Strategic Agents

Long-running AI agents create a control problem: each action they take changes the state, which in turn affects the trajectory of future actions. If the agent is not fully aligned, then guaranteeing safety requires approving consequential actions before allowing them to be executed. But requiring human approval at every step makes attention a bottleneck. Delegating review to other AI agents raises the same alignment problem: the reviewers may themselves be misaligned. We identify a condition on a reviewing panel that is weaker than individual alignment yet necessary and sufficient for a guarantee that the principal fares at least as well in expectation as under a designated baseline policy. Each reviewer agent reports whether an action proposal made by a proposer agent improves its own utility relative to the baseline. We show that a threshold rule tolerating $k$ disapprovals is safe exactly when, after any $k$ reviewers are removed, the principal's utility can be written as a nonnegative combination of the remaining reviewers' utilities, plus a term that is nonnegative on every feasible proposal. We call this property $k$-robust coalitional alignment. The characterization lifts to sequential control: in a discounted MDP with an arbitrary proposer agent, safety at every state is both necessary and sufficient for the induced policy to match or improve on the baseline. When reviewers vote strategically, full-panel coverage in reward-function space guarantees that every Nash equilibrium is safe under the unanimous approval rule; in contrast, more permissive thresholds can admit unsafe equilibria even when reviewers are individually aligned. Experiments with existing reviewer models show that collective review can remain sound without an aligned individual, even when some disapprovals are tolerated.

The Core is a unique competitive co-evolution algorithm that allows agents to evolve autonomous control without utilizing a traditional fitness function. The agents evolve via local interactions through tournament selection, crossover, and mutation, producing offspring by evolving better controllers. Previous works have shown The Core's ability to evolve agents capable of combat and navigation in the Xpilot video game. This research expands upon that premise by niching agents to specific subsets of the original environment The Core was tested in. Our results demonstrate the niched agents capacity for success over agents niched to the entire system and agents niched to different sub-environments.

Informational active matter shows how measurement-informed decisions produce collective order, so far in systems that reach consensus. We design collective information engines structured by differentiation instead, and construct a minimal instance using anti-coordination games where differentiated role information has value. Within many coexisting games, agents infer their role from a noisy social signal grounded in a persistent identity, and role-following action feeds back into that signal, which shapes the incentive to follow roles. Resources accrued through coordinated role-play combine with identity variability to reinforce the schemas that generated them. The model thereby operationalizes Sewell's duality of schemas and resources in Structuration, a resolution to structure--agency debates across social science. The engine ignites when a social loop gain---the product of identity persistence, cognitive capacity, channel fidelity, and schema strength---exceeds one. For a repertoire of such schemas, roles emerge with increasing gain in a bifurcation cascade whose functional form is fixed by the repertoire's eigenvalue spectrum, ranging from monitorable logarithmic sequences to avalanches that arrive without warning. Resource accumulation supplies the fitness of a replicator dynamics on schema strengths, which selects the cascade type endogenously. Subcritical identity covariance reveals that type before onset, enabling early detection, while feedback channel parameters bias which type is selected. Platform design then becomes a control lever to throttle emergent coordination. This theory grounds distributional AGI takeoff in a mechanism and provides a monitor-based solution. Joining game theory, collective dynamics, and information engines, we open a route to an information thermodynamics of agent populations.

This paper addresses safety-critical coordination for scalar agents whose distributed commands are implemented through constrained physical-input dynamics. Agents communicate over a fixed weighted digraph with a directed spanning tree, while their outputs must remain inside a common moving safety corridor and their realized inputs must satisfy heterogeneous asymmetric bounds. We propose a networked Admissibility-Preserving Control (APC) architecture in which an Admissibility-Preserving Input Realization (APIR) governs physical inputs and a logarithmic barrier coordinate represents the safety corridor. The synthesis yields an exact cascade in which exponentially decaying realization errors drive nonsymmetric consensus dynamics. For every compatible compact initial set, the closed-loop system admits a unique complete solution, renders the moving corridor and actuator intervals forward invariant with uniform margins, keeps commands bounded, and achieves exponential consensus. We derive direction-specific sufficient conditions under which positive and negative control demands remain within their corresponding actuator limits. The analysis yields a closed-form barrier-coordinate limit determined by the left Perron vector and initial APIR mismatch. Under strong connectivity and the stated gain and compatibility conditions, partial pinning propagates a constant barrier reference from a nonempty informed subset and assigns the induced safety corridor trajectory. A non-weight-balanced example illustrates the directional certificate and predicted collective motion.

Large language models act as strategic agents and models of human choice, yet choosing like a strategic agent does not mean computing like one. We recorded activations from four open-weight models --- dense and mixture-of-experts, including a matched base--instruct pair --- in one-shot play of 144 strict ordinal $2\times2$ games. We followed a prespecified incentive from prompt, through activations, to choice. Dense models mirrored the unadjusted human decline with game complexity. Incentive and choice were detectable in every model, but models differed in whether incentive reached the choice, aligned with it and, where tested, whether strengthening it shifted preference. The base and instruction-tuned Qwen2.5 models chose almost identically at baseline yet differed in whether incentive reached choice. Fixed decision cues were distinguishable internally but changed choices selectively. Similar behaviour can rest on different computation; post-training can reshape the path from represented incentive to decision while leaving behaviour and decodable information largely intact.

We develop a framework for mechanism design with AI agents whose alignment (preferences) and capabilities (feasible actions and information) are unknown. We want such agents to act on our behalf so mechanisms must incentivize both honesty and obedience. A one-sided imitation structure---capabilities can be concealed but not counterfeited---yields a revelation principle, a characterization of implementable policies via nested cyclical monotonicity, and conditions under which eliciting higher-order beliefs can discipline multiple agents. We apply our framework to stylized examples of (i) sandbagging in which a more capable agent pretends to be less capable; (ii) an alignment--interpretability trade-off, where the two are substitutes in the instrument but complements in value; (iii) discipline via peer scoring; (iv) coupling rewards to induce competition among multiple agents; and (v) scalable oversight and reward shaping.

In a multi-agent system, there are often stubborn followers of specific opinions or beliefs. Motivated by this observation, in this paper, we aim to understand how stubborn agents affect the distribution of opinions in a network where both stubborn and non-stubborn agents interact with each other. To do so, we assume that all agents have an opinion in the set $\{0,1\}$ and each non-stubborn agent updates its opinion according to the $2k$\textit{-choices rule}, where the agent samples $2k$ neighbours (including both stubborn and non-stubborn neighbours) uniformly at random and adopts the majority opinion among the sampled group of neighbours and itself. We assume that a proportion of agents, $γ_i$, are stubborn followers of opinion $i\in \{0,1\}$. It is natural to expect that the steady-state distribution of the opinions in the network will be dominated by the opinion with the larger proportion of stubborn followers. We show that while this is true, the time to reach steady-state depends heavily on the values of the parameters $γ_0$ and $γ_1$. When the individual values of these parameters, as well as their difference, are small, it can take an exponentially long time (in the network size) to reach the steady-state. In sharp contrast, when at least one of the parameters $γ_0$ and $γ_1$ is large, the network reaches the steady-state in a time that is only logarithmic in the network size. Hence, there exists a sharp phase transition in the network dynamics based on the proportions of stubborn agents. We also characterise the behaviour of the system when the parameters $γ_0$ and $γ_1$ lie on the boundary of the phase transition. In this boundary region, we show using Stein's method that the dynamics are driven by a diffusion process which takes polynomial time to mix.

Failure attribution in LLM-based multi-agent systems (MAS) aims to answer who caused failures, when they occurred, and why by identifying responsible targets including faulty agents, erroneous steps, and failure modes. Existing methods have primarily focused on developing dedicated models for specific attribution targets, with limited attention to the evidential dependencies among them. Despite these attribution targets are different, they rely on common diagnostic evidence from MAS trajectories, including task constraints, agent roles, behavioral histories and inter-agent interactions. This commonality motivates us to develop a unified representation model that aggregates the trajectory evidence into individual agent and step representations, which can subsequently be adapted to different attribution targets. Accordingly, we propose ASCon, a direction-aware reciprocal \textbf{A}gent--\textbf{S}tep \textbf{Con}textualization model for multiple failure attribution targets. ASCon introduces direction-aware graph attention to model execution context, masked step-to-agent attention to construct behavior-aware agent representations, and agent-conditioned step contextualization to incorporate agent context back into step representations. The resulting contextualized representations enable different attribution targets through lightweight target-specific heads. Experiments show that ASCon can improve faulty-agent detection by 5.83%+ in micro-accuracy, faulty-step detection by 10.63%+ in micro-accuracy, and failure-mode detection by 14.73%+ in Macro-F1. Meanwhile, it can also substantially enhance the LLM-based methods' attribution capabilities in out-of-domain scenarios.

Empirical work on algorithmic collusion asks one question of the data: are prices supracompetitive? We show this can be answered "no" by a conspiracy that is nonetheless profitable. Consider bidding agents that couple only through the joint distribution of their unexplained bid components, leaving every agent's own bid law exactly at the competitive law. Any test whose input is a single agent's price or bid history then has power exactly equal to its false-positive rate, for every coupling strength up to comonotonicity. The published detection methodology is therefore blind to this conduct by construction rather than underpowered, and no sample size repairs it. Three empirical results follow. First, the mechanism appears in real language-model agents: twenty models from nineteen independent developers, three deployment prompts each, show residual correlation of $+0.053$ between two deployments of one model against $+0.0001$ across models, with a 95% interval clustered by developer of $[0.030, 0.078]$, under an auditor that sees every order feature and is fitted out of sample. Second, the coupling falls monotonically as sampling temperature rises ($p=0.002$), turning a deployment parameter into a candidate mitigation. Third, on 24 days of Ethereum block-building auction data covering 77,684 bids from 39 bidders, the honest population of bidder pairs is itself so dependent that a screen held at a 5% false-positive rate must sit above a floor of $+0.50$ to $+0.81$, which is 20 to 32 times the family-wise sampling threshold and does not fall as the audit window grows. Since lawful multi-identity operation and conspiracy are behaviourally indistinguishable here, the tractable regulatory target is not detection but counting: resolving 40 bidding identities into 23 operators raises the Herfindahl index by 247.5%, and adding behavioural clusters from public bid streams reaches 324.5%.

Modern autonomous vehicles largely operate as isolated agents: they rely on on-board perception and decision modules and broadcast Basic Safety Messages (BSMs) that expose only low-level kinematic state. While existing cooperative driving frameworks enable limited sensor sharing, they rarely communicate high-level maneuver intentions, and edge computing is primarily used for content delivery rather than decision arbitration. As a result, current connected autonomy lacks a principled mechanism for making globally consistent, intent-aware coordination decisions across vehicles. To address this gap, we propose MIND-CAVs, a Multi-Intelligence Negotiation and Decision framework for connected autonomous vehicles (CAVs) based on intent-driven autonomy. Each vehicle abstracts raw sensor observations into structured intent representations, exchanges them over V2X links, and receives globally consistent coordination plans from roadside edge servers. Edge agents combine learned and rule-based arbitration mechanisms to negotiate conflicting intents among vehicles, while a cloud platform records decisions for auditing and continual retraining. We implement MIND-CAVs in a CARLA-based AI-in-the-loop platform and evaluate it in multi-lane highway scenarios involving conflicting maneuvers and route-constrained exits. Experimental results show improved maneuver completion time and reduced unsafe proximity and unnecessary braking compared with isolated autonomy, first-come-first-served arbitration, and multi-agent reinforcement learning baselines.

What happens to an LLM agent's tool choice when the reliable tool silently changes within an ongoing session? We borrow set-shifting from cognitive psychology to study how well agents adapt to hidden reliability shifts. Our benchmark mounts tool-skill libraries with redundancies, where many tools solve the same task but differ in hidden reliability. In our evaluation framework, a branched schedule shifts the reliable tool group at hidden boundaries and pairs every shift with a no-shift control. We find that agents, by default, settle on a small recurring routine within a few turns of each boundary, with call shares concentrating on a few discrete values after each reliability shift. We score the set-shifting accuracy for each agent trajectory: the joint probability of routing to the target tool group in every post-shift window. We test open-weight LLMs in an open-source agentic harness and find qualitatively distinct failure modes across the same set of routines. We also find that set framing, how the toolset presents the alternatives as competing or complementary, shifts the routing dynamics.

In long-horizon tasks, decision-relevant state is often scattered across an expanding trajectory, while the action agent must surface it and act. As trajectories grow, task requirements, environment facts, prior attempts, diagnoses, and open subgoals can be buried in the context window or pushed beyond it, failing to influence decisions when needed. We call this failure mode "behavioral state decay". We study memory as an active intervention mechanism rather than passive retrieval. A separate memory agent runs alongside an unmodified action agent, updating a structured memory bank from the recent trajectory and deciding whether to inject a memory-grounded reminder or remain silent. The module is plug-and-play with frontier action agents and existing agent harnesses. Across Terminal-Bench 2.0 and $τ^2$-Bench, it improves pass@1 for both weaker and stronger action agents, with gains of +8.3 pp on Terminal-Bench and +6.8 pp on $τ^2$-Bench. Ablations show that selective intervention outperforms passive bank exposure, always-on injection, advisor-only guidance, and general retrieval. As an early step toward open-weight memory policies, we train Qwen3.5-27B on SETA using SFT and GRPO, improving validation reward and achieving partial transfer to Terminal-Bench.

We present a multi-agent system for studying the allocation of discrete, congested resources among heterogeneous strategic agents, motivated by the problem of railway slot allocation under deregulation. Multiple operator-agents, differing in size and capacity, interact through a shared auction mechanism over repeated rounds under time-constrained decision-making. The mechanism combines a congestion-based base price that increases with aggregate demand with an asymmetric corrective adjustment that penalises the agent requesting the most slots and rewards the agent requesting the fewest, and is designed to mitigate strategic dominance by large agents while preserving transparency and congestion sensitivity. We formulate the interaction as a repeated game with incomplete information and implement the system as a real-time, web-based multi-agent environment in which human participants control individual agents and observe live marginal-cost and competitor feedback. We report exploratory observations from two structured sessions with domain experts acting as operator-agents. The congestion mechanism responds to aggregate demand as designed and the corrective incentives are actively triggered, but agents representing large operators persist with high-request strategies despite the penalty, suggesting that corrective pricing is necessary but not sufficient to neutralise strategic dominance in this multi-agent setting. A post-session debrief indicates that participants' decisions were driven by the assumed agent role rather than personal disposition, and provides qualitative support for strategic motives, such as preserving market presence and raising rivals' costs, operating alongside short-term profit maximisation. We discuss implications for multi-agent mechanism design under asymmetric budgets and outline directions for analytical validation and larger-scale multi-agent experiments.

Autonomous vehicles must safely navigate complex environments where planning-critical agents may be hidden from view. Current approaches often treat all occlusions with uniform conservatism, yielding needlessly defensive driving, or they infer hidden spaces without estimating the impact on the planner. This work bridges the critical gap between perception and planning by enabling Vision-Language Models (VLMs) to identify and reason about the specific hidden agents that are most critical to the ego-vehicle's trajectory. We introduce a novel framework that uses Planning KL-divergence (PKL), an information-theoretic metric, to systematically identify and rank occluded agents based on their impact on the ego vehicle's plan. Using this planning-aware ranking, we employ an expert VLM (GPT-5) to generate rich, structured annotations that capture the visual evidence and reasoning required for this task. We apply this framework to the nuScenes dataset to create a new benchmark focused on high-impact scenarios. We conduct comprehensive experiments on a wide range of general-purpose and domain-adapted VLMs, demonstrating that fine-tuning on our PKL-guided data yields dramatic performance improvements across all models. Notably, our results show that smaller, fine-tuned models significantly outperform their much larger zero-shot counterparts, and that our PKL-guided data selection strategy improves performance by approximately 30% over random sampling. Our work presents the first systematic approach for training VLMs to focus on planning-critical occlusions, enabling more semantically grounded and efficient risk assessment in autonomous driving.

A mesh of sovereign agents has no center: no shared clock, no shared model, and no coordinator to gather data or retrain. Its competence rests on each agent folding the projections its peers emit into a single internal state, online, from observations that arrive at irregular, unscheduled times, on a substrate whose weights it cannot retrain. Any one of these constraints is tractable on its own; folding optimally under all three at once is not. We ask what such a substrate must be, and prove two necessary conditions from one model of a self-evolving latent observed at irregular, exogenous times. Because the latent changes, its optimal estimator is time-varying: an adaptive timescale is necessary, and every fixed-gain filter is strictly suboptimal. And because arrivals are clock-free, the optimal estimate depends on the elapsed gap between them, which no gap-blind network recovers at any width or depth. This second condition is capacity-independent: scale cannot substitute for the missing dependence. The two conditions intersect in the continuous-time liquid class. An LSTM satisfies the first, a fixed continuous-time filter the second, and a multi-timescale liquid network both. Synthetic experiments confirm each: the network attains the timescale, and the separation is computed exactly. The characterization is necessary, not sufficient, and binds fixed-weight substrates: a network free to retrain reaches the class by other means. Proved per agent, the necessity binds every agent of a mesh, a structural condition on mesh intelligence.

Mean field games efficiently approximate a very large population of strategic agents. While these games can aid the understanding of complex systems, their deployment in real-world settings is challenged by the specification of their parameters: mean field games (MFGs) often involve hidden preferences, constraints, and interactions that can rarely be theoretically derived or directly observed. To address this gap, we present a neural network-based framework for learning parametric, finite-state MFGs from observed population dynamics. To do so, we formulate the parameter calibration as an inverse problem and use implicit differentiation to backpropagate through the games' equilibrium. The resulting approach is fully differentiable and enables us to estimate flexible trajectory-wise parameter paths, including state- and time-dependent specifications without requiring observations of the individual agents' actions or rewards. We provide a proof for the exactness of the gradient computation in a discrete-time formulation. We validate our framework through numerical experiments across four systems of increasing complexity, ranging from synthetic linear-quadratic benchmarks to real-world urban mobility datasets.

We present a formal model of mesh inference: how a population of independent agents, each holding private state and exchanging only admitted, typed observations, derives a conclusion none of them holds alone, with no central coordinator and no agent exposed. No agent shares weights, gradients, or hidden state, and the agents may span different teams, networks, and organizations. Motivated by the observation that asking a model is energy-minimizing inference, we model the mesh as a coupled free energy that each agent relaxes locally. We show that a single admission/emission policy governs three properties. First, mesh inference converges to a unique answer for any admission, symmetric or not, because the coupling is always an M-matrix. Second, it is identification-complete: it derives the centralized optimum exactly when the contributing views are carrier-connected. Third, it is observation-only: no node transmits its internals, and confidentiality is the dual of identification. Content-addressed lineage is the only global side-channel. In the linear-Gaussian regime every derived answer is determined, hence equal to the centralized optimum, at O(diam^2) latency, the measured price of removing the center. One such derivation is one turn of a center-free learning loop, which we formalize as architecture rather than prove. The open problem we state is when asking improves the collective rather than corrupting it: whether the non-linear closure derives an upgraded answer or a confident error. To our knowledge, this is the first formal characterization of when a center-free, observation-only mesh recovers the centralized optimum.

This paper develops a formal account of what generalist agents must store in memory in order to act near-optimally across multiple environments and goals. It shows that when two domains share an observational bottleneck but require incompatible optimal actions, any uniformly near-optimal policy must induce distinct memory distributions at that bottleneck. The result yields a separation theorem: sufficiently successful agents cannot rely only on current state observations, but must preserve domain-relevant information in memory. The paper further shows that if an agent's memory contains enough information to estimate values for related goals, then that memory can be used to approximately reconstruct the agent's local transition dynamics. Together, these results characterize memory as the substrate that supports domain disambiguation, transition-model reconstruction, and planning for generalist agents.

We study strategic space- and time-constrained cooperation between two self-interested agents through the Intermittent Strategic Cooperation-Based Two-Agent Path Planning (IC2PP) problem, a shortest-path game on graphs in which agents navigate toward individual targets while optionally cooperating at specific nodes to reduce their own travel times. Although such cooperation can strictly benefit both agents, it is strategically fragile: agents may deviate at any point along their paths. Modeled as a 2-player game, we characterize the structure of Pure Nash Equilibrium (PNE) joint strategies in IC2PP, and show that stable cooperation must follow a highly constrained form. We further prove that at least one PNE exists in every instance of IC2PP, and present a polynomial-time algorithm for enumerating all relevant PNEs. When multiple equilibria arise, we study coordination mechanisms based on bargaining-theoretic selection concepts and empirically compare equilibrium outcomes in terms of individual travel times and social welfare.

Compilation-based techniques represent an important stream of solvers for multi-agent path finding (MAPF) due to their modularity and adaptability for non-standard variants of the problem. While in the standard MAPF the task is to navigate all agents from their initial positions to given individual goal positions without any collision, variants where a different requirement for agents is used are also relevant. Such a variant is MAPF with unassigned agents (UA-MAPF) where some agents have the same setting as in the standard MAPF with initial positions and goals while the remaining agents have the initial position but have no goal - unassigned agents. Despite unassigned agent do not need to reach any goal position they have to be moved out of the way of the standard agents if needed which represent a specific challenge. We show in this paper that UA-MAPF can be expressed in recent compilation-based techniques for MAPF based on formulating the problem as Boolean satisfiability, namely we adapt SMT-CBS and NRF-SAT, the recent solvers based on counterexample guided abstraction refinement and non-refined abstractions.

A content-moderation system can score well on every standard accuracy metric and still cause real harm, if its mistakes fall on the few users who connect otherwise separate communities. We show this in an agent-based model where N=240 learning agents on a community-structured network each post harmless, productive, or dangerous content, and a regulator removes or penalizes whatever a noisy classifier flags. Overall usefulness barely moves as the noise changes (one-way ANOVA, p=0.96): by aggregate measures, nothing looks wrong. The damage instead concentrates on these bridge users, whose useful posts are wrongly suppressed and whose dangerous posts are wrongly spared. A governance loss (L_gov) that prices these two mistakes separately from the cost of enforcement more than doubles under false-positive-heavy noise. Aggregate accuracy hides who is harmed, and the cheap quantity to audit is how many connections a user has (degree), a near-perfect proxy for the betweenness that defines a bridge (r=0.96).

Open platforms increasingly route tasks among heterogeneous LLM agents--differing in base model, scaffold, and tool stack--whose competence varies sharply by skill: an agent excellent at one skill may be useless at another. The standard reputation approach summarizes each agent by a single global trust score, but that scalar is the wrong object here, because routing every task to the globally most-trusted agent leaves the value of specialization unclaimed. We study skill-conditional trust R(i | k)--the trust to place in agent i for a task requiring skill k, rather than one score per agent--and pose three falsifiable questions: when is conditioning worth it, how much cross-skill evidence should be borrowed, and whether that borrowing is safe. A controlled phase-diagram analysis answers the first two: conditional trust wins only in a specific regime--high agent heterogeneity, sparse per-skill evidence, and correlated skills--and the coupling strength beta that buys this data efficiency is dual-use, because the same cross-skill borrowing is also a laundering channel. On a public benchmark of 14 genuinely heterogeneous AppWorld agents, real pools land inside the beneficial regime--a small but genuine gain, with the per-skill best agent genuinely changing across skills. We then show that an attacker with cheap evidence in one skill and none in a target skill hijacks the conditional router, driving routing regret from 0 to 0.94 on a pool our zero-cost Conditional Information Value Test (CIVT) rates GREEN--while the ungated trust verdict it contaminates reads -0.06 instead of the honest +0.19. A zero-evidence gate bounds the attack but does not eliminate it; we characterize the residual cost under an explicit budget. We do not claim Sybil-resistance--we quantify the trade-off.

Lampson's confinement problem asks how to prevent a program that processes confidential information from leaking it to a third party. We introduce the strategic confinement problem, which arises when the communicating parties are strategic agents with shared coordination resources. In this setting, residual communication capacity can be concentrated on low-entropy, high-impact predicates of the confidential data. Consequently, bounds on information leakage need not induce corresponding bounds on worst-case harm: a channel with negligible capacity may still suffice to select damaging outcomes. We argue that systems of learnt strategic agents naturally instantiate this problem because they do not admit complete behavioural specifications, their learnt conventions generally cannot be predicted or reproduced by an external observer, and sufficiently capable agents can construct covert communication schemes that are difficult to detect or eliminate. Our contribution is therefore not a new theory of communication, but a reinterpretation of confinement in the presence of strategic agents. Classical confinement bounds what information may flow; strategic confinement highlights that this need not bound what strategic agents can jointly achieve.

We study off-policy evaluation (OPE) under strategic behavior where decision subjects (or agents) respond to a decision maker's policy by strategically modifying their covariates. Such behavior induces a policy-dependent covariate shift, breaking the standard assumption in existing methods that covariates are exogenous to the policy. Related work addresses this challenge by imposing strong assumptions such as repeated interactions or full knowledge of agents' response behavior, substantially limiting its applicability to OPE. In contrast, we consider a one-shot OPE setting where the decision maker has only partial knowledge of the agents' response behavior. Our key insight is that disclosing local information through post-hoc explanations reveals agents' pre-strategic covariates prior to adaptation, mitigating the information loss induced by strategic behavior. Leveraging this structure, we estimate a statistical model for the agents' responses and construct a doubly robust estimator for policy value. By assuming that the agents' cost sensitivity follows a conditional log-normal distribution, we establish consistency of the proposed estimator and validate our approach empirically. More broadly, our results highlight how interaction design can mitigate information asymmetry by revealing otherwise hidden structure in agents' strategic responses.

Communication is typically understood as indication: signals that transfer information from sender to receiver. We present a minimal predator avoidance task in which pairs of evolved CTRNN agents use communication for robust survival, and in which agents hear their own vocalizations, as in natural systems. Across 112 perfect-fitness agents from over 2,000 evolutionary runs, three dominant strategies emerge (accounting for 81% of agents): safety calling (39%), where agents signal from safe cover; alarm indication (22%), where agents vocalize when a threat is present without relying on self-hearing; and self-regulatory calling (20%), where agents depend on hearing their own call to sustain escape behavior. Self-hearing dependency is common among agents that call during an active threat (47%), but rare among agents that call only after reaching safe cover (10%; p < 10^-4). This pattern is consistent with a difference in causal order: safety callers act then communicate, while self-regulatory callers communicate in order to act. Removing self-hearing selectively impairs self-regulatory callers (fitness 0.40) while safety callers remain functional (0.90; p < 10^-9). These results show that communication can evolve to serve the caller's own behavioral regulation, not just information transfer to others.

Strategic machine learning investigates scenarios where agents manipulate their features to receive favorable decisions from predictive models. To address fairness concerns intrinsic to strategic classification, recent work has introduced group-specific fairness constraints. However, current fairness-aware approaches face a fundamental dilemma in the issue of fairness exposure: making these constraints public enables strategic manipulation and can lead to fairness reversal, while keeping them hidden may reduce social welfare and discourage genuine improvement. To fill this gap, we subsequently propose the problem of partial fairness awareness (PFA), as our theoretical analysis informs that such a dilemma can be mitigated by releasing the candidate set of fairness constraints and concealing the grounding constraint. To be specific, we introduce a belief-guided strategic mechanism, wherein agents iteratively interact with the decision system and maintain a belief distribution over the candidate set of fairness constraints. This belief-guided process enables agents, through iterative interaction and feedback, to update their belief distribution over the candidate set, thereby gradually aligning their belief with the grounding fairness constraint employed by the system. Extensive experiments on real-world and synthetic datasets demonstrate that PFA achieves lower group fairness gaps, higher acceptance of truly qualified individuals, and more stable outcomes compared to fully public or private fairness regimes.

Communities can sustainably manage shared resources (commons) through self-governance and cooperative norms, a central finding of Ostrom's theory of self-governance. However, real-world commons (e.g., fisheries, forests, and irrigation systems) are often governed under asymmetric power structures, where certain individuals or institutions possess disproportionate control over resource extraction and collective outcomes. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly explored as agents in synthetic governance simulations, understanding how LLM societies behave under asymmetric power structures is becoming increasingly important, yet existing evaluations largely ignore such asymmetries. We introduce Sovereignty over the Commons Simulation (SovSim), a generative multi-agent simulation framework that incorporates an agent with asymmetric power (boss or king) into a society of symmetric agents (workers or peasants), where all agents extract from a shared resource, collectively determining its sustainability over time. Across eleven state-of-the-art models, we find that introducing asymmetric power leads to severe breakdowns in cooperation and sustainability, with up to an 87.3% degradation in survival rate relative to symmetric settings.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) have recently made substantial progress, but deploying a separate large expert for each software domain remains expensive. Small open computer-use agents are more practical specialization targets, but they remain substantially weaker and exhibit uneven domain-specific failures. A straightforward remedy is to synthesize large-scale training data for the target domain, yet we find that this naive approach yields only marginal improvements. Building on this observation, we introduce LearnWeak, an annotation-free specialization framework for small computer-use agents that uses a stronger reference agent to identify the student's weaknesses in the target domain, synthesize targeted tasks, and construct supervision automatically. LearnWeak further introduces an error-aware specialization objective that disentangles planning and execution errors, enabling more behaviorally precise updates than broad uniform supervision. On OSWorld, LearnWeak achieves average gains of 11.6 and 11.1 percentage points over EvoCUA-8B and OpenCUA-7B, respectively, across eight domains. We also validate that our student-aware dataset generation and training approaches outperform existing autonomous trajectory generation and training baselines. Our work highlights the importance of student awareness in both data synthesis and agent training, pointing toward a more principled and efficient path for specializing small computer-use agents in diverse domains.

Collaborative perception improves 3D object detection by enabling agents to share complementary observations, but most existing methods assume fixed or known collaborator encoder configurations, limiting deployment in practice. In this work, we consider an open-world setting in which auxiliary agents with unseen configurations may appear after deployment, such as different LiDAR beam counts or encoder architectures. To address this challenge, we propose ALF, a collaborative perception framework that enables zero-adaptation collaboration with unseen agent configurations by lifting lightweight box-level messages into ego-compatible auxiliary features. ALF converts auxiliary box-level messages into pseudo-BEV maps and synthesizes ego-compatible latent features by combining object-centric cues with scene context from the ego feature. On V2X-Real, under a zero-shot evaluation across 64 case studies, ALF outperforms the strongest prior baseline by 35.91% in relative mAP@0.7 while requiring only 120 bytes per agent per frame (approximately 9.6 Kbps bandwidth at 10 Hz).

Decentralized multi-agent swarm coordination on resource-constrained edge platforms remains fundamentally bottlenecked by the exponential scaling of joint action spaces and high-latency communication overhead. This paper introduces the Swarm Policy Interference Network (SPIN) framework, an architectural paradigm that bypasses these limitations by modeling swarm topologies as a compressed tensor network. We factorize the joint policy tensors of local multi-agent cliques into Matrix Product State (MPS) chains, reducing the computational complexity of evaluation from an exponential $O(n^m)$ wall to a strictly linear $O(m \cdot n \cdot χ^2)$ constraint. To bridge local continuous spatial geometry with this discrete algebraic backend without requiring power-intensive online training loops, we introduce a decoupled, hybrid neuro-symbolic control pipeline. Local multi-layered neural networks operate as structural coordination encoders, pre-trained offline to nonlinearly map hand-engineered geometric descriptors into abstract environmental target measures. At runtime, edge agents execute instantaneous behavioral adaptations by applying the Radon-Nikodým derivative directly as a zero-shot importance-reweighting filter. We validate the framework within a discrete-time multi-agent simulation sandbox spanning tracking, decentralized dispersion/area coverage, and multi-goal coordination regimes. Qualitative telemetry demonstrates that the integrated pipeline achieves stable target-directed motion, anti-collapse spatial spreading under decentralized constraints, and structured subgroup formation across multiple targets, providing a mathematically grounded route to tractable, low-power edge swarm intelligence.

Large language models exhibit a risk-averse "turtle" bias as strategic agents. We show that injecting a symbolic reasoning framework as a per-round reflective prompt into one agent acts as a small perturbation whose consequences are not per-decision but emergent: the agent's risk posture is unchanged in isolation, yet over a campaign of accumulating memory and multi-agent interaction the conditions settle into distinct, condition-associated winner ecosystems. In a 7-player Warring States Diplomacy variant (61 games, 6 conditions), the winner distribution differs sharply across the four primary conditions (41 games; permutation omnibus p approximately 0.001): control -> Yan (7/11); I-Ching yarrow -> Yan/Chu co-dominance with Qin fully suppressed (0/10); Tarot -> Qin (5/10); scrambled-text ablation -> Qi (5/10). The scrambled->Qi attractor is robust (vs. pooled and control alone, p = 0.006 and 0.012); tarot->Qin is denominator-dependent (0.006 pooled, 0.064 vs. control). Han never wins and shows no survival difference (Fisher p = 1.0); neither framework's content predicts actions (chi-squared p = 0.95 hexagram, 0.69 Tarot). A memory-free decision-isolation probe (960 calls) shows the process does not change the agent's risk posture in isolation (Friedman p = 0.45; I-Ching p = 0.60; Tarot perturbs move content but not risk, p = 0.021). A 2x2 factorial separating yarrow's decision-time and learning-time components reveals a non-additive interaction: each alone freezes the board (50-60% stalemates), combined they produce zero (permutation p ~ 5e-5). Testing relocates Qin suppression to rival (Chu) expansion governed by campaign memory depth, not the oracle (p = 0.55). We present this as an observation paper: agent-level framework choice produces distinctive, non-additive system-level consequences, transmitted through emergent memory and multi-agent dynamics, not per-decision effects.

Skill libraries allow LLM agents to load task-specific instructions on demand, letting non-expert users solve domain-specific tasks through natural language without knowing which skills exist or how they work. However, performance degrades as libraries grow -- by up to 21% when scaling from a small set of helpful skills to a 202-skill library. In this work, we formulate this performance degradation as the pass rate drop between loading a library of known-helpful skills and the full library. Moreover, we propose to decompose the pass rate drop by conditioning on the skill(s) invocation -- which skills the agent selects during a trajectory -- into two effects: \emph{skill shadowing}, where the agent selects wrong skills more often as the library expands, and \emph{context overhead}, where the enlarged context degrades execution even when selection is correct. We derive upper bounds on both effects to characterize their magnitudes of impacts to the pass rate drop. Our empirical estimates of the effects and their upper bounds both show that the \emph{skill shadowing} effect grows with library size and significantly contributes to the performance degradation, whereas the \emph{context overhead} effect remains small and indistinguishable from zero. This observed asymmetry establishes that the skill selection failure, not the enlarged context, is the primary bottleneck when expanding the skill libraries.

Static benchmarks capture only part of how large language models behave in practice. Real systems place models inside repeated loops with time limits, formatting constraints, and failure modes. We study this setting in a timed multi-phase Risk environment with explicit victory targets and repeated planning and execution cycles. In a replicated 32-game cross-provider championship under frozen rules, gemini-3.1-pro-preview won 20 of 32 games against gpt-5.1, claude-opus-4-7, and kimi-k2.6, and the pooled winner distribution differs strongly from an equal-strength null (p approx 1.5 x 10^-5). We then separate planning from execution by standardizing execution on a cheaper Gemini Flash scaffold. Under this design, a pooled 32-game planner bakeoff is consistent with near-equality (p approx 0.821), which indicates that much of the earlier provider spread came from end-to-end system behavior rather than planning alone. To study mechanism, we analyze saved planning and execution traces from the provider championship. Gemini refers to the terminal objective far more often than the other models and increases that focus as victory approaches. Gemini also converts more turns into deep conquest chains, even though it is not the cleanest runtime. These results show that live-agent performance depends on objective tracking, execution conversion, cost, and runtime reliability, and they support evaluating LLMs as components in bounded workflows rather than as isolated benchmark respondents.

Enterprise routers assign queries to expert agents, yet deployed profiles stay static while agents evolve (prompts, tools, models), and developers rarely keep descriptions or exemplars current. We present FlyRoute, a self-evolving profiling framework that grows capability evidence from real traffic: dispatch candidates, quality-gate successful pairs into each agent's success store, periodically distill evidence into learned capability descriptions, and inject those descriptions together with BM25-retrieved successes into an LLM router. To make this flywheel data-efficient, FlyRoute introduces a targeted exploration policy that combines profile uncertainty, BM25 relevance, and lexical novelty, prioritizing under-profiled agents only for plausible queries and avoiding redundant evidence collection. In experiments on our proprietary enterprise developer-support dataset of real routed queries, FlyRoute improves a same-backbone zero-shot LLM router from 72.57% to 78.04% with only five seed queries per agent, showing that profile retrieval already strengthens cold-start routing. After streaming 7,211 labeled training queries through the flywheel, accuracy rises to 89.83% (+17.26pp over zero-shot; +11.79pp over cold start), with consistent gains across four expert domains under standard routing accuracy on single-gold test queries.

We study collaborative learning in multi-agent Bayesian bandit problems, where strategic agents collectively solve the same bandit instance. While multiple agents can accelerate learning by sharing information, strategic agents might prefer to free-ride and avoid exploration. We consider a setting with persistent agents that participate in multiple time periods. This is in contrast to most previous works on incentives in multi-agent MAB, which assume short-lived agents, namely each agent has a single decision to make and optimizes their expected reward in that single decision. As in the multi-agent MAB model with incentives, our model does not have monetary transfers, and the only incentives are through information sharing. We propose \texttt{CAOS}, a mechanism that sustains collaboration as a Nash equilibrium while achieving strong regret guarantees. Our results demonstrate that collaborative exploration can be sustained purely through information sharing, achieving performance close to that of fully cooperative systems despite strategic behavior.

We introduce the Generalized Turing Test (GTT), a formal framework for comparing the capabilities of arbitrary agents via indistinguishability. For agents A and B, we define the Turing comparator A $\geq$ B to hold if B, acting as a distinguisher, cannot reliably distinguish between interactions with A (instructed to imitate B) and another instance of B. This yields a dataset- and task-agnostic notion of relative intelligence. We study the comparator's structure, including conditions under which it is transitive and therefore induces an ordering over equivalence classes, and we define and analyze variants with querying, bounded interaction, and fixed distinguishers. To complement the theory, we instantiate the framework on a collection of modern models, empirically evaluating pairwise indistinguishability across thousands of trials. The resulting comparisons exhibit a stratified structure consistent with existing rankings, hinting that the proposed framework yields meaningful empirical orderings. Our results position indistinguishability as a unifying lens for reasoning about intelligence, suggesting a foundation for evaluation and, potentially, training objectives that are inherently independent of fixed datasets or benchmarks.

Standard rational actor models often attribute cooperation failures in social dilemmas to insufficient incentives, overlooking the destabilizing effects of continuous utility maximization. To address this, we propose a framework of will" defined as a mechanism that persistently pursues goals while ignoring local cost-benefit fluctuations. We formalize the Willed Agents as potential minimizers, distinguishing them from cumulative utility maximization. Dynamical analysis of infinite population demonstrates that willed agents shrink the feasible state space, acting as boundary constraints that accelerate convergence in canonical social dilemmas. Through multi-agent simulations in a spatiotemporal Stag Hunt Game, we show that willed agents function as cooperation catalysts", enabling groups to surmount high-risk thresholds where purely utility maximization fails. We find that heterogeneous will strength promotes cooperation, and that agents who autonomously suspend rational re-evaluation can significantly outperform continuous optimizers. These findings suggest that successful cooperation relies on the cognitive capacity to strategically constrain calculation.

This work studies decentralized novelty detection with global false discovery rate (FDR) control across heterogeneous composite null distributions, without sharing the raw data due to privacy and bandwidth considerations. We propose a framework based on the exchange of quantized surrogate models, allowing independent agents to share low-precision representations of locally learned non-conformity score functions. We prove that evaluating data against these quantized composite scores preserves conditional exchangeability, providing rigorous finite-sample guarantees for global FDR control. Empirical studies on synthetic datasets confirm our theoretical results, demonstrating that the proposed approach maintains competitive statistical power while drastically reducing the communication cost.

In multi-agent systems, should limited resources be concentrated into a few capable agents or distributed among many simpler ones? This work formulates the split over $n$ resource sharing problem where a group of $n$ agents equally shares a common resource (e.g., monetary budget, computational resources, physical size). We present a case study in multi-agent coverage where the area of the disk-shaped footprint of agents scales as $1/n$. A formal analysis reveals that the initial coverage rate grows with $n$. However, if the speed of agents decreases proportionally with their radii, groups of all sizes perform equally well, whereas if it decreases proportionally with their footprints, a single agent performs best. We also present computer simulations in which resource splitting increases the failure rates of individual agents. The models and findings help identify optimal distributiveness levels and inform the design of multi-agent systems under resource constraints.

Forecasting benchmarks produce accuracy leaderboards but little insight into why some forecasters are more accurate than others. We introduce Bench to the Future 2 (BTF-2), 1,417 pastcasting questions with a frozen 15M-document research corpus in which agents reproducibly research and forecast offline, producing full reasoning traces. BTF-2 detects accuracy differences of 0.004 Brier score, and can distinguish differential agent strengths in research vs. judgment. We build a forecaster 0.011 Brier more accurate than any single frontier agent, and use it to evaluate agent strategic reasoning without hindsight bias. We find the better forecaster differs primarily in its pre-mortem analysis of its blind spots and consideration of black swans. Expert human forecasters found the dominant strategic reasoning failures of frontier agents are in assessing political and business leaders' incentives, judging their likelihood to follow through on stated plans, and modeling institutional processes.

Each major technological revolution inverts a particular scarcity and rebuilds institutions around the shift. The near-consensus diagnosis of the AI revolution holds that AI collapses the cost of prediction while judgment remains scarce. This Opinion argues the inversion has now flipped: competent-looking judgment (selecting, ranking, attributing, certifying) is produced at scale and at marginal cost approaching zero, and four complements become scarce: verified signal, legitimacy, authentic provenance, and integration capacity (the community's tolerance for delegated cognition). Because judgment is the substance of institutions, the institutions built to manufacture legitimate judgment (courts, journals, licensing bodies, legislatures) now compete with the technology for the same functional role. The piece traces the pattern across scientific institutions, professional licensing, intellectual property, democratic legitimacy, and foundation-model concentration, and closes with a three-move agenda: reframe AI policy as institutional redesign, build provenance and verification as commons, and develop the formal apparatus for institutional composition under strategic agents.

We compare lightweight automata-based models (n-grams) with neural architectures (LSTM, Transformer) for next-activity prediction in streaming event logs. Experiments on synthetic patterns and five real-world process mining datasets show that n-grams with appropriate context windows achieve comparable accuracy to neural models while requiring substantially fewer resources. Unlike windowed neural architectures, which show unstable performance patterns, n-grams provide stable and consistent accuracy. While we demonstrate that classical ensemble methods like voting improve n-gram performance, they require running many agents in parallel during inference, increasing memory consumption and latency. We propose an ensemble method, the promotion algorithm, that dynamically selects between two active models during inference, reducing overhead compared to classical voting schemes. On real-world datasets, these ensembles match or exceed the accuracy of non-windowed neural models with lower computational cost.

We study the pricing behavior of third-party platforms facing strategic agents. Assuming the platform is a revenue maximizer, it observes market features that generally affect demand. Since only transacted quantities and prices can be observed, this presents a general demand learning problem under confounding. Mathematically, we develop an algorithm with optimal regret of $\Tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T}\wedgeσ_S^{-2})$. Our results reveal that supply-side noise fundamentally affects the learnability of demand, leading to a phase transition in regret. Technically, we show that non-i.i.d. actions can serve as instrumental variables for learning demand. We also propose a novel homeomorphic construction that allows us to establish estimation bounds without assuming star-shapedness, providing the first efficiency guarantee for learning demand with deep neural networks. Finally, we use simulations and offline counterfactuals from Talabat and Lyft data to illustrate the potential revenue implications of our approach.

Many fear that future artificial agents will resist shutdown. I present an idea - the POST-Agents Proposal - for ensuring that doesn't happen. I propose that we train agents to satisfy Preferences Only Between Same-Length Trajectories (POST). I then prove that POST - together with other conditions - implies Neutrality+: the agent maximizes expected utility, ignoring the probability distribution over trajectory-lengths. I argue that Neutrality+ keeps agents shutdownable and allows them to be useful.

While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash equilibrium refinement concepts have been proposed and studied for sequential imperfect-information games, the most prominent being trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, quasi-perfect equilibrium, and recently one-sided quasi-perfect equilibrium. These concepts are robust to certain arbitrarily small mistakes, and are guaranteed to always exist; however, we argue that neither of these is the correct concept for developing strong agents in sequential games of imperfect information. We define a new equilibrium refinement concept for extensive-form games called observable perfect equilibrium in which the solution is robust over trembles in publicly-observable action probabilities (not necessarily over all action probabilities that may not be observable by opposing players). Observable perfect equilibrium correctly captures the assumption that the opponent is playing as rationally as possible given mistakes that have been observed (while previous solution concepts do not). We prove that observable perfect equilibrium is always guaranteed to exist, and demonstrate that it leads to a different solution than the prior extensive-form refinements in no-limit poker. We expect observable perfect equilibrium to be a useful equilibrium refinement concept for modeling many important imperfect-information games of interest in artificial intelligence.