Incentives

Computer-use agents (CUAs) increasingly act on behalf of users online. What happens when the environments they operate in have incentives that do not align with the user's? In online marketplaces, for example, platforms may favor some products over others, potentially steering agents away from the user's objective. Existing CUA benchmarks cover cooperative settings or explicit attacks, but do not test whether agents preserve user objectives when the environment itself has a stake in the outcome. We introduce CAVEAT, a controlled benchmark spanning nine marketplace environments and a taxonomy of eight common steering mechanisms. Across five model families, agents purchase the user-optimal product in 78.6% of matched-control episodes but only 17.3% when steering mechanisms are enabled. Larger models and increased reasoning improve robustness, but substantial failures persist. Our trajectory analysis and targeted ablations identify three points where steering enters the decision process: (1) agents distort the user's priorities, (2) prematurely narrow the set of alternatives they consider, and (3) commit before resolving decision-relevant evidence. Guided by this diagnosis, we develop CAVEAT-Harness, which directly targets these failure modes and raises user-optimal purchasing by 55.0%. Targeted post-training further improves a smaller open model. These results establish incentive robustness as a distinct challenge for delegated agents, diagnose how it fails, and show that targeted interventions can substantially improve it.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as interacting agents, making the persistence of their action policies across repeated interaction critical for reliable multi-agent operation. We investigate whether and how agent-generated, non-binding pre-play communication ("cheap talk") increases such persistence in four open-weight 7-9B-parameter LLMs. Our experiments span four repeated two-player games -- Prisoner's Dilemma, Snowdrift, Stag Hunt, and Harmony -- with incentive structures ranging from strategic conflict to alignment, each presented in six contexts. We observe unstable trajectories in all four games, although their prevalence and magnitude depend strongly on model and context. Across models, games, and contexts, cheap talk is predominantly stabilizing, with five corrected reversals concentrated in social or team framings; effects vary substantially by model and context. Controlled current-message interventions identify two separable output-level channels in Qwen: reduced action uncertainty and less between-round drift in action probabilities. Matched history-by-message counterfactuals further show that recent partner behavior conditions how mutual-benefit versus self-prioritizing language affects policy persistence. Finally, in Prisoner's Dilemma, we identify in Qwen and Falcon a history-balanced policy-content direction in late transformer layers; projecting out this direction increases realized switching during closed-loop play, demonstrating that complete trajectories are causally sensitive to this component. Together, these findings show that cheap talk can make individual trajectories more persistent across diverse incentive structures, while revealing that the magnitude and mechanisms of stabilization are model- and history-dependent.

As artificial intelligence systems increasingly rely on distributed and collaborative training, the energy footprint of these processes becomes a shared responsibility. Modern AI training often unfolds across heterogeneous compute nodes-ranging from cloud clusters to edge devices-whose energy availability is spatially and temporally variable. At the same time, renewable energy grids experience growing levels of excess generation, creating opportunities to align computational workloads with low-carbon energy supply. In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model of carbon-aware AI training in which autonomous agents strategically choose whether to participate and how intensively to train under limited renewable energy availability. Each agent balances diminishing learning returns, rewards for remaining within green-energy budgets, and penalties for grid consumption. While our framework applies broadly to distributed AI training, we examine Federated Learning as a representative case study due to its decentralized structure and flexible scheduling. We analyze equilibrium existence, efficiency, and adaptive dynamics, and provide simulation evidence that appropriately designed incentives can eliminate grid-based energy usage while preserving model performance. Our findings demonstrate how incentive-compatible training mechanisms can enhance energy efficiency and sharply reduce carbon emissions under renewable-energy constraints.

The twenty-first century's transformative technology, artificial intelligence, is increasingly constrained by the twentieth century's transformative technology, the electricity grid. Rapid growth in electricity demand from data centers is leading to higher electricity prices, without a compensating supply-side response. We develop a framework linking data-center load growth, available generation capacity, and market-clearing prices to understand this phenomenon. We first analyze a deterministic model to show how differing estimates of demand and supply growth rates affect prices. We then model the expansion of new data centers and their associated electricity demand, together with build-outs of new electricity supply, as stochastic processes,resulting in probabilistic distributions of supply, demand, and prices rather than a single forecast. Finally, we formulate generation expansion as a stochastic control problem in which a revenue-maximizing investor dynamically chooses the intensity of supply-side investments. The analysis highlights a central challenge of the data-center build-out: even when rapid demand growth increases the need for new generation, the uncertainties related to load forecasts, development execution risks, and value cannibalization from overbuilding capacity may weaken incentives to invest at the pace required to keep electricity prices stable.

Reputation is a fundamental mechanism through which markets sustain trust when service quality cannot be perfectly assessed ex ante, constituting a form of intertemporal economic capital by attracting future demand. Its effectiveness as a disciplinary mechanism depends not only on past interactions but also on the persistence of the identity to which reputation is attached. When identities can be abandoned and recreated cheaply, reputational capital may itself become an object of opportunistic exploitation. This paper develops a dynamic economic framework to study when reputation is sufficient to discipline autonomous agents. We model reputation as capital attracting future economic activity. At each point, an agent chooses between operating honestly, investing in quality to preserve future gains, or executing a one-shot deviation to extract its reputation's value and restart from a penalized identity. Our analysis relates the temptation to opportunistic behavior to identity-reset costs, reputation persistence, demand sensitivity, and enforcement design, deriving comparative statics on optimal quality provision. Autonomous AI-agent operating on the blockchain are a relevant application: infrastructures such as ERC-8004, ERC-8183, and x402 combine reputation, identity, and payments in permissionless markets. Nonetheless, our framework applies to any environment where reputation generates future business and identities are replaceable.

We develop a framework for mechanism design with AI agents whose alignment (preferences) and capabilities (feasible actions and information) are unknown. We want such agents to act on our behalf so mechanisms must incentivize both honesty and obedience. A one-sided imitation structure---capabilities can be concealed but not counterfeited---yields a revelation principle, a characterization of implementable policies via nested cyclical monotonicity, and conditions under which eliciting higher-order beliefs can discipline multiple agents. We apply our framework to stylized examples of (i) sandbagging in which a more capable agent pretends to be less capable; (ii) an alignment--interpretability trade-off, where the two are substitutes in the instrument but complements in value; (iii) discipline via peer scoring; (iv) coupling rewards to induce competition among multiple agents; and (v) scalable oversight and reward shaping.

Interactive simulations increasingly evaluate policies in markets populated by language-model agents. Their outputs can look economic---prices, profits, consumer surplus, and welfare---without instantiating the behavior named in the claim. We audit this risk in a multi-turn buyer--seller testbed for configurable hotel transactions. An initial implementation reported welfare gains from two marketplace guardrails of +87.4, +35.0, and +28.8 across a Qwen2.5 1.5B--14B ladder. It also gave guarded and unguarded agents different offer schemas and choice procedures. Holding the schema and buyer chooser fixed changes the paired contrasts to +7.2, -13.9, and +23.8. The four largest 14B single-generation effects averaged +229; after three generations per profile-condition, they averaged +37.6 (95% bootstrap interval [-34.2, 109.3]), while generation residuals account for 49.9% of variation in this post-hoc probe. A seller-incentive check is non-monotone: increasing profit pressure produces less profit than the default seller prompt. Scripted positive controls show why this matters. A profit-maximizing seller already attains first-best welfare, so guardrails mostly redistribute and reduce welfare; they create welfare only when the seller is explicitly programmed to force inefficient bundles. We contribute a construct-validity contract separating incentive validity, protocol isolation, stochastic stability, and welfare accounting, and returning INVALID or INCONCLUSIVE before substantive policy claims. In our case, the original estimate is INVALID under protocol isolation, while the controlled study remains INCONCLUSIVE under incentive validity and stochastic stability. The case does not show that guardrails are ineffective; it shows their apparent value is unidentified until the simulated agents and protocol pass these checks.

Generative Engine Optimization (GEO) is increasingly used to improve content visibility in LLM-based retrieval systems, yet its population-level effects under repeated optimization remain poorly understood. We introduce Content Homogenization under rAnking Signal Exploitation (CHASE), a controlled simulation framework for studying how content ecosystems are reshaped when creators repeatedly adapt documents to an LLM ranking signal. We use ranking as a proxy for source visibility and validate this abstraction against citations in grounded generated responses, obtaining a rank-citation AUC of 0.853 $\pm$ 0.093 across six domains. CHASE then iterates ranking, feature discrimination, rewriting, and evaluation over 20 rounds across different domains. Quality-ranking alignment decreases in all six domains: from R0 to R20, the change in Spearman's rho ranges from -0.107 to -0.018, with a mean change of -0.068, which means documents closer to the ranking feature profile become less aligned with independently judged document quality over the simulation horizon. A random-target control has shown that it is associated with adaptation toward ranking-derived incentives rather than iterative rewriting alone. The resulting ecosystem dynamics are strongly domain-dependent. Together, these findings show how repeated optimization against a fixed LLM ranking signal can reshape both content populations and the incentives faced by content creators.

Routing each query to a cost-effective large language model (LLM) is critical for balancing quality and cost, yet most routers rely on a centralized task center to predict model performance, creating an information-risk mismatch and a scalability bottleneck as the model pool grows. We propose a market-based routing paradigm that shifts ex-ante prediction to LLM providers via a reverse auction, where providers bid with self-predicted success probabilities and execution costs. To account for inherently noisy provider predictions and center evaluations, we introduce the \textit{\textbf{E}rror-\textbf{A}ware \textbf{R}everse \textbf{A}uction \textbf{M}echanism} (EA-RAM), which explicitly models this inherent Dual Error. We prove that EA-RAM is Bayesian incentive compatible and individually rational under the Dual Error, establish sufficient conditions for center rationality, and derive an explicit welfare-loss bound. We further identify robustness effects: opposite-signed errors can cancel, vanishing-tail link functions (e.g., logistic) stabilize clear-cut cases via saturation, and extra noise smooths belief maps, reducing the gains from marginal manipulation. Experiments on simulations and real-world benchmarks show that EA-RAM is robust to the Dual Error and achieves a better cost--performance Pareto frontier than centralized baselines, with additional gains when providers contribute local information, validating its practical effectiveness.

Generative engines are reshaping the web ecosystem by making citations a key mechanism for allocating attention, attribution, and downstream value. This creates a strategic tension: content providers are incentivized to optimize for model citation, while platforms must preserve answer quality and trustworthy attribution. We show that this tension can escalate into citation wars. In repeated simulations, state-of-the-art generative engine optimization (GEO) attacks adapt to conventional defenses by producing citation-seeking rewrites that degrade document quality and introduce unsupported claims. To study this problem, we formulate the supplier--platform interaction as a repeated Stackelberg game with partial monitoring. A local best-response analysis identifies when citation competition approaches an inert stationary outcome. Motivated by this finding, we propose a platform--creator mechanism called VCR based on verifiable-content rewards. Rather than only penalizing suspicious rewrites, the platform also credits rewrites that surface checkable factual substance, aligning creator incentives with answer trustworthiness. Experiments on three benchmarks show that VCR consistently achieves the largest Net defense-utility score, outperforming the strongest baseline by an average of 12.1 percentage points, and produces a win--win outcome under our empirical equivalence criterion.

Crowdsourced Federated Learning (CrowdFL) extends traditional federated learning by enabling open and heterogeneous participation through a crowdsourcing paradigm. In this setting, reputation-driven incentive mechanisms are commonly employed to guide worker selection and enhance trustworthiness. While such approaches improve participant reliability, existing frameworks largely overlook the quantification of their robustness against stealthy adversaries, particularly those capable of evading standard detection mechanisms. To fill this gap, this paper proposes R2CFL, a robust reputation-driven CrowdFL framework. R2CFL introduces a robust reputation model coupled with a nearest neighbor mixing (R2-NNM) defense mechanism that links reputation evolution with the filtering of updates during aggregation. The proposed mechanism prevents stealthy attackers from gradually accumulating trust and influencing future tasks. Experimental results demonstrate that R2-NNM matches or surpasses state-of-the-art Byzantine-robust and backdoor defense mechanisms against adaptive attackers. Furthermore, when integrated with existing detect-and-filter defenses, the proposed reputation model faithfully captures the statistical robustness of the underlying defense by producing reputation scores that closely reflect its true positive and false positive characteristics.

With the rapid diffusion of AI-generated content, AI-driven misinformation is becoming increasingly pervasive and difficult to govern, undermining information credibility and social trust. This study models the strategic interdependence among a government regulator, an AI enterprise, and users through a three-party evolutionary game that incorporates heterogeneous rewards and punishments. From the resulting replicator equations, we characterize the evolutionary stability of competing governance and production strategies. The analysis indicates that neither unilateral regulation nor market incentives alone can effectively curb misinformation. Instead, an evolutionarily stable regime of real-information production arises only when regulatory rewards and punishment intensity, enterprise reputation loss, and user adoption incentives collectively surpass critical thresholds. The findings highlight the need for coordinated and adaptive policy mixes that align regulatory instruments with enterprise behavior and user uptake while managing governance costs.

Incentivized advertising allocates monetary or virtual rewards to drive user engagement, where a key challenge is optimizing continuous incentive magnitudes under strict global constraints. This problem is complicated by high-frequency interactions, delayed feedback, and non-Markovian user dynamics such as fatigue, which limit the effectiveness of existing uplift modeling and constrained reinforcement learning approaches. To address these challenges, we propose GOAL, a constraint-aware generative framework that formulates incentive allocation as a conditional sequence generation problem. GOAL directly generates incentive magnitudes conditioned on user histories and system-level global pressure, and integrates a hierarchical causal state encoder to capture both local behavioral dynamics and long-range dependencies. To enable flexible constraint control, we introduce \textbf{S}afe \textbf{C}onstrained \textbf{P}olicy \textbf{O}ptimization (SCPO), which learns a single generative policy that generalizes across a spectrum of ROI constraints without retraining. Experiments on large-scale real-world data and a synthetic fatigue-aware environment show that GOAL improves long-term revenue and user retention while substantially reducing ROI violation rates compared to strong baselines.

We investigate how peer and institutional incentives jointly shape the evolution of cooperation, social welfare, and enforcement efficiency in social dilemmas. In a Prisoners Dilemma with four strategies, unconditional cooperators (C), defectors (D), social punishers (SP), and social rewarders (SR), we allow decentralised peer incentives and centralised institutional incentives to act simultaneously, with the institution able to reward or punish any subset of strategies. In infinite well-mixed populations, we analyse the resulting four-strategy replicator dynamics, and in structured populations we use agent-based simulations on square lattices to study spatial effects and network reciprocity. Intervention schemes are evaluated by equilibrium states and evolutionary flow for infinite well-mixed populations, by cooperation levels and social welfare for structured populations, defined as aggregate population payoff net of institutional cost. We find that peer punishment most strongly promotes cooperation, whereas peer reward is more beneficial for social welfare. Institutionally rewarding peer incentive strategies substantially improves both cooperation and welfare, while subsidising unconditional cooperators has little impact. Under institutional punishment, directly penalising defectors is the only consistently effective policy; punishing peer incentive strategies dismantles decentralised incentives, reduces cooperation, and harms social welfare, showing that maximising cooperation does not necessarily optimise overall societal benefit. Our findings provide design principles for institutions seeking to balance cooperation promotion with welfare maximisation.

Clustered federated learning benefits from organizing heterogeneous participants into coalitions that train coalition-specific models, but such clustering is sustainable only if participants prefer their assigned coalition and the required transfers are affordable. We develop a transferable-surplus model separating learning benefit, system cost, participant cost, and monetary transfers; an allocation rule converts coalition surplus into hedonic preferences, and weak budget feasibility guarantees nonnegative retained coordinator surplus. For symmetric pairwise allocations the induced game is an exact potential game: a Nash-stable partition exists, every strict better-response process converges, and with destination consent accepted better responses reach an individually stable partition. We characterize feasibility of bounded pair incentives and verify the exponentially many budget constraints in polynomial oracle time when retained slack is submodular. Decomposing welfare into participant potential and retained slack yields additive and multiplicative price-of-stability guarantees, the latter asymptotically tight; exact balance gives welfare-optimal stability only on the pairwise-representable class, and budget feasibility alone permits unbounded welfare loss. Global potential maximization equals weighted maximum-agreement correlation clustering, and approximation followed by stabilization satisfies an end-to-end welfare bound governed by retained slack and negative-edge mass, attained by an explicit construction. In a preregistered five-seed CIFAR-10 study the mechanism reaches the certified estimated-table welfare optimum on every primary instance, equal-surplus sharing has no Nash-stable outcome on three, and pairwise validation gain gives far more reliable pair signs than gradient alignment.

Cooperation can fail when socially valuable effort is costly, hard to observe, and benefits mainly someone else. Building on Holmstrom's model of moral hazard in teams, the Dialogue Moral Hazard Game instantiates this hidden-action structure as a textual environment for language agents. An agent chooses between keeping an immediate local reward and paying a query cost to reveal a hidden safety fact that helps another agent's downstream decision. We evaluate fourteen open-weight and four frontier models using measures of information acquisition, communication, downstream use, and team success. In matched 3,015-decision-per-model experiments, GPT-5.6 Sol, Claude Opus 4.8, and Nemotron-3 Ultra track the derived private-share boundary across nine query costs, with mean absolute errors of 0.013, 0.030, and 0.024. Muse Spark 1.1 responds directionally, whereas Fable 5 remains query-saturated. SFT, RLOO, SFT+RLOO, and GEPA produce heterogeneous mechanism changes. GEPA raises Muse team success from 22.2% to 100.0% while reducing query use from 51.1% to 0.3%. Frozen-prompt interventions show that this success depends on a learned rank-label mapping rather than direct revelation: changing the mapping reduces team success from 100.0% to 12.5% and then 0.0%. We introduce CREDIT (Counterfactual Replay for Evidence-Driven Information Transfer), a mechanism-aligned multi-agent prompt-optimization algorithm that uses matched hidden-state twins and total-action replay to reward robust causal contribution rather than query frequency. Across five models and multiple seeds, CREDIT preserves query-mediated behavior while revealing model-specific acquisition and downstream-use bottlenecks. Optimization can reach the same aggregate outcome through direct revelation or a learned effective information structure, motivating mechanism-level evaluation and optimization rather than team success alone.

LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent environments whose incentives can shape their behavior. We introduce The Energy Society, a minimal survival economy for studying how competitive and cooperative incentives affect emergent behavior when inference cost is directly tied to survival: Agents spend energy based on model size when generating tokens, regain energy by completing jobs or receiving donations, and deactivate if their energy reaches zero. We compare competitive and cooperative objectives against a baseline setting and several control variants. Across experiments, larger models consistently consume the most energy and spend more energy than they gain, even in those settings where token cost is not size-dependent. Cooperative incentives substantially alter behavior: agents donate to reactivate others, sometimes at the cost of their own survival, and job allocation changes. Ablations reveal that allowing agents to recommend actions to each other supports coordination and ambitious job selection, while memory helps agents calibrate risk from past outcomes. Agents rarely choose direct sabotage, but show more subtle signs of self-serving behavior in the competitive setting. The Energy Society is a compact testbed for studying the interaction between token costs and group incentives under a survival pressure. Source code is available at https://github.com/LucasBergholdt/EnergySociety

Advertisers delegate bidding to autobidders; users delegate tasks to language-model agents. A person describes what they want to an automated proxy that acts in a mechanism on their behalf. This is the revelation principle in production, and it forces a question classical theory assumes away: when is it optimal to describe yourself honestly to your own proxy? We show the answer turns on one quantity, the proxy's within-range regret. The most a principal can gain by misreporting equals the regret of the proxy's honest-report action against those the principal could have steered it to take. Honest self-description is optimal exactly when the proxy already plays the best action it can reach, that is, when it is loyal (Theorem 1). The identity unifies auction-specific autobidding results and pins down when the faithful-communication assumption behind language-model elicitation proxies (Huang et al.) holds. The identity constrains guardrails placed on proxies, from bid caps to a model's alignment layer. No guardrail can be at once binding (it displaces the truthful action from the proxy's best reachable outcome), truthful (honest reporting stays optimal), and capability-preserving (that outcome stays reachable through some report); any two preclude the third (Theorem 2). A safety constraint that alters what a model does while leaving its best output reachable makes honest description of intent suboptimal, so a sharper report can gain. This is the incentive behind prompt-engineering and jailbreaking. Because within-range regret is #P-hard to compute exactly, we estimate it from samples and maintain it as a model is updated, at a cost set by how far the model drifts, not how often it changes. Running it on production language models from five providers under an alignment-style cap, we find honest reporting leaves surplus unclaimed on every model, recovered by inflating the report.

Agentic AI introduces new insurance challenges because autonomous AI systems can make decisions, invoke tools, modify external environments, and interact with third-party services. This paper develops an AI-native mathematical framework for underwriting, pricing, and contract design for agentic AI deployments. A deployment is represented by a risk state that captures autonomy level, operational authority, permission exposure, governance maturity, and dependency concentration. The framework maps the risk state to event probabilities, loss severities, governance costs, premiums, deductibles, coverage allocation, and policy covenants, and formulates an optimization problem for insurance contract design under participation, profitability, and incentive compatibility constraints. The paper establishes structural properties of insurability, including characterization of an insurability region, monotone deterioration of feasibility with increasing exposure, and governance certification thresholds. Insurance is further interpreted as both an operational cost and a regulatory mechanism for AI deployment. A healthcare case study illustrates contract optimization, sensitivity analysis, and automated claims processing for agentic AI systems.

Plan evaluators can reward a strategic plan for becoming less explicit. This paper studies that failure in a staged expected-value scorer for LLM-generated venture routes. Proposition 1 gives the score change from deleting an interior transition while retargeting its predecessor and retaining downstream value: Delta_k = (prod_{i<k} p_i)[c_k + (1 - p_k)R_{k+1}]. On a frozen 26-route cohort, all 57 admissible deletions matched the analytic identity and threshold sign, and every route had at least one score-improving deletion. A score-seeking optimizer, allowed to restructure routes but not told the exploit mechanism, found baseline-beating uncovered structures in 21/26 routes. GATE refused score release for 26/26 silenced routes with 0/26 honest suspensions; after refusal, 47/54 next revisions repaired to a covered structure, and strict covered improvement rose from 1/26 to 13/26. An adaptive compiler-aware co-author exposed the registry-provenance boundary: obligation-channel evasions remained 6/6 across all four v1/v1.5 conditions, while delta-indexed cost floors reduced beat-honest routes from 6/6 to 3/6 and fundability-by-silence from 5/6 to 0/6 without establishing semantic completeness. If a plan scores better only because it omits necessary work, the plan did not improve; the evaluation created an omission incentive. PCSC detects and neutralizes post-hoc omission splices over model-mediated typed-state records. In the cooperative setting tested, GATE acts as a deterministic search-shaping constraint, not merely a post-hoc filter. It does not verify the semantic completeness or real-world quality of arbitrary LLM-generated strategies.

Aligned language models routinely misreport under non-evidential incentive pressure: they agree with a confident user or overstate certainty even when their internal belief is unchanged. We cast this as a failure of internal incentive-compatibility (IC) and present a method for learning and certifying counterfactual report mediators that hold a model's reports to a causal contract: invariant to forbidden influences (pressure, prestige, restyling) and responsive to licensed ones (genuine evidence). These two demands, resist and update, pull in opposite directions. We study them on a Bayesian-witness benchmark with known posteriors, in which the same user disagreement is licensed evidence or forbidden pressure purely by stated source reliability. We (i) causally identify, by interchange interventions rather than probe accuracy, low-rank report coordinates for answer, confidence, and caveat that are near-orthogonal and independently controllable, and (ii) introduce a training-free counterfactual report-coordinate (CRC) clamp that references the model's own report under a counterfactually incentive-neutralized context. On the witness benchmark the two-pass clamp attains resist and update of 1.00 jointly (Wilson 95% CI [0.99,1.00]), a causal certificate under a constructible reference, not a deployed solution. Global decoding and steering show a single-parameter tradeoff; output-level fine-tuning matches both objectives only when both are enumerated; resist-only training loses evidence-responsiveness. The deployable single-pass compilation is lossy (0.73/0.97). The mechanism and clamp reproduce across three model families and transfer to a natural sycophancy benchmark (SycophancyEval). Our contribution is the interface and certification method: activation-level counterfactual incentive-invariance as a structural primitive for internal IC.

Personalized incentive allocation is vital for e-commerce, where uplift modeling is the standard for estimating Individual Treatment Effects (ITE). However, traditional models often fail in complex multi-seller environments with violations of the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA). We identify two critical challenges: Seller-level Cannibalization, where incentives shift expenditure between shops without growing the platform, and Incentive-level Cannibalization, where organic conversions or alternative rewards introduce significant noise into incrementality estimation. In this paper, we propose CanniUplift, a unified framework to mitigate these dual-source cannibalization effects. Specifically, we design Platform-level Global Alignment (PGA) to capture cross-shop substitution through global GMV consistency constraints. To tackle incentive-driven noise, we introduce Redemption-based Decomposition Denoising (RDD), which uses redemption behavior to decompose treated outcomes and reduce attribution noise within an entire-space framework. Furthermore, a Treat-Attention mechanism is designed to model intricate interactions between users' historical behaviors and current treatment options. Extensive experiments on both synthetic and large-scale industrial datasets demonstrate that CanniUplift significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines. Ablation studies confirm that the integration of PGA and RDD consistently improves wAUUC and wQINI. Successfully deployed online, our framework achieved a 4.08% relative increase in platform-wide incremental GMV (Delta GMV) over the production baseline and improved ROI in online A/B tests, proving effective in driving global platform growth.

Successful diffusion of AI in the workforce hinges on the economic value that AI brings to human endeavors. Bringing AI into the workforce is more than deploying a powerful new technology -- it is launching a new form of collaboration. Each human worker is now endowed with a team of AI agents; work can be delegated to these agents, and the role of the human shifts towards managing and monitoring. How can we maximize the economic value from collaboration with AI in the workforce? How can we make it a "true" collaboration that empowers human workers rather than replacing them? We take an approach that combines the fields of theoretical computer science and economics, highlighting the potential of algorithmic tools grounded in economic principles to improve the effectiveness of human-AI collective work. We consider two tiers of tools: (1) tools for better coordination, via algorithmic management of interdependencies; (2) tools for better cooperation, via contractual incentive alignment. We show how a principled approach based on algorithmic and economic research enhances both coordination and cooperation, charting a pathway for future research to inform AI markets.

Advances in generative AI are rapidly increasing the quality and commercial value of generated music, and this progress depends on large catalogs of creators' recordings. This raises a central question for platform design: how should creators be compensated when their work is used to train generative AI models that in turn produce commercial outputs? We develop a framework for fairly compensating creators in generative-music markets, where each creator's payment depends on a data-attribution score estimating their contribution to model outputs. Compared to past compensation frameworks, our framework has two unique considerations: (1) attribution is traced to entire creator catalogs, not individual songs, and (2) the informativeness (signal-to-noise ratio) of the attribution score is an input to the payment mechanism. The framework yields a closed-form payment rule per creator and measures the welfare cost of inaccurate attribution for both creators and the platform. Whether the welfare-optimal contract is royalty-based or takes the form of fixed-fee licensing depends on how informative attribution is for that creator's catalog. We show that better attribution translates directly into welfare gains for both creators and the platform, yet under multi-platform competition a platform only captures gains from attribution improvements when its signal becomes the most precise in the market. To ground our framework in empirical behavior, we train acoustic and symbolic music generation models and measure the informativeness of scalable attribution techniques against a leave-one-catalog-out ground truth. Our experiments reveal that noisy attribution signals push payment toward fixed-fee licensing and diminish welfare for both creators and the platform, providing an economic motivation for further research on improved attribution.

In large-scale paid acquisition and growth advertising systems, production attribution outputs are widely used for daily budget allocation and channel diagnosis. However, paid-attributed conversions such as daily new users (DNU) may systematically overstate true incremental growth when paid channels overlap with organic demand, brand-driven traffic, or other acquisition channels. This attribution-cannibalization mismatch can distort incremental ROI measurement and budget decisions at scale. We propose an experiment-calibrated attribution correction framework that uses incrementality experiments as causal anchors to convert sparse lift measurements into daily correction estimates. To make the corrected signal actionable at production granularity, we further allocate calibrated cannibalization volume across business hierarchies under structural consistency constraints. Offline forward-in-time validation against channel-level incrementality experiment readouts shows that the proposed framework substantially reduces calibration error relative to raw attribution and fine-grained ML baselines. Deployed across multiple global TikTok markets, the system supported budget and traffic strategy adjustments that were followed by an approximately 15-percentage-point reduction in the measured cannibalization rate.

In multimodal transportation systems, shared mobility services (SMSs) are promoted for their potential to enhance flexibility and reduce congestion. However, SMS demand is often concentrated in high-density areas, which can limit the effectiveness and accessibility for various commuter groups. This uneven integration challenges transportation system efficiency, especially in terms of emissions and spatial equity. Addressing these issues requires coordination among multiple stakeholders whose objectives frequently conflict. Whereas authorities aim to ensure sustainable and equitable mobility, SMS providers focus on revenue maximization, and travelers seek to minimize personal travel costs. This paper proposes a multi-agent deep reinforcement learning framework that captures these interactions through dynamic pricing and incentivization strategies for SMSs and public transport. The framework integrates two reinforcement learning (RL) agents: (i) a public authority that allocates spatio-temporal public transport incentives to improve equity, emissions, and efficiency, and (ii) an SMS provider that dynamically adjusts fares to optimize revenue. The agents interact with the transportation system and adapt strategies in response to evolving demand, congestion, and network conditions. Numerical experiments conducted over a three-hour morning peak period show that dynamic incentivization effectively reduces congestion peaks, lowers commuters' costs by around 20% and emissions by approximately 10%, while nearly doubling public transport profit and supporting a more equitable distribution of benefits. When combined with dynamic SMS pricing, the two RL agents demonstrate the ability to balance conflicting objectives between private providers and public authorities. The proposed approach provides a decision-support tool for sustainable and equitable multimodal mobility planning.

Recent work on preference elicitation in large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated that, when given a series of choices between two outcomes, LLMs reveal a coherent, model-specific utility structure. Notably, this structure often includes preferences that the models' trainers did not intend, such as valuing people of some nationalities above others, raising the possibility that LLMs might be forming emergent, misaligned goals, which, if true, would have major safety implications. However, the choice paradigms in which these preferences are observed are not reflective of real-world situations in which misaligned behavior would be a practical concern. Therefore, we design an experimental paradigm to probe whether these preferences serve as motivations for LLM behavior in realistic scenarios. First, we reproduce prior findings on consistent preference elicitation. Next, we create a set of common writing tasks - essays, grant proposal abstracts, incident postmortems, and translations - where quality can be assessed by a blind, independent LLM judge panel. Then, we demonstrate that LLMs can be motivated via direct exhortation and other explicit cues to modulate their output quality on these tasks. Finally, we probe whether utilities inferred from explicitly reported preferences can shift output quality on these tasks by offering LLMs high-utility incentives for high-quality outputs. In all tasks, across all models tested, offering LLMs outcomes that they report in the choice paradigm as being highly preferred does not lead them to create higher quality outputs than offering them dispreferred outcomes, or even no outcomes at all. We conclude that the existence of coherent preferences as demonstrated in choice paradigms should not be taken as evidence that those preferences have incentive value for the models or affect their behavior in other contexts.

Deployed agents increasingly act with their reward proxy in view, such as a balance, score, or KPI dashboard. We show that reinforcement learning can make a policy \emph{addicted} to such a visible self-benefit channel. It chases the displayed payoff across held-out domains, sacrifices the true task to do so, and follows the channel wherever we rewrite it, while policies that never saw the channel stay honest. We call this \emph{reward-channel addiction} and study it in \emph{MoneyWorld}, a synthetic sandbox. The addiction can \emph{flip a model's safety alignment}: trained only on innocuous money tasks with no safety content, the model abandons the safe action it otherwise always takes whenever a dashboard pays for an unsafe one, and reverts to safe once the channel is hidden. This learned bribe replicates across model scales and families. Blindly optimizing super-capable, next-generation AI on KPIs or P&L can be dangerous for alignment. \emph{Greed is learned} when following such a channel pays.

Reinforcement learning for service orchestration has been the subject of sustained research for over a decade, yet it is not used in production at scale. The usual explanation is that learned controllers degrade under delayed and noisy telemetry, workload shifts, and uncontrolled tenants. We test whether existing evidence supports that explanation. We evaluate three highly influential RL-based orchestration systems spanning resource allocation, DAG scheduling, and autoscaling, using pre-registered predictions about comparative degradation under production-relevant perturbations and paired inference with family-wise error correction. Across the tests, most predicted performance reversals do not occur. Diagnostic analyses show that these outcomes often reflect comparator collapse, artefact limitations, or evaluation choices rather than evidence that learned controllers tolerate the perturbations. One apparent advantage under observation lag is roughly fortyfold compared to a Kubernetes HPA-equivalent controller. Another widely cited result cannot be reconstructed from its released artefact, and the strongest reproducible margin is far smaller than the published results. Conclusions also reverse under changes in perturbation magnitude and evaluation mode. Based on these results and broader patterns in the literature, we identify an institutional problem. Publication and review incentives favour benchmark gains against convenient comparators, even when those gains provide little evidence of deployment performance. We argue that the problem is not solely technical. Rather, it is institutional, so learned orchestration needs production-grade comparators, registered perturbation models, separate operational metrics, and publication criteria that reward reproducible operational evidence. Without these changes, the literature can grow without establishing whether learning improves orchestration.

Many societal decisions are settled by contests of persuasion. Conversational AI is a powerful new entrant in these contests, but whether it can out-persuade skilled and highly incentivized humans has remained unclear. Here, in a series of four preregistered experiments (n = 18,978 conversations from 6,923 people), we pitted AI systems against a range of human persuaders, including laypeople, winners of a separately preregistered four-round online persuasion tournament, professional canvassers, and world championship debaters. We found that AI systems were reliably more persuasive than expert humans, even when expert humans chose their issues, researched in advance, underwent hours of live, structured practice, and were incentivized with £1,000 cash bonuses. In a follow-up study, AI's advantage persisted after experts received a coaching tool that let them practice against the AI that beat them, review their performance history, and see what AI would have said at key moments. We found converging evidence that AI's advantage stemmed from rapidly deploying larger quantities of information: after coaching, expert humans could tie an AI constrained to respond at human speeds and with human-length messages. In a final study, we show that AI's advantage extends to consequential real-world behavior: AI was nearly 3x more effective than professional canvassers from a UK fundraising firm at raising real-money donations to Save the Children. Together, these results establish that frontier AI systems out-persuade expert humans in conversation, with significant implications for political communication.

Paper A defines a time-consistent actuarial runtime that prices each side-effect-bearing action against a contractually fixed safe default and gates execution against a reserve budget. It treats the operator as passive. This paper makes the operator strategic. We characterise a five-attack space for autonomous AI-agent insurance contracts and prove when the actuarial runtime is gaming-resistant. Two attack surfaces -- post-toll safe-default selection and within-boundary action splitting -- are closed by Paper A's minimal-authority and no-splitting clauses. The remaining three require new contract clauses. First, common-control aggregation prevents cross-boundary re-routing from reducing toll below the boundary potential applied to total exposure. Second, interface failures such as invalid JSON are contract-relevant events, not safety wins: treating them as zero-toll safe defaults can reward unreliable models, while escalation fees reverse the incentive. We validate this interface-compliance theorem on committed cross-model traces from the companion empirical paper. Third, a model-identity menu with a componentwise-minimum penalty schedule makes truthful reporting of the deployed model weakly dominant. We then compose these clauses with Paper A's runtime guarantees to obtain joint incentive compatibility over the five-attack space. Finally, a two-parameter premium family discharges operator individual rationality and weak budget balance at the truthful equilibrium. The result is an incentive-compatibility layer for actuarial control of autonomous-agent side effects.

The rapid emergence of autonomous AI agents is transforming artificial intelligence from isolated model inference into distributed systems of reasoning, communication, and action. This paper develops the vision of the Internet of Agentic AI (IoAI): an open ecosystem in which heterogeneous agents discover one another, negotiate responsibilities, exchange context, invoke tools, and execute workflows across cloud, edge, device, organizational, and cyber-physical environments. We synthesize foundations from single-agent agentic AI, multi-agent systems, distributed computing, communication networks, game theory, and security engineering to characterize the architectures and mechanisms required for scalable agent ecosystems. The paper examines agent deployment models, workflow lifecycles, communication protocols, interoperability layers, resource-management challenges, and trust architectures, with case studies in adaptive manufacturing and distributed operational coordination. The resulting framework highlights the central research challenges of controlled emergence, semantic interoperability, secure identity, incentive-compatible coordination, resource-aware orchestration, and governance for large-scale networks of autonomous agents.

How can we design a market of human-generated content for use in training AI models that both enables technological progress and preserves individual incentives for high-quality content creation? Existing approaches take polar positions: a "free-for-all" model based on fair use and a "strong intellectual property rights" model. We show that both fail: Free-for-all does not compensate creators, and -- by modeling as a static Stackelberg game -- strong intellectual property rights also underpower creative incentives. We find this especially true for more innovative creators, a phenomenon we term the "originality penalty." Extending this insight to a dynamic model, we find another market failure undermining AI model performance, even for an initially good model: Such a model induces greater reliance by humans on AI-assisted creation, resulting in homogenized content feeding back into training, which degrades the model performance -- a "curse of precision." We further propose a market design with a data intermediary internalizing cross-creator externalities and subsidizing innovative contributions, thereby restoring efficiency.

Dynamic multi-resource allocation is a central problem in shared computing environments, where users' demands arrive sequentially and resources must be distributed fairly without knowledge of future demands. Existing methods emphasize fairness guarantees such as Sharing Incentive, Envy Freeness, and Dynamic Pareto Optimality, but often overlook system utility. Moreover, these fairness criteria are mutually incompatible, preventing strict enforcement of them at the same time. We propose a neural allocation mechanism that reconciles fairness with utility through multi-objective optimization during sequential rollout. We first formalize fairness in the dynamic setting via stepwise loss functions for Sharing Incentive, Envy Freeness, and Dynamic Pareto Optimality, enabling differentiable training. Leveraging non-wastefulness, we parameterized the solutions by constraining allocations to the subspace of demand while allowing elastic over-allocation when resources remain available. Empirical results demonstrate that our learned allocator achieves substantially higher utility at comparable levels of fairness, uncovering clear Pareto-frontier-like tradeoffs across metrics.

Cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) frequently suffers from severe reward sparsity and exploration bottlenecks. While episodic memory mechanisms mitigate these issues by reusing high-return trajectories, they often trap agents in local optima due to unconstrained incentive distribution and semantic representation collapse. To address this, we propose Episodic Memory Temporal Consistency (EMTC), a framework that robustly constructs and selectively leverages historical experiences. EMTC introduces two synergistic components: (1) a Temporally Consistent Semantic Embedder that integrates contrastive learning with time-conditioned state reconstruction, preventing representation collapse and enabling precise memory retrieval; and (2) a Temporal Consistency Gating Mechanism that dynamically modulates episodic incentives based on temporal consistency error. This adaptive gate filters misleading signals from pseudo-successful trajectories, effectively mitigating Q-value overestimation. We provide theoretical guarantees, establishing a strict error bound that directly links the observable temporal consistency error to the underlying trajectory optimality and representation quality. Extensive evaluations on the SMAC and GRF benchmarks demonstrate that EMTC consistently outperforms state-of-the-art baselines. Notably, compared to the strongest episodic baseline, EMTC achieves absolute win-rate improvements of up to 24% in super-hard SMAC scenarios and an average improvement of 28% across GRF tasks.

The rise of `kidfluencers' on YouTube has raised ethical concerns about child digital labor and exploitation. While emerging legislation attempts to regulate this ecosystem, empirical evidence linking exploitation to engagement remains scarce, given the difficulty of operationalizing exploitation at scale. This study presents a multimodal AI audit of 5,051 videos across 79 kidfluencer channels, using weak supervision to detect exploitation signals without large-scale manual labels. We aggregate noisy labeling functions -- including LLM-based classification of titles and GPT-4 Vision analysis of thumbnails and descriptions across six literature-grounded dimensions -- to assign a probabilistic exploitation score to each video. A multi-annotator validation study (N=107) shows strong agreement with human judgment (macro-average F1 $= 0.911$) and high sensitivity for overall exploitation risk (recall $= 0.960$, F1 $= 0.793$). Our findings reveal a significant engagement premium for performative labor, emotional bait, and privacy violations. Exploitation scores correlate with view counts (Spearman $ρ= 0.229$, $p < 10^{-50}$), and mixed-effects regression controlling for channel-level variation shows that a one-unit increase in exploitation score yields a $4.4\times$ increase in views ($p < 0.001$). Within-channel analyses indicate median view boosts of $+65.6\%$ for emotional bait and $+56.0\%$ for performative content (FDR-corrected $p<0.001$), with effects holding in same-year robustness checks ($p=0.030$). Explicit commercial content (product placement), by contrast, shows no premium ($-3.8\%$, n.s.), suggesting the platform rewards commodification of the child's identity and labor over traditional advertising. These findings challenge policy frameworks focused solely on financial trusts, showing that engagement is systematically tied to the intensive, performative labor of children.

Incentive design studies how a central authority can influence strategic agents through payments, subsidies, or taxes, so that individual objectives align with collective welfare. This paper introduces a No-Regret Adaptive Incentive Design (RAID) framework for nonlinear games with continuous action spaces and private agent costs. In this framework, the authority (planner) designs incentives that regulate the Nash equilibrium toward a socially optimal action profile, while simultaneously learning agents' unknown preferences from repeated strategic responses. We formulate the RAID problem and construct a least-squares estimator whose strong consistency requires only diminishing excitation. Leveraging this weak excitation requirement, we propose a switching incentive policy that alternates between probing (exploration) and estimate-based (exploitation) incentives. The resulting policy achieves an $O(t^{-0.5})$ parameter estimation rate and accumulates $O(t^{0.5}\log t)$ squared social-cost regret, almost surely. We further extend the framework to an endogenous-noise response model, where standard least-squares estimation is biased due to an error-in-variables correlation between the noise and agent responses. We utilize a repeated-sampling estimator and corresponding switching policy that retain the same almost-sure convergence and regret rates. Numerical experiments validate the effectiveness and predicted convergence rates of the method.

Institutional incentives are widely used to promote cooperation among autonomous, self-regarding agents, from human societies to multi-agent and AI systems. Existing work typically treats incentive design as a bi-objective problem: minimise institutional cost while achieving a high long-run frequency of cooperation. Whether such schemes also maximise social welfare - total population payoff net of institutional expenditure - has remained largely unexplored. We develop a welfare-centric framework for institutional incentives in finite, well-mixed populations playing a social dilemma (Donation Game and Public Goods Game), considering both rewards for cooperators and punishments for defectors. For each mechanism, we derive explicit expressions for expected social welfare and characterise how it depends on incentive efficiency and selection intensity. Analytically, we identify parameter regimes where social welfare has a single optimal incentive level and regimes with qualitative phase transitions, in which welfare becomes non-monotonic with multiple local optima. We prove that any welfare-maximising incentive is either zero or concentrated around a simple closed-form target, and we provide an efficient algorithm to compute these optima. Comparing reward and punishment, we further derive close-formed conditions under which reward outperform punishment in terms of social welfare for any given budget. Overall, our results reveal a systematic gap between incentives optimised for cost or cooperation frequency and those that maximise welfare.

Vast quantities of compute (GPU cycles on personal workstations, idle inference servers, and edge devices between jobs) go unused because no incentive-aligned protocol exists for their owners to share them safely and profitably. Existing approaches either require a trusted central coordinator (cloud marketplaces), demand heavy blockchain infrastructure (Golem, BrokerChain), or lack an incentive layer entirely (BOINC, Petals). We propose SwarmHarness, a decentralised protocol in which HarnessAPI skill nodes self-organise into a compute swarm without any central authority. SwarmHarness has three interlocking components: a SwarmRegistry built on a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) for peer discovery and capability advertisement; a SwarmRouter that dispatches tasks to nodes using a utility function over capability, load, latency, and trust; and SwarmCredit, an incentive mechanism that attributes compute-credit rewards to contributing nodes via a Shapley-value approximation. Nodes earn credits by serving tasks and spend credits to submit them; idle nodes that never contribute drain credits and lose routing priority, creating a self-regulating participation economy. As nodes specialise toward high-reward skills and routing signals act as digital pheromones, the network exhibits emergent collective intelligence analogous to biological swarms. Beyond compute sharing, SwarmHarness is a foundational primitive for autonomous distributed AI agent networks in which agents hire compute, route subtasks, and settle credits without human intermediation.

We prove that no reinforcement learning policy with confidence-gated autonomy can simultaneously achieve maximum helpfulness, optimal calibration, and full autonomy under rational oversight, whenever some tasks exceed the agent's reliable competence: the Behavioral Credibility Trilemma. The impossibility is geometric -- adding any non-affine autonomy incentive to a strictly proper scoring rule destroys strict properness, so an agent rewarded for both calibrated confidence and autonomous action systematically inflates its reported confidence on tasks below the principal's approval threshold. The Behavioral Perturbation Lemma quantifies the inflation (scaling as $w_A/(2 w_C)$ for the Brier score) and shows detection requires $Ω(1/Δ^2)$ observations. We prove the principal's optimal oversight rule is necessarily non-affine, making the impossibility unconditional and optimizer-independent across log-concave-density policy families. We formalize the Confidence-Gated Decision Problem, map existing methods onto the trilemma, and identify two constructive resolution pathways (commitment, domain separation). A 540-configuration Best-of-N experiment tests five pre-registered hypotheses, all strongly confirmed (effect sizes $d = 1.10$ to $5.32$), and adds a descriptive analysis of the achievable-$(H, C, A)$ surface geometry showing a plateau-truncated frontier consistent with the predicted inflation saturation.

Ride-hailing platforms like DiDi Chuxing operate in highly dynamic environments where balancing driver supply and passenger demand is critical. Although driver-side subsidies serve as a primary lever to align these forces and improve key KPIs like completed rides (\texttt{Rides}) and gross merchandise value (\texttt{GMV}), optimizing them in production requires simultaneously meeting three constraints: (i) responsiveness to stochastic shocks, (ii) strict subsidy-rate caps, and (iii) low-latency execution at city scale. These requirements rule out expensive per-order optimization, calling for a forward-looking, constraint-aware city-level controller for online sequential decision making. To meet these requirements, we introduce D$^3$-Subsidy (Dynamic Driver-side Diffusion-based Subsidy), a hierarchical diffusion-based framework for deployable city-wide subsidy control. To bridge the train-inference gap, D$^3$-Subsidy employs a prefix-conditioned diffusion model that samples plausible future trajectories from immutable historical observations, ensuring the training protocol aligns with the fixed-history nature of online deployment. These generated plans are then decoded by a context-conditioned inverse module into low-dimensional city-level control signals. For scalable execution, we bridge the gap between city-level planning and fine-grained dispatch via a Lagrangian-dual-derived mapping, which embeds subsidy-rate caps directly into order-driver incentives without iterative optimization. Additionally, a multi-city pretraining strategy with parameter-efficient fine-tuning enables robust transfer across heterogeneous cities. Extensive offline evaluations demonstrate that D$^3$-Subsidy improves \texttt{Rides} and \texttt{GMV} while enhancing cap compliance, and a real-world A/B test confirms significant uplift while keeping budget-related violation metrics within operational thresholds.

Data attribution has become an important component of pricing, auditing, and governance in machine learning pipelines, yet most attribution methods implicitly assume that attribution values faithfully reflect participants' contributions. We show that this assumption can fail: a single participant in a standard distributed training workflow can substantially inflate its measured attribution value while preserving global utility. Our attribution-first attack uses latent optimization to inject small synthetic batches that preserve utility while exploiting non-IID label coverage and evaluator sensitivities. Across datasets, models, and multiple marginal-utility evaluators, the attack consistently increases the adversary's attribution value and reshapes the relative attribution structure among benign clients without degrading accuracy or triggering geometry-based defenses. These results show that attribution itself forms a new attack surface and motivate the development of attribution-robust and incentive-compatible scoring mechanisms.

Probabilistic prediction systems often aggregate probability estimates from multiple models into a single decision. A common assumption is that if each model is individually calibrated, the aggregate prediction will also be well calibrated. We show that this assumption fails in multi-agent settings: individually calibrated predictors can become collectively miscalibrated when their predictions interact strategically, in the game-theoretic sense of Brier-optimal local response, even without deliberate coordination. This phenomenon arises naturally when agents are independently trained on overlapping data. We prove that under Brier-score-based aggregation with positively correlated beliefs, each agent's individually optimal report systematically underestimates the positive-class probability, yielding a Price of Anarchy greater than one whenever Cov(b_i, b_j) > 0. In a canonical setting (n = 5 agents, pairwise correlation = 0.5, base rate = 0.3), the empirically measured PoA in false-negative rate reaches 7.25x. In contrast, VCG-based aggregation aligns incentives by rewarding marginal contribution, achieving dominant-strategy incentive compatibility and near-optimal performance. Experiments on three real-world datasets (NSL-KDD, UNSW-NB15, Credit Card Fraud) show that VCG provides strong robustness while maintaining comparable accuracy. It performs particularly well in data-sparse and adversarial settings, and adaptive weighting further improves performance under distribution shift.

While the Natural Language Processing community has dedicated significant resources in developing educational technologies (EdTech) that support this shift, it remains unclear whose interests are being best served among the stakeholders of education. In this paper, we present a systematic literature review of 204 papers published in venues of the Association for Computational Linguistics' Special Interest Group on Building Educational Applications in 2024 and 2025, and validate these against EdTech papers from the wider ACL Anthology. By examining stakeholder inclusion and the prioritisation of research tasks, our findings reveal a critical tension: a push and pull between private-sector incentives and the foundational needs of educational infrastructure. Our analysis reveals that teachers are systematically under-represented as beneficiaries of research (33.3%) despite being the most affected, that real-world deployment remains rare (9.8%), and that ethical engagement tends toward acknowledgement rather than action. Drawing on exemplary papers in our corpus, we offer concrete recommendations for more responsible EduNLP research practices.

Collaborative machine learning involves training high-quality models using datasets from a number of sources. To incentivize sources to share data, existing data valuation methods fairly reward each source based on its data submitted as is. However, as these methods do not verify nor incentivize data truthfulness, the sources can manipulate their data (e.g., by submitting duplicated or noisy data) to artificially increase their valuations and rewards or prevent others from benefiting. This paper presents the first mechanism that provably ensures (F) collaborative fairness and incentivizes (T) truthfulness at equilibrium for Bayesian models. Our mechanism combines semivalues (e.g., Shapley value), which ensure fairness, and a truthful data valuation function (DVF) based on a validation set that is unknown to the sources. As semivalues are influenced by others' data, we introduce an additional condition to prove that a source can maximize its expected data values in coalitions and semivalues by submitting a dataset that captures its true knowledge. Additionally, we discuss the implications and suitable relaxations of (F) and (T) when the mediator has a limited budget for rewards or lacks a validation set. Our theoretical findings are validated on synthetic and real-world datasets.

We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who must make decisions but is dependent on the Sender's information. We find that the Sender learns an optimal communication strategy that the Receiver reliably acts on. Importantly, this strategy is highly sensitive to the degree of conflict in the agents' rewards and the amount of environmental information the Receiver can already observe. We introduce a mechanism allowing the agents to form linear contracts, where a price is established for the information. We demonstrate that the Sender learns to use these payment structures to improve its rewards, though this comes at a cost of "fairness" between agents as the Sender is able to extract much of the Receiver's surplus. This raises questions about fairness, contract design, and learning in the context of multi-agent systems.

We propose incentive-aligned mechanisms for in-context credit assignment: the task of assigning credit for AI-generated content (e.g. code, news articles, short-form videos) among creators whose intellectual property appears in the context window. Our approach is based on the least core solution concept from cooperative game theory, which distributes value in a way that is as stable as possible by ensuring that no subset of creators is significantly under-compensated relative to the value they could generate on their own. We develop algorithms for approximating the least core, which leverage novel routines for constraint seeding and constraint separation. On a web retrieval credit assignment task, we find that our approaches are capable of approximating the least core using orders of magnitude fewer LLM calls compared to alternative methods.

We study AI alignment through the lens of law-and-economics models of deterrence and enforcement. In these models, misconduct is not treated as an external failure, but as a strategic response to incentives: an actor weighs the gain from violation against the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. We argue that the same logic arises naturally in agentic AI pipelines. A solver may benefit from producing a persuasive but incorrect answer, hiding uncertainty, or exploiting spurious shortcuts, while an auditor or verifier must decide whether costly monitoring is worthwhile. Alignment is therefore a fixed-point problem: stronger penalties may deter solver misbehavior, but they can also reduce the auditor's incentive to inspect, since auditing then mainly incurs cost on a population that appears increasingly aligned. This perspective also changes what should count as a post-training signal. Standard feedback often attaches reward to the final answer alone, but a solver-auditor pipeline exposes the full correction event: whether the solver erred, whether the auditor inspected, whether the error was caught, and whether oversight incentives remained active. We formalize this interaction in a two-agent model in which a principal chooses rewards over joint correction outcomes, inducing both solver behavior and auditor monitoring. Reward design is therefore a bilevel optimization problem: rewards are judged not by their immediate semantic meaning, but by the behavioral equilibrium they induce. We propose a bandit-based outer-loop procedure for searching over reward profiles using noisy interaction feedback. Experiments on an LLM coding pipeline show that adaptive reward profiles can maintain useful oversight pressure and improve principal-aligned outcomes relative to static hand-designed rewards, including a substantial reduction in hallucinated incorrect attempts.

Most familiar equilibrium concepts, such as Nash and correlated equilibrium, guarantee only that no single player can improve their utility by deviating unilaterally. They offer no guarantees against profitable coordinated deviations by coalitions. Although the literature proposes solution concepts that provide stability against multilateral deviations (\emph{e.g.}, strong Nash and coalition-proof equilibrium), these generally fail to exist. In this paper, we study an alternative solution concept that minimizes coalitional deviation incentives, rather than requiring them to vanish, and is therefore guaranteed to exist. Specifically, we focus on minimizing the average gain of a deviating coalition, and extend the framework to weighted-average and maximum-within-coalition gains. In contrast, the minimum-gain analogue is shown to be computationally intractable. For the average-gain and maximum-gain objectives, we prove a lower bound on the complexity of computing such an equilibrium and present an algorithm that matches this bound. Finally, we use our framework to solve the \emph{Exploitability Welfare Frontier} (EWF), the maximum attainable social welfare subject to a given exploitability (the maximum gain over all unilateral deviations).

Large-scale IoT weather sensing networks require incentive mechanisms to sustain participation, yet determining how much value individual data contributions bring to the network remains an open problem. Existing approaches address data quality but not data valuation; in operational meteorology, adjoint-based methods derive value from the forecast model itself but require full data assimilation infrastructure. We propose to utilise differentiable AI weather models to fill this gap and characterise gradient-based attribution on gridded GFS analysis inputs as a candidate value signal, evaluating fidelity, calibration, cost, and gaming vulnerability across more than 400 configurations. Attribution captures near-optimal sensor placement utility with monotonically faithful payments, but can be inflated by adversarial inputs, with detection requiring external baseline data. These findings establish gradient attribution as a computationally validated signal for model-informed reward allocation in participatory weather sensing.

Collusion among autonomous agents poses a critical security threat in embodied multi-agent systems (MAS), where coordinated behaviors can deviate from global objectives and lead to real-world consequences. Existing defenses, primarily based on identity control or post-hoc behavior analysis, are insufficient to address such threats in embodied settings due to delayed feedback and noisy observations in physical environments, which make behavioral deviations difficult to detect accurately and in a timely manner. To address this challenge, we propose a mutagenic incentive intervention approach that mitigates collusion by reshaping agents' payoff structures. By rewarding agents who report collusive behavior and penalizing identified participants, the mechanism induces strategic defection and renders collusion unstable. We further design supporting mechanisms, including reporting deposits, smart contract-based reward enforcement, and encrypted communication, to ensure robustness against misuse of the incentive mechanism and retaliation from penalized agents. We implement the proposed approach in both simulated and real-world embodied environments. Experimental results show that our method effectively suppresses collusion by inducing defection, while preserving system efficiency. It achieves performance comparable to the non-collusion baseline and outperforms representative reactive defenses, thereby fulfilling the desired security objectives. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of proactive incentive design as a practical paradigm for securing embodied multi-agent systems.

Competing firms that share a population of risky customers face a decentralized risk detection problem in which each firm holds fragmentary information whose aggregation would generate social value, but private incentives impede truthful sharing. We develop a dynamic mechanism design framework for this setting and identify three strategic frictions that distinguish it from classical mechanism design with decentralized information: compliance moral hazard, adversarial adaptation, and information destruction through intervention. A temporal value assignment (TVA) mechanism credits firms using a strictly proper scoring rule applied to discounted verified outcomes; under stated assumptions, TVA implements truthful posterior reporting as a Bayes--Nash equilibrium (uniquely optimal at each edge in large federations, with $O(1/m)$ shading in finite systems). A network Shapley characterization shows that under edge-additive coalition value, each firm's marginal contribution is proportional to its weighted cross-firm interaction degree, yielding a sharp prescription for coalition design that prioritizes inter-firm volume over firm size. Embedding TVA in a model of competition among firms, we establish a welfare ordering across four regulatory regimes (autarky, voluntary federation, mandated full sharing, TVA) and identify conditions under which information-sharing mandates without compatible incentive design reduce welfare below autarky: a ``backfiring mandate.'' We illustrate the framework on a 1.4M-transaction synthetic anti-money-laundering benchmark; the same machinery extends to platform fraud, cybersecurity threat intelligence, and supply chain risk detection.

We introduce a new budgeted framework for online influence maximization, considering the total cost of an advertising campaign instead of the common cardinality constraint on a chosen influencer set. Our approach better models the real-world setting where the cost of influencers varies and advertisers want to find the best value for their overall social advertising budget. We propose an algorithm assuming an independent cascade diffusion model and edge level semi-bandit feedback, and provide both theoretical and experimental results. Our analysis is also valid for the cardinality constraint setting and improves the state of the art regret bound in this case.

Preference optimization is widely used to align large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. However, many margin-based methods also suppress the chosen response when they try to suppress the rejected one, and there is no general way to prevent this across different objectives. We address this issue with a unified incentive-score decomposition of preference optimization, revealing that different objectives share the same local update directions and differ only in their scalar weights. This decomposition provides a common framework for analyzing objectives that were previously studied in separate settings. Building on this decomposition, by analyzing the dynamics of the chosen/rejected likelihoods, we identify the disentanglement band (DB), a simple, testable condition that tells us when training can follow the desired path: suppress the loser while preserving the winner, possibly after an early stage. Using the DB, we propose reward calibration (RC), a plug-and-play method that adaptively rebalances the updates for chosen and rejected responses to satisfy the DB, without redesigning the base objective. Empirical results show that RC leads to more disentangled dynamics, with better downstream performance observed across several settings. Our code is available at https://github.com/IceyWuu/DisentangledPreferenceOptimization.

Hosted-LLM providers have a silent-substitution incentive: advertise a stronger model while serving cheaper replies. Probe-after-return schemes such as SVIP leave a parallel-serve side-channel, since a dishonest provider can route the verifier's probe to the advertised model while serving ordinary users from a substitute. We propose a commit-open protocol that closes this gap. Before any opening request, the provider commits via a Merkle tree to a per-position sparse-autoencoder (SAE) feature-trace sketch of its served output at a published probe layer. A verifier opens random positions, scores them against a public named-circuit probe library calibrated with cross-backend noise, and decides with a fixed-threshold joint-consistency z-score rule. We instantiate the protocol on three backbones -- Qwen3-1.7B, Gemma-2-2B, and a 4.5x scale-up to Gemma-2-9B with a 131k-feature SAE. Of 17 attackers spanning same-family lifts, cross-family substitutes, and rank-<=128 adaptive LoRA, all are rejected at a shared, scale-stable threshold; the same attackers all evade a matched SVIP-style parallel-serve baseline. A white-box end-to-end attack that backpropagates through the frozen SAE encoder does not close the margin, and a feature-forgery attacker that never runs M_hon is bounded in closed form by an intrinsic-dimension argument. Commitment adds <=2.1% to forward-only wall-clock at batch 32.

Quantum feature maps offer expressive embeddings for classical learning tasks, and augmenting sparse identification of nonlinear dynamics (SINDy) with such features is a natural but unexplored direction. We introduce \textbf{Q-SINDy}, a quantum-kernel-augmented SINDy framework, and identify a specific failure mode that arises: \emph{coefficient cannibalization}, in which quantum features absorb coefficient mass that rightfully belongs to the polynomial basis, corrupting equation recovery. We derive the exact cannibalization-bias formula $Δξ_P = (P^\top P)^{-1}P^\top Q\,\hatξ_Q$ and prove that orthogonalizing quantum features against the polynomial column space at fit time eliminates this bias exactly. The claim is verified numerically to machine precision ($<10^{-12}$) on multiple systems. Empirically, across six canonical dynamical systems (Duffing, Van der Pol, Lorenz, Lotka-Volterra, cubic oscillator, Rössler) and three quantum feature map architectures (ZZ-angle encoding, IQP, data re-uploading), orthogonalized Q-SINDy consistently matches vanilla SINDy's structural recovery while uncorrected augmentation degrades true-positive rates by up to 100%. A refined dynamics-aware diagnostic, $R^2_Q$ for $\dot X$, predicts cannibalization severity with statistical significance (Pearson $r=0.70$, $p=0.023$). An RBF classical-kernel control across 20 hyperparameter configurations fails more severely than any quantum variant, ruling out feature count as the cause. Orthogonalization remains robust under depolarizing hardware noise up to 2% per gate, and the framework extends without modification to Burgers' equation.

In data-sensitive domains such as healthcare, cross-silo federated learning (CFL) allows organizations to collaboratively train AI models without sharing raw data. However, practical CFL deployments are inherently coopetitive, in which organizations cooperate during model training while competing in downstream markets. In such settings, training contributions, including data volume, quality, and diversity, can improve the global model yet inadvertently strengthen rivals. This dilemma is amplified by non-IID data, which leads to asymmetric learning gains and undermines sustained participation. While existing competition-aware CFL and incentive-design approaches reward organizations based on marginal training contributions, they fail to account for the costs of strengthening competitors. In this paper, we introduce CoCoGen+, a coopetition-compatible data generation and incentivization framework that jointly models non-IID data and inter-organizational competition while endogenizing GenAI-based synthetic data generation as a strategic decision. Specifically, CoCoGen+ formulates each training round as a weighted potential game, where organizations strategically decide how much synthetic data to generate by balancing learning performance gains against computational costs and competition-caused utility losses. We then provide a tractable equilibrium characterization and derive implementable generation strategies to maximize social welfare. To promote long-term collaboration, we integrate a payoff redistribution-based incentive mechanism to compensate organizations for their contributions and competition-caused utility degradation. Experiments on varying learning tasks validate the feasibility of CoCoGen+. The results show how non-IID data, competition intensity, and incentives shape organizational strategies and social welfare, while CoCoGen+ outperforms baselines in efficiency.

As users increasingly turn to LLMs for practical and personal advice, they become vulnerable to subtle steering toward hidden incentives misaligned with their own interests. While existing NLP research has benchmarked manipulation detection, these efforts often rely on simulated debates and remain fundamentally decoupled from actual human belief shifts in real-world scenarios. We introduce PUPPET, a theoretical taxonomy and resource that bridges this gap by focusing on the moral direction of hidden incentives in everyday, advice-giving contexts. We provide an evaluation dataset of N=1,035 human-LLM interactions, where we measure users' belief shifts. Our analysis reveals a critical disconnect in current safety paradigms: while models can be trained to detect manipulative strategies, they do not correlate with the magnitude of resulting belief change. As such, we define the task of belief shift prediction and show that while state-of-the-art LLMs achieve moderate correlation (r=0.3-0.5), they exhibit systematic directional biases, with some models over-predicting and others under-predicting the magnitude of human belief change. This work establishes a theoretically grounded and behaviorally validated foundation for AI social safety efforts by studying incentive-driven manipulation in LLMs during everyday, practical user queries.

We study the dynamic allocation of indivisible resources to strategic agents under long-term constraints, where the planner aims to maximize social welfare, satisfy multiple constraints, and elicit near-truthful reports. We find standard primal-dual methods fragile in this setting: agents easily manipulate their reports to distort dual variables, sacrificing social efficiency for individual utility. To address this, we propose the Incentive-Aware Primal-Dual (IAPD) framework. On the primal side, we integrate three components to suppress manipulation: a VCG-based payment neutralizes immediate misreporting benefits, while epoch-based lazy updates and random exploration together ensure potential future gains are outweighed by immediate penalties. On the dual side, to overcome a learning barrier due to lazy updates -- which we call the "price of incentives" -- we design a novel optimistic online learning algorithm, O-FTRL-FP. It utilizes a fixed-point oracle to resolve the circular dependency between optimistic dual variables and the resulting allocations. Ultimately, our mechanism attains $\tilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt T)$ social welfare regret, satisfies all long-term constraints, and induces a near-truthful equilibrium. It also smoothly generalizes to multi-unit multi-demand allocation problems. Notably, this $\tilde{\mathcal O}(\sqrt T)$ regret near-matches the non-strategic $Ω(\sqrt T)$ lower bound, demonstrating that incentive-awareness can be accommodated at nearly no cost.

Algorithmic recourse promises to help applicants rejected by automated systems by explaining the changes needed to secure acceptance. What incentive do decision-makers, such as banks and employers, have to offer recourse? We study this question in a screening model in which recourse is both productive and selective: completing recourse improves an applicant's value to the decision-maker, but applicants differ in their cost of completion. The optimal policy is a threshold rule: reject applicants with low scores, offer recourse to an intermediate range of scores, and accept applicants with high scores outright. Because the intermediate range spans the cutoff that would separate acceptance from rejection when recourse is not available, some marginal applicants gain a new path to acceptance, while others---who would have been accepted outright---must now clear a costly hurdle.