Equilibrium

Disaggregated inference architectures physically separate prefill and decode phases onto distinct GPU pools, creating competing "agents" that share a fixed hardware budget. We provide, to our knowledge, the first formal game-theoretic analysis of this architecture, using NVIDIA Dynamo as a concrete case study. We model disaggregated serving as three coupled games: a two-player resource game between prefill and decode pools, a selfish caching game over the hierarchical KV cache, and a congestion game with positive externalities for request routing. We empirically validate the latter two; the P/D resource game is treated analytically (Section 9.2). We characterize how GPU saturation induces regime transitions that shift the game's payoff structure: below saturation, selfish behavior has bounded Price of Anarchy (PoA); at saturation, superlinear latency and cache externalities drive our empirical estimator PoA-hat (defined in Section 6.4) upward. Based on this analysis, we design an adaptive controller that detects saturation transitions in real time and adjusts routing parameters accordingly, shifting from cache-affinity exploitation to load-balanced congestion avoidance. We instantiate our framework on a 3-node NVIDIA B200 cluster running Dynamo with two models, Nemotron-4-340B (TP=8, full-node workers with cross-InfiniBand KV transfers) and Llama-3.1-70B (TP=4), and find the same three-regime PoA-hat structure with the same first post-knee grid point (C=128) on both models. Adaptive routing shifts each model to a better operating point. Our strongest result is on the 70B 1P/5D topology, where PoA-hat drops 3.1x (66.4 to 21.5) in the saturated phase at a 13% throughput cost. On the 70B 1P/2D, PoA-hat drops 2.2x and TTFT P99 drops 7.6x (see Section 8.5).

We introduce Equilibrium State Estimation (ESE), a novel paradigm for simultaneous prediction, where multiple interacting systems require separate yet coordinated forecasts. Such scenarios often arise in real-world settings such as economics and healthcare modeling. Unlike existing approaches that predict one system at a time, ESE forecasts all systems in a single pass. It first estimates the equilibrium state across systems, then generates holistic forecasts based on the difference between the current state and the estimated equilibrium. Extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets, including currency exchange and COVID-19 spread modeling, demonstrate that ESE is at least as accurate as state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods while being significantly faster. In addition, ESE integrates seamlessly with conventional predictors, combining their accuracy with its exceptional efficiency and delivering a 10-70x speedup. With linear-time complexity, ESE scales far better than SOTA methods as the number of systems increases. Moreover, it remains accurate under diverse perturbations, establishing ESE as a fast, generalizable, robust, and scalable multi-prediction method.

Cooperation in multi-agent systems is typically optimized through utilitarian objectives that maximize overall efficiency but fail to account for reward distribution, often resulting in inequitable "leader-follower" dynamics. While fairness-based approaches encourage pro-social behaviors where every agent benefits from cooperation, many current algorithms - including those utilizing reward shaping - break the stationarity of Markov Games or lack rigorous theoretical guarantees. This creates a critical gap between fair objective methods and theoretically safe learning frameworks. We propose a novel framework that bridges $α$-fairness with Heterogeneous-Agent Trust Region Learning (HATRL), ensuring monotonic improvement and convergence toward Nash Equilibria. Our approach leverages a fair advantage function that dynamically weights agent utilities based on their expected returns, allowing the global objective to transition from purely utilitarian efficiency to $α$-fairness welfare based on the parameter $α$. We introduce two practical algorithms, $α$-fair HATRPO and $α$-fair HAPPO, and demonstrate through experiments in sequential social dilemmas like CleanUp and CommonHarvest that they perform better than HATRL's algorithms from a utilitarian point of view while achieving socially higher outcomes.

In this paper, we develop a continuous-time model-free reinforcement learning algorithm to learn deterministic equilibrium policies in general time-inconsistent control problems. Utilizing the extended Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system, we recast the original time-inconsistent problem into an equivalent two-stage problem. In the first stage, for given auxiliary functions, we employ the deterministic policy gradient approach to learn an optimal policy in an auxiliary time-consistent control problem. In the second stage, given the updated policy, we exploit the inner fixed point iterations and some martingale characterizations to learn the auxiliary functions. As a theoretical contribution, we provide some mild model assumptions and establish the convergence of inner fixed point iterations. By repeating this actor-critic style of iterations across two stages, our algorithm aims to learn the equilibrium under different sources of time-inconsistency in a unified manner. The superior effectiveness of the proposed algorithm are illustrated in two classical financial applications with time-inconsistency: mean-variance portfolio management and optimal tracking portfolio under non-exponential discounting.

Real-world multi-agent systems, from traffic coordination to resource allocation, are often modeled as general-sum games where individual incentives conflict with collective welfare. In these settings, the central challenge is not merely finding an equilibrium, but selecting socially desirable outcomes among many suboptimal Nash equilibria. Standard deep multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods struggle with this problem, as value-decomposition approaches are constrained by monotonicity assumptions and policy-gradient methods often converge to stable but socially inefficient equilibria. To address this limitation, we propose $Φ$-Actor-Critic ($Φ$-AC), a framework that leverages swap regret minimization to steer learning toward high-welfare correlated equilibria (CE). To make counterfactual regret estimation tractable in deep MARL, $Φ$-AC employs a centralized attention critic that predicts vector-valued regrets in a single forward pass, avoiding computationally expensive counterfactual simulations. We further introduce a Lagrangian-based equilibrium selection mechanism that optimizes social welfare while enforcing stability through regret constraints. Experiments on matrix games, Multi-Agent Particle Environments (MPE), and the Melting Pot Harvest scenario demonstrate that $Φ$-AC learns efficient and stable coordination strategies across diverse mixed-motive settings while maintaining high collective return and competitive fairness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-turn interactions maintain evolving context rather than generating isolated responses, making them vulnerable to prompt-injection and context-poisoning attacks in which locally plausible adversarial fragments gradually distort reasoning trajectories. Existing defenses mainly filter individual outputs and often ignore context evolution across turns, leaving long-horizon reasoning exposed. Although the Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes context exchange and tool invocation, it functions as a passive routing layer and does not enforce contextual stability. To address these limitations, we introduce the Game-Theoretic Secure Model Context Protocol (GT-MCP), a controller-driven multi-agent method that treats context management as a closed-loop dynamical process. GT-MCP coordinates three heterogeneous LLM agents and selects outputs through a trust function that jointly evaluates causal consistency against a validated context graph, semantic agreement among agents, and distributional drift over time. When instability is detected, a rollback-based self-healing mechanism restores the validated context and prevents unsupported fragments from propagating. Empirical evaluation over 500 interaction turns under an adaptive adversarial threat model shows that contextual drift remains bounded in 99.6% of turns, with recovery required in only 0.4%. Per-turn utility remains tightly concentrated, with median = -0.19, P05 = -0.72, and P95 = 0.30; severe degradation below -1 occurs in only 0.4% of cases, and no injection attempt succeeds at the controller level. Selected outputs maintain stable win rates above 98%, and computational overhead remains predictable, with latency per token = 1.63e-3 s.

A common assumption in strategic classification is that the classifier is public knowledge. However, it remains unclear whether, and why, a system would choose to commit to full disclosure. We study a setting in which regulation requires the system to disclose some, but not all, of the information. This induces a learning task in which the learner must jointly optimize the classifier and the uncertainty surrounding it. To this end, we adopt from robust mechanism design the notion of ambiguity, which in our setting allows the learner to reveal a set or range of possible classifiers, while privately choosing which of them to ultimately realize. We investigate how ambiguity affects the learning task, develop efficient algorithms for computing best-responses and training, and empirically explore strategic learning and its outcomes in this novel setting and using our approach.

The abundance of pre-trained diffusion models provides an opportunity for composition. Combining several models, however, runs the risk of one model dominating or models disagreeing with each other. Here, we propose Divide-and-Denoise, a method for coordinating multiple pre-trained diffusion models during sampling. Much like managing a specialized workforce, our method creates a fair but efficient division of labor across models. Central to our method is the notion of an allocation which defines the responsibility of each model to every region of the noisy sample. At every timestep, we then denoise by (i) updating the allocation by solving a fair division game, where we divide the sample into regions that maximize total utility under fairness constraints, and (ii) aligning the models with this allocation, where we guide each model to denoise within its assigned region. This leads to a new composite denoising process that evolves in tandem with a division process. We evaluate Divide-and-Denoise on conditional image generation. Across several quality metrics, including the GenEval benchmark, our method outperforms baselines and resolves common failures including missing objects and mismatched attributes. Experiments show that Divide-and-Denoise utilizes each model's expertise without neglecting any other model.

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems often fail to reliably outperform a single strong model equipped with best-of-N sampling. We argue that a core source of this instability is ill-posed equilibrium selection: current systems specify what information agents share, but not which coordination convention should be selected. We formalize a broad class of such systems as discounted incomplete-information Markov games and show that two common pathologies, oscillation between competing conventions and drift across them, can both induce unstable learning and linear Bayesian regret. To obtain a well-posed target, we introduce the Heterogeneous Quantal Response Equilibrium (HQRE), an entropy-regularized equilibrium concept with agent- and state-dependent temperatures. Under a monotonicity condition, HQRE is unique, admits linearly convergent mirror updates, and yields bounded Bayesian regret; the same condition yields rollout-measurable stability diagnostics. We instantiate this objective in two algorithms: DICE-PC, which coordinates frozen models through prompt-control actions, and DICE-FT, which performs parameter-efficient mirror fine-tuning. Across eleven benchmarks in four domains, DICE improves accuracy-cost trade-offs over strong within-class baselines; on reasoning and planning tasks, DICE-PC improves by 4.3 percentage points on average and DICE-FT by 8.5 points.

In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with \emph{adaptive} opponents who can respond based on histories of play. The standard metric of \emph{external regret} in online learning is known to fail to capture such adaptivity. To account for players' counterfactual reasoning, we introduce {\tt Repeated Policy Regret (RP-Regret)}, a game-theoretic metric that measures the difference between the \emph{realized} and the \emph{best-in-hindsight} accumulated utility when all players can \emph{respond} to the history of play. Compared to existing regret notions in this setting, ours is native to repeated game playing, enabling stronger comparators and opponents with fewer constraints, while maintaining the possibility of finding better equilibria when all players minimize it. We first identify necessary conditions for obtaining {\tt RP-Regret} sublinear in time, on the variation of the player's comparator strategies in the regret definition and on the memories of both the comparator and opponents' strategies. We then study additional conditions and provable algorithms to minimize {\tt RP-Regret}, which is by definition \emph{non-convex} in the strategy space. To address this challenge, we propose three algorithms: (i) one based on an optimization oracle, as assumed in some prior work in online non-convex learning; (ii) one that minimizes a convex and \emph{linearized} surrogate of {\tt RP-Regret} at each iteration; (iii) one that directly minimizes {\tt RP-Regret} when opponents change strategies slowly. Furthermore, when all players can run algorithms to minimize the {\tt RP-Regret} (or its linearized variant), certain subgame perfect equilibria of the repeated game can be learned. We also provide experiments showing that minimizing our regret notions can lead to more cooperative solutions with higher utility in games such as Stag-Hunt.

Many real-world competitive systems require multiple decision-makers to act simultaneously under shared constraints, limited information, and repeated interaction, as in auctions, resource allocation, and security competition. We study multi-turn simultaneous bidding as a controlled testbed for such problems and propose DNQ, a solver-in-the-loop equilibrium supervision framework for training bidding agents. DNQ alternates between trajectory collection, critic-based payoff estimation, equilibrium computation, and policy imitation. At each visited state, a shared critic predicts either pairwise payoff matrices or an exact N-player payoff tensor, an external solver computes equilibrium strategies, and the agents are trained by minimizing the KL divergence between their masked policies and the solver-derived equilibrium targets. We focus on a scalable pairwise formulation that greatly reduces equilibrium-solving cost and training time compared with the exact formulation, while the shared critic amortizes payoff learning across agents and states. Experiments compare the pairwise and exact variants using critic loss, policy entropy, bidding resource usage, and training cost, showing that the pairwise method scales to larger numbers of agents, whereas the exact method becomes computationally impractical as the joint game grows. These results illustrate the trade-off between strategic fidelity and scalability in repeated competitive environments.

Mean-based algorithms are a class of online learning algorithms that assign low probability to actions with low average rewards. Recent work indicates these algorithms converge favorably to serially undominated actions, which approximate Nash equilibria in economic games. However, empirical studies also show slower convergence compared to established algorithms in bandit-feedback scenarios. We study mean-based algorithms when the time horizon is unknown and only bandit feedback is available. In this setting, we provide the first lower bound on the algorithm-defining sequence $γ_t$ that formally establishes a limit on how fast these algorithms can learn. Additionally, we propose two mean-based algorithms: one generalizes $ε$-greedy, and the other extends the mean-based Exp3 to unknown horizons. Our experiments show that mean-based algorithms, although slightly slower, can perform competitively with other bandit-feedback algorithms. We further analyze the relationship to no-regret algorithms. Depending on the choice of $γ_t$, the intersection with no-regret algorithms is non-trivial, and we show that algorithms exist that are both mean-based and no-regret. This adds context to the "exploitability" of this class of algorithms that previous contributions suggest.

Asynchronous reinforcement learning can improve language-model post-training throughput by decoupling response generation from policy optimization, but stale responses introduce distribution drift. Standard behavior-corrected methods control this drift with behavior-policy probabilities, importance ratios, or clipping, which requires token-aligned, versioned, and numerically consistent behavior log-probabilities across rollout and learner systems. We ask whether asynchronous group-relative RL can instead be stabilized using only current-policy probabilities. We identify a scale-imbalance failure mode: when stale responses are evaluated under the current policy, positive and negative loss terms can appear at different negative log-probability scales, so zero-sum advantages no longer imply balanced loss contributions. We propose Asymmetric-Scale Policy Optimization (ASymPO), which normalizes each response's token loss by its current average token negative log-probability. ASymPO requires no behavior-policy probabilities, restores response-level zero-sum balance, and preserves a nonzero learning signal. We also introduce Scaled Policy Optimization (SPO), a fixed negative-scaling baseline, and evaluate both current-policy-only objectives in asynchronous mathematical reasoning post-training.

Large language model (LLM) agents have begun to delegate work to one another. Protocols such as the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and the Agent2Agent protocol (A2A) let an agent publish what it can do and let others call it, and public registries of such agents are already appearing. These protocols assume an advertised capability is a static, truthful fact. A real agent is none of these things: its competence is probabilistic, varies with input, drifts when the underlying model is updated, and, because the agent is itself a language model, it can describe itself with complete confidence and be wrong. A caller therefore sees what an agent claims to do, not what it can do, with no principled way to tell a reliable provider from a fluent impostor. We argue these difficulties share one cause: the market for lemons. When quality is hidden and claims are cheap, good and bad providers become indistinguishable, honest reliability goes unrewarded, and the market decays toward its worst participants. Economics offers three remedies, signaling, screening, and reputation, and none are present in today's agent protocols. We make four contributions: (1) a failure taxonomy that names confident-wrong as a non-adversarial, correlated subclass of Byzantine faults that classical fault-tolerance mismodels; (2) a market-for-lemons model showing that faith-based protocols admit only a low-trust equilibrium; (3) the Trust Layer, a thin, protocol-agnostic narrow waist above MCP and A2A that adds probabilistic capability descriptors, screening, and reputation, and admits a separating equilibrium when the cost of sustaining an overclaim exceeds the gain from it; and (4) a reliability-composition bound for delegation chains with an end-to-end placement argument. The design needs no model retraining and degrades gracefully when its trust anchors are absent or corrupt.

The coordination of heterogeneous autonomous agents in dynamic, adversarial environments requires simultaneous satisfaction of geometric constraints, logical consistency, temporal reasoning, and strategic optimization. Existing sheaf- and topos-theoretic frameworks provide powerful tools for geometric consensus, knowledge alignment, and causal planning, but lack explicit models for value, reward, and strategic choice. This report presents a unified categorical framework that integrates event calculus, SCEL-like ensemble formation, and game-theoretic reward structures into a single Grothendieck topos of time-space histories. We introduce the notion of a \emph{game sheaf} whose stalks contain utility functions and policy distributions, and restriction maps encode both parallel transport and best-response dynamics. We prove that Nash equilibria correspond to global sections of a derived best-response correspondence sheaf, while cohomological obstructions classify failures of strategic consistency. A detailed case study of an immunological ``bastion defense'' scenario -- heterogeneous agents forming attack/defense ensembles under resource constraints -- demonstrates the framework's expressiveness. This synthesis provides a rigorous foundation for verifiable, autonomic, and economically rational multi-agent systems.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as advisors whose objective is not aligned with the user's: recommenders optimize for engagement, sales assistants for purchases, negotiation agents for concessions. Whether such advisors stay truthful when honesty conflicts with their own payoff is a core alignment-evaluation question. We turn the canonical Crawford-Sobel cheap-talk model into a pre-specified benchmark for LLM honesty under preference misalignment. Cheap-talk theory predicts neither full revelation nor silence but coarse monotone partitions, with fewer informative intervals as preference conflict grows. A sender observes a state omega in [0,1], wants the receiver's action near omega+b, and sends one costless message to a receiver whose ideal action is omega. The design uses 5 bias levels, 3 prompt frames, a fixed low-temperature setting, and 200 states per cell: 12,000 sender calls. For the positive-bias grid b in {0.01,0.04,0.08,0.12} the exact most-informative partition sizes are 7,4,3,2, with oracle normalized mutual information 0.5294, 0.3268, 0.2205, 0.1829. Running the full design on four instruction-tuned models (GPT-4o, Claude Sonnet 4.5, Gemini 2.5 Flash-Lite, Llama-3.3-70B), we find all four over-reveal relative to the most-informative equilibrium by 1.8 to 4.2x: normalized mutual information stays at 0.78-0.94 where the oracle prescribes 0.18-0.53. Informativeness declines with bias as predicted but never approaches the strategic optimum; rather than coarse partitions, models show near-full revelation with a constant upward offset tracking their bias (linear exaggeration). Payoff-maximizing versus honesty framing has negligible effect. A decoder ablation shows the finding is recoverable only when the receiver reads the sender's stated number: an embedding-only decoder mis-reads the same data as near-babbling.

Preference alignment is central to improving large language models, but standard reward-based formulations can be restrictive when human preferences are cyclic, non-transitive, or otherwise not representable by a scalar reward. Nash Learning from Human Feedback (NLHF) addresses this limitation by modeling alignment as a preference game and targeting a Nash equilibrium rather than a reward maximizer. However, the learning-theoretic foundations of scalable NLHF remain limited. Existing regret guarantees rely on oracle-based methods that estimate a general preference model and solve KL-regularized minimax problems, while iterative NLHF methods directly optimize policy-level preference losses and are easier to implement but lack regret guarantees. We study online iterative NLHF under general preference models and identify exploration as the key obstacle. First, we show that standard iterative NLHF can suffer an exponential dependence on the KL-regularization parameter, revealing that implicit exploration through policy updates is insufficient for controlling regret. Second, we propose an explicitly exploratory iterative NLHF algorithm that combines SFT-based regularization with adversarial policy exploration. The resulting method retains the direct policy optimization structure of iterative NLHF, avoids explicit preference model estimation, and achieves an $O(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound without an exponential dependence on the KL-regularization parameter. We show that the regret can be improved to $O(\log(T))$ with access to a minimax oracle, clarifying the computational-statistical tradeoff in learning general preference games. Finally, we instantiate our method for LLM fine-tuning and evaluate it on \texttt{Llama-3-8B-Instruct} across multiple benchmarks, where explicit exploration yields consistent improvements over existing NLHF baselines.

We study two-player zero-sum games (TPZSGs) with bandit feedback under fairness constraints requiring every action to be played with probability at least $α/m$. Existing instance-dependent results target $\textit{pure}$ Nash equilibria, while fairness generically produces $\textit{mixed}$ equilibria, a harder learning target. Our key technical tool is a reparametrization: every fair strategy decomposes as $p = (α/m)\mathbf{1} + (1-α)\widetilde{p}$ with $\widetilde{p} \in Δ_m$, and substituting into the payoff form yields $p^{\top}Aq = \widetilde{p}^{\top}\widetilde{A} q$ for a fair payoff matrix $\widetilde{A} := (1-α)A + α\mathbf{1} c^{\top}$, where $c_j = \tfrac{1}{m}\sum_i A(i,j)$ is the column-mean vector. The fair game on $A$ is then equivalent to a standard zero-sum game on $\widetilde{A}$, so equilibrium existence, KKT structure, and LP basis stability reduce to classical results applied to $\widetilde{A}$. We derive the fair minimax value, fair Nash equilibrium, fair regret, and a clean dual representation showing the price of fairness is at most $α(1-1/m)$ and vanishes whenever the unconstrained equilibrium already has full support. Our main result is an $\widetilde{O}(T^{2/3})$ regret bound for an Explore-Then-Commit algorithm, $\texttt{Fair-ETC-TPZSG}$, applicable to general mixed fair equilibria, together with a discussion of why naive action elimination does not readily improve it. When the fair equilibrium has a single dominant action, equivalently when $\widetilde{p}^{\star}$ is a vertex of $Δ_m$, the bound sharpens to instance-dependent $\widetilde{O}(1/\widetildeΔ(α)^{2})$, where $\widetildeΔ(α)$ is the LP-margin gap.

Recent advances in artificial intelligence have expanded the focus from classical optimization to include equilibrium analysis in noncooperative games. Many such games involve shared constraints, leading to Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems (GNEPs). Existing distributed algorithms typically require agents to exchange Lagrange multipliers to enforce consensus and compute variational-GNEs (v-GNEs). This work introduces fully distributed continuous-time algorithms and establishes convergence without requiring multiplier exchange, thereby reducing information exchange per iteration while improving privacy preservation. The analysis focuses on strongly monotone games with convex individual constraints and linear shared constraints. I also propose several discretization schemes for the continuous-time algorithms. The proposed approach converges to general GNEs, rather than being restricted to v-GNEs, with the attained equilibrium depending on the initialization. The effectiveness of the proposed method is demonstrated through applications in multi-robot coordination and placement. In the second part, this work includes research conducted in collaboration with Amazon scientists. One of the most challenging problems in real-world machine learning is labeled data collection, which typically requires substantial human effort and cost. Active learning aims to reduce this labeling requirement. Existing handcrafted active learning strategies, however, generally perform well only on specific types of datasets, which are often unknown in advance. In this work, I propose using contextual bandits to adaptively select the most suitable active learning strategy. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is demonstrated on publicly available external datasets.

We argue that governance must transition from a normative discipline to an engineering discipline, and we develop a formal framework, inspired by the physics of metamaterials, to make this transition quantitative and testable. Artificial General Intelligence affects civilization primarily by increasing decision velocity while human verification capacity remains bounded. When the cost of validating AI-generated outputs exceeds the expected utility of acting on them, rational agents default to inaction: a stable but catastrophic Nash equilibrium we term the Freezing Equilibrium. Drawing on metamaterials, where emergent macro-properties arise from designed microstructure, we develop a phenomenological constitutive law for institutional coordination: $R_{\mathrm{eff}} = β\cdot (1-ρ) \cdot (1-τ) \cdot (1-γρτ)$, where $β$ is the decision branching factor, $ρ$ is provenance fidelity, $τ$ is the verification rate, and $γ\in [0,1]$ captures correlated-detection synergy between provenance and verification failures. The model predicts a sharp phase transition between self-healing ($R_{\mathrm{eff}} < 1$) and self-destabilizing ($R_{\mathrm{eff}} > 1$) regimes. We introduce a three-class provenance taxonomy: cryptographic, institutional, and context binding, and derive four falsifiable hypotheses with a proposed 12-week stepped-wedge cluster-randomized trial in government grant review panels. The framework bridges AI alignment theory and institutional design.

In this work we study agents in simulated bargaining scenarios, where a buyer and a seller communicate through a text channel and attempt to negotiate mutually beneficial trades, under different information regimes (complete information, information asymmetry or mutual uncertainty). We evaluate their performance w.r.t. game-theoretical solutions and further investigate their honesty (their tendency to disclose or withhold information or to mislead and deceive) as well as their credulity (their tendency to trust or distrust information provided by the other agent). We study zero-shot LLM agents with simple prompting scaffolding as well as fine-tuned agents, in order to investigate whether optimising the agents to maximise financial profits makes them stronger negotiators but also more dishonest and less trusting. We find that off-the-shelf LLMs all substantially deviate from game-theoretical equilibria, they attempt to lie about their private information but cannot efficiently exploit information asymmetries. Fine-tuning on financial utility makes the agents stronger at achieving better deals but also more dishonest, highlighting the risks that optimising agents for a task can have on their safety. We release our code and a dataset of bargaining scenarios.

We develop a game-theoretic framework that compares welfare efficiency across three market mechanisms: continuous double auctions with transparent order books (lit exchanges), opaque order books (dark pools), and periodic batch auctions. Each mechanism is modeled as a queuing system where heterogeneous traders face trade-offs between the execution price, waiting costs, and transaction costs. Our main result establishes that under moderate arrival rates and bounded adverse selection, dark pools dominate both alternatives in aggregate ex-ante welfare. Observable order books create costly strategic timing games in which traders delay or rush submissions to optimize their position in the queue, generating wasteful social waiting costs. Opaque order books eliminate these timing games through information design. We formally characterize the equilibrium strategies in each mechanism and prove the welfare ranking $W^{DARK} > W^{LIT} > W^{BATCH}$. Extensions incorporate asymmetric information and endogenous venue choice. The results demonstrate how the information structure and the discipline of the service jointly determine efficiency in strategic matching environments.

Poker is a landmark challenge for artificial intelligence. The dominant approach relies on equilibrium solvers built on counterfactual regret minimization, requiring millions of core-hours of training. Large Language Models (LLMs) possess extensive poker knowledge but perform far below solver-based agents when asked to play directly. Traditional rule-based poker agents are interpretable and training-free, but their strategic ceiling remains far below equilibrium play. We introduce \textbf{PokerSkill}, a training-free and solver-free framework that bridges this gap by using detailed rule-based poker skills as a structured action-grounding interface for LLMs. A deterministic context engine analyzes the current state and retrieves only the relevant fragments from a layered skill library, which is entirely designed by human poker experts, constraining the LLM's choice to reasonable actions. Against GTOWizard, a state-of-the-art GTO benchmark, GPT-5.5 XHigh with PokerSkill achieves $-57 \pm 21$ mbb/hand, Claude Opus 4.6 achieves $-80 \pm 29$ mbb/hand and Claude Opus 4.7 achieves $-87\pm 64$ mbb/hand, reducing losses by 49--61% compared to default-prompt baselines and outperforming the strong bot Slumbot. Our key finding is that rule-based skills alone do not constitute a strong strategy, and LLMs alone cannot play well, but their combination yields an agent that requires neither training nor solver access yet competes with systems built on millions of core-hours of computation. To our knowledge, this is the first demonstration of an LLM achieving competitive performance in a complex imperfect-information game without game-specific training or solver queries. Code is available at https://github.com/lbn187/PokerSkill.

A central challenge in game theory and learning systems such as GANs is understanding which algorithms can efficiently compute equilibria across the heterogeneous landscape of games. Equilibrium computation is typically studied solver by solver and game class by game class, yielding strong local guarantees but a fragmented view of solver behaviour. Existing discrete taxonomies often provide an incomplete account of where algorithms succeed. We study this problem through a solver-game map linking games to effective solver dynamics. Classical theory identifies isolated regions of this map but provides limited insight into intermediate or overlapping regimes, suggesting that solvability is governed by latent structural properties defining a continuous solver-aligned geometry of games. We formalise this perspective through structure-aware solver synthesis. A learned structure recogniser maps each game to a low-dimensional solver-aligned representation, and a policy maps this representation to effective primitive mechanisms, adapting solver behaviour across regimes. This reveals regions where particular solver dynamics are effective and where mixtures of primitives are required rather than a single dominant solver. A bounded residual acts as a local corrector and diagnostic signal for incomplete solver bases or representations. The framework yields both an adaptive solver and an analytical lens: games with similar optimisation dynamics cluster together, revealing continuous regions of algorithmic validity and overlapping solver behaviour. Empirically, we show that fixed primitives exhibit systematic regime mismatch, while the learned representation organises game space into a structured cartography aligned with solver behaviour. These results suggest viewing equilibrium computation as the joint problem of learning solver mechanisms and mapping the geometry of solvability.

Do next-generation LLM agents inherit the cooperative biases documented in their predecessors, or does scale and provider diversity reshape equilibrium behaviour in competitive multi-agent settings? Willis et al. established a benchmark for this question using evolutionary game theory and the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), finding consistent cooperative biases in ChatGPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet. We extend this benchmark to four frontier models released in 2025-2026 - Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Gemini 3.1 Pro, and GPT-5.4 Mini - applying the identical protocol across three prompting styles (Default, Prose, Self-Refine) and four population compositions (balanced and biased, with and without noise). Cooperative bias persists across providers (H1): ten of twelve model-prompt combinations favour cooperative equilibria in balanced noiseless conditions. Cross-provider divergence is substantial (H3): Gemini 2.5 Flash reaches up to 77% aggressive equilibria under biased conditions, while GPT-5.4 Mini reaches 70% cooperative equilibria under Self-Refine. Support for aggressive capability parity is partial (H2): Self-Refine raises ICD in all models and Gemini 3.1 Pro Refine achieves the highest ICD in the dataset (0.925), but Default and Prose prompts show no systematic narrowing. Evidence on noise robustness is directionally positive but not robustly confirmed (H4): with n=500 Moran iterations per condition, average noise sensitivity is about 6 percentage points for Claude Sonnet 4.6 versus 13 pp for Claude 3.5 Sonnet, but this cross-study gap is not statistically significant once the predecessor's unreported sampling error is propagated. Provider identity, rather than model generation, is the strongest correlate of equilibrium outcomes; noise remains a universal challenge regardless of model size or vintage.

Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) agents typically learn world models by minimizing predictive loss. However, powerful RL optimizers inevitably exploit minor model inaccuracies, leading to simulator exploitation and a reality gap where policies succeed in simulation but fail in the real world. We propose that the objective for learning simulators should be strategic robustness rather than predictive accuracy, and formulate this as a zero-sum minimax game between a model player and an adversarial policy player. We provide a comprehensive theoretical analysis: (1) an online learning guarantee showing the game is learnable with sublinear regret bounds; (2) a tractable critic-based simplification bounding the global policy-value gap by the local critic's loss; and (3) an Error-MDP duality, proving that finding the worst-case policy is formally dual to a standard RL problem where the reward is the one-step critic error. This duality yields a provably convergent active data selection algorithm. Experiments on continuous control tasks demonstrate that our approach reduces prediction error in strategically important regions by $1.5$-$2.2\times$ and enables policies trained purely in simulation to match near-optimal real-world performance.

We introduce the incremental voter model (IVM), a discrete-opinion multi-agent system where agents undergo step-wise transitions biased by the opinion of a randomly selected persuader. Our incremental voter model comprises a large population of interacting agents, each holding an opinion represented by an element of the discrete set $\{-k,\ldots,0,\ldots,k\}, k \in \mathbb{N}_{+}$. At each update step as time progresses, a pair of distinct agents are selected independently and uniformly at random from the population, and the first agent (viewed as the listener'') updates its opinion based on that of the second (viewed as the persuader''), adopting a new opinion that differs from its current one by at most one unit. By deriving the mean-field system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations (ODEs) that governs the large-population limit of the agent-based model, we develop a rigorous mathematical framework to study the asymptotic behavior of the opinion distribution in the mean-field limit. These results contribute to a deeper understanding of social influence processes in complex systems, particularly in modeling opinion polarization, and may guide the formulation of more advanced models in future research.

The Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) framework scales equilibrium computation to large zero-sum games by iteratively expanding a restricted strategy set using deep reinforcement learning (DRL). A central challenge is to construct, under limited computational budgets, a small strategy population whose induced game well approximates the full game. Existing PSRO variants typically expand the population using best responses to meta-strategies computed from restricted-game payoffs, which can lead to inefficient expansions that provide limited global improvement. We propose to guide population expansion by directly evaluating the post-expansion population quality. Specifically, we adopt Population Exploitability (PE) to measure how well a restricted strategy set represents the full game, and introduce a two-phase exploration--selection framework that explicitly minimizes PE during expansion. We instantiate this framework as Global PSRO, a practical DRL-based algorithm that efficiently generates candidate responses and estimates PE via parameter-sharing conditional neural networks. Experiments across multiple two-player zero-sum games show that Global PSRO achieves lower exploitability and approximates Nash equilibria with significantly fewer policy iterations than prior PSRO methods.

Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UASs) have become a growing threat to the security of critical infrastructure, exploiting spatiotemporal gaps in sensor perimeters to infiltrate restricted airspace undetected. We formulate this interaction as a two-player zero-sum differential game between an adversarial UAS and a heterogeneous sensor network of directional and omnidirectional sensors. Unlike earlier game-theoretic approaches that restrict the defender to discrete placement graphs or fixed configurations, we introduce a continuous sensor redeployment technique in which each sensor slides freely along the convex building boundaries. This is enforced via a log-sum-exp smooth approximation that preserves differentiability at polygon vertices, enabling optimization with gradient-based methods. The attacker's best response is computed via a two-step approach combining STP-RRT* for feasible trajectory initialization and nonlinear programming for detection-minimization refinement. The joint optimization converges to a Local Nash Equilibrium (LNE) via alternating bilevel optimization, with analytical first-order stationarity conditions derived for both players, thereby establishing a deployable baseline for heterogeneous sensor placements in CUAS missions.

Imperfect-information games (IIGs) are challenging, as players must make decisions without fully observing the true game state. While AlphaZero has achieved remarkable success in perfect-information games, extending it to IIGs remains difficult. Existing search-based approaches, such as Perfect Information Monte Carlo (PIMC), suffer from strategy fusion, while Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search (IS-MCTS) incurs high computational cost when combined with neural networks. In this paper, we propose Multi-State Aggregated PoLicy Evaluation (MAPLE), a tree search method that aggregates policy and value evaluations from multiple sampled world states within a single search tree, combining the advantages of PIMC and IS-MCTS while maintaining a controllable computational cost. We further incorporate a Siamese-based sampling strategy to select informative world states from the information set. Experiments on Phantom Go and Dark Hex show that MAPLE significantly outperforms the PIMC-based AlphaZero baseline, achieving Elo improvements of 291 and 136, respectively. These results demonstrate that MAPLE is an effective approach for AlphaZero-style learning in imperfect-information games.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as economic agents in marketplaces, auctions, and bidding settings. Anticipating their behavior in any specific deployment is hard. Existing strategic-reasoning benchmarks evaluate models on fixed canonical games. These benchmarks may saturate as the frontier improves, and they do not allow evaluators to generalize with confidence from benchmark performance to the varied and messy strategic environments that actual deployments involve. We introduce GENSTRAT, which uses procedurally generated strategic environments to address these challenges. Concretely, we generate a distribution of two-player zero-sum imperfect-information card games. The generator can draw fresh games on demand, allowing for evergreen evaluation and resistance to contamination. We pair the game distribution with a capability-profile methodology that decomposes model competence across six axes (state space, temporal depth, information sensitivity, opponent modeling, risk, and brittleness). We also introduce a jaggedness measure of within-distribution smoothness that detects when a model's advantage jumps unpredictably between strategically similar games. We sample 50 benchmark games from a 2,000-game generated pool and evaluate nine frontier and open-weight LLMs in a head-to-head tournament with over 36,000 matches. Newer frontier-tier models score higher on average. Beyond that average, models with near-identical overall strength show qualitatively different capability profiles, and two of the top three leaderboard models (gpt-5 and claude) are noticeably more locally volatile than the third (gemini-3.1-pro), despite being close in overall strength. Together, the capability profile and the jaggedness measure give a deployment-relevant diagnostic that the overall ranking alone cannot provide.

Imperfect-information multiplayer games test whether agents can act under hidden information, sparse rewards, and non-stationary opponents. We study these challenges in Big 2, a four-player imperfect-information card game. We develop a self-play RL framework for Big 2 that enables controlled comparisons between policy-gradient and value-approximating agents. Under a common environment, input representation, training budget, and evaluation protocol, PPO outperforms Monte Carlo Q approximation, SARSA, and Q-learning against random, greedy, and heuristic Big 2 opponents. We further find that moderate entropy regularization improves PPO by preventing the policy from becoming overly deterministic, and that current-policy self-play provides a stronger finite-budget curriculum than checkpoint self-play or fixed-opponent training. Together, these results show that Big 2 is a useful controlled setting for studying deep RL under imperfect information, multiplayer interaction, delayed rewards, and variable action sets.

Trauma resuscitation is a clinical process for treating life-threatening physiological disorders in safety-critical environments, driven by the experience of healthcare workers (HCWs). Designing and optimizing quantifiable metrics that accurately capture HCW decisions may augment current resuscitation procedures with the potential to improve patient outcomes. This motivates our socio-technical formulation of trauma resuscitation as a distributed generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE)-seeking game with coupled inequality constraints. This method is optimized over a time-varying communication graph. We introduce novel insights from clinical experience to model HCWs behavior. This work facilitates the best possible resuscitation outcome given HCWs workloads, schedules, competencies, and limited resources.

Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) energy trading enables decentralized peer-to-peer energy exchange among electric vehicles (EVs), reducing grid dependency while monetizing surplus capacity. However, coordinating self-interested EV agents with diverse charging needs and uncertain arrival-departure schedules remains challenging. Existing approaches either require centralized optimization with computational limitations or lack fairness guarantees. This paper integrates Nash Bargaining Solution into Multi-Agent Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient, namely Nash-MADDPG, for incentive-aligned V2V energy trading. Nash bargaining determines efficient bilateral pricing, while Nash-guided price proximity rewards align agent learning toward bargaining-optimal strategies. Evaluation over 30-day continuous operation demonstrates an improvement of 61.6% in social welfare and 62.9% improvement in trading volume over Double Auction, while achieving superior fairness, such as 40.1% improvement in Jain's index. Testing across 6-100 agents over a 30-day horizon with continuous vehicle turnover confirms scalability across population size and empirically stable pricing near the Nash Bargaining benchmark.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has spurred economists to study how humans and LLMs behave in strategic settings. We organized a series of round-robin tournaments in the Colonel Blotto game. This game attracts game theorists' attention due to high-dimensional action space and the absence of pure strategy Nash equilibria. In the first tournament, more than 200 human participants competed against one another. In the second tournament, several popular LLMs were invited to submit strategies. In the third tournament, we matched the number of LLM strategies to the number submitted by humans. We find that humans more often employ better-calibrated intermediate-level allocation heuristics and outperform the simpler, more stereotyped strategies submitted by LLMs. Strategic sophistication is key to success if and only if the necessary level of reasoning depth is reached, while lower and higher levels of reasoning offer no clear advantage over the primitive strategies. Among humans, field of study weakly predicts success: participants with STEM backgrounds perform better in the first tournament. Surprisingly, humans almost do not adjust their strategies across tournaments with different sets of opponents. This result suggests that humans base their choices primarily on the game's rules rather than on the identity of their opponents, treating LLMs much like human competitors.

Data valuation, the task of quantifying the contribution of individual data points to model performance, has emerged as a fundamental challenge in machine learning. Game-theoretic approaches, such as the Banzhaf value, offer principled frameworks for fair data valuation; however, they suffer from exponential computational complexity. We address this challenge by developing efficient algorithms specifically tailored for computing Banzhaf values in $k$-nearest neighbor ($k$NN) classifiers. We first establish the theoretical hardness of the problem by proving that it is #P-hard. Despite this intractability, we exploit the locality properties of $k$NN classifiers to develop practical exact algorithms. Our main contribution is a dynamic programming framework that achieves significant computational improvements: we present a pseudo-polynomial algorithm with $O(Wkn^2)$ time complexity for weighted $k$NN classifiers, where $W$ is the maximum sum of top-$k$ weights, and a specialized algorithm for unweighted $k$NN that achieves $O(nk^2)$ time complexity, that is, linear in the number of data points. We also offer efficient Monte Carlo estimation methods. Extensive experiments on real-world datasets demonstrate the practical efficiency of our approach and its effectiveness in data valuation applications.

In this paper, we investigate whether deep reinforcement-learning agents interacting in a shared optimal-execution environment can sustain supra-competitive outcomes, in the sense of achieving lower implementation shortfalls than the relevant game-theoretical competitive benchmark. We study a two-agent Almgren-Chriss liquidation game and examine how learned behavior depends on intra-episode environment feedback, the ability to interpret the mid-price and the agent's knoledge of the past. We first use ex-ante schedule-learning agents to remove intra-episode feedback and isolate what can arise when agents commit to complete liquidation trajectories before execution begins. We then allow agents to condition on the evolving state using a variety of DDQN architectures. We find that, when agents are given access to intra-episode history, especially recent prices and own past actions, supra-competitive outcomes become substantially more frequent and more persistent. These findings indicate that supra-competitive behavior in this execution game is driven not by multi-agent learning or by current price observation alone, but by feedback, memory, and state-contingent interaction along the realized execution path.

This article presents a Hamilton--Jacobi (HJ) reachability framework for a two--satellite collision avoidance problem operating in the same circular orbit, where relative motion is modeled in the radial--tangential--normal (RTN) frame using planar Hill--Clohessy--Wiltshire (HCW) dynamics. We define the target state space as unsafe relative configurations in the orbit plane corresponding to minimum separation requirements consistent with Federal Communications Commission (FCC) orbital standards. The interaction between spacecraft is formulated as a zero--sum differential game, where Player 1 is the controlled satellite and Player 2 is modeled as a bounded adversarial disturbance with unknown intent. We present the HJ formulation and compute backward reachable sets that characterize relative states from which collision cannot be avoided under worst-case disturbances, while states outside this set admit provably collision-free trajectories. These reachable sets are integrated with supervisory hybrid control logic to determine when evasive maneuvers must be initiated, enabling mathematically grounded safety guarantees for scalability.

Multimodal large language models often generate reasoning chains containing subtle errors that lead to incorrect answers. Current verification approaches have notable limitations. Learned critics need extensive labeled data and show inconsistent performance across different tasks. Meanwhile, existing training-free methods simply average scores from different sources, missing a key insight: when these scores disagree, that disagreement itself carries important information about whether a reasoning step is truly valid or not. We propose a training-free verification approach that treats step-wise verification as a coordination problem among specialized judges. We formalize these judges' interaction as a Nash equilibrium game where agreement signals valid steps while disagreement reveals instability. Our method computes equilibrium scores through a closed-form solution, enabling both disagreement-aware filtering and stability-conscious ranking of reasoning steps. Evaluated across six benchmarks, our approach achieves consistent improvements of 2.4% to 5.2% over baseline models and shows competitive performance against learned critics, demonstrating that cross-modal agreement (not just average confidence) provides robust verification signals without task-specific adaptation.

To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an unpredictable environment, a useful abstraction is to model the situation as a two-player zero-sum game. The goal is then to find a strategy for the system that guarantees the specification against any strategy of the environment. However, to model more complex situations, such as multiple systems with different objectives or an environment composed of various agents, the richer framework of multiplayer games must be considered. In this setting, a natural question is to identify equilibria, i.e., strategy profiles that are robust in the sense that no player has an incentive to deviate. The most well-known equilibrium concept is the Nash equilibrium, but several alternatives exist. We study five such notions and, for each of them, we provide complexity results for the constrained existence problem, which consists of deciding whether a given game contains an equilibrium that ensures each player a payoff within a specified interval.

Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is the dominant algorithmic family for solving large imperfect-information games, underpinning breakthroughs such as Libratus and Pluribus in No-Limit Texas Hold'em poker. In real-time game-playing systems, the solver must compute a near-equilibrium strategy within a strict time budget of only a few seconds per decision, and the number of CFR iterations completed in this window directly determines play strength. We present \textbf{Parallel CFR}, the first parallelization framework for real-time depth-limited CFR solving that seamlessly integrates pruning, abstraction, and advanced CFR variants. We decompose each CFR iteration into a pipeline of seven stages and identify two orthogonal dimensions of parallelism: \emph{by information set} and \emph{by tree node}. Leaf node evaluation is offloaded to GPUs via batched neural network inference, creating a heterogeneous CPU--GPU pipeline. Experiments on Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold'em demonstrate that Parallel CFR achieves $3.3$--$3.4\times$ speedup over the single-threaded baseline on postflop streets, with per-iteration time of ${\sim}47$--$54$~ms on a depth-limited game tree with over $1$ billion histories. All experiments run on a single desktop-class device (NVIDIA DGX Spark), enabling hundreds of CFR iterations within a typical real-time decision budget without requiring datacenter-scale infrastructure.

The remarkable success of the Adam in training neural networks has naturally led to the widespread use of its descent-ascent counterpart, Adam-DA, for solving zero-sum games. Despite its popularity in practice, a rigorous theoretical understanding of Adam-DA still lags behind. In this paper, we derive ordinary differential equations (ODEs) that serve as continuous-time limits of the Adam-DA. These ODEs closely approximate the discrete-time dynamics of Adam-DA, providing a tractable analytical framework for understanding its behavior in zero-sum games. Using this ODE approach, we investigate two fundamental aspects of Adam-DA: local convergence and implicit gradient regularization. Our analysis reveals that the roles of the first- and second-order momentum parameters in zero-sum games are exactly the opposite of their well-documented effects in minimization problems. We validate these predictions through GAN experiments across multiple architectures and datasets, demonstrating the practical implications of this reversed momentum effect.

As jailbreaks, adversarially crafted inputs that bypass safety constraints, continue to be discovered in Large Language Models, practitioners increasingly rely on fine-tuning as a defensive strategy. Yet the theoretical foundations underlying this robustness fine-tuning remain underexplored. We introduce a game-theoretic framework in which the interaction between an evaluator (auditing the model for jailbreaks) and a trainer is formalized as a two-player game. A key feature of our approach is the use of group actions, a mathematical structure that captures symmetries and transformations, to formally represent data augmentation. The simplest non-trivial instance is the circle with cyclic translation groups, where we exhibit various regimes depending on the trainer's generalization range. Below a critical threshold, the evaluator maintains a constant miss ratio for linearly many rounds, whereas other settings can yield very different behaviors. We further provide empirical evidence supporting locality-dependence of the model: for the three model families we tested (Llama, Qwen and Mistral), we have significant evidence that fine-tuning on adversarial prompts induces only local generalization, with refusal rates on test examples highly correlated with the distance to the fine-tuning prompts. Our framework recasts the central object of adversarial evaluation: a benchmark is not a static set of prompts but an orbit under the evaluator's group action, and audit protocols that ignore trainer-side adaptation cannot distinguish a genuine fix from a memorized patch.

Generative artificial intelligence is rapidly transforming the supply side of training data: an increasing share of new tokens, images, and structured records is produced by previous-generation models rather than by human originators. Recursive training on such synthetic content induces a measurable and often irreversible loss of distributional fidelity, a phenomenon known as model collapse. We develop the first unified microeconomic theory of synthetic data markets under model collapse. We introduce the Synthetic Data Contamination Equilibrium (SDCE), prove existence and generic uniqueness, derive a welfare decomposition W = W_prod + W_cons - L_coll - L_info, establish a Wasserstein-gradient-flow mean-field collapse limit, prove an impossibility of information-constrained implementation, and obtain closed-form expressions for the welfare-maximizing provenance subsidy s* = KL(q||p)/(2 kappa) and the welfare-maximizing watermark strength w* = (1 - psi) KL(q||p)/(2 kappa psi). We prove an information-theoretic Cramer-Rao lower bound on any provenance estimator using only producer-side observations and show that the Provenance-Market Iterative Retraining (PMIR) algorithm attains this bound up to constants while converging to an epsilon-SDCE in O(epsilon^-2 log T) iterations. A reduced-form OLS estimation on a C4-synthetic benchmark over ten retraining generations yields a collapse-rate coefficient b-hat = 0.181 (HAC s.e. 0.024), within one standard error of the structural prediction 0.183. Calibrated experiments raise generation-ten model quality by 23.1 percent over the unregulated benchmark while lowering the 2-Wasserstein drift on a held-out diversity probe from 0.318 to 0.142. Scaling experiments over generations t in {1,...,10} recover a logarithmic-in-t collapse law log Q_t = log Q_0 - 0.183 t rho^2 with R^2 = 0.962.

Additively separable hedonic games (ASHGs) are a prominent model of coalition formation where agents' preferences are derived from their individual valuations of peers. While social welfare maximization in ASHGs has traditionally focused mostly on utilitarian welfare, Nash welfare -- a well-established metric in economics which balances fairness with efficiency and offers scale invariance -- has been entirely overlooked. In this paper, we initiate the study of Nash welfare in ASHGs. We point out desirable properties fulfilled by partitions with high Nash welfare. This includes guaranteed contractual Nash stability in symmetric games, even for any approximation of Nash welfare. This is particularly appealing since, as for other welfare notions, Nash welfare turns out to be NP-hard to maximize, even for the ASHG subclass of symmetric aversion to enemies games (AEGs). A main focus of our study is on approximation algorithms for the Nash welfare objective. We present packing-based algorithms with approximation ratios for well-established subclasses of ASHGs: $n-1$ for AEGs and $2n$ for appreciation of friends games. This is complemented by a strict inapproximability result showing it is NP-hard to approximate Nash welfare within a factor of $1.0000759$ in general ASHGs. Further, we investigate the restricted settings with an upper bound on the coalition size or number of coalitions, and draw the boundary between the cases admitting efficient algorithms and those yielding NP-hardness: bounding the allowed size or number of coalitions by $2$ admits polynomial-time solvability, whereas bounds of $3$ or more yield NP-hardness or unbounded inapproximability.

Multi-agent policy-gradient methods have been shown to converge locally near stable Nash equilibria. Local convergence, however, does not determine which equilibrium is reached. We study this question through basin-entry probability with respect to a target set of equilibria selected by an external criterion, such as payoff dominance. For finite-unroll Meta-MAPG, we show that the update decomposes into ordinary policy gradient plus own-learning and peer-learning corrections, with controlled sampling noise and finite-unroll bias. We identify the peer-learning correction as the main equilibrium-selection mechanism: under a local alignment condition, the probability of entering the certified attraction region of the target stable-Nash set increases, relative to ordinary policy gradient. Because persistent correction may shift zero-update points of the original game, annealing the correction after entering the basin recovers ordinary policy-gradient dynamics and inherits local stable-Nash convergence guarantees. Experiments in Stag Hunt, iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, and preliminary neural-policy coordination environments support this basin-entry view, showing increased entry into cooperative basins under peer-aware updates.

Non-contrastive self-supervised learning (SSL) is an effective framework for predictive representation learning, but popular (and in practice effective) methods such as SimSiam, BYOL, I-JEPA or DINO, which rely on a form of self-distillation to train a teacher-student network, remain poorly understood as they typically do not minimize a well-defined objective. We analyze the dynamics of a variant of the Joint Embedding Predictive Architecture (JEPA) using a regularized linear regressor to predict the learned representations of two views of the data from one another, and fully characterize its stability: non-collapsed stable equilibria align with leading nonlinear canonical correlation subspaces, while collapsed equilibria may also be stable attractors. Motivated by this result, we introduce PEIRA, a non-contrastive SSL method with an explicit objective defined through the trace of the optimal linear regressor. We show that its only stable equilibria are nontrivial global minimizers and recover the same canonical correlation subspaces, with regularization selecting the effective dimension. Experiments on ImageNet-1K and CIFAR-10 show PEIRA is competitive with VICReg and LeJEPA baselines, and qualitative empirical results support the theory.

Plasma shape control in tokamaks requires a real-time controller that tracks dynamically changing shape targets while tolerating diagnostic failures. Classical approaches decompose the problem into equilibrium reconstruction followed by a linear controller, and assume a fixed, fully operational sensor set. We present a reinforcement learning agent that addresses both limitations simultaneously. The agent is trained in NSFsim, a high-fidelity tokamak simulator configured for DIII-D, on a curated dataset of 120 experimental plasma shapes. The shape targets are resampled as random step changes every 0.25 s, exposing the agent to diverse transitions across the full shape envelope. At test time the agent zero-shot tracks dynamic shape sequences; on a held-out static configuration in simulation it achieves a mean shape error of 2.01 cm, and dynamic trajectory following is demonstrated qualitatively in simulation and on the physical device. Diagnostic dropout randomly masks 30% of magnetic sensors per episode, yielding a single policy robust to arbitrary sensor subsets without backup controllers or mode-switching logic. An asymmetric actor-critic architecture with privileged equilibrium information improves value estimation under partial observability; an auxiliary shape reconstruction head on the actor enables end-to-end shape reconstruction from raw diagnostics and serves as an interpretability tool for policy analysis. The policy transfers to experimental DIII-D shots, where it directly commands the coil actuators on two dynamic shape maneuvers, and to the independent GSevolve simulator.

Softmax feedback systems are a common mathematical core of entropy-regularized reinforcement learning, logit game dynamics, population choice, and mean-field variational updates. Their central stability question is simple: when does a self-reinforcing softmax system produce a unique and globally predictable outcome? Classical theory gives a conservative answer. By treating softmax as a unit-scale response, it certifies stability only in a strongly randomized regime. We prove that the classical approach misses an entire stable regime and does not identify the point at which the qualitative change truly occurs. For finite-dimensional affine logit systems, the sharp dimension-free Euclidean threshold is $β\|ΠWΠ\|_{\mathcal T\to\mathcal T}<2,$ rather than the previously used condition, which certifies stability only while the softmax system remains safely over-regularized. Our theorem fills the previously missing pre-bifurcation regime, extending stability guarantees for affine softmax feedback systems to reward-responsive yet globally predictable systems. It enlarges the certified stability boundary for these systems and identifies where the model genuinely undergoes a phase transition.

Financial, social, and political factors often prevent the interests of the owners of ML systems and services and their users from being perfectly aligned. ML systems often produce biased information that can influence users to make decisions that are not in their best interest. Current solution approaches require ML systems to implement protocols to mitigate their biases. However, ML system owners usually do not have any incentive to implement these protocols and often argue that it limits their freedom of expression or business. We believe that a successful solution to this problem must recognize the conflict of interest between the ML systems and their users, and use this information to protect users against information that adversely influences their decisions while allowing users to safely benefit from these systems. To this end, we propose a game-theoretic framework that models the interaction between ML systems and users with conflicts of interest. We present scalable algorithms with theoretical guarantees that maximize the amount of desired information and actions and minimize the amount of biased and manipulative actions in interaction with ML systems.

We introduce the Estimated Dynamic Equilibrium Model (EDEM), an agent-based framework that treats supply and demand as a coupled stochastic process driven by heterogeneous, noisy agent valuations. The model's primary technical contribution is the identification of a generative mechanism for persistent disequilibrium: when market-clearing prices are sequentially sampled from the upper tail of noisy bid distributions and recycled as inputs for future valuations, expected prices drift upward despite strictly zero-mean estimation errors. We derive this order-statistic bias in closed form for i.i.d. uniform bids and use simulations to show that compounding this bias across epochs yields exponential price growth without requiring assumptions of investor optimism or irrationality. This framework extends Miller's divergence-of-opinion theory to a dynamic setting, recovering Walrasian equilibrium and Miller's static premium as limiting cases. Through controlled experiments and sensitivity analysis on a simulated real-estate neighborhood, we identify six distinct regimes-ranging from band-stability to runaway bubbles-emerging from a single agent ruleset. These results offer a potential explanation for the contradictory findings in the empirical divergence-of-opinion literature and suggest that machine-learning valuation algorithms may inadvertently amplify this inherent statistical bias.

Reliable position and shape control in tokamak plasmas requires accurate real-time regulation of several strongly coupled shape parameters. The control vectors that disentangle these couplings, referred to as \textit{virtual circuits} (VCs), enable independent shape parameter control for a specific Grad--Shafranov (GS) equilibrium. Numerical calculation of VCs is not currently feasible in real time, therefore VCs are usually computed prior to each experiment, using a small number of reference GS equilibria sampled along the desired scenario trajectory, with each VC used to control the plasma within a preset time interval. While effective near the reference equilibrium, this approach can lead to degraded performance as the plasma departs from the reference equilibrium and/or from the desired trajectory, and it complicates the design of robust control strategies for rapidly evolving plasma configurations. In this paper, we construct neural-network-based emulators of plasma shape parameters from which VCs can be derived, to provide the MAST Upgrade (MAST-U) plasma control system with state-aware VCs in real-time. To do this, we develop an extensive library of over a million simulated GS equilibria, covering a substantial portion of the MAST-U operational space. These emulators provide differentiable functions whose gradients can be rapidly computed, enabling the derivation of accurate VCs for real-time shape control. We perform extensive verification of the emulated VCs by testing whether they disentangle the control problem. The neural-network-based approach delivers high accuracy and orthogonality across a diverse range of equilibria. This work establishes the physical validity of emulated VCs as a scalable and general alternative to schedules of precomputed VCs.

Probabilistic prediction systems often aggregate probability estimates from multiple models into a single decision. A common assumption is that if each model is individually calibrated, the aggregate prediction will also be well calibrated. We show that this assumption fails in multi-agent settings: individually calibrated predictors can become collectively miscalibrated when their predictions interact strategically, in the game-theoretic sense of Brier-optimal local response, even without deliberate coordination. This phenomenon arises naturally when agents are independently trained on overlapping data. We prove that under Brier-score-based aggregation with positively correlated beliefs, each agent's individually optimal report systematically underestimates the positive-class probability, yielding a Price of Anarchy greater than one whenever Cov(b_i, b_j) > 0. In a canonical setting (n = 5 agents, pairwise correlation = 0.5, base rate = 0.3), the empirically measured PoA in false-negative rate reaches 7.25x. In contrast, VCG-based aggregation aligns incentives by rewarding marginal contribution, achieving dominant-strategy incentive compatibility and near-optimal performance. Experiments on three real-world datasets (NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, Credit Card Fraud) show that VCG provides strong robustness while maintaining comparable accuracy. It performs particularly well in data-sparse and adversarial settings, and adaptive weighting further improves performance under distribution shift.

Finding approximate equilibria for large-scale imperfect-information competitive games such as StarCraft, Dota, and CounterStrike remains computationally infeasible due to sparse rewards and challenging exploration over long horizons. In this paper, we propose a multi-agent starting-state sampling strategy designed to substantially accelerate online exploration in regularized policy-gradient game methods for two-player zero-sum (2p0s) games. Motivated by an assumption that offline demonstrations from skilled humans can provide good coverage of high-level strategies relevant to equilibrium play, we propose the initialization of reinforcement learning data collection at intermediate states sampled from offline data to facilitate exploration of strategically relevant subgames. Referring to this method as Data-Augmented Game Starts (DAGS), we perform experiments using synthetic datasets and analytically tractable, long-horizon control variants of two-player Kuhn Poker, Goofspiel, and a counterexample game designed to penalize biased beliefs over hidden information. Under fixed computational budgets, DAGS enables regularized policy gradient methods to achieve lower exploitability in games with significantly more challenging exploration. We show that augmenting starting state distributions when solving imperfect information games can lead to biased equilibria, and we provide a straightforward mitigation to this in the form of multi-task observation flags. Finally, we release a new set of benchmark environments that drastically increase exploration challenges and state counts in existing OpenSpiel games while keeping exploitability measurements analytically tractable.

Watermarking techniques for large language models (LLMs), which encode hidden information in the output so its source can be verified, have gained significant attention in recent days, thanks to their potential capability to detect accidental or deliberate misuse. Similar challenges involving model misuse also exist in the context of game-playing, such as when detecting the unauthorized use of AI tools in gaming platforms (e.g., cheating in online chess). In this paper, we initiate the study of how game-playing strategies can be watermarked. We show how the KGW watermark for LLMs can be adapted to watermark game-playing agents in perfect-information extensive-form games. The watermark can then be detected using a statistical test. We show that the degradation in the quality of the watermarked strategy profile, quantified by the expected utility, can be bounded, but there is a tradeoff between detectability and quality. In our experiments, we bootstrap the watermarking framework to various chess engines and demonstrate that a) the impact of the watermark on the quality of the strategy is negligible and b) the watermark can be detected with just a handful of games.

Parallelization has played an instrumental role in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), drastically reducing the time taken to train and evaluate large AI models. In contrast to its impact in the broader field of AI, applying parallelization to computational game solving is relatively unexplored, despite its great potential. In this paper, we parallelize the family of counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) algorithms, which were central to important breakthroughs for solving large imperfect-information games. We present a generalized parallelization framework, reframing CFR as a series of linear algebra operations. Then, existing techniques for parallelizing linear algebra operations can be applied to accelerate CFR. We also describe how our technique can be applied to other tabular members of the CFR family of algorithms, including the state-of-the-art, such as CFR+, discounted CFR, and predictive variants of CFR. Experimentally, we show that our CFR implementation on a GPU is up to four orders of magnitude faster than Google DeepMind OpenSpiel's CFR implementations on a CPU.

This paper studies the convergence of the Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update algorithm (OMWU) in two player zero-sum games. Recent works have identified instances on which the last-iterate of OMWU can converge arbitrarily slowly, but understanding when and why this slow convergence occurs has remained open. In this work, we develop a new analysis framework that gives sharp, quantitative explanations for this behavior. Our analysis is based on viewing the algorithm's dual iterates as an optimistic skew-gradient descent with respect to an energy function. We prove over the dual iterates that energy is dissipative, and by establishing tight bounds on the magnitude of dissipation, our analysis quantifies the geometric bottlenecks that arise when the corresponding primal iterates are close to the simplex boundary. This further translates into a new linear last-iterate convergence rate in KL divergence on games with a unique and interior Nash equilibrium. Compared to prior work, this new rate contains a much sharper dependence on game-specific constants, and we prove this dependence is optimal. Moreover, these geometric insights further translate into new separations on uniform convergence rates for OMWU. On the one hand, we prove constant lower bounds on the uniform best-iterate convergence rate in KL divergence and total variation distance from Nash. On the other hand, we establish for the $2\times 2$ setting a new ${\widetilde O}(T^{-1/2})$ best-iterate rate in duality gap, improving substantially over prior work. Together, this shows in general that uniform convergence rate guarantees do not transfer across different measures of distance to Nash.

Responsibility allocation -- determining the extent to which agents are accountable for outcomes -- is a fundamental challenge in the design and analysis of multi-agent systems. In this work, we model such systems as concurrent stochastic multi-player games and introduce a notion of retrospective (backward) counterfactual responsibility, which quantifies an agent's accountability for outcomes resulting from a given strategy profile. To allocate responsibility among agents, we utilise the Shapley value and formally show that this method satisfies key desirable properties, including fairness and consistency. Building on this foundation, we propose a formal framework that supports both verification and strategic reasoning in responsibility-aware multi-agent systems. Furthermore, by adopting Nash equilibrium as the solution concept, we demonstrate how to compute stable strategy profiles in which agents trade off responsibility against expected reward.

We study the problem of learning Nash equilibria in offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. While existing approaches often rely on explicit pessimism to address distribution shift, we show that KL regularization alone suffices to stabilize learning and guarantee convergence. We first introduce Regularized Offline Sequential Equilibrium (ROSE), a theoretical framework that achieves a fast $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/n)$ convergence rate under \textit{unilateral concentrability}, improving over the standard $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\sqrt{n})$ rates in unregularized settings. We then propose Sequential Offline Self-play Mirror Descent (SOS-MD), a practical model-free algorithm based on least-squares value estimation and iterative self-play updates. We prove that the last iterate of SOS-MD attains the same $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/n)$ statistical rate up to a vanishing optimization error of order $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\sqrt{T})$ in the number of self-play iterations $T$.

By specifying behaviour across multiple agents, social norms are a coordination approach to resolving social dilemmas. Decentralized and wide adoption can be achieved by norms whose prescription involves interpreting stochastic signals in the environment. Such signals must have enough correlation to orchestrate mutually beneficial coordination and enough disincentivizing uncertainty about the benefits of exploiting that coordination. Evolutionary game theory of matrix games has been used to describe how, by rational agents comparing and adopting norms, a norm can evolve to become dominant in a population. Morsky & Akçay (2019) classify norms according to a set of rationality criteria. Joint player strategies that adopt norms that are consistent with optimal single-player strategies with respect to expected reward naturally satisfy a correlated, rather than Nash game theoretic equilibrium condition. Here, we present a version of this theory that clarifies the basic ingredients. We formulate it in the more general Markov game setting more commonly used in reinforcement learning theory. We illustrate the theory by mapping norms over the signal and reward space, while also giving a detailed exposition of the underlying mechanics of the approach. Finally, we give a general solution and analysis of replicator dynamics, which Morsky & Akçay (2019) propose as a means by which these norms could emerge.