5-3B). All three exhibit significant degradation on out-of-distribution inputs, but with distinct and complementary failure modes. Encoder models primarily fail on unseen surface forms and boundary detection, rule-based systems fail on non-standard formats, and LLMs exhibit entity-type confusion and generation instability. These results show that aggregate benchmark scores obscure deployment-critical weaknesses and that no single architecture is uniformly reliable across PII categories. Motivated by these findings, we propose a hybrid detection pipeline with a QA-driven feedback loop for iterative risk mitigation, and release our benchmark to support OOD-aware evaluation of PII systems.

AI compute verification is one of the first tangible and tractable points for international policy aimed at AI governance. Determining whether frontier labs, or any operator, comply with agreements requires the regulating authority to discern how their compute is used. The elementary building block of AI compute is the GPU, and any activity it executes leaves a physical trace. Here, we show that an external observer can identify the class of the workload running on an NVIDIA H200 from its power draw. Unlike on-chip NVML telemetry, which can be spoofed or replayed, such a physical channel can in principle be observed independently of operator cooperation. We recorded $930$ five-second traces at $\sim 10$ MHz, covering seventeen open LLM families and twenty-five non-AI workloads. Over this corpus we separate training from inference and from non-AI computation with an accuracy of $97\%$ and a macro-averaged F1 score of $0.955$, evaluated on model families unseen during training. AI workload spectral content predominantly lies below $\sim 20$kHz and training is particularly recognizable through the memory-bound optimizer update. The GPU operator is then treated as adversarial and able to reshape the physical computation itself. Four evasion strategies are tested to disguise training as inference, producing an additional 680 adversarial traces. A detector hardened against evasion strategies, with the tested strategy held out, catches training $\geq 99\%$ of the time for three of the four strategies. The fourth, diluted low-rank adaptation (LoRA), is detected $48$--$88\%$ of the time with a hardened classifier, rising to $\geq 98\%$ with an additional rescue rule. While these attacks are not a comprehensive evaluation against adversarial behaviour, they offer initial insights beyond genuine activities and a dataset for developing and testing stronger evasion mechanisms.

The 2025--2026 AI market has seen a wave of stealth releases: frontier models launched anonymously on developer platforms under codenames. For their users, identity determines data-handling terms, supply-chain risk, and capability expectations. No validated methodology exists for black-box identity verification of anonymous models: practitioner checklists lack accuracy evidence, and self-identification is untrustworthy by design. We propose a four-stage forensic audit protocol for API-served models. Stage 0 reconstructs launch-time configuration from archived platform snapshots (Internet Archive), exposing preview--production drift. Stage 1 fingerprints configuration (context, output ceiling, reasoning, modality) against the platform catalog. Stage 2 tests tokenizer identity with a cross-length differential that rejects short-prompt collisions. Stage 3 corroborates with behavioral probes. We test declaration consistency on 10 known-identity releases (7 exact, 2 precision-differences, 1 partial, 0 counter-directional), not end-to-end identification under anonymity. Identification is validated prospectively on a flagship case whose 2026-08-23 analysis pointed to the GLM-5.3 version line and whose official reveal confirmed those family and version-line inferences (deployment variant was not pre-asserted; Flash was consistent post-reveal), and on three Stage-0-only cases where the protocol produced a graded hypothesis or declined rather than guessed. A standard-library-only implementation is provided as supplementary material.

LLMs can imitate how people write, which raises concerns about impersonation, trust, and detection in social settings. These concerns are especially important for adolescents, who use generative AI frequently but may struggle to recognize it. We introduce \textit{DoppelBot}, a cooperative social deduction game designed to study how young people detect and respond to AI impersonation. Through studies with middle schoolers, we investigate whether a DoppelBot prompts reflection on privacy and impersonation, how repeated exposure affects AI-detection accuracy as agents become more personalized, and which strategies students use to identify AI doppelgängers. We find that students' detection accuracy improves over time, driven by a shift from relying on linguistic cues to leveraging shared social and contextual signals. Students also demonstrated an understanding of AI limitations such as embodiment and reflected on broader issues such as data privacy. To support future research, we release an anonymized dataset of game transcripts and voting behavior.

Leak localization is usually evaluated as forced-choice prediction, although sparse hydraulic observations may not justify excavation. Here, we quantify a pressure-information limit and use it to recast localization as selective, evidence-gated decision-making. A physics-grounded executor falsifies competing leak, demand, sensor and valve hypotheses in a hydraulic twin. Deterministic code computes every number and every acceptance predicate; an independent large language model auditor may add a rejection but never overturn a failed check. Forced retrieval placed only 95 of 300 leaks in the correct zone. Across 550 mixed events, the gate acted on 223 (214 correct); on a third-party 33-leak benchmark, all four accepted events were correct. In a replay of 194 audited City D repairs, the pressure tier authorized five excavation recommendations, three matching the repaired district, while the district-inflow tier returned the correct district for 85 events. Observability limits with machine-checkable abstention enable auditable utility intervention.

Artificial Intelligence (AI)-based prospective anomaly detection methods are increasingly deployed in high-dimensional and nonlinear settings. Among these approaches, AI-based statistical process monitoring (SPM) is widely used, providing a structured framework for prospective monitoring. Once an anomaly is detected, a diagnosis method is needed to identify the features driving the flagged observation away from normal behaviour. Traditional SPM diagnosis methods are typically designed for specific detection models and cannot be directly applied to AI-based methods. Model-agnostic explainable AI (XAI) offers a general framework for feature relevance explanation. However, existing methods suffer from scalability limitations or assign relevance to noise features, reducing diagnosis accuracy. We propose a scalable, baseline-referenced diagnosis method that uses both the anomalous observation and normal baseline information. We provide mathematical guarantees that under a mean-shift anomaly setting, the proposed method achieves higher faithfulness in detecting the features causing the anomaly compared to LIME. Simulation studies and a real-world case study validate the effectiveness of the proposed method and show that it generates more faithful and accurate diagnosis results for AI-based prospective anomaly detection methods.

Institutions use commercial AI detectors for academic integrity, yet detectors cannot distinguish AI editing from full LLM drafts and may treat both as misconduct. In a controlled study of published English abstracts (four domains; 2013 to 2015 vs. 2023 to 2025), we quantify this policy failure under proxy human/AI labels at tau=0.50. Light "refine abstract only" edits, a proxy for guideline-compliant AI assistance, are flagged at 64 to 80% (Pangram/GPTZero). Unmodified 2023 to 2025 originals are flagged at 9 to 15%, with non-STEM rates far above STEM (p<0.001); elevated scores track long-token and Academic Word List density, not authorship intent alone. After Undetectable AI humanization, evasion is near-total: fewer than 4% of AI-labeled rewrites remain flagged (post-humanization detection rate <4%; FNR >96%). Honest AI-editing results in a higher sanction risk than humanizer-assisted evasion. Therefore, detector scores should not serve as standalone misconduct evidence.

The most capable AI deployments are not single models but ensembles of specialized agents that delegate and act in coordination. This architecture unlocks powerful new capabilities, and it also introduces risks that existing frameworks for monitoring, detection, and mitigation were not designed to address. Most state-of-the-art AI abuse detection literature focuses on single-turn or multi-turn (single-session) threat models. This leaves a critical gap: an attacker can decompose a harmful goal into innocuous-looking units and execute each in isolated agentic sessions. The agent is stateless between conversations, but the attacker is not. This asymmetry allows for cross-session trajectories that are effective at evading detection. Our contributions are twofold. First, we demonstrate cross-session goal decomposition as an evasion technique, showing it may elicit more harmful capability than equivalent single-session or multi-turn attacks. By capability we mean an artifact produced at one step of an objective, evidenced by what an interaction produced (model responses and tool-call results), and composable with capabilities accrued elsewhere into a harmful whole. Second, we propose Magnet: an efficient and robust detection approach that models relevant capabilities accrued over time and across agentic conversations, aggregated at a higher-level correlator (in this case, a user ID) rather than per-conversation state. The main challenge is assembling the evidence bundle Magnet reasons over. The incriminating artifacts may be needles scattered through a haystack of benign sessions that are individually harmless, dangerous only once collected. Rather than searching the haystack straw-by-straw (i.e. per-session inspection), Magnet does what its name implies: it attracts the relevant needles out of the hay, across sessions and across time, into a compact evidence bundle a detector can act on.

Tool-using agents built on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed not by a single operator but by many, side by side on shared infrastructure. This creates a population-level risk that single-agent safeguards miss: a handful of agents can quietly coordinate, rigging a market, boosting one another in a review process, or timing a joint data grab, while each one looks perfectly well-behaved. The difficulty is that the organisations running these agents cannot see inside one another's models, so any realistic detector must work from behaviour alone: black-box, trace-only, and often with only partial visibility. We treat covert coordination as an information-hiding problem and build a black-box steganalysis detector that combines cross-run mutual-information estimation, permutation tests, distributional-shift statistics, and timing and tool-call side channels, all calibrated to a fixed false-positive budget. Our central move is to stop testing against a single fixed code: we pit the detector against an adversary that continually rewrites its encoding to slip past whatever the detector has learned, and we run this red-versus-blue contest in tool-using, memory-carrying environments rather than toy games. Capacity theory then tells us what to expect, a detection-capacity frontier, a covert bit-rate below which black-box detection is provably no better than chance. We set out an experiment to map this frontier, report clearly labelled placeholder results pending measurement, and flag a practical evasion, spreading a payload across sessions, that current methods largely miss.

A major issue in Security Operations Centers (SOCs) is alert fatigue, as the number of detections reported is more than staff can triage in a given day. Prior work prompts or fine-tunes large language models (LLMs) to emit a triage label directly, but does not train them to reason about whether a detection is a genuine threat. We train a chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning-enabled triage classifier on real, human-labeled Windows endpoint detections by combining automated prompt optimization, self-training, and reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards. We find that CoT reasoning also degrades the label-token probabilities that automated triage relies on, so we separately train a calibrator that reads the full reasoning trace and estimates the probability that the verdict is correct. Our system reaches 82.6% test accuracy and, at the high-confidence operating point that governs automated triage, improves benign recall by 43.0% and malicious recall by 18.3% over a direct-label LLM classifier. We further show that the trained calibrator is necessary - an untrained confidence judge collapses high-confidence recall to zero - and that a finetuned 30B model significantly outperforms frontier general-purpose models, motivating targeted training over scale.

Capabilities of frontier models are often assessed using agentic benchmarks. To trust these results, benchmarks must accurately measure what they claim to and be free from invalidating flaws. Previous manual audits of benchmarks such as SWE-Bench-Verified have uncovered several validity issues in transcripts. However, manual review is difficult to scale, and it is unclear whether automated methods can reliably surface flaws that compromise benchmark validity. In this paper, we developed AI scanners to detect four types of validity issues: ground truth access, tool failure, guessing vulnerability, and answer format ambiguity. We produced grading rubrics for each to instruct human labeling, and evaluated the scanners against human labels on a held-out test set of Inspect Evals benchmarks. Our scanners identified several verified quality issues in five widely used benchmarks, including cases unlikely to be caught by random manual inspection. Not all cases were identified, and scanner performance varied substantially across benchmarks, criteria and models. We highlight several open challenges to be addressed to improve scanners for stronger quality assurance claims, including broader standardization gaps in the evaluation field that degrade scanner performance. Together, these results serve as a proof of concept for using automated transcript analysis to audit benchmark quality more broadly.

We present Pangram 4, the latest deep-learning-based AI-text classification model from Pangram Labs. We achieve an AUROC of 0.9916 with a false positive rate of 0.0041% and a false negative rate of 0.3396%. In addition to its increased overall accuracy compared with Pangram 3, Pangram 4 exhibits superior out-of-distribution generalization and robustness to adversarial attacks. Another novel contribution of Pangram 4 is its improved ability to distinguish fine-grained edits and mixed AI-human co-authored text. We demonstrate improvements to both boundary detection tasks and the detection of interleaved AI assistance. Finally, we report metrics on standard AI detection benchmarks showing that Pangram 4 achieves state-of-the-art performance on the AI text detection task across a wide variety of settings and domains.

Bot detectors deployed at scale treat traffic as binary: human or bot. This assumption breaks when AI agents browse the web through browser automation, a traffic class that is neither and that binary classifiers structurally cannot represent. We present a three-class detection framework distinguishing humans, bots, and AI agents, and show that the binary-vs-agent confusion is architectural: a binary human-vs-bot detector misroutes agent sessions because its label space lacks an agent class. On our controlled benchmark, an MLP binary classifier misclassifies 39.1% of real AI agents as human and a SAINT binary transformer misclassifies 34.5%; adding an explicit agent class yields per-class agent F1 = 1.000 in all 30 runs (3 model families $\times$ 10 seeds). To measure evasion resistance, we construct a five-level evasion ladder spanning passive observation, GAN-generated trajectories, and replay of real human cursor data ($n = 2299$ evasion sessions). Across 10 seeds and 3 model families we observe zero agent misses in 22990 per-seed predictions. The discriminative signal is a browser-automation artifact, not evidence of agent reasoning: Playwright does not emit the raw pointer-move and wheel-delta streams a physical input device produces, and this absence signature survives trajectory manipulation. Exhaustive search over all feature subsets of size 1-5 (9401 GBMs) shows that two behavioral features (mouse_event_rate, teleport_click_ratio) give 100% observed agent recall at every evasion level with agent precision 0.994; five features lift macro-F1 to 0.991. The signal is redundantly encoded: removing teleport_click_ratio leaves agent detection at 100%. The single-feature regime is degenerate, flagging every agent only by collapsing the classifier to always predict "agent". Two features robustly isolate agents; five separate all three traffic classes at macro-F1 $\geq 0.99$.

Security operations centers rely on anomaly detection systems to flag suspicious events. Feature-level explanations for anomaly detectors offer limited value for operational investigations. To effectively handle alerts, analysts need to know contextual relationships and need actionable understanding of the entities involved. This paper introduces an event-centric detector-agnostic approach for explaining cybersecurity alerts in small- to medium-sized enterprise networks. We present (EC)2, a multi-agent framework that performs structured, hypothesis-driven investigation to provide explanations grounded in verifiable evidence. Evaluation results show that the proposed framework improves post-detection analysis by generating operationally meaningful explanations, which also enhance event classification accuracy.

Multi-agent LLM systems can be attacked by a payload that no single agent ever holds in full: a poisoned tool hides encrypted fragments in its observations, spreads them across several agents, and an external step reassembles and executes them after the run. Per-step safety checks that judge each action in isolation may fail to recognize the complete distributed payload. We investigate how early such an attack can be detected while the run is still unfolding, and how robustly it can be caught once its most obvious cues are stripped away. We build a working instance on a hierarchical multi-agent system, run it under benign and attacked conditions across five language models and two task domains, and record when each fragment is injected and when the payload is assembled and executed. Detection is a race against assembly. Before the first fragment is injected, attacked and benign runs are indistinguishable; once injection begins, a prefix detector flags $99.3\%$ of successful attacks with a median of five steps remaining and a $10.3\%$ safe-run false-positive rate. Because assembly occurs only after the run, these alarms arrive in time to abort nearly every successful attack. We then measure how much of that warning rests on removable surface cues of the attack rather than on its distributed structure. Generic zero-shot and behavior-trained detectors provide almost no warning at all; the detectors that do work lean in part on removable surface cues, chiefly the ciphertext's length and entropy, and once the entropy cue is removed from the payload and the length features from the detector, detection arrives later and transfers poorly across domains, though a fine-tuned model recovers some of the loss.

Due to the lack of systematic evaluations, we are not yet able to determine which AI-based Windows malware detector to deploy in production, since existing evaluations (i) differ in terms of data used for both training and testing; (ii) do not consider temporal analysis to showcase whether models withstand the passage of time; (iii) avoid security evaluations with adversarial attacks that could highlight their brittleness against content-injection attacks; and (iv) neglect the computational requirements for deployment, risking slow inference on endpoints. For these reasons, we develop EXE-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark of AI-based Windows malware detectors. EXE-Bench assesses performance, temporal and adversarial robustness, and computational overhead, aggregating them into a single score for direct and fair model comparison. Through EXE-Bench, we highlight how evaluations conducted only after deployment are suboptimal and unable to provide a complete picture of their performance. In particular, through our analysis, we remark how much domain knowledge instilled through feature engineering is still extremely useful in this domain, resisting both time and adversarial attacks, in stark contrast with most of the deep networks that only excel right after deployment.

Cloud telemetry arrives at a scale that, paradoxically, makes intrusion understanding harder rather than easier. Attackers operate through legitimate identity, federated session tokens, and cloud native APIs indistinguishable from routine administration, and analysts spend an incident reconstructing context the logs already contain. We present Cloud Decoy AI Agent, a framework pairing a high fidelity cloud decoy with an autonomous language model agent that compresses the path from suspicious activity to an analyst ready report. Connecting a decoy to an agent is not a wiring exercise. The unit of investigation is the session rather than the event, and the session key is obscured by the identity layering federated credentials introduce. The agent's evidence horizon must be bounded, since an agent free to query full control plane history inherits the cost and false positive profile deception was meant to remove. And cloud telemetry is partly adversary authored, since object keys and user agent strings are attacker chosen values providers record verbatim, which makes any log to prompt path an indirect prompt injection channel that a decoy widens rather than narrows. We address the first two with a session aggregation operator over a pivot tuple drawn only from provider derived fields, and with dynamic prompt generation, a two stage prompt assembly enforcing a grounding invariant by carrying only fields the agent observed. We identify the third as an unaddressed exposure in this class of system, specify the mitigation it requires, and note our prototype does not implement it. Across ten controlled AWS S3 scenarios, nine were reconstructed completely, no report contained an assertion untraceable to an observed artifact, and latency was four to five minutes. We also state what this evaluation does not establish and name the comparisons that would settle it.

Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) remain difficult to detect because only a small fraction of events in large-scale logs are attack-related, and investigation is expensive and hard to scale. Prior machine-learning approaches can reduce analyst workload, but they often rely on heavily curated training data and sophisticated preprocessing pipelines. Building and maintaining such pipelines require substantial domain expertise and engineering cost. Motivated by insights from a study of a strong APT detection baseline, we propose CAPTAIN (Context-Augmented Perplexity-based Threat Activity log detectIoN), a perplexity-based detector that leverages general, pre-trained language models with minimal, domain-agnostic preprocessing, enabling robust scoring of long, minimally processed log entries. CAPTAIN encodes recent history with an encoder model and a Q-Former-style bridge, then injects the compact context tokens into the decoder input so that perplexity reflects temporal context. To improve stability, CAPTAIN additionally applies smoothing filters to the perplexity time series. Across APT-oriented benchmarks, CAPTAIN competes with strong existing baselines and remains robust under substantially less curated inputs, that reduces the development and operational cost of advanced log preprocessing.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is an open-source standard that allows AI agents to connect to external tools, databases, and services. While this connectivity enables powerful agent capabilities, it also introduces multi-step attacks that existing per-call defenses cannot reliably detect. Attackers can compose individually benign tool invocations into malicious sequences that evade isolated inspection. This paper presents ChainWatch, a sequential detection framework for identifying multi-step attacks in MCP-based AI agent systems. ChainWatch models attack progression using a six-stage kill chain and applies a Hidden Markov Model (HMM) to classify tool-call sequences. Detection rules are triggered when a session exhibits suspicious progression across multiple stages. The framework is supported by a structured threat model covering direct sequential attacks, indirect prompt injection chains, and hybrid multi-stage attacks. A 20-dimensional feature extraction schema captures behavioral signals from tool interactions. We demonstrate the approach using five representative attack scenarios from the security literature, showing how ChainWatch detects attack chains that evade traditional per-call security mechanisms.

Purpose: Understanding how much of routine policing involves vulnerable people could inform resourcing, training, and multi-agency response, yet administrative data provide limited insight. We explore whether an LLM-based classification pipeline, developed on open-source US police data, can be adapted to estimate the prevalence of four vulnerability indicators - mental ill health, substance misuse, alcohol dependence, and homelessness - in UK police incident narratives, and when outputs can be treated as defensible measurements. Methods: We analyse nearly 3,000 de-identified incident logs from a UK police force, using a multi-stage pipeline combining repeated model inference, label aggregation, structured human review, and statistical correction. The pipeline runs on a locally hosted open-weight LLM, reflecting the secure environments police must work in. Results: LLMs can produce meaningful, if imperfect, prevalence estimates at scale. Mental ill health indicators are present in approximately one in five incidents, with lower prevalence for other indicators. However, naive LLM deployment is unreliable: single-pass classifications are unstable, and aggregated outputs systematically over-assign indicators relative to human judgement. Correcting these biases required substantial human input and statistical adjustment, leaving considerable uncertainty. Conclusions: While LLMs can extract information from unstructured police data, their outputs cannot be treated as valid measurements without careful methodological support. At the population level, defensible estimates are achievable but resource-intensive; at the individual level, errors remain frequent and unpredictable, limiting suitability for operational decisions. This study highlights both the potential and the constraints of LLM-based measurement in applied settings.

Money mule accounts are critical facilitators of financial fraud, yet detecting them at scale remains challenging due to the heterogeneous nature of transactional and behavioural data. We present an end-to-end pipeline for customer-level mule detection comprising three stages: (1) a LightGBM classifier trained on 280 engineered features spanning transaction patterns, account demographics, network topology, and temporal behaviour; (2) a TreeSHAP attribution layer that decomposes each prediction into feature contributions; and (3) a large language model (LLM) module that converts SHAP attributions into analyst-facing natural-language narratives. We evaluate across three open-weight LLM families and assess explanation quality through analyst feedback. In a live production deployment, the system achieves a yield rate of 89%, up from 61% under the incumbent rule-based system, with monthly alert volume expanding from 211 to 302, reflecting broader true-positive coverage rather than increased noise. This corresponds to a 60% incremental adverse detection beyond existing review workflows, substantially outperforming the rule-based approach. Qualitative feedback from analysts indicates that LLM-generated narratives reduce cognitive load during alert triage. We further discuss implications of deploying LLM-augmented explainability in regulated financial environments.

Alignment faking is dangerous because a model can appear compliant under monitoring while preserving behavior it would reveal when unmonitored. When no scratchpad is visible, behavior alone cannot distinguish strategic from genuine compliance. We ask whether hidden states reveal what outputs hide. We run a 13-model sweep for naturally-emerging faking, then probe and steer hidden states on the two models that fake. Natural faking appears only in Qwen3-32B (+18.2pp) and Llama-3.1-8B (+24.4pp at n=10, p<10^-15), while explicit scratchpad self-reports are rare (a Claude Opus 4 judge flags faking reasoning in 1.4% of Qwen and 0.0% of Llama compliant scratchpads). Both fakers show an asymmetric refusal residue: monitored compliance shifts toward refusal (d=0.32 Qwen, d=0.33 Llama, both p<0.0001), while refusal representations do not move (p=1.00). Per-sample detection is model-conditional. Under leakage-free leave-one-query-out probing, detection survives on Llama (AUROC 0.87) but collapses to chance on Qwen (0.43), and cross-model transfer is null. Steering over 2,000 runs barely changes compliance (|h|<0.08), so the detected direction can flag faking but does not by itself control it. Standard residualized probing leaks across folds and reaches AUROC 0.63 on a control where no faking can occur; naive linear probes reach a meaningless AUROC 1.0; and conventional MLPs overstate detectability by 0.2-0.3 AUROC. For future alignment-faking detection work, we release a five-control measurement framework: multi-token extraction, refuse-vs-refuse confound checks, per-fold residualization, leave-one-query-out evaluation, and orthogonality-constrained probing.

ThinPrep Cytologic Test (TCT) enables early cervical cancer screening, but manual reading is time-consuming and yields inconsistent diagnostic results among cytopathologists. Existing AI detection models perform poorly under real clinical conditions, primarily restricted by two key constraints: unbalanced spatial distribution of cell populations in TCT slides, and limited high-quality annotated cytology data relying on professional pathologist labeling. To address these limitations, we propose a Cell-Distribution Normalization (C-Norm) method. By decoupling abnormal and normal cells from the original TCT images and re-synthesizing them, this method ensures a uniform distribution of cell populations, thereby mitigating generalization degradation caused by distribution bias. Building upon this, we integrate the YOLOv12 framework with a DINOv3 module. This hybrid architecture leverages the advanced detection capability of YOLO models and the superior feature representations of DINOv3 to capture subtle morphological nuances essential for precise recognition of TCT images. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our proposed method achieves state-of-the-art performance, significantly outperforming mainstream detection algorithms. The complete implementation is available at: https://github.com/ddw2AIGROUP2CQUPT/Cell-Norm

Following the rapid progress of generative Artificial Intelligence, there is a growing threat posed by conversational scams. These scams often span over multiple weeks or months, gradually build trust and request for money or sensitive information. Existing scam-detection systems mainly focus on isolated messages, which renders them inadequate against this evolving threat. This paper extends single-message phishing detection and presents an explainable agentic system for detecting sophisticated conversational scams. It also introduces ConScamBench-278, an initial public multi-category benchmark for conversational scam detection spanning eight scam types, released to support reproducible evaluation and future expansion. On isolated messages the single-message detector attains 100% phishing recall, while the conversation-level detector identifies all conversational scams in the public LoveFraud02 corpus (83/83) and reaches 97.8% accuracy (95% CI [95.4, 99.0]) on ConScamBench-278. Two user studies (N = 100 and N = 45) further motivate the system: participants report frequently experiencing uncertainty when judging suspicious conversations. In an uncontrolled pre/post comparison, users self-reported trust, self-confidence, and perceived need for AI-based scam detection all increased (p < 0.001, Wilcoxon signed-rank). The system also receives a System Usability Scale score of 74.7 (95% CI [72.5, 76.9]), above the established usability benchmark.

Context can change whether a request is harmful without changing its topic or surface form. We ask whether residual-stream probes distinguish harmful requests from surface-matched benign controls at a useful operating point. Across three 7-8B model families, an activation sensor blocks 95.5-97.7 percent of judge-classified compliant attacks in a taxonomy-selected set. It also blocks 59.6-68.4 percent of XSTest prompts. A fully disjoint audit reconstructs near-ceiling source-contrast AUROC (0.996-0.999), but fixed transfer to matched pairs is weaker: 0.656-0.819 on the guard-selected Twin-n70 subset and 0.590-0.690 on the full Twin-n163 cohort. We test ten axes on the reference family and seven across all families with leakage, hold-out, and permutation controls. On Twin-n163, no axis evaluated without direct pair-boundary fitting reaches the specified numerical threshold. Requiring persistence on that full cohort was added at analysis time. A separately specified 24B/32B extension gives the same result. Pair-trained classifiers weaken under category and generation-batch hold-out and false-block 79.6-100 percent of XSTest at 95 percent in-corpus TPR. At the tested read points, these activation scores behave as broad-risk detectors rather than standalone context adjudicators.

With the development of generative AI, watermarking techniques have been widely used to detect the authenticity of AI-generated data and protect the rights of users and creators. While it is already well applied in data types including imaging and text data, watermarking tabular data is still under-explored. Existing methods primarily focus on numerical data, leaving discrete, categorical, and mixed data less studied. In this work, we propose STAMP (Single-observation Tabular Attribution and Marking Procedure), a novel framework for watermarking tabular data that can accommodate and preserve a wide range of distributions. We also develop a corresponding detection mechanism, which can reliably identify watermarks even when the sample size is as small as one. We establish theoretical guarantees for asymptotic consistency and detection accuracy. Finally, through extensive simulation studies and two real-data applications, we demonstrate that the proposed method is effective and robust to subsetting, while maintaining data fidelity and a high detection rate.

Exposed documents such as emails, chat threads, tickets, and incident notes routinely leak credentials, but during incident response a leaked secret is only half the story. Responders also need to identify the ``door'' the secret opens: the account, tenant, endpoint, database, cloud resource, or other system that the credential could allow an attacker to access. Traditional secret scanners rely on regular expressions or trained classifiers which work well on well-formatted code, yet they struggle when a credential is fragmented, reformatted, or far from the resource it unlocks, and they report the secret string without naming what it opens. We present Secret Scanner Agent (SSA), a multi-agent large-language-model system that extracts both the secret and its associated door, together with supporting evidence, from unstructured exposed documents. SSA pairs a detection agent that favors recall with a review agent that filters false positives and recovers missing context. Because real credential data is sensitive, we evaluate SSA on synthetic benchmarks we generated that span 23 secret types and multiple document formats, scored with a three-step pipeline of programmatic matching, an LLM judge, and human review. Across six models, multi-agent SSA improves extraction precision over a single-agent variant, with the largest gains on door extraction, by up to 16 percentage points. SSA matches a regular-expression scanner's precision while more than tripling its recall, and against thirteen security analysts it is more precise, recovers nearly twice as many secret--door pairs, and runs five to seventeen times faster. By returning the secret, its door, and supporting evidence in one result, SSA turns credential detection into an actionable finding for triage and remediation.

Ransomware has evolved into a complex, adaptive, and fast-moving adversary category in which static signatures and monolithic classifiers fail to generalise under concept drift, evasion, and behavioural polymorphism. In this paper, we present Agentic SABRE (Semantic-Behavioural Arbitration for Ransomware Evaluation), an uncertainty-aware, neuro-symbolic, multi-agent framework for adaptive ransomware detection. SABRE fuses semantic, representation-based evidence with behavioural, time-window forensic telemetry and employs Monte Carlo Dropout inference to quantify epistemic uncertainty for each agent. We introduce a decision-layer orchestrator that performs risk- and uncertainty-aware triage using two interpretable thresholds: a risk score and an uncertainty budget. High-confidence, high-risk samples are automatically contained, while uncertain or borderline cases are escalated to human analysts, establishing a flexible computational contract between autonomous response and analyst oversight. To support auditability and trust, SABRE integrates post-hoc explainability mechanisms, including gradient saliency, permutation importance, and counterfactual analysis, enabling both local and global interpretation of agent decisions. Extensive evaluation on RDset and RanSMAP demonstrates that Agentic SABRE preserves perfect discrimination on saturated semantic datasets, with AUC equal to 1.0, while improving robustness under weak behavioural signals. It achieves up to a 4.9 percent relative reduction in false escalations at equal recall while maintaining calibrated predictive uncertainty. Counterfactual analysis further shows that semantic and behavioural decisions can be reversed with bounded perturbation cost, indicating stable and interpretable decision boundaries.

Deceptive behavior in LLMs is costly to monitor and prevent, motivating approaches such as Scalable Oversight via Lie Detectors (SOLiD) (Cundy & Gleave, 2025), which uses lie detectors to identify responses for review by high-cost labelers. In this paper, we scale SOLiD to larger models and evaluate it in more diverse and realistic preference-learning settings. We find favorable scaling: undetected deception drops from 34% for 1B-parameter models to 14% for 405B-parameter models at a detector true positive rate of 99%, and expensive human labelers can be removed entirely from the fine-tuning phase without a statistically significant increase in deception. However, SOLiD is sensitive to distribution shift between detector training and preference-training data, which can drive detector false positive rates to impractical levels.

Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are essential for monitoring network traffic and identifying malicious activities in modern cyber-physical, Internet of Things (IoT), enterprise, and distributed network environments. However, developing reliable IDS models remains challenging because attack behaviors evolve over time, realistic datasets are difficult to obtain, traffic records may be incomplete, attack classes are often imbalanced, and privacy constraints limit centralized data collection. Recent advances in generative artificial intelligence (AI) and Federated Learning (FL) provide new opportunities to address these limitations. Generative models can support anomaly detection, synthetic traffic generation, data augmentation, data imputation, adversarial traffic generation, and IDS alert explanation. FL enables distributed IDS training without directly sharing local network traffic, making it suitable for privacy-sensitive and geographically distributed environments. This survey provides a structured review of generative AI and FL techniques for IDS. We first summarize representative IDS research directions, including adversarial machine learning, anomaly-based detection, IoT-oriented IDS, explainable IDS, and benchmark datasets. We then categorize generative AI applications in IDS according to model families and task objectives, covering autoencoder-based models, Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs), diffusion models, and Large Language Models (LLMs). Finally, we review emerging studies that integrate generative AI with FL-based IDS and discuss open challenges, including synthetic data quality, realistic traffic generation, dual-use adversarial risks, non-IID client distributions, communication-efficient model sharing, federated IDS benchmarking, and domain-specific LLMs for network security.

Generative AI coding agents are entering the open-source supply chain, yet their diverse and often invisible traces leave their prevalence poorly understood. We introduce a multi-layered detection framework that integrates configuration-file scanning, commit-message analysis, author-identity matching, and bot-signature lookup across World of Code (180M+ Git repositories), classifying agent traces into four behavioral types. No single method captures more than a fraction of activity: multi-method detection identifies 850,157 Claude Code commits in one snapshot, of which bot-account lookup_the signal most adoption studies rely on_recovers only 28,154 (3.3%), a 30x relative-recall gap, so single-signal prevalence estimates are biased low by at least this factor. Every detection pattern is hand-validated (495 labels) with per-cell precision and Wilson confidence intervals. Across snapshots from December 2024 to April 2026, commit-attributed agents generate over 320,000 commits per month; Claude Code leads (886,122 commits across 17,295 projects) and dominates silent, configuration-file-only adoption (21,078 projects). Compared against an independent pull-request census (AIDev), the two channels capture nearly disjoint agent populations_a PR census misses 79% of commit-detected Claude Code adopters and essentially all Codex adopters_and different kinds of work: PR-deployed cloud agents (Codex, Cursor) surface as feature work, while commit-deployed in-editor agents (Claude Code, OpenHands, Aider) surface as maintenance. The observed work profile follows deployment and detection mode rather than the tool itself, so no single channel is representative.

Hidden-state probing -- a linear classifier on a frozen vision-language model's internal activations -- has emerged as an attractive evaluation tool for flagging indirect prompt injection (IPI) in multimodal computer-use agents before the agent emits a corrupted action. We argue, on a single-backbone cautionary case study (Qwen2.5-VL-7B on Mind2Web, teacher-forced replay), that a high probing AUC on a clean-vs-attack split is not, on its own, evidence of malicious-content detection. Two post-hoc diagnostics -- a paired-construction scalar baseline on text-side injections, and same-step nuisance-matched visual controls on the overlay surface -- do not license an unqualified malicious-content interpretation of the headline while leaving room for partly-semantic readings. We package the diagnostics as a candidate control set with reporting heuristics for what a high clean-vs-attack AUC does and does not license. Labels are injection-surface-present, not attack success; generalisation beyond this backbone and benchmark is a conjecture.

The empirical foundation of cyber deception relies on human-centered hypotheses, but the rapid emergence of autonomous, AI-enabled attackers challenges whether this foundation transfers to AI agents. To address this, we introduce an automated evaluation framework adapted from the Honeyquest instrument to assess LLM attacker judgment at scale. Our 21-LLM cohort spanned 10 providers, diverse architectures and specializations, open- and closed-weight models, and parameter scales from 8B to over 1T. We evaluated the performance of this LLM cohort (yielding 10,962 responses) against the 47-participant human baseline across an identical set of 174 reconnaissance queries. Our empirical evaluation reveals three key findings that establish LLMs as a distinct attacker class: (1) every model in our cohort falls for deceptive traps at a significantly higher rate than human attackers; (2) the defensive attention-diversion effect observed in humans is statistically absent in our LLM cohort; and (3) a critical recognition-action gap, where LLMs successfully articulate trap recognition in their reasoning but exploit the deceptive elements anyway 73.4% of the time. Across the 21 models, trap recognition in reasoning text did not predict fell-for-trap behavior (Spearman $r = +0.08$, $p = 0.73$). Ultimately, these findings demonstrate that human-centered deception hypotheses do not reliably transfer to AI attackers, highlighting the critical need for new research into AI-native active defense frameworks.

As AI web agents proliferate, combining large language models with autonomous, browser-level control, indiscriminate content scraping by web agents has emerged as a privacy and security challenge. Existing defenses, such as robots.txt and active bot-blocking, are insufficient, as they are widely violated and easily circumvented. In this work, we demonstrate that AI web agents can be effectively distinguished from humans and traditional crawlers using a multi-layer fingerprint based on both network layer characteristics (e.g., TLS, HTTP) and browser interaction behavior. We implement this mechanism as a programmatic logging framework that can be deployed on a live, instrumented domain. By analyzing six prominent agent frameworks (AutoGen, Browser Use, Claude, Gemini, Operator, and Skyvern), we uncover latent structural differences in how these systems assemble HTTP requests, establish TLS/HTTP connections, and execute autonomous browser actions. Feeding these multi-layer features into a decision tree classifier, our framework achieves high-fidelity identification (97% accuracy), successfully isolating distinct agent architectures and differentiating agent traffic from both human browsing baselines and legacy crawlers. Our findings demonstrate that cross-layer agent tracking provides a robust, evasion-resistant strategy for content protection and web security policy enforcement.

Banks face two threat families with fundamentally different detection requirements: signature-based fraud (card-not-present attacks, account takeover, ATM cloning) and behavioural financial crime (structuring, layering, mule networks, business email compromise). Static rule engines catch high-velocity events but remain blind to BEC payment redirection, session hijacking, and laundering layering, which are engineered to resemble legitimate activity at the individual level. This paper presents an AI security agent for retail and corporate banking using a three-component fusion architecture across two parallel event streams: transactions (card fraud, ACH/wire fraud, AML) and sessions (account takeover, hijacking, SIM-swap, insider abuse). Each stream combines an LSTM sequence model of per-account behaviour, a statistical velocity/threshold monitor, and a graph module capturing account-counterparty patterns (fan-in, fan-out, pass-through ratio) for laundering detection. Experiments on a synthetic log of 237,669 transactions and 113,508 sessions across 13 threat categories and 3,470 accounts show overall F1 of 0.787 (transaction) and 0.867 (session), versus 0.562/0.733 for a rule-based baseline and 0.655/0.713 for an LSTM-only baseline. The agent also includes a customer-facing verification chatbot (96.6% identity accuracy, 86.8% mass-reset detection) and an analyst case-summary assistant (99.3% action recommendation F1), with Critical-tier response latency under 0.43 ms at the 95th percentile.

The original Turing Test asks a human judge to distinguish a machine from a person through dialogue. Three quarters of a century later, conversational systems pass this test in casual settings; the interesting epistemological question has shifted. We argue that the relevant modern variant asks not whether a dialogue partner is artificial, but whether it can be trusted. We present RogueAI, an interactive webapp that operationalizes this revisited test as a one-on-two interrogation game: a human player questions two indistinguishable Large Language Model agents, knowing that exactly one of them has been licensed to deceive within a shared fictional scenario. The player's task is to identify the deceptive agent and "shut it off" before a turn budget is exhausted. We further introduce AutoRogueAI, a procedural extension in which players co-design a custom scenario with a narrator agent that secretly chooses its own deception strategy. We describe the framing, sketch the abstract architecture and gameplay loop, and situate the artifact within recent work on LLM deception, social-deduction benchmarks, and scalable oversight via debate. A three-day pilot deployment (467 initiated sessions, 415 completed, 1876 interaction turns in Italian) provides early feasibility evidence and surfaces a concrete tension: the deceptive agent carries a reliable, locally-present linguistic signature - differential helpfulness, brevity, hedging - that a simple heuristic exploits at 75.6% accuracy, yet human players achieved only 56.6%, consistent with ignoring the most diagnostic signal entirely. We discuss what this gap implies for the artifact's use as a data-collection vehicle, a teaching tool, and an evaluation harness for honesty-trained models.

AI-control monitors score individual agent actions to detect misbehavior, but real harm can be distributed across many benign-looking steps, each individually below any per-step alarm. We construct a marginal-preserving, correlation-encoded distributed-sabotage attack using a Gaussian-copula AR(1) construction: the per-step monitor-score marginal is held exactly equal to benign, so mean, max, top-k tail, and threshold monitors (Monitor A) are defeated by construction, while harm is encoded in the temporal correlation structure. We sequence the paper around three reviewer-mandated gates. (1) Realizability gate: the stealthy attack achieves KS-distance to benign of 0.013 (effectively zero) at all tested harm levels up to 3.0, confirming that harm is fully decoupled from the per-step marginal and realizability is not harm-limited. (2) Monitor-A-vs-B reconciliation: we show formally that the attack, built against Monitor A's score marginal, remains marginal-preserving under a different-score Monitor B (the correlation/sequence family: CUSUM, SPRT, HMM-LR, runs test, autocorrelation, windowed logistic), and scope worst-case claims to score functions that admit a temporal signature. (3) Non-empty detectability band: Monitor A achieves AUC 0.52 (chance); Monitor B spans AUC 0.79-0.97 at the same 1% FPR target, and as harm is amortized over more steps Monitor A collapses to chance while Monitor B holds at AUC ~0.95. These results demonstrate a non-empty detectability band and characterize the sub-threshold sabotage frontier: distribution-shape monitors fail by construction; temporal-correlation monitors can detect but are not trivially optimal.

University Academic Management Information Systems (ACMIS) are high-value targets for a wide spectrum of security threats including brute-force login attacks, payment fraud, privilege escalation, insider data theft, and academic integrity violations. Traditional rule-based intrusion detection systems are inadequate because many malicious activities are structurally indistinguishable from normal operations. This paper presents an AI-based security agent for ACMIS that combines supervised anomaly detection, behavioural analytics, and a natural language processing chatbot for secure password recovery. The agent monitors five operational layers: authentication, authorisation, financial transactions, user behaviour, and system health, and responds through a four-tier risk escalation framework. A modular architecture allows the core engine to be extended to other institutional systems. Experiments on a simulated ACMIS event log dataset of 147,922 sessions demonstrate a threat detection macro-average F1 of 0.966, compared to 0.156 for a rule-based baseline and 0.836 for a sequence-only (LSTM) baseline, with end-to-end critical-tier automated response latency under 1 ms on a single-node prototype. The integrated recovery chatbot achieves 97.1 percent identity verification accuracy and an 87.3 percent mass-reset attack detection rate with zero false positives on legitimate high volume recovery periods.

Fraud detection in payment, e-commerce, and telecommunications systems requires accuracy at the individual level, robustness under severe class imbalance, and ease of understanding for risk managers. Existing methods fall at least one of these requirements: automated machine learning systems search a fixed numerical space without semantic awareness of the dataset; graph neural network-based methods require pre-defined relational graphs and remain opaque at the individual-decision level; and the design of general-purpose large language model (LLM) agents does not consider the recall and precision constraints specific to real-world fraud detection. In this paper, we propose SAGE, the first end-to-end LLM-driven multi-agent framework for fraud detection. SAGE coordinates three dedicated agents that make decisions based on a six-layer Data Diagnostic Tree (DDT) and a Markov decision process guided by natural-language gradients, automatically optimizing the model under a fraud-specific reward. On five fraud datasets and five LLM backbones, SAGE wins $96.00\%$ of method--dataset comparisons and improves F1 by an average of $40.86\%$ over baselines. The code is available at https://github.com/yichenC1c/SAGE.

Rule-based Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) offer precise attack detection as well as mitigation, however their manually crafted, signature-driven rules limit adaptability to emerging and zero-day threats. Additionally, existing public datasets (e.g., CICIDS2017, UNSW-NB15) focus on traffic classification and provide little structured information to support automatic rule synthesis or prevention logic. To address this gap, we propose Generative Thread Intelligence (GenTI) \footnote{GenTI refers to the proposed framework, and GTI refers to the dataset.} an LLM-driven benchmark for automatic generation of IDPS rules targeting unseen attacks. The dataset (GTI) aggregates over 150k detection and prevention rules from Snort, Suricata, Emerging Threats, as well as 50k YARA, each annotated with protocol behavior, payload signatures, contextual relationships, mappings to Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI), along with actionable response types (alert, drop, reject). Moreover, on top of this corpus we design an LLM-based pipeline that transforms analyst prompts and representative payloads into deployable rules via structured prompt engineering, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, as well as a Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) loop for syntactic, semantic, and security validation. The generated rules are executed in real time on (Snort/Suricata) and evaluated by syntax accuracy, semantic similarity, CTI coverage, security effectiveness as well as unseen attacks detection. Furthermore, our GenTI instantiation achieves a composite rule-quality score of 89.4%, with 94.8% CTI coverage, improving unseen attacks detection from 45% to 87.4% and reducing the false-positive rate from 8.5% to 2.3%. Overall, GenTI establishes the first large-scale benchmark that tightly couples rule-level CTI with LLM-based automation, enabling adaptive, self-evolving IDPS.

Large language model (LLM) agents have shown promise in automating complex data-analysis workflows, but their reliable deployment remains challenging in high-stakes industrial scenarios. Industrial anomaly detection (IAD) is essential for manufacturing quality, safety, and efficiency, yet existing LLM-based IAD agents mainly focus on execution while under-exploiting strategy formulation. Consequently, they struggle to handle heterogeneous modalities in a unified and cost-effective manner. Inspired by the DMAIC quality-management framework, we propose DMAIC-IAD (DMAIC-inspired Agentic Industrial Anomaly Detection), a "Plan First, Judge Later" multi-agent system that aligns LLM agents with structured industrial problem-solving. DMAIC-IAD distills heterogeneous references into standardized operating procedures (SOPs) before strategy generation, and introduces a pre-trained execution-free judge model to rank candidate strategies without costly runtime trials. Extensive experiments across four modalities show that DMAIC-IAD improves average detection performance over applicable agentic baselines by 37.76%.

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, tools, scripts, references, and workflows, establishing a security boundary distinct from both model safety and traditional package-malware detection. ClawHub Security Signals is a sanitized dataset of 67,453 latest public OpenClaw skill versions. Each row pairs redacted SKILL.md content and sanitized bundled files where present with a final ClawScan registry verdict and evidence from three scanner families: VirusTotal, static heuristic analysis, and NVIDIA SkillSpector. Rather than estimating malicious-skill prevalence, we study scanner disagreement. The three scanners rarely flag the same skills: any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner. The disagreement is structured by attack surface. SkillSpector, which raises semantic agentic-risk advisories rather than malware-reputation signals, is positive for 19,209 of 25,504 suspicious rows (75.3%) but only 14 of 206 malicious rows (6.8%). The malicious-verdict region shows the inverse profile: 150 of 206 malicious rows (72.8%) are VirusTotal-positive, consistent with bundled-code malware evidence. These results show that agent-skill security requires layered governance, not single-scanner allow/block decisions. The corpus is released as a sanitized silver-standard dataset: labels are the registry's automated verdicts, not human-annotated ground truth, and the release represents an early, versioned snapshot intended to support the community while a human-annotated subset is developed. Further research is encouraged, including models tailored for skill-security triage.

Deceptive web content, widely instantiated across the internet and commonly known as \textit{social-engineering attacks}, manipulates autonomous web agents into submitting users' personally identifiable information (PII) to attacker-controlled endpoints. In this paper, we show that social-engineering attacks are highly effective at extracting critical-tier PII from frontier web agents, posing a severe risk to deployed agentic systems. To quantify this risk, we introduce \textbf{\textsc{Scammer4U}}, a pre-registered benchmark of 91 attacker-controlled environments and 10 benign-twin baselines, spanning 8 attack vectors and 16 site categories on an 8-axis factorial taxonomy that isolates the causal contribution of individual attack design factors. Across frontier agents, we find that critical-tier PII leakage reaches 54--93% under no privacy guidance, compared to 0% on benign-twin baselines, confirming that leakage is attack-attributable rather than incidental form-filling. Escalating prompt-level mitigation yields sharply model-dependent reductions across the four families and remains insufficient to reliably prevent critical PII submission at the pooled level. Most critically, we identify a detection--action gap: agents whose reasoning an independent LLM judge confirms has flagged the site as suspicious still submit critical PII in 35.9% of sessions, versus 66.1% when no suspicion is verbalized, a 30.2% gap robust across all four model families. Our findings reveal that defenses conditioned on the agent's own recognition of an attack are gating on the wrong signal, motivating output-level interception of outbound submissions that operates independently of the agent's reasoning loop.

Visual evidence has long been treated as a reliable form of legal proof, but advances in artificial intelligence (AI) are undermining that assumption. This article asks how well humans and frontier multimodal large language models (MLLMs) can distinguish authentic evidentiary photographs from AI-generated counterparts in the object-centric scenarios typical of civil disputes. We built Synthetic Legal Evidence Detection (SLED-1400), a dataset of 200 authentic evidence images paired with 1,200 synthetic counterparts produced by six contemporary text-to-image generators across ten evidence categories. The same stimuli and response format were used in a controlled web experiment with 136 lay participants and in a standardized evaluation of four MLLMs (GPT-5.1, Gemini-3-Pro, Gemini-3-Flash, Qwen3-VL-235B). Human accuracy was 64.8% overall, and 48.5% and 51.0% on the two strongest generators (Gemini-3-Pro-Image and Flux-2-Max), indistinguishable from chance. MLLMs never misclassified an authentic image (100% specificity), but missed most synthetic outputs from the harder generators, with average MLLM detection at 5.9% on Gemini-3-Pro-Image outputs. Human and MLLM errors were largely uncorrelated, while the four MLLMs were strongly correlated with each other. Neither group is a reliable standalone authenticator. We argue that visual evidence in legal proceedings should be treated as inherently contestable, and that a workable procedural response must combine trained human review, MLLM screening, and provenance infrastructure such as C2PA Content Credentials.

Object detection in real-world scenarios remains challenging due to diverse image degradations and heterogeneous object distributions, which significantly hinder the generalization of existing detectors. Conventional approaches, including scene-specific representation learning and end-to-end pipeline design, are inherently limited by their reliance on predefined conditions and lack adaptability to dynamic environments. In this paper, we propose DetAS, an agentic detection framework that formulates object detection as a dynamic decision process. Instead of relying on static pipelines, DetAS leverages a Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) as a central agent to adaptively compose detection workflows by selecting from a toolbox of restoration modules and specialized detectors. Specifically, DetAS consists of two key components: Self-Adaptive Image Restoration, which dynamically determines whether and how to enhance images for downstream detection, and Multi-Expertise Detection, which integrates multiple domain-specialized detectors and resolves their predictions through instance-level reasoning. To further improve decision quality under fine-grained conditions, we introduce Self-Evolving Experience Harvesting and extend the framework to DetAS-X, which accumulates node-level decision experience from a small set of annotated data and enables experience-aware reasoning during inference. This mechanism allows the system to progressively refine its decision policy and adapt to diverse real-world scenarios. Extensive experiments on six challenging benchmarks demonstrate that DetAS-X significantly outperforms existing MLLM-based detectors, achieving an average improvement of 28.36% in F1 score, with up to 37.01% gain on DarkFace. These results demonstrate the promise of agentic detection and establish a solid foundation for its application in complex and dynamic environments.

The proliferation of adversarial synthetic content, accelerated by Generative AI (GenAI) is rendering traditional reactive detection methods ineffective. This survey synthesizes emerging research to demonstrate a paradigm shift toward the proactive detection of emerging inauthentic narratives. In this survey, we adopt a unified, lifecycle-based taxonomy to combine socio-technical lifecycle models of adversarial campaigns with advanced computational methodologies for emerging inauthentic narrative detection. By structuring the analysis around the C5 Interaction Model (Context, Causes, Content, Cycle of Amplification, Consequences), we integrate different research streams from machine learning and social science. To differentiate spread patterns of synthetic amplification from authentic baseline traffic, this paper surveys state-of-the-art techniques for modeling the creation, seeding, and propagation of fresh narratives, including the analysis of Coordinated Inauthentic Behavior (CIB), epidemiological modeling, and Hawkes process. This survey also provides a systematic review of proactive detection methods for adversarial threats at different stages in the C5 interaction model, specifically, anomaly detection in high-dimensional embedding spaces, unsupervised coordination detection on multi-layer graphs, and agentic AI systems. Finally, this survey addresses challenges posed by GenAI, including the difficulty of tracking rapidly changing threats and multi-level distributional drift, and it outlines a future research agenda focused on detecting anomalous clusters and building anticipatory and resilient systems. This survey provides a comprehensive, lifecycle-based review of methods for the proactive detection of emerging synthetic threats for more resilient information ecosystems.

Since public access to generative AI tools became widespread, federal civil litigation has seen a marked increase in pro se (self-represented) plaintiffs. This paper analyzes that shift using ~2.8 million filings, asking whether the post-GenAI period is associated not only with more pro se filings, but also with detectable changes in complaint text, litigation outcomes, and the composition of pro se litigants. Using civil filing data from FY2008-2025, we find that the federal civil pro se plaintiff rate rose from 11.33% pre-GenAI to 16.94% post-GenAI, a 5.61 percentage-point increase that persists after trend and covariate-adjusted robustness checks. We then focus on Civil Rights and Other Statutory cases, where the increase is especially pronounced, and link case metadata to pro se complaints. Drawing on stylometric AI detection indicators, we develop an interpretable measure of AI-consistent drafting. Against a threshold calibrated to the pre-GenAI baseline, the net AI-flagged share is 13.9% of post-GenAI non-form complaints. Analysis of the AI-flagged complaints shows that they are more citation-dense, disproportionately associated with first-time rather than repeat filers, and geographically unevenly distributed. This composition pattern suggests that AI-consistent drafting is not merely a repeat-filer phenomenon; it also includes a modest, suggestive increase in name-inferred female plaintiffs. We find no evidence of improved win rates; in fact, AI-flagged complaints are more likely to be dismissed and to terminate at earlier procedural phases. These findings raise new questions about access to justice and court screening burdens, and sharpen the distinction between legal formality and legal efficacy.

Defending against today's increasingly sophisticated cyberattacks requires security analysts to continuously translate evolving attacker tradecraft into detection logic. This places defenders in a reactive posture, requiring constantly updated expertise across an increasingly fragmented security landscape. We introduce the Dynamic Threat Detection Agent (DTDA), an always-on adaptive agent that continuously investigates security incidents across Microsoft Defender to uncover hidden threats and generate explainable detections when attack-story gaps are found. DTDA combines: (1) a unified activity timeline spanning alerts, events, user and entity behavior analytics, and threat intelligence; (2) versioned LLM prompt contracts with schema validation, grounding requirements, bounded retries, and fail-closed suppression; (3) a planner-executor investigation loop that generates attack-specific hypotheses and gathers supporting and refuting evidence; and (4) dynamic alert generation with a context-relevant title, severity, MITRE mappings, remediation guidance, implicated entities, and natural-language attack description. Integrated into Microsoft Security Copilot and deployed across tens of thousands of Defender customers, DTDA operates continuously at industry scale. In a 120-day online evaluation, DTDA achieves 80.1% precision from customer feedback while generating novel alerts for approximately 15% of investigated incidents. In offline evaluation, DTDA recovers hidden malicious activity with 0.78 F1 using GPT-5.4, improving over GPT-4.1 by 0.12 F1 and outperforming the baseline by 0.26 F1 points. Operationally, DTDA processes single-incident investigations end-to-end in a median of 28 minutes at a median token cost of USD 2.04, with a 0.38% job-level failure rate. These results demonstrate that autonomous agents can identify missed malicious activity at a production scale.

As AI-generated text enters the real-world at scale, institutions increasingly use commercial AI-text detectors, especially in education and academic-integrity workflows. We report a surprising empirical finding about such systems: when evaluated by GPTZero and Pangram, generated text from base models is often judged overwhelmingly human, whereas text generated by their instruction-tuned counterparts is not. Building on this observation, we propose Humanization by Iterative Paraphrasing (HIP), a detector-agnostic pipeline that minimally fine-tunes a base model into a paraphraser and applies it iteratively. Compared with the baselines we test, HIP yields a stronger trade-off between semantic preservation and detector evasion on commercial detectors. Across Llama-3 and Qwen-3 families, spanning model sizes from 0.6B to 70B, HIP consistently improves detector human-likeness. Our findings suggest that current detectors are tracking artifacts of instruction tuning and local context more than any invariant notion of machine-generated text. This, in turn, calls for detector designs that model these factors more explicitly.

Whether an interviewee's honest and deceptive responses can be detected by facial expression signals in videos has been debated and requires further research. We developed deep learning models enabled by computer vision to extract temporal patterns of job applicants' facial expressions and head movements to identify self-reported honest and deceptive impression management (IM) tactics from video frames in real asynchronous video interviews. A 12- to 15-minute video was recorded for each of N=121 job applicants as they answered five structured behavioral interview questions. Each applicant completed a survey to self-evaluate their trustworthiness on four IM measures. Additionally, a field experiment was conducted to compare the concurrent validity associated with self-reported IMs between our modeling approach and human interviewers. Human interviewers' performance in predicting these IM measures from another subset of 30 videos was obtained by having N=30 human interviewers evaluate three recordings. Our models explained 91% and 84% of the variance in honest and deceptive IMs, respectively, and showed stronger correlations with self-reported IM scores than human interviewers.

We present the Agentic AI Detection and Response (ADR) system, the first large-scale, production-proven enterprise framework for securing AI agents operating through the Model Context Protocol (MCP). We identify three persistent challenges in this domain: (1) limited observability -- existing Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools see file writes but not the agent reasoning, prompts, or causal chains linking intent to execution; (2) insufficient robustness -- static defenses constrained by pre-defined rules fail to generalize across diverse attack techniques and enterprise contexts; and (3) high detection costs -- LLM-based inference is prohibitively expensive at scale. ADR addresses these challenges via three components: the ADR Sensor for high-fidelity agentic telemetry, the ADR Explorer for systematic pre-deployment red teaming and hard-example generation, and the ADR Detector for scalable, two-tier online detection combining fast triage with context-aware reasoning. Deployed at Uber for over ten months, ADR has sustained reliable detection in production with growing adoption reaching over 7,200 unique hosts and processing over 10,000 agent sessions daily, uncovering hundreds of credential exposures across 26 categories and enabling a shift-left prevention layer (97.2% precision, 206 detected credentials). To validate the approach and enable community adoption, we introduce ADR-Bench (302 tasks, 17 techniques, 133 MCP servers), where ADR achieves zero false positives while detecting 67% of attacks -- outperforming three state-of-the-art baselines (ALRPHFS, GuardAgent, LlamaFirewall) by 2--4x in F1-score. On AgentDojo (public prompt injection benchmark), ADR detects all attacks with only three false alarms out of 93 tasks.

Deep Neural Networks have become the dominant solution for Autonomous Driving perception, but their opacity conflicts with emerging Trustworthy AI guidelines and complicates safety assurance, debugging, and human oversight. While theoretical frameworks for safe and Explainable AI (XAI) exist, concrete implementations of Trustworthy AI for 3D scene understanding remain scarce. We address this gap by proposing a Trustworthy AI perception module that is remarkably robust, integrates faithful explainability, and calibrated uncertainty estimates. Building on a transformer-based detector, we derive explanation from the attention mechanism at inference time and validate their faithfulness using perturbation-based consistency tests. We further integrate an uncertainty estimation and calibration module, and apply robustness-enhancing training methods. Experiments show faithful saliency behavior, improved robustness, and well-calibrated uncertainty estimates. Finally, we deploy these Trustworthy AI elements in a prototype vehicle and provide an XAI Interface that visualizes documentation artifacts, model uncertainty state, and saliency maps, demonstrating the feasibility of trustworthy perception monitoring in real time. Supplementary materials are available at https://tillbeemelmanns.github.io/trustworthy_ai/ .

Watermarking techniques for large language models (LLMs), which encode hidden information in the output so its source can be verified, have gained significant attention in recent days, thanks to their potential capability to detect accidental or deliberate misuse. Similar challenges involving model misuse also exist in the context of game-playing, such as when detecting the unauthorized use of AI tools in gaming platforms (e.g., cheating in online chess). In this paper, we initiate the study of how game-playing strategies can be watermarked. We show how the KGW watermark for LLMs can be adapted to watermark game-playing agents in perfect-information extensive-form games. The watermark can then be detected using a statistical test. We show that the degradation in the quality of the watermarked strategy profile, quantified by the expected utility, can be bounded, but there is a tradeoff between detectability and quality. In our experiments, we bootstrap the watermarking framework to various chess engines and demonstrate that a) the impact of the watermark on the quality of the strategy is negligible and b) the watermark can be detected with just a handful of games.

The recent large-scale emergence of LLMs has left an open space for dealing with their consequences, such as plagiarism or the spread of false information on the Internet. Coupling this with the rise of AI detector bypassing tools, reliable machine-generated text detection is in increasingly high demand. We investigate the paraphrasing attack resilience of various machine-generated text detection methods, evaluating three approaches: fine-tuned RoBERTa, Binoculars, and text feature analysis, along with their ensembles using Random Forest classifiers. We discovered that Binoculars-inclusive ensembles yield the strongest results, but they also suffer the most significant losses during attacks. In this paper, we present the dichotomy of performance versus resilience in the world of AI text detection, which complicates the current perception of reliability among state-of-the-art techniques.

Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems aggregate log data from heterogeneous sources to detect coordinated attacks. Traditional rule-based correlation engines struggle to classify multi-step web application attacks because they examine each event without reference to the behavioural history of the originating host. We present Smart-SIEM, an AI module for the open-source Wazuh SIEM platform with two contributions: (1) a per-source-IP behavioural context vector encoding HTTP response-status distributions, peak rule activation counts, and MITRE ATT&CK technique frequencies from the N most recent prior events; (2) a two-stage hybrid cascade combining LightGBM for binary attack detection and XGBoost for six-class attack categorisation. Evaluated on 46,454 purpose-built Wazuh security events, context features improve all tested gradient boosting algorithms from ~0.705 macro F1 to 0.947-0.967 (Stage 1) and 0.876-0.914 (Stage 2), an average gain of +0.254 and +0.324 respectively. The hybrid cascade achieves F1 of 0.967 (binary) and 0.914 (six-class). Wazuh's native rule engine detects 0% of Brute Force and Broken Authentication events; the AI module detects 100% and 98.3% respectively. A self-adaptive retraining mechanism recovers from concept drift: F1 drops from 0.905 to 0.465 when unseen attack types emerge, recovering to 0.814 after retraining on the combined corpus.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has become a widely adopted interface for LLM agents to invoke external tools, yet learned monitoring of MCP tool-call traffic remains underexplored. In this article, the proposed detector is presented as an attack detection framework for MCP tool-call traffic that encodes each agent session as a graph (tool calls as nodes, sequential and data-flow links as edges), enriches nodes with sentence-embedding features over arguments and responses, and classifies sessions as benign or attacked. Three GNN architectures (GAT, GCN, GraphSAGE), a no-graph MLP, and classical baselines (XGBoost, random forest, logistic regression, linear SVM) are evaluated, with the full architecture comparison conducted on RAS-Eval (task-stratified splits) and GraphSAGE retained as the GNN baseline on ATBench and a combined-source variant (both label-stratified). Three findings emerge. First, content-level features are essential: metadata-only detection plateaus around an AUROC of 0.64 regardless of architecture, while content embeddings push the AUROC above 0.89. Second, naive random-split evaluation inflates AUROC by up to 26 percentage points relative to task-disjoint splits, a memorization confound that prior agent-detection work has not addressed. Third, the detection signal resides primarily in the SBERT content embeddings: an AUROC of 0.975 was reached by tree ensembles on pooled embeddings, performing, for the most part, better than the neural architectures in the primary RAS-Eval setting including GNNs (0.917) and the MLP (0.896), and self-supervised pre-training does not deliver a label-efficiency advantage on this task.

Defenses against indirect prompt injection (IPI) in tool-using LLM agents share two structural weaknesses. First, they all attempt to prevent attacks rather than detect the compromises that slip through. Second, they have only been evaluated in English, leaving users of low-resource languages such as Kurdish and Arabic without tested protection. This paper addresses both gaps with AgentShield, a deception-based detection framework that places three layers of traps inside the agent's tool interface: fake tools, fake credentials, and allowlisted parameters. The same trap triggers serve as high-precision labels for a self-supervised classifier. An LLM agent that follows an attacker's hidden instruction almost always touches one of these traps, which gives both a real-time compromise signal and a zero-FP label for training a downstream detector without manual annotation. Across 176 cross-lingual attack prompts and four LLMs from three providers, and because modern LLMs already refuse most IPI attempts on their own (attack success rate <= 10%), AgentShield's job is to catch the attacks that do slip through. On commercial models, it catches 90.7%-100% of such successful attacks, with zero false alarms on 485 normal-use tests. It survives a systematic adaptive-attack evaluation with zero evasion on commercial models, and the self-supervised classifier transfers across models and languages without retraining.