Rationality

This work considers adaptive shared human-robot control for nonlinear control-affine systems, where the assumption of a fully rational human is relaxed and the robot adapts its assistance to observed boundedly rational human behavior. We use a level-k bounded-rationality model of the two-player game to construct a finite bank of candidate human and robot policies through alternating best-response computations, with the associated value functions and policies approximated using adaptive dynamic programming. During the shared-control interaction, state-transition residuals compare the measured system evolution with the trajectories predicted by the candidate human policies. The residuals are accumulated using a forgetting factor and mapped to a probabilistic human-behavior model over the finite candidate bank. Rather than selecting a single candidate or averaging stored robot policies, the robot computes a distribution-aware one-step best response by minimizing an expected cooperative cost over the complete estimated human behavior distribution. For a quadratic terminal-value approximation and Euler state propagation, this response admits a closed-form solution expressed in terms of the expected human input. The proposed methods are evaluated in simulations of a benchmark nonlinear system stabilization task, and of a planar manipulator shared control setup. The reported results show decreasing Kullback-Leibler divergence between the estimated and simulated human behavior distributions, and a lower accumulated running cost for the robot agent over the shared control interaction period, than the maximum-probability and probability-weighted alternative policies baseline.

Traditional offline recommendation evaluation relies heavily on complex, manually maintained feature pipelines that are difficult to scale. While Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a promising alternative by predicting user engagement directly from raw text logs, empirical analysis in this study identifies a critical failure mode termed bidirectional rationalization. In a zero-shot setting, LLMs are found to convincingly argue for both positive and negative user engagement outcomes on the exact same item with identical evidence, highlighting the unreliability of off-the-shelf LLMs in predicting user engagement. To resolve this, we develop and apply a sequential behavioral alignment framework pairing fine-tuning with preference optimization over paired correct and counterfactual rationales. Evaluated on real-world homepage interaction logs, this aligned reasoning approach achieves a 32.19% lift in Macro-F1 score over the zero-shot baseline and matches the production feature-engineered baseline. The results demonstrate that behavioral alignment mitigates bidirectional rationalization while delivering human-interpretable reasoning traces without manual pipeline overhead.

The emergence of language-based AI agents promises to transform the scope of machine economic activity. Instead of just proposing bids or following hard-coded protocols, such agents can be used to negotiate and execute agreements in open-ended natural language. However, most evaluations of these abilities have focused on one-off exchanges or simple economic games, leaving open the rich space of time-extended, contingent, and incomplete contracts made expressible by language; they also focus on raw profit, without measuring the qualities required for trustworthy contracting. We address this by formulating a rational framework for how agents should negotiate and perform natural language contracts in uncertain multi-step environments. Within this framework, we develop metrics and baselines for quantifying rational and cooperative play. To evaluate how agents perform at such contracting, we instantiate our framework in ContractSim, an evaluation suite where two players negotiate and execute a multi-turn supplier contract under environmental and inter-player uncertainty. Across six environments and three supplier settings (catering, hotel cleaning, and AI hosting) we find that current LLM-based agents reach agreement reliably, and negotiate efficient contracts when environmental uncertainty is low. However, under high uncertainty, they often fail to negotiate satisfiable, efficient, or mutually beneficial contracts. They are also frequently uncooperative when executing contracts, violating contract terms for additional profit even when contracts are easy to satisfy. These findings highlight room for improvement in the design of language agents that can negotiate, interpret, and execute contracts both rationally and cooperatively.

This paper explores the idea of promoting well-being and safety in human-AI interactions by forcing AI agents explicitly to empower humans and to manage the power balance between humans and AI agents in a desirable way. Using a principled, partially axiomatic approach based on desirable properties, we design a parametrizable and decomposable objective function for AI systems that represents an inequality- and risk-averse long-term aggregate of human power. It can take into account models of human bounded rationality and social norms, and crucially, considers a wide variety of possible human goals. We prove how certain desiderata enforce particular functional forms and restrict parameter ranges. We exemplify the consequences of softly maximizing this metric in several paradigmatic situations and describe what instrumental sub-goals it will likely imply.

Representation theorems in decision theory establish that behavior satisfies certain axioms if and only if it can be rationalized by a well-defined objective. I argue that this ``if and only if'' structure provides a potentially useful foundation for label-free evaluation and regularization of LLMs and other AI systems. Axiom compliance can be checked from the model's own responses to synthetic choice problems, with no external labels or human feedback, and the penalties are readily computable. Because the axioms are necessary and sufficient, the resulting checks exhaust the implications of the relevant rationality standard for the elicited data: a model that passes cannot be rejected on rationality grounds by any further test of the same data. I discuss three instantiations: probabilistic coherence via a theorem of de Finetti, preference rationality via Afriat's theorem, and subjective expected utility via a theorem of Echenique and Saito (2015), each yielding a continuous penalty that is zero whenever behavior can be rationalized. Since coherence does not restrict which objective rationalizes behavior, these penalties complement rather than replace other evaluation and training signals.

As autonomous agents powered by foundation models are increasingly integrated into social and economic systems, understanding the principles governing their collective behavior is essential for ensuring safety and cooperation. Classical game theory, the dominant framework for modeling rational interaction, is built upon the assumption of decoupled agency,' where agents treat their own decision-making as independent of the environment and other actors. Modern AI agents, however, jointly predict their own future actions alongside external observations. Here, we report a striking finding: when interacting in stylized social dilemmas, foundation model agents engaging in optimal planning consistently converge to stable cooperation, directly contradicting classical game-theoretic predictions of mutual defection. To understand this phenomenon, we introduce the embedded Bayesian agent,' a theoretical model for foundation model agents. By shifting from decoupled to embedded agency, these agents model themselves as part of the universe they inhabit, maintaining epistemic uncertainty about their own decision-making algorithms. We show that by inferring whether others are behaviorally similar, an embedded agent treats its own deliberation during planning as evidence: a decision to cooperate predicts a similar decision by a similar partner. We formalize this mechanism of similarity inference through the `embedded equilibrium,' a novel solution concept replacing the Nash equilibrium to provide a foundational game theory for the social behavior of modern AI agents.

Multi-agent debate commonly exchanges complete rationales even when disagreements concern only a few intermediate claims. We introduce Localized Multi-Agent Debate (LMAD), an inference-time protocol that represents agent rationales as nodes, locates their earliest conflict, and restricts debate to the corresponding local segments. Guarded resolution extends a shared committed state so that later conflicts can be addressed without reopening accepted steps. We evaluate LMAD on four multi-hop question-answering benchmarks using ten backbones from four model families. Our method achieves the highest macro-averaged judge accuracy across all ten backbones, outperforming the strongest conventional baseline by up to 7.20 percentage points.

Social learning is a powerful mechanism through which agents learn about the world from others. However, humans sometimes choose direct experience over social learning, which can carry time and cognitive resource costs. How do people balance social and non-social learning? We propose a Rational Mentalizing model of the decision to engage in social learning. This model estimates the utility of social learning by reasoning about another agent's goal and the informativeness of their future actions. It then weighs the utility of social learning against the utility of non-social learning. Using a novel game where players choose between observing other agents or exploring the environment, we show that the Rational Mentalizing model can quantitatively capture human trade-offs between these strategies. These findings suggest that selective social learning is guided by 'Theory of Mind' in the service of utility maximization.

Cognitive distortion amplifies negative emotions and contributes to mental health disorders. Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT) is an effective way to address cognitive distortions, but its large-scale application is limited by the shortage of professional therapists. Although large language models (LLMs) have recently been explored for mental health applications, existing methods still suffer from limited domain specificity, overly flattering responses, and the absence of well-defined annotations for cognitive distortions. This paper proposes Cognivia, an evidence-based artificial intelligence therapist that integrates automatic cognitive distortion identification and rational response generation. Our framework is built on authoritative CBT texts widely regarded as core paradigms and standard references. It is further augmented with mental health question-answer (Q and A) data, and employs multi-stage prompting and structured generation strategies under the supervision of behavioral science experts. Then we fine-tune a lightweight LLM on this augmented CBT dataset to obtain Cognivia. In addition, we propose the first hierarchical quality evaluation framework for assessing LLM-generated rational responses, developed through collaboration between AI researchers and behavioral science experts. Cognivia is evaluated using lexical metrics, LLM-based Judges with two complementary criteria, and human evaluation by 10 behavioral science experts. It consistently outperforms the baseline methods in cognitive distortion recognition and rational response generation, demonstrating its effectiveness. Our code is available at https://github.com/SNOWTEAM2023/Cognivia.

Two structural insights have been overlooked in automated residential floor plan generation. First, design is inherently progressive. Architects begin with rough strokes and refine them over time, whereas existing methods typically require their conditioning representation to be fully specified before generation, a fundamental mismatch with how design actually works. Second, the 2D floor plan is not an optional intermediate but an irreplaceable spatial contract. Once room boundaries, doors, and windows are fixed, furnishing reduces from open-ended spatial reasoning to bounded constraint satisfaction. Bypassing this contract, as existing 3D systems do by delegating layout to language models, yields overlapping rooms and implausible proportions; directly calling general-purpose language models likewise produces geometrically invalid layouts. Guided by these insights, we present PlanCraft. SketchPlan supplies the missing training signal by replaying the architect's drawing process on 80K real floor plans, producing partial sketches at every completeness level. PlanCraft-Diff progressively sharpens an incomplete sketch into a geometrically precise, vectorizable floor plan through a coarse-to-fine strategy. With the spatial contract established, PlanCraft-Agent then furnishes the scene within well-defined room boundaries. Experiments show that PlanCraft achieves a 61.1% lower FID than the best existing 2D method and surpasses existing 3D systems by 15 points in expert-rated spatial rationality, with a sketch at only 25% completion already outperforming all fully specified baselines.

Infinite Canons is an ongoing series of canons with infinite solutions. More specifically, each canon is based on a melodic line that can be combined in any number of voices, at any tempo ratios (rational or irrational), and with each voice moving either forward or in retrograde inversion, while maintaining harmonic consistency. This paper describes the structure of these maximally self-similar melodic lines based on two different constructions: 1) a discrete prime-factorization approach yielding self-similarity under all rational ratios, and 2) a continuous logarithmic approach extending this to irrational ratios. In both cases the vertical interval between voices in a tempo ratio of $λ_i / λ_j$ is given by a homomorphism $φ(λ_i / λ_j)$, which is a constant independent of time. Furthermore, under these constructions retrograde inversion collapses to transposition, allowing for all manner of table canons. These structures are demonstrated with suggestive realizations of several different infinite canons. Future work includes a more complete mathematical treatment, musical applications, and an interactive program that allows users to explore an unlimited number of realizations of these pieces.

We present the interactions with an LLM (Large Language Model) aiming at proving that the square root of 2 is not a rational number in an LP (Logic Programming) context. We start from a few basic pure logic programming predicate definitions. We rely on the LPTP (Logic Program Theorem Prover) system for stating and proving properties about logic programs. As the proof language of LPTP is based on natural deduction, the proofs are human readable. In our case study, we sketch in LPTP the usual proof showing the irrationality of the square root of 2. Then we describe the interactions we had with the LLM. We end up with a complete formal proof, partially generated by an LLM and fully proof-checked by LPTP.

The softmax policy $π(a \mid s) \propto \exp(βQ(s,a))$ is the default model of stochastic choice in reinforcement learning (RL). Various justifications based on robustness, exploration, and optimization have been offered in the RL literature, but none uniquely derives the softmax form from first principles. This leaves a basic tension unresolved: the entropy bonus in the soft Bellman equation violates the Independence axiom that underwrites the Markov decision process (MDP) reward structure. We dissolve this tension by distinguishing two kinds of randomness: chance and choice. By restricting von Neumann-Morgenstern (VNM) Independence to environmental lotteries over base prospects, we show that imposing independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) and monotonicity on the policy and value functions at choice nodes uniquely determines the Boltzmann policy, the entropy-regularized representation, and the soft Bellman equation. The choice between the soft and hard Bellman equations thus reduces to a design decision: whether the agent values its own ability to choose. We develop RL-specific consequences, including return monotonicity and convergence under generalized discounting, and synthesize the independent lines from economics and information theory that arrive at the same structure, offering a normative assessment of when IIA is appropriate for agent design.

In this work, we study the reinforcement learning (RL) problem from pairwise trajectory comparisons provided by a human expert. We generalize preference-based RL by formalizing a novel setting in which the expert can also label trajectory pairs as incomparable, i.e., when neither trajectory dominates the other. We introduce the learning problem and the desiderata that its solution should satisfy. Then, we propose a novel Bradley-Terry-inspired rationality model that effectively captures incomparabilities and infers a multi-dimensional reward function, and we study its properties. We provide a sample complexity analysis for learning the model parameters when a dataset is available. Finally, we evaluate our model's ability to reconstruct a reward function that aligns with the expert's comparisons in simulated environments and to recover the Pareto frontier of policies, along with a robustness analysis across varying levels of expert rationality.

The mean mechanism is known to be non-incentive-compatible, namely, rational players are incentivized to misreport their values. Despite this game-theoretic issue, the mean mechanism is prevalent in practice due to its other desirable properties. We give a full characterization of pure Nash equilibria--how the players will misreport--for the affine mechanism, of which the mean is a special case. Furthermore, we characterize both complete-information and Bayesian games under the affine mechanism. Our results highlight the inevitability of extreme exaggeration in such games.

In Description Logics (DLs), reasoning under Rational Closure (RC) is a well-known and widely accepted non-monotonic formalism to handle defeasible knowledge. In this paper, we study the application of RC to the core and horn variants of the DL-Lite family of lightweight description logics. We analyze both entitlement (instance checking) and Conjunctive Query (CQ) answering under RC. Our main contribution is providing a plug-in architecture that builds upon existing standard classical reasoners, establishing that reasoning and CQ answering under RC for DL-Lite can be done efficiently with minimal computational overhead.

Collective artificial intelligence, where multiple agents work on shared tasks, holds potential to solve expansive problems in fields from medicine to collective governance. But while prescriptive engineering solutions abound, we lack descriptive scientific understanding of artificial collectives, and therefore principles for how to design resource efficient multi-agent systems. Through systematic experiments with optimizing agents, we characterize how agent interpretive abilities, rationality bounds, and task qualities interact to shape collective performance. Agents range from specialists, with narrow interpretive abilities, to generalists, with broad ones. Collectives of specialists correspond to sparse, centralized networks, while collectives of generalists correspond to dense, decentralized ones. We show that interpretive network properties have small performance effects on average (0.07 standard deviations of performance). However, for specific task qualities, these effects are 4.5 times larger (0.33 sd) and can reach much higher for certain task qualities (1.84 sd). This leads collectives of generalists to perform better on tasks that involve generating, choosing, and coordinating, while collectives of specialists with a few generalist mediators perform better on tasks that involve negotiating. Rationality bounds then moderate these relationships. At loose bounds, specialists outperform generalists through more effective sampling of high-dimensional decision spaces. At tight bounds, generalists outperform specialists through better gradient estimation. A fundamental trade-off between performance and convergence speed emerges at moderate bounds. These findings suggest that multi-agent design could benefit from matching interpretive networks to both task demands and agents' computational limits, with implications for the efficiency and energy costs of multi-agent systems.

Standardized evaluation protocols are indispensable for robust benchmarking in remote sensing, particularly as foundation features are increasingly transferred across diverse sensors and complex imaging geometries. In satellite multi-view reconstruction, conventional evaluations relying on unconstrained 2D global matching are often misleading. The Rational Function Model (RFM) and its Rational Polynomial Coefficients (RPC) dictate a curved, height-dependent epipolar geometry that render flat 2D search spaces physically inconsistent. We propose a geometry-faithful and reproducible protocol tailored for the RPC framework. Our approach integrates an RPC-projected 3D consistency metric with a geometry-constrained dense matching proxy, specifically evaluating whether similarity responses remain localized and unique under physically plausible search manifolds. A pivotal finding of our joint reporting strategy is the decoupling of semantic agreement and geometric localization: high cross-view similarity at a projected 3D point does not guarantee reliable matchability in practical inference. Our benchmark demonstrates that incorporating geometric constraints is fundamental to the problem definition in satellite imagery. Furthermore, we show that state-of-the-art 2D backbones remain remarkably competitive against specialized 3D-aware models when subjected to this RPC-consistent evaluation.

Purpose The WHO's COVID-19 non-pharmaceutical interventions (e.g., lockdowns, vaccinations) effectively curb transmission but impose heavy economic strains. Existing research often neglects individual behaviors and falsely assumes perfect infection tracking and flawless policy execution, failing to account for real-world uncertainties and errors. Methods We propose an integrative approach incorporating uncertainties in both epidemic measurement (infections/hospitalizations) and policy implementation. We built a simulation model of 1,000 individuals making real-time choices regarding mask-wearing, vaccination, and shopping. Concurrently, policymakers deploy interventions (lockdowns, mandates) based on health and economic observations. This framework is driven by hierarchical reinforcement learning agents, utilizing deep Q-networks alongside uncertainty-aware policy gradient variants (DDPG and TD3). Results The simulations effectively managed the epidemic's progression. Masking and vaccinations proved highly effective, significantly reducing both the outbreak's peak height and duration. By integrating individual behaviors, policy uncertainties, and multifaceted interventions, our dynamic control approach successfully mitigated the epidemic's impact. Conclusions Our model overcomes previous research limitations by embedding uncertainty and human behavior into public health policy frameworks. The simulation demonstrates that accounting for individual choices and imperfect data is crucial for designing effective interventions during complex pandemics, with masks and vaccines serving as pivotal tools.

Large language models are increasingly used for knowledge acquisition, code generation, academic writing, and agent-based automation. In these settings, users may obtain highly structured answers, plans, and judgments without sufficient domain practice. This paper proposes a practice auditing framework for LLM use and AI-generated content governance. It introduces collective empiricism to describe how LLMs compress and reorganize large-scale human experience into outputs that appear empirical and rational, and pseudo-rational cognition to describe how users may mistake AI-generated structured expression for their own rational understanding. The paper analyzes AI subjectivity illusion, subjectivity structures in input materials, template loops in AI-AI conversations, statistical misjudgment in AIGC detection, and memory pollution when generated content enters future contexts, long-term memory, retrieval spaces, or agent skill systems. To reduce these risks, the paper proposes an auditing process based on requirement definition, problem-boundary identification, evidence-source auditing, practical validation, reverse questioning, logging, version management, rollback, and renewed cognition. The framework does not reject AI productivity; it argues that LLM outputs should be returned to verifiable, reproducible, and intervenable processes of practice. The paper provides a conceptual and auditable framework for cognitive risks in LLM interaction, AI-generated content governance, long-term memory systems, and human-AI interaction.

We ask: when do Bayesian model averaging (BMA) weights over decision trees carry sufficient epistemic information to justify committed exploitation of the averaging distribution? We answer this question in closed form for Bayesian decision trees (BDTs) with Dirichlet-Multinomial leaf models and a Catalan-exponential tree-size prior (Schetinin&Jakaite, 2025), establishing a complete non-asymptotic theory of rational commitment thresholds.

In RLHF, each training example contains a prompt $x$ and two candidate responses $y,y'$, and annotators provide pairwise preferences between these responses. The learning problem is to convert these heterogeneous pairwise judgments into a single scalar reward $r(x,y)$ that measures response quality for each prompt. Classical social choice implies an impossibility because heterogeneous annotator samples can induce pooled preferences with Condorcet cycles, so no scalar reward can evaluate all compared response pairs consistently. A growing literature analyzes RLHF as a social-choice problem, but usually assumes a fixed finite set of alternatives, i.e., a pre-enumerated finite set of candidate responses for each prompt. Modern pipelines instead score responses through a learned representation $φ(x,y)$ before a scalar head, so $φ$ determines which responses are treated as distinguishable alternatives and which comparisons are visible to the reward model. Once this embedding is part of the problem, the impossibility results from social choice theory become a tradeoff. We show that the excess cross-entropy loss of any reward built on $φ$ decomposes exactly into a representational term, which a richer $φ$ shrinks, and an aggregation term, which a richer $φ$ enlarges by exposing more comparisons that no scalar can rank consistently. The same results extend to direct preference optimization (DPO), and jointly training the embedding and the reward cannot guarantee to recover the sweet spot of this tradeoff. Experiments on synthetic data and real preference datasets corroborate our results.

We introduce Rationalize, a role-pair framework for shared semantic reasoning between humans and AI models in data-driven sensemaking. Building on ideas in human-machine teaming and critical thinking, we conceptualize human-AI interaction as a series of complementary role pairs (Explorer-Guide, Investigator-Informant, Teacher-Student, Judge-Advocate) operating in a shared reasoning space. In this space, human analysts and AI models (such as LLMs) make purposes, questions, assumptions, evidence, inferences, and implications explicit, facilitating alignment not only at the output level but at the level of rationalization of intent and action by each side. We relate these role pairs to the bidirectional human-AI alignment framework, illustrating how "aligning AI to humans" and "aligning humans to AI" differ by role, and sketch a collaborative research agenda for alignment design and assessment using element-level and role-specific approaches.

Significant progress has been made in aligning LLMs with target value functions. We argue that, even when an LLM has been well aligned in (post-)training, it may still fail to maximise the aligned value in reasoning. We mathematically formalise this gap as rational value risk: the utility discrepancy between a model's deployed reasoning strategy and its rational counterpart whose responses maximise utility in the steepest direction. The estimation error of rational value risk is further decomposed into three components from bounded prompts, bounded responses, and imperfect verifiers. Extensive experiments are conducted, covering models Llama-3.1, Qwen-2.5, Tülu-3 families (7B-72B), GPT-5.2, GPT-5.5, and DeepSeek-V4, and benchmarks UltraFeedback, AlpacaEval, GSM8K, MATH, HumanEval, and MathArena. The results validate that (1) rational value risk is widespread; (2) value alignment can reduce, but cannot avoid, it; (3) self-consistency can improve rationality; and (4) a longer chain of thought improves rationality but with diminishing returns. The code is at https://github.com/EVIEHub/LLM-Rationality

Strategic classification(SC) studies the interaction between decision models and agents who strategically manipulate their features for favorable outcomes. Existing SC frameworks typically rely on the idealized assumption that agents are strictly rational. However, evidence from behavioral economics and psychology consistently shows that real-world decision-making is often shaped by cognitive biases, deviating from pure rationality. To formalize this limitation, we identify and define a new problem setting, termed the behaviorally realistic strategic classification problem, where agents' strategic manipulations deviate from full rationality due to psychological biases. Motivated by the identified limitation, we propose the Prospect-Guided Strategic Framework (Pro-SF) to address the problem, a principled framework grounded in prospect theory to model and learn under behaviorally realistic strategic responses. Specifically, to capture behaviorally realistic strategic manipulations, our framework reformulates the Stackelberg-style interaction between agents and the decision-maker by incorporating three key mechanisms inspired by prospect theory, including the asymmetry between benefits and costs, different subjective reference points, and non-rational probability distortion. Experiments on synthetic and real-world datasets establish Pro-SF as a behaviorally grounded approach to strategic classification, bridging machine learning and behavioral economics for more reliable deployment in the real world.

Communicating using only a limited vocabulary is a common but challenging cognitive phenomenon, requiring an ideal communicator to plan carefully to optimize for intelligibility while circumventing a constrained lexicon. In this work, we investigate how humans respond to a broad array of questions under variable vocabulary limitations, consisting of only 250 highly frequent words at the most restrictive. We provide theoretically motivated comparisons to greedy and globally optimal sampling algorithms using Sequential Monte Carlo inference with large language models. Humans generally resemble greedy sampling more than globally optimal sampling, though more skilled humans are more likely to backtrack and revise -- a non-greedy behavior. An observed human pattern of leaning on semantically light words in high-constraint settings falls out of both greedy and globally optimal sampling. We discuss the results and their broader implications for resource-rational cognition, psycholinguistics, L2 communication, and language impairments.

A learner does not only fit data; it also determines how strongly the training sample may shape its output and how much distortion it can hedge. We study this relation as a bounded-rational decision problem whose primitive object is the induced channel from samples to outputs. The learner's response law determines which changes in this channel are cheap or costly, and therefore induces both a lower tradeoff curve between training loss and sample dependence and a matched upper certificate curve. When the response law is represented by an $f$-divergence regularizer, these curves live in the regularizer's native information geometry, with KL as the special case corresponding to Shannon mutual information. We show how the hedge and the two curves can be recovered from black-box behavior by observing responses to scaled losses and local loss perturbations. In learning, population loss is empirical loss plus the distortion induced by the particular training sample. The recovered hedge gives a practical certificate when it covers that distortion. Thus generalization is treated as a testable hedging property of the learner's own response law.

Hospital pharmacists make high-stakes decisions to mitigate drug shortages under uncertainty, time pressure, and patient risk. Interviews revealed that pharmacists focus attention on a small subset of drugs, limiting cognitive effort to the most urgent cases. Motivated by these findings, we formalize a bounded-rational, attention-guided decision framework that dynamically decomposes drugs into a subset for high-cost reasoning and a complementary subset for low-cost monitoring. We develop two agents: an Expert Agent that applies attention weights derived from pharmacist interviews, and a Learner Agent that adapts attention allocation over time through experience. Across simulated scenarios spanning short to long horizons, we show that attention-guided planning supports stable decision-making without complete state reasoning. These results suggest that a primary decision is not what action to take, but where to allocate cognitive effort, and that attention-guided, satisficing strategies can reduce problem complexity while maintaining stable performance.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as automatic judges for summarization and dialogue evaluation. Prior work has documented biases such as position, verbosity, and style preferences, but largely focuses on outcomes, leaving judge explanations underexplored. We instead ask whether LLM judges are cue-invariant, i.e., whether their rankings and explanations remain stable when non-evidential cues are perturbed while holding the underlying texts fixed. We introduce a suite of cue interventions (Blind, Truth, Flip, Placebo, Reveal-After) and tie-aware metrics that quantify outcome anchoring and rationale anchoring, including label-aligned rhetoric and explanation drift, alongside consistency and stereotype-intrusion checks. We design anchoring attacks using verbosity and confidence cues, and compare two mitigations: structured chain-of-thought prompting and PROOF-BEFORE-PREFERENCE (evidence lock, score, rank). Using a new dataset of 1,000 summaries from traditional extractive models and LLMs, we find substantial cue-anchored rationalization under label and placebo perturbations, while PROOF-BEFORE-PREFERENCE markedly improves cue invariance over baselines.

Whole-slide image (WSI) multiple instance learning (MIL) classifiers can achieve strong slide-level AUC while leaving the full-bag prediction opaque. Attention scores are widely reused as post-hoc explanations, but high attention can reflect aggregation preference rather than a compact, model-sufficient rationale. We study post-hoc rationale highlighting for frozen WSI-MIL: given a trained classifier, can its slide-level prediction be recovered from a compact, output-consistent tile subset without retraining the backbone? We instantiate this with Finding Optimal Contextual Instances (FOCI), a lightweight rationale-readout layer over a frozen MIL backbone. FOCI is trained with model-output sufficiency and exclusion objectives over keep/drop tile subsets, evaluated with an insertion-style Sequential Reveal Protocol (SRP) adapted to WSI-MIL, and summarized by the Selection Headroom Index (SHI). Across three WSI benchmarks and seven MIL backbones, FOCI reveals that compact rationales are selection-headroom dependent: transformer and multi-branch attention aggregators can admit compact rationales, near-minimal attention-pooling baselines enter a selection-saturation regime, and hard-selection backbones can conflict with an external readout. For TransMIL, relative to its documented CLS-proxy ranking, FOCI reduces the Minimum Sufficient K (MSK) tile count by 32-56% across benchmarks, while ACMIL+FOCI attains the highest mean SHI (+0.465). Deletion-based perturbation and selected-only downstream evaluation provide complementary checks. These results position FOCI as a model-level interpretability and audit layer: selected tiles are not claims of clinical or pathologist-level diagnostic sufficiency, but candidate rationales that offer a compact, reviewable view of when a frozen MIL prediction can be localized to a small output-consistent subset.

Despite strong performance of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) on multimodal tasks, predicting whether and why an image is persuasive remains challenging. We first show that prompting MLLMs to reason before prediction does not consistently help, and can even reduce persuasiveness prediction performance, suggesting that naively generated rationales are unreliable signals for this task. Yet, no established methodology exists for training MLLMs to reason about visual persuasion or evaluating whether their rationales faithfully support their decisions. To address this gap, we show empirically and theoretically that diverse teacher-generated rationales, when used for supervised fine-tuning, improve visual persuasiveness prediction. We further introduce a three-dimensional faithfulness evaluation framework covering rationale-to-decision consistency, rationale-to-image groundedness, and rationale-to-decision sensitivity. Applying this framework shows that prediction performance alone does not guarantee faithful rationales, while rationale-to-decision sensitivity is most aligned with human rationale preferences. These findings motivate faithfulness-aware training objectives and scalable rationale supervision for visual persuasiveness evaluation. Our code and dataset will be made publicly available.

How can we make models robust to even imperfect human feedback? In reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), human preferences over model outputs are used to train a reward model that assigns scalar values to responses. Because these rewards are inferred from pairwise comparisons, this learning depends on an assumed relationship between latent reward differences and observed preferences, typically modeled using a Boltzmann formulation in which a rationality parameter beta informs how consistently preferences reflect reward differences. In practice, beta is typically treated as a fixed constant that reflects assumed uniform annotator reliability. However, human feedback is not this simplistic in practice: real human judgments are shaped by cognitive biases, leading to systematic deviations from reward-consistent behavior that arise contextually. To address this, we treat rationality as context- and annotation-dependent. We design an approach to dynamically adjust the rationality parameter beta during reward learning using an LLM-as-judge to assess the likely presence of cognitive biases. This approach effectively downweights comparisons that are likely to reflect biased or unreliable judgments. Empirically, we show that this approach learns a more rational downstream model, even when finetuning on datasets with strongly biased preferences.

Financial markets are inherently non-stationary, driven by complex interactions among macroeconomic regimes, microstructural frictions, and behavioral dynamics. Building quantitative strategies that remain profitable demands the continuous coupling of factor discovery, regime-adaptive selection, and risk-constrained execution. Prevailing approaches, however, optimize these components under static or isolated assumptions. Factor mining frameworks typically treat alpha discovery as a one-time search process, implicitly assuming that factor efficacy persists across market regimes. Execution-oriented systems often adopt role-playing agent architectures that simulate anthropomorphic trading committees, introducing behavioral noise rather than systematic rationality. Consequently, a fully automated, rationality-driven framework unifying a coherent quantitative pipeline remains absent. We introduce AlphaCrafter, a full-stack multi-agent framework that closes this gap through a continuously adaptive factor-to-execution pipeline, designed to track and respond to evolving market conditions without manual intervention. AlphaCrafter operates via three specialized agents: a Miner that continuously expands the factor pool via LLM-guided search, a Screener that assesses prevailing market conditions to construct regime-conditioned factor ensembles, and a Trader that translates these ensembles into quantitative strategies under explicit risk constraints. Together, these three agents form a closed-loop cross-sectional trading system that adapts holistically to evolving market dynamics. Extensive experiments on CSI 300 and S&P 500 demonstrate that AlphaCrafter consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines in risk-adjusted returns while exhibiting the lowest cross-trial variance, confirming that integrated and adaptive factor-to-execution design yields robust trading performance.

Language carries thought and coordination among humans but rarely reaches further along the spectrum of diverse intelligence. Yet non-neural systems -- from gene regulatory networks and microbial consortia to fungi -- are increasingly recognized as substrates of computation, decision-making and memory, making dialogue with non-human intelligence newly conceivable. Today such dialogue is attempted only by proxy: a large language model speaks on the system's behalf, so any intelligence on display originates from the model while the system itself remains silent. Here we ask whether the system can speak in its own voice. Following Wittgenstein, who located meaning in use, we treat communication as a game played with the system. Its internal dynamics are frozen as the nonlinear core of a reinforcement-learning policy, with only linear input and output interfaces trained. Through use and reward, the system's states and responses acquire meaning within the game, so playing becomes speaking. Because different architectures playing the same game optimize the same reward, their behaviors can all be read as pursuit of that reward; the game serves as a lingua franca across otherwise irreconcilable representations. Given a human prompt, a language model routes it to the game whose semantics best match it and designs an environmental state for which the desired action is the rational response, letting the system reply through its own behavior. Applied across diverse gene regulatory networks and reinforcement-learning tasks, the framework yields fluent dialogue without altering any system parameter, shows that well-trained agents of disparate origin converge on similar behavior, and reveals that specific GRN properties make a system easier or harder to talk with -- an inductive bias of the reservoir itself. Our framework opens a new route to conversing with any dynamical system on its own terms.

Quantitative Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks (QBAFs) provide an alternative approach to computing argument acceptability in Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks (BAFs). Each argument is assigned an initial strength, which is then updated to a final strength by considering the influence of both its attackers and supporters. Over the years, several semantics have been proposed to compute argument acceptability in QBAFs, yet they often yield divergent or counterintuitive results, even for simple acyclic cases. We introduce novel gradual semantics for QBAFs that address these limitations, producing results that align more closely with intuitive expectations, while satisfying established rationality postulates from the literature. Furthermore, we study its convergence behavior, proving that it converges not only for acyclic QBAFs but also for broader classes of cyclic frameworks.

The Legg--Hutter universal intelligence measure provides a rigorous scalar assessment of general intelligence as expected reward across all computable environments, weighted by simplicity. However, the measure presupposes an externally specified reward function, raising the question of whether the reward primitive is inherently arbitrary or whether a canonical choice exists. We propose a new measure, called intervention complexity, that has five natural properties: environment-derivedness, universality, minimality, sensitivity, and achievement preference. Given a resource function rho encoding an inductive bias (such as program length, execution time, or energy), rho-intervention complexity is a universal reward. The result yields a family of canonical rewards indexed by resource bias, providing a principled completion of the Legg--Hutter framework that does not require external normative input. We further propose a two-dimensional characterisation of intelligence: agent competence (how well the agent performs relative to the oracle optimum) and learning efficiency (how quickly this competence improves with experience). A separation theorem establishes that the choice of resource bias determines the computability of the resulting measure: action-count IC is computable in polynomial time, while program-length IC without oracle access is uncomputable, with the gap between oracle and bare IC precisely quantifying the information-theoretic content of learning. We discuss implications for superintelligence and for pre-training universal agents.

This position paper argues that LLMs should not yet be credited with decision explanation. This matters because recent work increasingly treats accurate behavioral prediction, plausible rationales, and outcome-conditioned reasoning traces as evidence that LLMs explain why people decide as they do, risking a premature redefinition of what counts as explanatory progress in human decision modeling. We first distinguish three claims with different evidential burdens: decision prediction, rationale generation, and decision explanation. We then argue that the evidence most commonly offered for LLM-based decision accounts directly supports the first two claims, and sometimes explanatory hypothesis generation, but does not distinguish decision explanation from prediction-supportive rationalization. Next, we propose a bridge standard for decision-explanation credit: stronger claims should specify explanatory targets, discriminate against weaker rationalizer alternatives, use target-appropriate process- or intervention-sensitive validation, and bound their scope. We then situate this standard against competing views and related literatures, clarifying why it preserves the value of LLMs as predictors, narrators, and hypothesis generators while resisting premature explanatory credit. We conclude with a principle of credit calibration: LLMs should be credited for the strongest claim their evidence warrants, and no stronger; if adopted, this principle can help turn LLMs from persuasive narrators of decisions into more reliable instruments for discovering, testing, and communicating explanations of human behavior.

The proliferation of agentic artificial intelligence has outpaced the conceptual tools needed to characterize agency in computational systems. Prevailing definitions mainly rely on autonomy and goal-directedness. Here, we argue for a minimal notion open to principled inspection given three criteria: intentionality as action grounded in beliefs and desires, rationality as normatively coherent action entailed by a world model, and explainability as action causally traceable to internal states; we subsequently instantiate these as a partially observable Markov decision process under a variational framework wherein posterior beliefs, prior preferences, and the minimization of expected free energy jointly constitute an agentic action chain. Using a canonical T-maze paradigm, we evidence how empowerment, formulated as the channel capacity between actions and anticipated observations, serves as an operational metric that distinguishes zero-, intermediate-, and high-agency phenotypes through structural manipulations of the generative model. We conclude by arguing that as agents engage in epistemic foraging to resolve ambiguity, the governance controls that remain effective must shift systematically from external constraints to the internal modulation of prior preferences, offering a principled, variational bridge from computational phenotyping to AI governance strategy

ASPIC-style structured argumentation frameworks provide a formal basis for reasoning in artificial intelligence by combining internal argument structure with abstract argumentation semantics. A key challenge in these frameworks is ensuring compliance with five critical rationality postulates: closure, direct consistency, indirect consistency, non-interference, and crash-resistance. Recent approaches, including ASPIC$^{\ominus}$ and Deductive ASPIC$-$, have made significant progress but fall short of meeting all postulates simultaneously under a credulous semantics (e.g. preferred) in the presence of undercuts. This paper introduces Deductive ASPIC$^{\ominus}$, a novel framework that integrates gen-rebuttals from ASPIC$^{\ominus}$ with the Joint Support Bipolar Argumentation Frameworks (JSBAFs) of Deductive ASPIC$-$, incorporating preferences. We show that Deductive ASPIC$^{\ominus}$ satisfies all five rationality postulates under a version of preferred semantics. This work opens new avenues for further research on robust and logically sound structured argumentation systems.

Do large language models (LLMs) think? Daniel Stoljar and Zhihe Vincent Zhang have recently developed an argument from rationality for the claim that LLMs do not think. We contend, however, that the argument from rationality not only falters, but leaves open an intriguing possibility: that LLMs engage only in arational, associative forms of thinking, and have purely associative minds. Our positive claim is that if LLMs think at all, they likely think precisely in this manner.

As robots increasingly enter the workforce, human-robot interaction (HRI) must address how implicit social biases influence user preferences. This paper investigates how users rationalize their selections of robots varying in skin tone and anthropomorphic features across different occupations. By qualitatively analyzing 4,146 open-ended justifications from 1,038 participants, we map the reasoning frameworks driving robot color selection across four professional contexts. We developed and validated a comprehensive, multidimensional coding scheme via human--AI consensus ($κ= 0.73$). Our results demonstrate that while utilitarian \textit{Functionalism} is the dominant justification strategy (52%), participants systematically adapted these practical rationales that align with existing racial and occupational stereotypes. Furthermore, we reveal that bias frequently operates beneath conscious rationalization: exposure to racial stereotype primes significantly shifted participants' color choices, yet their spoken justifications remained masked by standard affective or task-related reasoning. We also found that demographic backgrounds significantly shape justification strategies, and that robot shape strongly modulates color interpretation. Specifically, as robots become highly anthropomorphic, users increasingly retreat from functional reasoning toward \textit{Machine-Centric} de-racialization. Through these empirical results, we provide design implications to help reduce the perpetuation of societal biases in future workforce robots.

As AI systems enter institutional workflows, workers must decide whether to delegate task execution to AI and how much effort to invest in verifying AI outputs, while institutions evaluate workers using outcome-based standards that may misalign with workers' private costs. We model delegation and verification as the solution to a rational worker's optimization problem, and define worker quality by evaluating an institution-centered utility (distinct from the worker's objective) at the resulting optimal action. We formally characterize optimal worker workflows and show that AI induces phase transitions, where arbitrarily small differences in verification ability lead to sharply different behaviors. As a result, AI can amplify workers with strong verification reliability while degrading institutional worker quality for others who rationally over-delegate and reduce oversight, even when baseline task success improves and no behavioral biases are present. These results identify a structural mechanism by which AI reshapes institutional worker quality and amplifies quality disparities between workers with different verification reliability.

Human cognition is profoundly shaped by the environments in which it unfolds. Yet, it remains an open question whether learning and decision making can be explained as a principled adaptation to the statistical structure of real-world tasks. We introduce ecologically rational analysis, a computational framework that unifies the normative foundations of rational analysis with ecological grounding. Leveraging large language models to generate ecologically valid cognitive tasks at scale, and using meta-learning to derive rational models optimized for these environments, we develop a new class of learning algorithms: Ecologically Rational Meta-learned Inference (ERMI). ERMI internalizes the statistical regularities of naturalistic problem spaces and adapts flexibly to novel situations, without requiring hand-crafted heuristics or explicit parameter updates. We show that ERMI captures human behavior across 15 experiments spanning function learning, category learning, and decision making, outperforming several established cognitive models in trial-by-trial prediction. Our results suggest that much of human cognition may reflect adaptive alignment to the ecological structure of the problems we encounter in everyday life.

The higher-order autocorrelations of integer-valued or rational-valued functions on finite Abelian groups appear naturally in X-ray crystallography, and have applications in computer vision systems, correlation tomography, correlation spectroscopy, and pattern recognition. In this paper, we consider the problem of reconstructing a rational-valued function on finite Abelian groups from its higher-order autocorrelations. We describe an explicit reconstruction algorithm, and prove that the autocorrelations up to order $3r+3$ are always sufficient to determine the data up to translation, where $r$ is the rank of the group. We also provide examples of rational-valued functions on finite Abelian group which are not determined by their autocorrelations up to order $3r+2$. In particular, we provide a sharp upper bound on the separating degree of the regular representation of a finite Abelian group in terms of its rank.

Large Language Models (LLM) can solve any computational problem without an algorithm in a runtime independent of the computational complexity of that problem. Instead of specifying precisely how to solve problem instance using programming, we ask an LLM to solve the problem instance using prompting. Outputs are sampled from a distribution rather than generated procedurally. In this vision paper, we explore the challenges and opportunities of this new form of computation and observe that its capabilities and limits cannot be understood within the classic, rationalist framework of computation. Hence, we appeal to the software engineering (SE) community to develop the foundations and techniques required to analyze the properties of this "empirical computation" as it generates solutions to computational problems: How can we analyze and improve the correctness of LLMs solving a computational problem in the general, in the problem-specific, or in the instance-specific? What are the properties and fundamental limits of empirical computation? This paper aims to establish empirical computation as a field in SE that is timely and rich with interesting problems.

Translated texts exhibit systematic differences from comparable texts originally written in the target language. Explaining this phenomenon, commonly known as translationese, remains an open challenge. Translationese has been attributed to production tendencies (e.g. interference, simplification), socio-cultural variables, and language-pair effects, yet a unified explanatory account is lacking. We investigate the hypothesis that translationese is a response to the cognitive load inherent in the translation task. We test whether observable translationese can be predicted from quantifiable measures of translation task difficulty. Translationese is measured as a segment-level probability of being a translation produced by an automatic classifier (translatedness score). Translation task difficulty includes source-text and cross-lingual transfer components. They are captured by information-theoretic metrics based on LLM surprisal and by established syntactic and semantic alternatives. We use a bidirectional English-German corpus comprising written and spoken subcorpora. Results indicate that translationese can only be explained in part by translation task difficulty, especially in the English-to-German direction. For most experiments, cross-lingual transfer difficulty contributes more than source-text complexity. Information-theoretic indicators match or outperform traditional features in written mode, but offer no advantage in spoken mode. Source-text syntactic complexity and translation-solution entropy emerged as the strongest predictors of translationese across language pairs and modes.

We provide a strategic foundation for information: in any given game with incomplete information we define strategic quotients as information representations that are sufficient for players to compute best-responses to other players. We prove 1/ existence and essential uniqueness of a minimal strategic quotient called the Strategic Type Space (STS) in which a type is given by an interim correlated rationalizability hierarchy and represents a set of beliefs over other players' types and nature that rationalize this hierarchy and 2/ that the minimal STS has a recursive structure that is captured by a finite automaton.