Theory-Of-Mind Reasoning

Training embodied foundation models typically requires massive-scale datasets and extensive computational resources, yet often suffers from three critical limitations: (1) inefficient sample utilization due to low-informative samples; (2) imbalanced gradient contributions across heterogeneous tasks; and (3) severe credit assignment problem in long-horizon planning, where trajectory-level rewards indiscriminately penalize all tokens. To address these issues, we propose an efficient training paradigm that achieves state-of-the-art average performance through strategic data selection and hierarchical policy optimization. Our approach consists of three synergistic stages. First, Rejection Sampling-based Fine-Tuning (RSFT) filters out low-informative samples to establish robust behavioral priors while preventing distributional collapse. Second, Iterative Rejection GRPO (IR-GRPO) employs task-specific queues stratified by difficulty to keep datasets balanced across reinforcement learning iterations, coupled with a hybrid reward mechanism for precise cross-task feedback. Third, to enhance long-horizon task planning, we introduce Trie-GRPO, a novel reinforcement learning algorithm based on action prefix trees, which enables step-level advantage estimation. This resolves the credit assignment problem by isolating intermediate correct decisions from downstream errors, while effectively balancing exploration efficiency and depth compared to conventional search trees. As a result, EmbodiedMind achieves a state-of-the-art average performance of 70.02% across 18 benchmarks, and significantly outperforms other embodied foundation models in long-horizon task planning accuracy. Our project will be released for reproducibility.

Spatial reasoning depends not only on metric properties such as distance, angle, and shape, but also on topological relations that remain invariant under continuous deformation. Cognitive science identifies these relations as foundational to spatial understanding, yet foundation-model evaluations largely focus on metric or viewpoint-dependent relations. We introduce MindTopo, a benchmark of topological intuition across five properties grounded in cognitive science and formal topology: continuity, separation, order, enclosure, and knots. MindTopo evaluates each property at two cognitive levels. Reasoning asks a model to identify topological relations or infer how they change. Planning instantiates a foundation model as a closed-loop agent whose policy selects environment actions. MindTopo contains 11,030 instances across 13 procedurally generated task types with controllable difficulty. We benchmark 14 MLLMs and study agent configurations augmented with image and video generation, including 3 video generative models in planning settings. Every MLLM performs better on reasoning than on planning, and the best-performing model remains far below observed human performance. On Qwen3-VL-2B-Instruct, supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning improve reasoning more than planning. Generated observations retain local cues and reach plausible endpoints, but audited rollouts do not reliably follow environment dynamics or preserve topology across transitions. Our website is at https://mind-topo.github.io/

The Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC) benchmarks cognitive generalization, the ability to infer and apply abstract rules from limited examples. This paper presents a multi-stage rule-chaining framework that performs compositional reasoning across symbolic, structural, and conceptual levels. The framework integrates three complementary solvers: (1) a deterministic rule discovery module that induces atomic transformations through geometric, color, and object-based analysis; (2) a pattern-composition engine that reconstructs outputs via block merging, repetition, and spatial heuristics; and (3) a structural abstraction layer that infers hierarchical and nested relationships across grids. These solvers operate sequentially within a progressive fallback hierarchy, where each stage reuses prior reasoning traces to enhance interpretability and generalization. Training passed for 995 tasks out of 1000, further evaluated on 105 tasks out of 120 and solved 230 test tasks out of 240 ARC-AGI-2 tasks. The system achieved strong coverage across deterministic, compositional, and abstract categories, demonstrating an overall accuracy exceeding 95 percent. The proposed architecture bridges symbolic reasoning and pattern synthesis, providing interpretable insight into cognitive generalization. The results suggest that rule chaining and hierarchical composition can advance machine reasoning toward transparent, human-aligned abstraction without relying on task-specific tuning.

Productive dialogue alignment requires distinguishing \emph{surface coordination} (acknowledgments and smooth task progression) from \emph{epistemic alignment} (convergence of belief states); standard preference-based methods typically optimize response-level preferences without explicitly modeling the latter. We operationalize Theory-of-Mind (ToM) inference as a control signal within Frictive Policy Optimization by extracting, at each referring expression, a four-part belief structure: the speaker's intended referent, the addressee's interpretation, and each participant's model of the other's belief. This makes friction mechanically computable from epistemic-state comparisons, capturing \emph{silent divergence}, where both participants proceed confidently while grounding to different referents. We evaluate the signal at two levels. At the representation level, ablating the second-order channel reduces misunderstanding recall from $65\%$ to $26\%$. At the policy level, reward-shaping (FAR) and trust-region (FTR) variants improve intervention F1 and warranted-context calibration over DPO, with Brier scores independently supporting the calibration gains. Across three training runs, FAR and FTR remain substantially more stable, whereas DPO varies widely and can degrade intervention competence already present in the base policy. Thus, ToM-grounded friction provides a trainable signal for context-sensitive intervention under referential belief divergence.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is essential for agent interactions, yet existing evaluations either rely on static scenarios that oversimplify mental-state reasoning or interactive settings that provide limited diagnostic insight. We present Avalon-ToM-Bench, a fine-grained benchmark that operationalizes ToM through the asymmetric-information mechanics of The Resistance: Avalon. Rather than evaluating end-to-end gameplay, it decomposes ToM into a 2$\times$2 taxonomy -- epistemic versus motivational reasoning crossed with inference versus action -- using human-crafted, perspective-constrained queries. Benchmarking 28 LLMs reveals three insights: 1) Reasoning, not knowledge. Models show strong game-rule comprehension but markedly weaker ToM abilities, isolating failures to social reasoning rather than missing domain knowledge. 2) Expression, not representation. Mechanistic analyses via linear probing and activation steering show that models frequently represent correct mental-state inferences in their hidden states but fail to express them during generation -- linear probes recover 77-82% accuracy versus 62-70% from the models' own chain-of-thought. 3) Policy, not deliberation. Dedicated reasoning training yields substantial improvements whereas test-time chain-of-thought provides only marginal gains (+11.0 versus +1.1 points on average), suggesting that robust ToM depends on a learned reasoning policy rather than increased inference-time deliberation.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently shown strong performance on Theory of Mind (ToM) tests, prompting debate about the nature and validity of the underlying capabilities. At the same time, reasoning-oriented LLMs trained via reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards have demonstrated notable improvements across a range of benchmarks. In this work, we examine the behavior of such reasoning models in ToM tasks using novel adaptations of machine psychological experiments together with results from established benchmarks. We observe that reasoning models consistently exhibit increased robustness to prompt variations and task perturbations. Our analysis suggests these gains come at least partly from models being more robust at reaching the correct answer under prompt and task variation. We read this as evidence for a robustness-based account rather than for a new ToM-specific ability.

We present a structured large-language-model (LLM) architecture for zero-shot human--robot coordination in a cooperative construction task with private goal views. Guided by a Dec-POMDP formulation, the architecture decomposes decision-making into (i) action-conditioned Theory-of-Mind (ToM) inference, (ii) hierarchical planning, (iii) conversation interpretation, (iv) action verification, and (v) feedback-based replanning. We compare the proposed method with an ablation without ToM inference and a multi-agent reinforcement-learning policy trained offline over many goal pairs. In human-participant experiments, the proposed method required fewer interaction steps and yielded higher post-interaction trust ratings than both baselines. These results suggest that systematically decomposing the team decision problem, using LLMs as tractable surrogates for otherwise intractable inference and planning computations, and retaining conventional verification for physical feasibility can improve both task coordination and the human experience.

Simulating human-like Theory of Mind (ToM) has been a longstanding problem in natural language processing (NLP). To address this, existing works introduce a reasoning step of event hiding (a.k.a. perspective-taking), where events unknown to a character are removed before question answering. However, resorting to event hiding for ToM reasoning presents a performance degradation issue due to the strict output format constraints involved in event hiding. To mitigate this issue, we propose generating perspective-taking outputs as free-form explanations without event hiding, but this poses a notable yet underexplored challenge: LLMs need to inhibit responses to events unknown to characters, because the absence of event hiding exposes LLMs to these events throughout reasoning. To address this challenge, we hypothesize and empirically verify that LLMs can achieve such inhibition if a character's lack of knowledge about events is made explicit during reasoning. Based on this finding, we introduce PICTURE, a new prompting method that enables LLMs to generate a character's lack of knowledge within free-form Chain-of-Thought (CoT). Experimental results show that PICTURE outperforms existing prompting methods by an average of 7.3% on false-belief tasks.

Do frontier vision-language models present a coherent Theory-of-Mind (ToM) profile across tasks, matching the same human reference group, or does that profile fragment from one paradigm to the next? We evaluate a shared panel of nine frontier VLMs on two psychology-derived benchmarks: the Keysar Director Task (visual perspective-taking under egocentric interference) and the Frith-Happé animated triangles scored with the Castelli rubric (intention attribution from pure motion). On the Director Task, without chain-of-thought, the panel makes the egocentric error on 78% of trials like children rather than adults; variation is substantial across models, and reasoning rescues several models. On the triangles, the panel under-attributes intention: its ToM profile sits more than three times closer to the high-functioning-autistic-adult (HF-ASD) mean than to the typical-development-adult (TD) mean, while Goal-Directed and Random stay near TD. No model is nearest TD on both tasks; the model that looks adult-like on the Director Task falls on the HF-ASD side on the triangles, and the most TD-like model on the triangles is child-like on the Director Task. We report group-level descriptions, not diagnostic labels for any model.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer other's beliefs, intentions, and states of knowledge, is central to social interaction, yet remains challenging for current Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), especially in multi-party meetings where cues are distributed across speech and behavior. Existing multimodal ToM benchmarks mainly focus on video-grounded question answering over overt, externally verifiable signals, and provide limited coverage of latent social states and group dynamics. We introduce MeetingToM, a benchmark for complex social behavior reasoning in naturalistic multi-party meetings. MeetingToM targets meeting-specific phenomena such as \textbf{pseudo-consensus}, where apparent agreement masks private dissent under social pressure. The benchmark is hierarchically organized to evaluate ToM at increasing levels of social granularity, including (i) subject-level mental state prediction, (ii) dyadic-level addressee understanding, and (iii) group-level consensus reasoning. We provide a unified evaluation protocol and conduct systematic analyses of representative MLLMs, revealing persistent limitations in integrating non-verbal cues, inferring hidden attitudes, and distinguishing genuine consensus from pseudo-consensus. Our results highlight key challenges and establish MeetingToM as a testbed for advancing meeting-grounded ToM in multimodal models.

Representation is a central concept in modern machine learning, where it usually refers to internal encodings that support learning and generalization. As models scale and their capabilities become increasingly human-level, this representational language sometimes shifts from an engineering context into the more philosophically loaded domain of mental representation. We argue that this is the case for recent claims about the convergence of representational properties across different AI models. In particular, we assess the arguments developed in The Platonic Representation Hypothesis, according to which this convergence is driven by a unified structure of reality. We examine this claim by introducing arguments and ideas from debates about mental representation in the philosophy of mind. We argue that these philosophical resources can clarify what is at stake in such claims, explain why alignment evidence alone is insufficient for strong metaphysical conclusions, and suggest directions for future research.

Text-based evaluations of Theory of Mind (ToM) in Large Language Models (LLMs) often involve cognitive tests akin to the Sally-Anne task that can be gamed due to exposure to relevantly similar tasks in pre-training and do not obviously test models' functional ToM abilities in ways that generalize to naturalistic settings. To address these issues, we introduce the Epistemic Asymmetry Schelling Task (EAST), a two-player dialogue game designed to benchmark robust and generalizable ToM abilities. By requiring LLM-LLM dyads to independently converge on semantic Schelling points under varying states of epistemic transparency, we evaluate whether models can robustly apply ToM to achieve coordination. Our results reveal a significant capability gap in functional social reasoning, with only frontier models successfully navigating the varying epistemic demands of the tasks. Analysis of reasoning traces shows that coordination failures are primarily driven by epistemic tracking errors, such as conflating private knowledge with mutual knowledge. Despite high performance on traditional static benchmarks, our study shows that robust social reasoning and epistemic tracking remain a critical bottleneck, providing concrete targets for future LLM evaluation and development.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmarks for Large Language Models (LLMs) typically rely on passive question-answering formats, but the deployment of LLMs in increasingly agentic and autonomous forms demands new evaluations. In this paper we evaluate an agent's ability to induce specific belief states in other agents by taking actions rather than using conversational persuasion, a capability we call Non-Conversational Planning ToM (NCP-ToM). NCP-ToM is likely to be essential for many agent use-cases, including within user-assistant interactions and pedagogical contexts, but may also present manipulation or misinformation risks. Using a novel framework, NCP-ExploreToM, we subvert the conventional task structure by providing models with a set of belief state goals and requiring them to move objects or direct characters into rooms to achieve their goals. We evaluated six frontier models, including GPT-5, Gemini 2.5 Pro and the Claude 4 series, and a cohort of human participants, across 600 task instances. GPT-5 was successful on approximately 80% of tasks in the agentic setting, and was the only model to outperform human participants on our task, but was still less robust than humans across contexts. We additionally found that all models, like humans, performed better on tasks inducing true belief states than false belief states, which is a positive signal for alignment efforts. These findings highlight emerging social-reasoning capabilities in LLMs for non-conversational task completion and underscore the necessity of agentic evaluations for understanding the safety and alignment of autonomous social agents.

Cognitive tasks are organized by shared and specialized neural processes. Masked fMRI reconstruction provides a common self-supervised objective for quantifying transfer relations among task states, but existing reconstruction-based taskonomies mainly study one-to-one transfer from a single source task to a target. Here, we extend an fMRI cognitive taskonomy from single-source to multi-source transfer across 23 Human Connectome Project task states and use Boolean Integer Programming (BIP) to analyze budget-constrained task allocation. We train 1,127 task-specific and transfer models. Single-source transfer is directional and paradigm structured: motor states transfer well within the motor paradigm but provide limited support to most non-motor targets, consistent with a shared sensorimotor execution system and effector-specific representations. Multi-source transfer depends on the composition of the source set, suggesting that many-to-one task relations are not fully captured by pairwise taskonomy alone. Across supervision budgets, BIP repeatedly allocates direct supervision to several 0-back and 2-back working-memory states, although these states are not consistently the strongest individual sources. This pattern may reflect the integration of perceptual, attentional, and executive processes in working-memory tasks. Together, these findings reveal a cross-paradigm-limited motor cluster and working-memory states with high priority under the specified global allocation objective. Our study extends reconstruction-based fMRI taskonomy from one-to-one transfer to many-to-one task relations and budget-constrained task dependencies.

Time series analysis has recently been coupled with Large Language Models (LLMs) to leverage their reasoning and world knowledge capabilities, yet gains remain limited. We attribute this to a fundamental mismatch between existing task formulations and LLM strengths: most settings reduce time series understanding to curve-fitting systems, focusing on low-level prediction while ignoring the semantic, contextual, and reasoning-intensive nature of real-world temporal decision-making.To address these limitations, we introduce TSCognition, a multimodal benchmark for multi-dimensional time series reasoning. It collects real-world time series and textual information from 15 public sources and constructs approximately 41K QA samples around five cognitive reasoning tasks: Decoding, Grounding, Inferring, Extrapolating, and Acting. Building on this, we further propose TSAlign, a unified framework that encodes time series into compact patch-level representations and aligns them with semantic directions in the LLM embedding space via gated residual injection and multivariate fusion.Experiments show that TSAlign outperforms existing LLM, VLM, and time series QA baselines on TSCognition and the publicly available TimerBed benchmark while substantially reducing computational cost.Code is available at: https://github.com/EIT-NLP/CognitiveTSR

Theory of mind (ToM), the capacity to ascribe mental states to others and use those ascriptions for prediction and inference, is widely assumed to be essential for effective human-machine integration. Existing AI-ToM models address \emph{how} to mentalize, but leave the question of when largely unaddressed. The central question is: under what situational and agent-level conditions is ToM engagement causally warranted in conflict? This paper presents a structural causal model formalized as a directed acyclic graph (DAG), treating ToM as a mechanism activated by situational and agent-level conditions rather than as an always-on capacity. The model specifies four exogenous variables capturing situational and agent-level conditions, five endogenous mediators, and a mechanistic ToM node producing engagement states through three distinct causal pathways: a tractability pathway, a reasoning-depth pathway, and an enabling-cause pathway. The primary outcome is epistemic accuracy, which decouples social reasoning from behavioral policy and generalizes across social phenomena beyond conflict. The framework gives AI systems a principled, resource-rational decision procedure for mentalizing, with implications for efficiency, trust, and the development of robust artificial social intelligence. Simulation validation, empirical human-machine teaming studies, and ethical considerations arising from conflict-optimized mentalizing are discussed.

Inferring others' beliefs requires more than reading surface signals; it requires tracking who told them what, in what order, and how credibly. The Theory of Mind Utility (ToM-U) formalizes this epistemic state inference problem at the computational level of analysis, specifying what mentalizing computes and why without commitment to algorithmic or neural implementation. ToM-U achieves this by constructing Local Epistemic World Models (LEWMs) -- directed typed graphs that represent agents, state nodes, and the epistemic relationships among them -- and evaluating discrete candidate LEWMs against observed behavior until one achieves sufficient confidence. Five formal definitions specify the LEWM structure, agent node properties including ordered information access history, a bounded proliferation mechanism for recursive mentalizing, three inference procedures, and a residue function that captures the structured trace left by failed mentalizing attempts. ToM-U differs from Bayesian Theory of Mind and adjacent formal accounts, which presuppose rather than derive belief states, and from simulation theory and theory-theory, which lack a formal apparatus for epistemic state inference. The architecture generates directional, falsifiable predictions about mentalizing failure that follow from structural properties of the model rather than auxiliary assumptions, and positions ToM-U as a domain-agnostic mechanism upstream of goal inference and other downstream social cognitive processes.

Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning requires inferring agents' beliefs from partial and asymmetric observations, which remains an open challenge for LLMs. Existing prompting-based approaches improve ToM reasoning through observable-event filtering or temporal belief chains, without explicitly modeling nested beliefs. We introduce RecToM, an inference-time framework for ToM reasoning that models nested beliefs via recursive perspective construction. RecToM constructs each character perspective from the preceding character perspective along the character chain specified by the question, reducing higher-order belief questions to actual-world questions within the final constructed perspective. We further provide a KD45 analysis showing that RecToM's perspective construction induces a well-formed belief modality beyond simple event filtering. Experiments on ToM benchmarks, including Hi-ToM, Big-ToM, and FanToM, across multiple LLM backbones show that RecToM consistently outperforms recent advanced approaches, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Notably, RecToM reaches 100% accuracy on Hi-ToM with GPT-5.4 and Qwen3.5, a benchmark requiring higher-order ToM reasoning.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is a must-acquire skill for modern foundation model systems to operate effectively and safely in the real world. Recent works have explored honing ToM via post-training; however, we show that such progress is confounded by a pervasive "shortcut" issue: tasks can reach up to 99% accuracy by simply exploiting spurious causal correlations, leading to a false sense of ToM. Motivated by this, we first develop a framework to systematically examine ToM datasets for shortcuts and provide guidance for future development. We find that questions reducible to pure state tracking, such as "belief," are especially shortcut-prone compared to mind questions, such as "intention," where reasoning beyond tracking is required. Using four shortcut-free datasets across three ToM contexts, we then comprehensively study whether Reinforcement Fine-Tuning with verifiable rewards and explicit reasoning chains, called Thinking-RFT, elevates ToM beyond Supervised Fine-Tuning, or SFT. Our key findings are as follows. First, Thinking-RFT effectively improves ToM in all scenarios, with a 6% improvement over SFT, particularly in complex higher-order reasoning, with a 10% improvement over SFT, and multimodal cases, with a 7% improvement over SFT. It also generalizes notably better to unseen domains and higher-order queries while being more robust to counterfactuals. Second, ToM benefits specifically from the joint effect of reasoning and RL: Thinking-RFT outperforms Non-Thinking-RFT by 7% on average. Third, RFT works by learning to ground its reasoning on anchor cues, such as keywords and state changes, that correspond to causal factors. We believe our study is useful for developing effective and robust ToM post-training datasets and advancing critical ToM capabilities.

True general intelligence requires not only a model of the physical world but also a social world model: the capacity to infer how individual mental states interact and crystallize into group-level outcomes. Despite notable progress in individual-level Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning, existing multimodal large language models fail at this broader task. Collective behavior emerges non-linearly from social tensions, conformity dynamics, and structural constraints, meaning it cannot be recovered by merely summing individual intentions. We present GroupToM-Bench, the first multimodal benchmark for group-level ToM, built around a causal chain spanning micro-level BDI states (belief, desire, intention), meso-level group tension and structural constraints, and macro-level outcome prediction and mechanistic attribution. To probe this full arc, we develop a seven-level cognitive audit framework. Experiments reveal a gap between current models and human baselines, highlighting a failure to process social structures and non-linear collective dynamics.

This paper proposes, for the first time, a rigorous formal definition of the concept of Machine Theory of Mind, based on principles supported by evidence from cognitive psychology, neuroscience and artificial intelligence, and uses the above as a lens to examine state-of-the-art and current efforts in the field, driving a potential agenda for further research there able to "crack" the problem. It also advances a general holistic meta-model for Machine Theory of Mind, and examines the state of the art when it comes to empirically benchmarking such models.

Theory of Mind (ToM) enables an agent to reason about another actor's beliefs, goals, and intentions, which is essential for human-centered embodied assistance. Existing ToM benchmarks have advanced text and multimodal mental-state recognition, but they mostly evaluate offline question answering or final action prediction. They do not fully test whether an embodied agent can stay connected to a changing environment, update actor-specific beliefs, decide when reasoning is needed, and intervene only when help is useful. Building on MindPower, we extend robot-centric ToM reasoning to a real-time closed-loop setting and introduce MindClaw, a framework for embodied mental-state reasoning with precision intervention. MindClaw connects multi-source inputs, belief memory, an embodied cognitive trigger skill, mental reasoning, and action generation, allowing the agent to output helpful actions at the right time while remaining silent when intervention is unnecessary. Experiments show that direct VLM baselines struggle with task awareness and intervention calibration, while MindClaw achieves the best overall performance, demonstrating the importance of trigger-skill optimization for closed-loop embodied ToM assistance.

Effective real-world assistance requires AI agents with robust Theory of Mind (ToM): inferring human mental states from their behavior. Despite recent advances, several key challenges remain, including (1) online inference with robust uncertainty updates over multiple hypotheses; (2) efficient reasoning suitable for real-time assistance; and (3) the lack of ground-truth mental state annotations in real-world domains. We address these challenges by introducing MindZero, a self-supervised reinforcement learning framework that trains multimodal large language models (MLLMs) for efficient and robust online mental reasoning. During training, the model is rewarded for generating mental state hypotheses that maximize the likelihood of observed actions estimated by a planner, similar to model-based ToM reasoning. This method thus eliminates the need for explicit mental state annotations. After training, MindZero internalizes model-based reasoning into fast single-pass inference. We evaluate MindZero against baselines across challenging mental reasoning and AI assistance tasks in gridworld and household domains. We found that LLMs alone are insufficient; model-based methods improve accuracy but are slow, costly, and limited by backbone MLLM capacity. In contrast, MindZero enhances MLLMs' intrinsic ToM ability and significantly outperforms model-based methods in both accuracy and efficiency, showing that mental reasoning can be effectively learned as a self-supervised skill.

The ability to reason, adapt, and creatively solve problems under unexpected challenges is essential for robots operating in real-world environments. However, current robotic benchmarks primarily emphasize skill-level execution and provide limited insight into such cognitive reasoning capabilities. We introduce RoboWits, a bi-manual robotic benchmark designed to systematically evaluate cognitive reasoning, creative tool use, and robustness to unexpected conditions. To enable scalable construction of high-quality reasoning-centric unexpected scenarios, we propose an automated task generation pipeline formulated as a multi-agent cooperative framework, comprising agents for seed task generation and verification, metric generation, scene generation, and task mutation. Using the pipeline, we curated 30 diverse seed tasks and 208 tasks with mutations and graded difficulty across geometry, material, and assembly-based reasoning. We benchmark popular robot policies, pre-trained VLAs, and oracle-state planners. Our results reveal a significant performance gap: while pre-trained VLAs exhibit preliminary success on seed tasks after single-task fine-tuning, they struggle to perform on mutated tasks, implying their brittleness in manipulation tasks requiring reasoning, strategy adaptation, and robustness to deceptive or constrained environments. Project page is available at https://umass-embodied-agi.github.io/RoboWits.

Understanding what a user believes and intends is central to building effective agent assistants. This ability is often evaluated through Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks, where success requires reasoning from the user's perspective. However, many existing approaches address ToM with complex pipelines that model behavior indirectly, without explicitly reconstructing the user's mental state. This misses the core structure of the problem: users act based on their beliefs, which are updated through observations of the environment; beliefs and intentions jointly determine actions, which in turn change the environment; and social reasoning often requires nested beliefs about what others believe or intend. We propose UserHarness, a simple framework that reframes ToM reasoning as explicit user-mind reconstruction. UserHarness decomposes the user's mental state, its relation to the external environment, and the actions that follow from it, enabling agents to track what the user observes, believes, intends, and does. Across five benchmarks, UserHarness reaches up to 95.94% macro accuracy, improving over existing inference methods by more than 15% relative and over the strongest prompt-only harness by about 20% relative. These results suggest that robust user understanding requires reasoning from the roots of the user's mind, positioning user harnessing as a promising foundation for more adaptive future assistants.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' knowledge, intentions, and emotions, is commonly evaluated in large language models (LLMs) using end-point question answering, where performance is judged solely by the final answer to a social reasoning query. This paradigm obscures whether the model actually constructs the underlying mental-state representations required for robust reasoning, particularly in scenarios involving divergent, evolving, or mistaken beliefs. In order to address this research gap, we introduce OmniToM, a benchmark that directly evaluates these representations by requiring explicit modeling of belief structures for all relevant actors within a narrative. These structures are composed of belief propositions: minimal statements of what an actor takes to be true about the world or another actor's mental state, allowing knowledge, intentions, emotions, and false beliefs to be analyzed in a common format. Models are evaluated in two stages: Stage 1: Belief Extraction, which extracts from the story the beliefs relevant to its social dynamics, and Stage 2: Belief Labeling, which assigns each belief a seven-dimensional schema label covering recursive order, truth status, knowledge access, explicitness, content type, mental source, and context. Built from 895 stories from the existing ToMBench story corpus and augmented with 22,343 labeled belief propositions, OmniToM uses a human-calibrated LLM-assisted annotation pipeline. Across diverse models in zero-shot evaluation, OmniToM reveals an actor-specific belief-tracking bottleneck: current LLMs struggle with the knowledge-access and representational decisions required to transform narrative facts into actors' beliefs and shared mental states.

Monitoring autonomous large language model (LLM) agents for covert malicious behavior is challenging due to delayed, context-dependent, and long-horizon attack patterns. Agents may pursue hidden objectives while maintaining superficially benign behavior, making detection difficult even with full trajectory access. Prior monitoring approaches improve scaffolding or ensemble aggregation, but treat each trajectory independently and do not learn from prior monitoring experience. Moreover, standard reasoning methods explain observed behavior without explicitly reasoning about agent beliefs, intentions, and goal alignment required to distinguish benign task execution from covert deviation. We propose \textbf{Agent-ToM}, a learning-to-monitor framework grounded in Theory-of-Mind (ToM) reasoning for security analysis of autonomous agents. Agent-ToM performs structured full-trajectory analysis by inferring beliefs, intent hypotheses with calibrated confidence, expected actions, and deviations from task-consistent behavioral baselines. At inference time, it employs a \textit{Reason-Verify-Refine} pipeline to construct and validate monitoring decisions. At training time, Agent-ToM distills critique signals into a persistent \textit{semantic guardrail memory}, enabling reusable belief- and intent-conditioned constraints across episodes. We evaluate Agent-ToM on adversarial agent monitoring benchmarks (SHADE-Arena and CUA-SHADE-Arena). Agent-ToM achieves strong precision-recall balance and outperforms state-of-the-art monitoring baselines, including ensemble methods, while using a coherent two-call reasoning pipeline. These results demonstrate that learning at the monitoring layer, combined with structured ToM reasoning and verification, provides an effective and deployable foundation for securing autonomous LLM agents.

Persuasive dialogue requires reasoning about others' latent mental states, a capability known as Theory of Mind (ToM). However, due to reliance on simple prompting strategies and insufficient ToM knowledge, existing LLMs often fail to capture the intrinsic dependencies among mental states, leading to fragmented representations and unstable reasoning. To address these challenges, we introduce the ToM-based Persuasive Dialogue (ToM-PD) task, grounded in the Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) framework, which explicitly models the sequential dependencies among mental states in multi-turn dialogues. To facilitate research on this task, we construct a large-scale annotated dataset, ToM-based Broad Persuasive Dialogues (ToM-BPD), capturing fine-grained mental states and corresponding persuasive strategies. We further propose Think Thrice Before You Speak (TTBYS), a knowledge-enhanced stepwise reasoning framework that leverages both explicit and implicit prior experiences to improve LLMs' inference of desires, beliefs, and persuasive strategies. Experimental results demonstrate that Qwen3-8B equipped with TTBYS outperforms GPT-5 by 1.20%, 22.80%, and 16.97% in predicting desires, beliefs, and persuasive strategies, respectively. Case studies further show that our approach enhances interpretability and consistency in reasoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) perform well on many language tasks, but their Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning is still uneven in complex social settings. Existing benchmarks, including ExploreToM, do not always test the recursive beliefs and information asymmetries that make these settings difficult. This paper presents OSCToM (Observer-Self Conflict Theory of Mind), an approach for modeling nested belief conflicts in LLM-based ToM tasks. The key case is one in which an observer's view of another agent conflicts with the observer's own belief state. Such cases go beyond simple perspective-taking and require recursive, multi-layered reasoning. OSCToM combines reinforcement learning (RL), an extended domain-specific language, and compositional surrogate models to generate observer-self conflicts. In our experiments, OSCToM-8B gives the best overall result among the systems tested. It improves on the reported ExploreToM results on FANToM and remains competitive on Hi-ToM and BigToM. On the information-asymmetric FANToM benchmark, OSCToM reaches 76% accuracy, compared with the 0.2% reported by ExploreToM. The data-synthesis procedure is also 6x more efficient, indicating that targeted training data can help smaller models handle advanced cognitive reasoning. The project code is available at https://github.com/sharminsrishty/osct.

Discrepancies between an agent's actual knowledge and what a person thinks the agent knows can hinder interactions. If an agent could detect such discrepancies, it could provide feedback to account for them and improve current and future interactions. Using the I-POMDP as a framework for a second-order Theory of Mind (ToM-2), this work endows an agent with the ability to model the evolution of a person's erroneous beliefs about an agent and the cognitive biases and heuristics (CBH) from which they arise. In doing so, the agent can detect when CBH might be at play during an interaction and adaptively generate feedback that accounts for them. An in-person user study shows how a ToM-2 learner can account for the effects of a teacher's CBH to significantly improve the informativeness of teacher actions, and subjective results suggest people find the ToM-2 learner's feedback more useful.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to track others epistemic state, makes humans efficient collaborators. AI agents need the same capacity in multi agent settings, yet existing benchmarks mostly test literal ToM by asking direct belief questions. The ability act optimally on implicit beliefs in embodied environments, called functional ToM, remains largely untested. We introduce EnactToM, an evolving benchmark of 300 embodied multi-agent tasks set in a 3D household with partial observability, private information, and constrained communication. Each task is formally verified for solvability and required epistemic depth, and new tasks are generated increase difficulty as models improve. On the hard split, all seven evaluated frontier models score 0.0% Pass^3 on functional task completion, while averaging 45.0% on literal belief probes. Manual analysis traces 93% of sampled failures to epistemic coordination breakdowns such as withheld information, ignored partner constraints, and misallocated messages, providing a concrete target for future work.

Understanding human mental states from natural behavior is crucial for intelligent systems in the real world. However, most current research focuses on predicting isolated mental state labels, lacking structured annotations of complex interpersonal interactions. To support structured analysis, we introduce MOTOR-Bench, a carefully-designed benchmark with a real-world dataset MOTOR-dataset, containing 1,440 multimodal video clips in collaborative learning scenarios, reflecting key real-world data challenges including natural class imbalance, visual noise, and domain-specific language. Each sample is labeled by educational experts based on self-regulated learning theory. We further evaluate several state-of-the-art multimodal large language models and multi-agent systems in a zero-shot setting on our MOTOR-Bench. However, their performance on this task remains limited, suggesting that existing methods still struggle with structured reasoning from observable behavior to deeper mental states. To address this challenge, we propose a reasoning multi-agent framework, named MOTOR-MAS. It coordinates multiple agents through a structured agent coordination mechanism to infer explicit behaviors, internal cognitions, and psychological emotions. Experimental results show that our MOTOR-MAS outperforms the best single-model benchmark by 15.93 points in Macro-F1 scores for the three labels of behavior, cognition, and emotion, and outperforms the general multi-agent benchmark by 10.2 points in internal cognition prediction.

What does it mean to understand the world? Contemporary world models often operationalize understanding as accurate future prediction in latent or observation space. Developmental cognitive science, however, suggests a different view: human understanding emerges through the construction of internal theories of how the world works, even before mature language is acquired. Inspired by this theory-building view of cognition, we introduce Learning-to-Theorize, a learning paradigm for inferring explicit explanatory theories of the world from raw, non-textual observations. We instantiate this paradigm with the Neural Theorizer (NEO), a World Theory Model, that induces latent programs as a learned Language of Thought and executes them through a shared transition model. In NEO, a theory is represented as an executable, compositional program whose learned primitives can be systematically recombined to explain novel phenomena. Experiments show that this formulation enables explanation-driven generalization, allowing observations to be understood in terms of the programs that generate them.

Humans typically use natural language to update teammates on task states. Since not all updates are communicated, discrepancies arise between the team members' mental models that negatively affect overall team performance. How can we categorize such discrepancies? Do misalignments detected in team dialogue predict future mental model misalignments? Traditional shared mental model (SMM) assessment methods rely on retrospective expert coding that cannot capture real-time coordination dynamics. We propose a framework to identify and categorize four types of mental model discrepancies: unsupported beliefs, false beliefs, belief contradictions, and omissions, all of which can naturally emerge in team dialogues. Using dialogues from twenty dyad teams performing collaborative object identification tasks across four sequential levels, we demonstrate that these discrepancy patterns contain predictive signals. Averaging historical discrepancy counts achieves meaningful prediction accuracy using uniform weighting as an exploratory baseline, with differential predictability across discrepancy types.

Despite remarkable advances, today's AI systems remain narrow in scope, falling short of the flexible, adaptive, and multisensory intelligence that characterizes human capabilities. This gap has fueled longstanding debates about whether AI might one day achieve human-like generality or even consciousness, and whether theories of consciousness can inspire new architectures for AI. This paper presents an early blueprint for implementing a general AI system, CTM-AI, combining the Conscious Turing Machine (CTM), a formal machine model of consciousness, with today's foundation models. CTM-AI contains an enormous number of powerful processors ranging from specialized experts (e.g., vision-language models and APIs) to unspecialized general-purpose learners poised to develop their own expertise. Crucially, for whatever problem must be dealt with, information from many processors is selected, integrated, and exchanged appropriately to solve the task. CTM-AI achieves state-of-the-art accuracy on MUStARD (72.28) and UR-FUNNY (72.13), outperforming multimodal and multi-agent frameworks. On tool-using and agentic tasks, CTM-AI achieves 10+ points of improvement on StableToolBench and WebArena-Lite. Overall, CTM-AI offers a principled, testable blueprint for general AI inspired by a model of consciousness.

Improving the Theory of Mind (ToM) capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for effective social interactions between these AI models and humans. However, the existing benchmarks often measure ToM capability improvement through story-reading, multiple-choice questions from a third-person perspective, while ignoring the first-person, dynamic, and open-ended nature of human-AI (HAI) interactions. To directly examine how ToM improvement techniques benefit HAI interactions, we first proposed the new paradigm of interactive ToM evaluation with both perspective and metric shifts. Next, following the paradigm, we conducted a systematic study of four representative ToM enhancement techniques using both four real-world datasets and a user study, covering both goal-oriented tasks (e.g., coding, math) and experience-oriented tasks (e.g., counseling). Our findings reveal that improvements on static benchmarks do not always translate to better performance in dynamic HAI interactions. This paper offers critical insights into ToM evaluation, showing the necessity of interaction-based assessments in developing next-generation, socially aware LLMs for HAI symbiosis.

We introduce DialToM, an annotated Theory of Mind (ToM) benchmark built from naturalistic human-human dialogues using a multiple-choice evaluation framework. Concurrent with recent work showing a gap between explicit mental-state inference and applied ToM in synthetic settings~\cite{gu2024simpletom}, we establish a stricter \emph{State-Driven Diagnostic Probe} in which models must forecast state-consistent dialogue trajectories solely from isolated mental-state profiles without dialogue context. Our evaluation reveals a systematic reasoning asymmetry -- LLMs excel at inferring mental states (Literal ToM) but struggle to leverage them for social forecasting (Functional ToM). Crucially, a domain expert achieves 100% accuracy on this task, proving its validity and establishing a stark human-AI capability gap. Further, a teacher-student reasoning injection probe shows that Gemini 3 Pro -- which establishes the leading baseline -- possesses robust Functional ToM capabilities for context-free forecasting that are transferable to weaker models. DialToM, its evaluation code, and dataset are publicly available at https://github.com/Stealth-py/DialToM.

Large language models (LLMs) perform substantially below human level on existing theory-of-mind (ToM) benchmarks, even when augmented with chain-of-thought prompting or probabilistic belief updates. We argue that these failures primarily arise from unreliable implicit state tracking rather than limitations in high-level reasoning. We introduce PDDL-Mind, a neuro-symbolic framework that decouples environment state evolution from belief inference. By translating narrative descriptions into explicit states and actions expressed in Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL), and by verifying action-induced state transitions against a predefined domain, PDDL-Mind provides LLMs with a logically consistent and explicit representation of world states for ToM tasks. Experiments on MMToM-QA, MuMA and FanToM show that PDDL-Mind achieves over 5% absolute accuracy gain over the best existing state-of-the-art method on ToM benchmark questions.

While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) excel at single-image understanding, they exhibit significantly degraded performance in multi-image reasoning scenarios. Multi-image reasoning presents fundamental challenges including complex inter-relationships between images and scattered critical information across image sets. Inspired by human cognitive processes, we propose a Cognition-Inspired Meta-Action Framework (CINEMA), which decomposes multi-image reasoning into five structured meta-actions: Global, Focus, Hint, Think, and Answer, explicitly modeling the sequential cognitive steps humans naturally employ. For cold-start training, we introduce a Retrieval-Based Tree Sampling strategy that generates high-quality meta-action trajectories to bootstrap the model with reasoning patterns. During reinforcement learning, we adopt a two-stage paradigm: an exploration phase with Diversity-Preserving Strategy to avoid entropy collapse, followed by an annealed exploitation phase with DAPO to gradually strengthen exploitation. To train our model, we construct a dataset of 56k cold-start and 58k reinforcement learning instances spanning multi-image, multi-frame, and single-image tasks. We conduct extensive evaluations on multi-image reasoning benchmarks, video understanding benchmarks, and single-image benchmarks, achieving competitive state-of-the-art performance on several key benchmarks. Our model surpasses GPT-4o on the MUIR and MVMath benchmarks and notably outperforms specialized video reasoning models on video understanding benchmarks, demonstrating the effectiveness and generalizability of our human cognition-inspired reasoning framework.

This paper presents a hybrid insider threat detection framework for enterprise environments, integrating multi-agent simulation, layered SIEM correlation, trust-adaptive thresholds, behavioral and communication forensics, and Theory-of-Mind reasoning. Email is treated not as a control channel but as a coordination and social-engineering evidence stream correlated with authentication, file-access, and privilege events. Four variants are evaluated: Layered SIEM-Core (LSC), Cognitive-Enriched SIEM (CE-SIEM), Evidence-Gated SIEM (EG-SIEM), and EG-SIEM-Enron with Enron-calibrated email forensics. Across ten matched runs with eight malicious insiders, actor-level F1 improves from 0.567 for LSC to 0.774 for CE-SIEM, 0.898 for EG-SIEM, and 0.944 for EG-SIEM-Enron; paired Wilcoxon tests confirm the first three differences after Holm-Bonferroni correction. Evidence gating reduces confirmed false positives from 33.7 per run under LSC and 49.3 under CE-SIEM to 0.2 and 0.0 respectively, a precision gain traded against longer confirmation time. Domain-shift evaluation shows that an Enron-trained email classifier does not transfer to a different operational email domain, although target-domain fine-tuning reaches F1 = 0.974 under grouped template-family evaluation. On CERT r4.2, the evidence-gated logic improves actor-level detection while reducing false positives, outperforming tabular anomaly detectors and a sentence-embedding baseline. Scalability tests to 1000 agents indicate stable detection quality.

Building on the third-wave Extended Mind (EM) theory and radical enactivism, this article suggests an alternative to representation-based models of the mind. We build on the ABC framework in which translation is not understood as the manipulation of static interlingual correspondences but an enacted activity, dynamically integrating affective-evaluative, behavioral-enacting, and cognitive-inferential (ABC) processes. Drawing on affordance theory, we argue that the translating mind is the dynamically organized process through which the translator and its environment constitute and transform a landscape of enlanguaged translation affordances for action, that emerges through loops of brain-body-environment interactions. This non-representational account reframes translation as skillful participation in sociocultural practice, where meaning is co-created in real time through embodied interaction with texts, tools, and contexts.

Multimodal large-scale models have significantly advanced the development of web agents, enabling perception and interaction with digital environments akin to human cognition. In this paper, we argue that web agents must first acquire sufficient knowledge to effectively engage in cognitive reasoning. Therefore, we decompose a web agent's capabilities into two essential stages: knowledge content learning and cognitive processes. To formalize this, we propose Web-CogKnowledge Framework, categorizing knowledge as Factual, Conceptual, and Procedural. In this framework, knowledge content learning corresponds to the agent's processes of Memorizing and Understanding, which rely on the first two knowledge types, representing the "what" of learning. Conversely, cognitive processes correspond to Exploring, grounded in Procedural knowledge, defining the "how" of reasoning and action. To facilitate knowledge acquisition, we construct the Web-CogDataset, a structured resource curated from 14 real-world websites, designed to systematically instill core knowledge necessary for web agent. This dataset serves as the agent's conceptual grounding-the "nouns" upon which comprehension is built-as well as the basis for learning how to reason and act. Building on this foundation, we operationalize these processes through a novel knowledge-driven Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning framework, developing and training our proposed agent, the Web-CogReasoner. Extensive experimentation reveals its significant superiority over existing models, especially in generalizing to unseen tasks where structured knowledge is decisive. To enable rigorous evaluation, we introduce the Web-CogBench, a comprehensive evaluation suite designed to assess and compare agent performance across the delineated knowledge domains and cognitive capabilities. Our code and data is open sourced at https://github.com/Gnonymous/Web-CogReasoner