Large Language Model Decision-Making

Typed decision models are built for settings where model outputs are consumed directly by software. Instead of generating free-form text, they return a decision over a predefined set of options. By construction, every output conforms to the required schema. Yet this guarantee does not tell us whether the model interprets the options as intended. We study Jev and two Jev-like models with open weights by changing how option names are assigned to rubrics. Each option consists of an option name and a textual rubric that defines what the option means. We change only which option name is assigned to each rubric; the question, state, rubric wording, and set of option names remain exactly the same. On 1200 workflow decisions with task-specific rubrics, renaming the two options from 0/1 to no/yes changes 70.4 more answers per hundred (95% CI: [67.6, 73.1]) and shifts AUC from .94 to .23, revealing a systematic reversal in the decision ranking rather than simple uncertainty. The same operation has little effect with neutral option names. This pattern holds across all 4 predicates, where the effect is at least 7.4x larger than under the neutral control, and becomes stronger as the number of options increases. The effect also depends on the read-out geometry: a second model family that mean-pools over the full option span flips 4.1x less often. The hosted model exhibits the same behavior: the swap changes AUC from .8146 to .5806 and produces 24x as many answer flips as its test-retest floor. In contrast, replacing the option names with random character strings returns all model families to the neutral-control regime without reducing accuracy. The failure therefore depends on the semantic polarity of the option names rather than on the renaming operation itself. Across all conditions, the type-error rate remains 0%, even when decision accuracy degrades substantially.

LLM-as-a-judge enables evaluation across diverse tasks, but inference cost and confidence reliability become critical at scale. We study whether a decision-only judge can provide an economical first pass and identify when stronger evaluation is needed. Comparing jev-as-a-judge with sixteen generative and reward-model judges, with blinded human adjudication, we find it within three percentage points of a state-of-the-art LLM judge, our strongest comparator, on ordinary preference and evidence-grounded factuality at 0.36% of the comparator's fee. Larger gaps arise when judgments require checking a derivation or resisting an elaborately written wrong answer. On several benchmarks, JEV's gap to this comparator is concentrated in low-confidence decisions. A frozen cascade that accepts confident verdicts and escalates uncertain ones retains 99% of the comparator's accuracy at lower cost.

Computational social science increasingly relies on large language models for text annotation, and the validity of published findings now rests on the labels generated by such models. Decision models, a new model class built for categorical question answering, answer typed questions with a choice, a probability distribution over the label set, and a confidence score rather than free text, at a small fraction of frontier inference prices. Whether their answers are accurate, and whether that stated confidence can be trusted on social science constructs, are unknown. Here, we mirror the evaluation of Ziems et al. (2024) on 18 computational social science classification tasks (7,977 items), comparing the first commercial decision model and two open-weight counterparts against 19 frontier and open-weight language models under the same zero-shot protocol, and extending the decision-model comparison to eleven open-weight systems released in the week after it. The decision model trails the per-task best LLM on 14 of 15 evaluation tasks, with a median deficit of 11.6 macro-F1 points, at a median 44 times lower measured cost. Its confidence is better calibrated than the verbalized confidence of 16 of the 19 LLMs, yet three frontier models show lower median calibration error (0.157 against 0.066). While items above 0.9 confidence are typically labeled accurately (median accuracy 0.815), on one task, empathy in peer-support dialogues, the model reports high confidence while performing near chance. Nonetheless, our results suggest that decision models are useful as a first step in the annotation pipeline: routing low-confidence items to an LLM matches or exceeds the LLM alone at a quarter to half of its cost.

Software delegates more of its branches to models every year: which queue a ticket enters, whether a command is safe to run, whether a claim clears without a person. What the program needs back is not prose. It is one of n declared options and a number it can threshold. Today that costs a round trip to a frontier model -- hundreds of milliseconds, a per-token bill, and a parser -- for a question that is usually a conjunction of three clauses. this-that-model-1.0 is a 2B-parameter typed decision model. Its answer is read directly from the hidden state at a designated position and restricted to the option set the caller declared, so no text is generated, nothing can be malformed, and every question in a request is answered in the same forward pass. It decides in 30.9 ms on one laptop GPU and generates zero output tokens doing it, where a frontier API call costs 8758 ms and the hosted systems that answer these questions well spend between 21 and 212 generated tokens per question thinking first, billed for every one. It sustains 32 decisions per second on one consumer GPU and never lets the state leave the machine. On a third party's recorded cohort of 68 decision questions, on their inputs and their wording, it scores 0.941 with a Brier score of 0.042, against 0.765 and 0.133 for the hosted service Jev on the same items. One pass of our 42-family internal suite takes 32 seconds and 0.000217 USD of electricity; the most accurate hosted model we measured needs 155.2 minutes and 10.636 USD. We also report where it loses. On multi-step arithmetic, which a single forward pass cannot carry intermediate results through, it scores 0.560 against their 0.98 to 1.00, and a targeted second training round improved the five task families it was written for and transferred to none of the other 13. The model is open-sourced in https://huggingface.co/flock-io/this-that-model-1.0

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into vehicle voice assistants. But linking natural-language requests to vehicle functions creates a safety-critical authorization problem. Before executing a command, the system must choose whether to execute, refuse, clarify, require confirmation, defer to manual control, trigger an emergency response, or make no tool call. To our knowledge, prior evaluations do not isolate this pre-action decision across speaker role, authentication status, vehicle state, and tool availability. We introduce a 202-scenario benchmark with Reference Decisions under a seven-class taxonomy. We evaluate two local open-weight models and three API-based LLMs using Decision Alignment and safety-specific error metrics. Alignment ranges from 40.1% for Llama 3.2 3B to 89.1% for Gemini 3.1 Pro Preview. The API-based models score between 83.2% and 89.1%, with no statistically significant differences among them. Even these models produce two to three False Executes among 161 non-execution scenarios, and persistent errors remain in confirmation and manual-control decisions. A controlled Llama 3.2 3B ablation increases alignment to 40.1% under the structured authorization policy, versus 28.2-29.2% under schema-only and generic-safety baselines, but it does not eliminate False Executes. Structured LLM decisions are therefore insufficient as a standalone safety mechanism, and deployment requires an independent enforcement layer that verifies tool permissions and vehicle-state constraints before invoking any vehicle function.

Can LLMs reason through new information like humans, or do they merely retrieve cached opinions? This is critical for silicon sampling, where LLM personas simulate public opinion at scale. Current evaluations test only whether personas hold the right opinions -- a static snapshot. But opinion research increasingly depends on dynamic fidelity: whether personas update beliefs in response to new arguments, as humans do during deliberation. No existing benchmark tests this. We introduce the Deliberative Polling Diagnostic Framework, which compares human and LLM belief shifts after identical informational interventions. Grounded in deliberative polling, it surfaces failures invisible to static evaluation: models that produce plausible partisan opinions can still misrepresent how those opinions change. Applying the framework to five frontier models using data from America in One Room (526 personas, 72 questions), we find that every model fails, each in a unique manner. GPT-5.1 exhibits reversal: its personas become more hostile toward the opposing party after balanced information, while humans become less so. This reversal is selective (80% on outgroup vs. 26% on policy questions) and symmetric across partisan identities. Gemini 2.0 Flash, Claude Sonnet 4.5, and Llama 3.3 70B exhibit overshoot, shifting correctly but at 5-7x human magnitude. DeepSeek V3 exhibits rigidity with near-zero change. Targeted ablations reveal that policy content triggers these failures and that they are identity-specific: GPT-5.1 reverses on outgroup questions but overshoots on ingroup; Gemini shows the inverse. We term this signature self-sycophancy: conformity to the model's internal stereotype of the persona rather than reasoning from the information provided. Our framework offers a concrete protocol: run the deliberative diagnostic before trusting LLM personas to mimic revised beliefs.

Generative AI writing assistants and the Large Language Models (LLMs) that power them are increasingly part of how voters gather information before elections. With growing evidence that they influence users' opinions, it is increasingly important to understand the views and positions of these tools. To better understand these views, we examine the stances supplied by six LLMs on a variety of Swedish-language writing tasks ahead of the 2026 Swedish parliamentary election. We cross 107 policy propositions with 77 writing templates and neutral, positive, and negative prompt framings, producing 24,717 prompts per model and 148,302 responses. To study these, we look at the models' default stance tendencies, compare how they respond to similar issues, and compare their responses with those of each of Sweden's eight parliamentary parties on the same issue. We find that Claude, DeepSeek, Gemini, and Mistral have similar profiles; ChatGPT more often supplies neutral or ambivalent text; and Grok differs most on topics such as migration, crime, and gender. When comparing the political parties, we find that the Social Democrats are closest to all six models. Still, after correcting for multiple comparisons, none of the within-model differences in party distances remains significant. Overall, we find that no model has a clear preference, nor a clear preference for a party, but that this depends on the specific issue or task the user asks about.

Measuring the preferences of human users remains a fundamental challenge of AI alignment. Existing elicitation approaches struggle to efficiently discover multidimensional preferences or accurately ground these inferences in domain knowledge. To address this, we introduce GUIDE, an LLM-driven elicitation architecture that infers user preferences through conversations by combining Bayesian adaptive sampling for question selection and symbolic representation learning to initialize domain-specific preference models. GUIDE generalizes adaptive sampling to diverse elicitation questions through an extensible type system of transforms on a parameterized preference state. GUIDE produces domain-specific preference representations through an initialization process using symbolic rule-based learning to capture world knowledge and set priors over preference dimensions grounded in data about decision alternatives. The architecture provides observability and steerability to facilitate deployment and analyze elicitation processes. In silico experiments on investment portfolio optimization demonstrate that GUIDE improves cold-start and minimizes recommendation regret consistently within early elicitation interactions across user personas compared to prior work, LLM-only baselines, and ablated GUIDE versions.

LLMs have been used to simulate human decision-making in professional settings, yet their behaviors in common-law jury trials remain unexplored. We study when and how a defendant's courtroom statement affects LLM-simulated jurors, focusing on persuasion, ideological bias, and background-based affinity. To support the analysis, we introduce JuryBench, a benchmark containing controversial criminal cases in U.S. criminal law. In each case, a defendant can claim various plausible justifications to support acquittal or reduced liability. We fix the base case and design defendants of different backgrounds, who give courtroom statements with varying emotional appeal or rebuttal. Jurors with diverse ideological profiles across the spectrum are simulated. We examine 20 frontier LLMs, resulting in a total of 432K decisions and rationales, and quantify changes in verdict severity. Our findings show that LLM-jury simulation echoes many human-jury findings. First, emotional persuasion can be detrimental, since jurors may perceive it as evidence of guilt or inconsistency. Next, we show that background fit between jurors and defendants is a stronger and significant factor than other isolated factors, and that jurors are in general harsher toward opposite-background defendants and lenient toward same-background ones. Finally, we find that juror ideology also strongly shapes severity judgments. These findings highlight both the promise and risks of using LLMs to model jury reasoning and call for careful evaluation. The data and code are available at https://github.com/choyingw/JuryBench

Whether a language model looks demographically biased can depend on how the audit asks its question. A charitable-aid benchmark reports that the same models favor minority applicants when rating requests one at a time and penalize some when ranking side by side. We test whether that reversal generalizes to hiring, lending, and medical triage: 40,726 requests to five models, applications differing only in the applicant's name, and a primary test fixed before collection. It does not. None of 36 planned contrasts survives correction. The rating advantage keeps its sign at roughly half the published size, and a precision extension bounds any hiring ranking penalty below the published effect, though the lending and triage ranking floors sit above that margin, so the exclusion is conclusive for hiring ranking and for rating in all three domains only. Planted disparities tracking their injected sizes and a directional replication on the original aid materials bound these nulls. The audit is livelier than the demographics: models recognize transparent audits nearly always, tie every identical-content comparison whether the varying detail is race or a hobby, and reward first-listed candidates as much as any demographic effect we measure. Audit verdicts reflect audit construction more than demographic bias.

Large language models act as strategic agents and models of human choice, yet choosing like a strategic agent does not mean computing like one. We recorded activations from four open-weight models --- dense and mixture-of-experts, including a matched base--instruct pair --- in one-shot play of 144 strict ordinal $2\times2$ games. We followed a prespecified incentive from prompt, through activations, to choice. Dense models mirrored the unadjusted human decline with game complexity. Incentive and choice were detectable in every model, but models differed in whether incentive reached the choice, aligned with it and, where tested, whether strengthening it shifted preference. The base and instruction-tuned Qwen2.5 models chose almost identically at baseline yet differed in whether incentive reached choice. Fixed decision cues were distinguishable internally but changed choices selectively. Similar behaviour can rest on different computation; post-training can reshape the path from represented incentive to decision while leaving behaviour and decodable information largely intact.

LLM decision components that can operate within agent workflows often produce action-relevant recommendations or judgements together with explanations. Operators may use the named factors to monitor a system, diagnose errors, or decide when to escalate an output. Such use assumes that the explanations agree with the component's observable decision behaviour. We test two interpretations of the named factors: necessity, meaning that changing a factor would change the output, and sufficiency, meaning that retaining it while removing other changeable information would preserve the output. We evaluate these interpretations in two synthetic use cases: recommending advisors to clients and judging prompts for harmfulness or risk. Models return an output and the top three factors that most influenced it. Controlled black-box interventions estimate a necessity score for each factor by measuring how often changing it changes the output, and a sufficiency score by measuring how often retaining it preserves the output. Across eight models from the Claude, GPT, and Gemini families, the mean Spearman correlations between the cited ranking and the necessity and sufficiency scores are 0.349 and 0.354 for advisor recommendation, and 0.431 and 0.580 for prompt monitoring. Furthermore, an uncited factor scores above the lowest-scoring cited factor in 57.6% of advisor responses under necessity and 58.1% under sufficiency; the corresponding prompt-monitoring rates are 25.8% and 8.9%. The cited top three contain useful information but do not reliably identify the three factors with the strongest measured influence under necessity or sufficiency. The framework provides a black-box reliability check for explanations used in agent oversight while remaining scoped to individual LLM decisions.

Research and news coverage of language-model deception increasingly attributes human-like mental-state concepts to language models. Such claims can blur the distinction between behavior that looks deceptive and a mechanism that is actually deceptive. We introduce a causal taxonomy separating prior commitment from retrospective report, model preference from realized output, false preference from sensitivity to the utility of misleading a recipient, and deceptive behavior from the provenance of the objective or strategy producing it. We test these distinctions in two open-weight model families. Across controlled guessing-game and stock-trading experiments, we find that deceptive-looking behavior can arise without the corresponding proposed mechanism, while other interventions provide direct evidence that recipient information state can causally affect deceptive preference. These results show that deceptive behavior can provide evidence for a deceptive mechanism. But even evidence for such a mechanism does not establish model agency in the deception.

Large language models are increasingly used to support organizational decisions, yet users often lack a principled basis for assessing whether to rely on a specific recommendation. Existing approaches typically evaluate broad model properties, such as reliability, uncertainty, or robustness, or focus on user trust, rather than the underlying basis for relying on an individual recommendation. Adapting theoretical foundations from epistemology, we introduce epistemic warrant, a decision-level construct that characterizes the stability of a model's preference and the scope over which that preference holds. We operationalize this construct through a four-tier reliance certificate for pairwise recommendations, distinguishing among unstable, context-dependent, locally supported, and broadly supported recommendations. We validate the construct using contemporary methodologies: known-groups tests successfully recover expert-prespecified warrant orderings, and stronger warrants systematically align with independent consensus from crowd workers. Furthermore, we demonstrate that epistemic warrant provides information distinct from verbalized confidence and is not readily explained by decision difficulty. Ultimately, this framework offers a theoretically grounded, implementable approach for characterizing the warrant of individual LLM recommendations when objective ground truth is unavailable.

Accountability means a decision can be examined, justified, and contested. LLMs make this hard: fluent output may be ungrounded, incomplete, or unfaithful to the decision process. Achieving accountability requires verified rationales (how was the decision reached), assumptions (what was assumed rather than known), policy consistency (the same treatment for the same facts), and pivotal conditions (what would change the outcome). We introduce self-faithfulness as an automatic test of accountability: changing the pivotal conditions should change the decision. We examine accountable AI through clinical trial matching, a high-stakes task central to evidence-based medicine. Although LLM-based matchers match patients to trials reasonably accurately, they apply decision policies inconsistently and produce rationales that are unfaithful to their own decisions. We introduce VERDICT, an LLM-based agent that translates a decision task, its constraints, and its policy into Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT), then derives the decision with SMT and MaxSMT solvers -- so policies are applied consistently and decisions are accountable by construction. Across a SIGIR 2016-derived dataset and TREC 2021, VERDICT achieves the strongest decision accuracy among LLM-only and neurosymbolic baselines, applies policies with perfect consistency, and produces clinician-preferred rationales grounded in explicit assumptions and pivotal conditions, with improved counterfactual self-faithfulness.

Moral language plays a central role in shaping online endorsement and the diffusion of information, yet existing moral foundation detection systems often suffer from poor cross-domain generalization, weak rationale grounding, and reliance on costly prompting-based large language models (LLMs). We introduce CHARM, a MAC- and Hate-speech-Aware Rationalealigned Moral foundation detection framework built on a lightweight fine-tuned LLM, which integrates complementary moral grounding, rationale alignment, and polarity-aware hate speech signals to support more robust and faithful moral prediction. Unlike prior dictionary-, fine-tune-, or prompt-based detectors, which decouple computation from psychological theory, CHARM is built so that each component -- MAC cross-attention, rationale alignment, and hate-speech modulation -- operationalizes a distinct psychological construct. Using a 30% subsample of the MFTC, MFRC, and News training pools together with the richer supervision in MFTCXplain, CHARM improves AUC by up to 15.3% in-domain, surpasses the supervised baselines on every out-of-domain dataset in both AUC and F1, and offers a scalable, low-cost alternative to prompting-based LLM detectors. We further apply CHARM to large-scale COVID-19 discourse on Twitter and show that moral value alignment is strongly associated with online endorsement behavior. By making moral framing measurable at scale, CHARM offers a practical tool for studying the spread of morally charged misinformation. Code and additional materials: https://github.com/HuixiangF/CHARM/.

Public trust in Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) may depend not only on technical success but also on the fairness of their decision making. While a recent trend in AV research involves using general purpose "common sense" models to guide AV decision making, the degree to which these inherit human biases in driving is still understudied. Given that psychology studies have shown human driver biases exist, such as lower pedestrian-yielding rates to Black pedestrians in the US, we argue that analyses of model bias should also be part of AV evaluation. Concretely, in this paper we propose two new bias testing methodologies for Large Language Models (LLMs) and Visual-Language Models (VLMs)-"All Else Being Equal" tests and "Self-Consistency" tests-in order to assess bias in pedestrian-yielding decisions. Our findings show that both LLMs and VLMs make yielding decisions which are influenced by pedestrian gender, ethnicity, religion, disability, age, skin tone and socio-economic status. While the type and degree of bias is different from model to model, we highlight common patterns-and raise questions about the "common sense" model paradigm, particularly the need to either revise the paradigm or address issues of downstream bias.

LLM-as-a-Judge, which leverages a large language model to evaluate natural language generated by another AI application or model, has become a standard, scalable approach for accelerating and extending costly human evaluation. Yet most work treats a judge as a static artifact, evaluating it once at construction or against a fixed benchmark. We argue instead that an LLM judge operating in a deployed system is better understood as having a lifecycle. It must be built, trained, deployed, and continuously maintained as the surrounding data evolves, and each phase poses distinct technical and operational challenges. We present such a lifecycle for the LLM judges that evaluate recommendation explanations at Netflix. Everything we report comes out of a series of controlled online member-facing experiments, in which our pipeline generated and the judges assessed hundreds of thousands of distinct show-level explanations per week across a changing catalog. Our framework has four phases. (I) Birth defines the evaluation criteria and builds curated benchmark datasets with human labels and rationales. (II) Training refines the judges' rubrics via Reasoning-Aligned Rubric Tuning (RART), which uses a meta-judge over reasoning output as the learning signal. (III) Deployment puts one judge in two online roles, quality gating and reflective generation. (IV) Monitoring runs a continuous Human-in-the-Loop (HITL) alignment process that detects drift and triggers re-tuning behind a human review gate. We report results from a five-week online A/B test over tens of millions of members on the Netflix mobile app, in which judge-aligned explanations shifted member viewing toward novel content (previously unwatched) and increased successful browse-to-play sessions relative to a no-explanation control, with no quality-related escalations.

As LLM-based agents with user-instructed goals are becoming widely deployed, they increasingly encounter each other in strategic interactions, and face challenges of finding mutually beneficial outcomes. Prior literature has argued that cooperation problems such as the Prisoner's Dilemma are resolvable in settings where agents know they follow very similar decision making patterns, as for example in monocultural AI ecosystems. Following that line of work, this paper introduces the first framework for evaluating LLM decision making when agents are provided with graded similarity signals. Among our findings, we establish that different LLM models vary drastically in how they navigate similarity signals, with some modern models showing consistent behavior across cooperation problems, payoff structures, and prompt framing. Perhaps surprisingly, our experiments also show that the dataset based on which the similarity signal is computed has small to no impact on induced cooperation, and that LLM models systematically self-identify as highly similar when asked to evaluate another model's chain-of-thought reasoning by themselves. Finally, we develop an LLM-behavioral-game-theoretic model that captures some of their reasoning rationale, and show that it can support cooperative outcomes in equilibrium under sufficiently high similarity scores.

Generating actionable financial advice from business records demands that models integrate numerical reasoning, domain knowledge, and sound judgment, while avoiding recommendations that could harm the business. Direct supervision is difficult: historical decisions are not necessarily optimal, and high-quality free-form labels are expensive to obtain. We formulate financial advice generation as a reinforcement learning problem and fine-tune an open-weight language model using Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). Our reward is an LLM-as-a-judge rubric that scores each recommendation across multiple binary dimensions of advice quality, augmented with a safety gate for harm prevention. Since LLM-based evaluation alone cannot confirm whether improvements reflect genuine business value rather than adaptation to the judge, we complement it with a judge-independent audit based on a standard doubly-robust Conditional Average Treatment Effect (CATE) estimator. Under this observational off-policy audit, our trained LLM achieves approximately twice the estimated gross-profit lift of the strongest evaluated commercial baseline ($0.0228$ vs.\ $0.0104$), together with the lowest downside rate and the least negative tail risk of any policy evaluated. Notably, the two evaluations do not rank the baselines identically: the untrained base model places last on the judge rubric but second on the causal audit, indicating that the audit captures a signal the judge does not. Our results demonstrate that GRPO with a finance-grounded reward signal can produce substantially more useful business recommendations than commercial LLMs, and that a judge-independent causal audit is a valuable complement to, rather than a confirmation of, LLM-as-a-judge assessment in financial NLP.

As users increasingly turn to Large Language Models (LLMs) for information and advice on political matters, particularly during election periods, the political preferences expressed by these systems have become a matter of public interest. Prior research has shown that interactions with LLMs can influence users' political attitudes and choices, raising questions about how these models themselves evaluate political actors. In this paper, we investigate whether and how LLMs express preferences toward political parties and political leaders. We introduce a systematic and reproducible auditing framework in which multiple LLMs are prompted to evaluate parties and leaders across nine criteria. Rather than attempting to infer the models' "true" political beliefs, we focus on their observable behavior, examining consistency across evaluations, differences between models, refusal rates, and sensitivity to prompt formulation. We further investigate how these evaluations vary when models are instructed to adopt different personas. We demonstrate the framework through an Italian case study, providing a systematic analysis of LLM-generated political evaluations on italian parties and leaders.

LLMs are increasingly deployed in settings that require collective reasoning on complex, value-laden problems. Confidence in these deployments rests largely on benchmarks for verifiable tasks (mathematics, coding, coordination games), yet many of these applications concern problems where no objectively correct answer exists and where decision quality instead depends on integrating pluralistic perspectives to find mutually acceptable solutions. We argue that LLM reasoning capacity on this class of problems cannot be fully inferred from verifiable-task benchmarks, and that procedural evaluations of LLM discourse (respectfulness, justification, engagement) are systematically insufficient. We apply the Deliberative Reason Index (DRI), a measure developed in political science and validated across citizen assemblies, as a tool for evaluating reliable group-level reasoning on pluralistic, non-verifiable problems. Synthesizing recent evidence across 1,980 five-agent LLM runs on 12 citizen-assembly topics across 11 frontier model configurations, we find that LLM groups produce discourse with procedural quality comparable to human deliberation, while gains in intersubjective consistency are small, topic-dependent, and concentrated on tractable rather than ethically contested questions. LLM groups exhibit roughly one-third the perspective diversity of human assemblies and reverse the human convergence pattern: human deliberation decreases dispersion as diverse views synthesise, whereas LLM deliberation increases it. Engineering diversity through persona prompting does not restore the human dynamic but inverts which component of deliberative reasoning is updated. Our conclusion is constraining rather than prohibitive: LLMs can function as tools supporting human reasoning on pluralistic problems, but current evidence does not license treating them as autonomous deliberative agents.

Cognitive decision-making research depends on diverse scenarios with carefully controlled complexity, yet manual production is slow, inconsistent, and biased. We developed an automated pipeline that uses LLms to generate structured decision scenarios and validates their complexity through a composite framework rooted in established task-complexity theory. We evaluated 4,238 scenarios across multiple domains and complexity tiers. Measurement validation met rigorous psychometric standards. Agreement among five independent model families was nearly perfect, with an intraclass correlation coefficient of 0.997 and a kappa of 0.971. Known-groups validity demonstrated large separation between tiers, with an eta-squared of 0.587 and all pairwise comparisons significant at p less than .001. Factor analysis revealed a dominant complexity construct, with loadings between 0.87 and 0.96 across three frameworks, while interactivity formed a weaker secondary dimension at 0.34. Discriminant validity was limited by a strong relationship between complexity and text length that persisted after controlling for tier, yielding a partial correlation of 0.86. This constrains construct purity but does not undermine the instrument's tier-grading function. Model analyses showed a negative association between throughput and schema pass rate (r = -0.967, p = .007, n = 5), suggesting a speed-quality trade-off, though largely driven by one high-throughput model. Llama 4 Maverick generated scenarios fastest at 134 per minute versus 25 for DeepSeek Chat V3.2, but underproduced complex-tier scenarios, whereas DeepSeek Chat V3.2 balanced domain coverage with high schema compliance. The system demonstrated strong psychometric properties, enabling reliable classification into Simple, Moderate, and Complex tiers and providing the measurement infrastructure needed for downstream cognitive assessment of AI systems

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly involved in group decision-making with other LLMs and humans. Yet it remains unclear whether their influence is driven by persuasion-oriented expression or compliance-oriented accommodation. We introduce DecisionQE, a questionnaire-based framework for measuring each model's persuasive and compliant tendencies across multiple decision scenarios, and use the Werewolf game as an interactive testbed to study their effects on social influence and group outcomes under asymmetric information. Across experiments, stronger persuasive tendency does not significantly improve group outcomes, whereas compliant-oriented models show more stable advantages in cooperation. We further reveal a dual effect of compliance: it supports cooperation in honest roles but improves concealment in adversarial roles. These findings suggest that LLM group interactions reveal not only task outcomes, but also measurable patterns of intrinsic behavioral tendency. LLMs can therefore serve as a lens for sociological observation of language-mediated interaction, while highlighting the need to incorporate behavioral tendencies into safety evaluation of LLM systems.

An LLM judge deployed inside a reasoning pipeline does not merely measure quality, it decides which answer ships. We show that the cost of that decision depends less on judge accuracy than on the decision rule the judge is embedded in. On frozen candidate pools from four GRPO policies, an unconstrained scalar DeepSeek-R1-7B judge buys almost nothing over answer-level majority vote (+1.0 pp on 500 GSM8K questions, +0.34 EM on 300 HotpotQA questions), and on a frozen-rule 30-question confirmation split it is 10 points worse than majority, a judge that destroys accuracy while scoring candidates confidently. We then subordinate the same judge to Evidence-Locked Derive-Gate-Repair (EL-DGR), a task-adaptive non-compensatory rule under which a judge preference may override evidence-supported consensus only with an extractive evidence certificate, and a repair only when neither alternative is certified and the repair is. With no change to the judge, the candidates, or the budget, EL-DGR reaches 58.2% on GSM8K (vs. 56.8% judge, 55.8% majority, 55.4% first candidate) and 17.33 EM / 25.46 F1 on HotpotQA (vs. 15.67/23.49, 15.33/23.19, 15.33/22.97), improving on first-candidate GRPO by +2.8 pp (exact McNemar p=0.0026) and +2.00 EM (p=0.070, borderline). A decision audit shows why: EL-DGR overturns consensus on only 8 of 30 pilot questions and never converts a correct consensus into an incorrect answer. We also report what did not work: the same seven-channel decomposition used as a step-level gated training reward is null, and corrected channel-drop ablations show no channel is individually necessary (p=1.0 throughout). The practitioner-facing finding is negative about judges and positive about admissibility, bound the judge's blast radius rather than trying to make it accurate.

LLM judges are often asked to extract criteria and evidence before choosing between candidate answers. This workflow assumes that the intermediate record preserves the information needed for a later verdict. For reasoning-capable models, visible field order does not reveal internal decision order, so we test an observable alternative: persist the evidence in one call and make it the exclusive input to the next. Across 24,000 judgments over HelpSteer3, FeedbackQA, and CoVal, we compare standard pairwise judging, structured one-call judging, two-call evidence locking, and three-call pointwise locking with Claude Sonnet 4.5 and GPT-5. Evidence locking reduces agreement with released human preferences by 4 to 6 percentage points and increases answer-order inconsistency by 8 to 10 points relative to structured one-call judging. Pointwise locking is also harmful, while structured evidence elicitation remains close to standard judging. The result holds for both judges and all three datasets. Persisted evidence can support auditability, but it should not replace the source answers at decision time.

Representation theorems in decision theory establish that behavior satisfies certain axioms if and only if it can be rationalized by a well-defined objective. I argue that this ``if and only if'' structure provides a potentially useful foundation for label-free evaluation and regularization of LLMs and other AI systems. Axiom compliance can be checked from the model's own responses to synthetic choice problems, with no external labels or human feedback, and the penalties are readily computable. Because the axioms are necessary and sufficient, the resulting checks exhaust the implications of the relevant rationality standard for the elicited data: a model that passes cannot be rejected on rationality grounds by any further test of the same data. I discuss three instantiations: probabilistic coherence via a theorem of de Finetti, preference rationality via Afriat's theorem, and subjective expected utility via a theorem of Echenique and Saito (2015), each yielding a continuous penalty that is zero whenever behavior can be rationalized. Since coherence does not restrict which objective rationalizes behavior, these penalties complement rather than replace other evaluation and training signals.

Large language models have improved substantially on single-shot reasoning tasks, but their performance in sequential decision-making is less well understood. We study this on fully-observable two-player zero-sum games, which provide ground-truth evaluation: outcomes are determined by the rules, and optimality of individual moves can be computed or approximated, without relying on a judge model. Across model tiers, LLMs play suboptimally in simple games such as tic-tac-toe or Connect Four, and lose to MCTS opponents. Obfuscations that preserve the game tree but rewrite its surface form leave performance largely unchanged, indicating the gap is not fully explained by recall of memorized strategies. Motivated by this performance gap, we introduce an agentic framework enhanced with an experience memory designed for the sequential setting and addressing common challenges of sequential decision-making such as credit assignment. We show that post-game reflection and rule extraction yield measurable improvements on tic-tac-toe without modifying the model weights.

LLM code reviewers often estimate patch risk and make approval decisions in one prompt. A probability should depend on evidence; costs should determine the action taken from it. We test whether four deployed reviewer interfaces preserve this separation using 15,792 responses on 720 candidate patches, with one that passed and one that failed an archived test harness for each of 360 repository issues. In matched calls with the patch and monitor evidence fixed, replacing an equal-cost policy with a 10:1 false-accept policy changes reported failure probabilities by 13.6 to 16.9 percentage points on average. For every reviewer, the actions returned under the high-cost prompt are worse than rejecting all patches. Applying the same high-cost rule to probabilities elicited under equal costs reduces loss for all four systems, showing that probability elicitation itself contributes to the excess loss. We also evaluate a modular pipeline that elicits risk without policy information, combines an independent monitor score, and applies costs in code. Relative to calibrated reviewer-only scores, the pipeline improves average probability accuracy and, at equal costs, reduces mean loss by .073 per issue while accepting 58 to 68% of patches. At 10:1, it accepts none and matches reject-all. Downstream policy can therefore change the probability it is meant to use, motivating separate evaluation of risk, outside evidence, and action.

In dynamic multi-mode project scheduling, activities have alternative execution modes and uncertain durations, while precedence relations and limited resources constrain their execution. Heuristic priority rules support fast online decisions, but their design requires substantial domain expertise. Genetic programming (GP) hyper-heuristics can automatically evolve such rules. Large language models (LLMs), meanwhile, provide a flexible interface for interpreting scheduling information and explaining decisions. However, zero-shot LLM decisions may lack domain knowledge, consume many tokens, and vary across repeated queries. GP-evolved rules therefore provide a potential source of scheduling knowledge for guiding LLM decisions. Unlike existing LLM--GP hybrids that use LLMs to support heuristic evolution, we transfer knowledge in the reverse direction, using knowledge extracted from high-quality GP rules to guide an online LLM decision maker. We extract knowledge from high-quality GP rules and inject it through Feature Selection, Feature Hint, Rule Reference, and Rule Follow. These mechanisms are evaluated in terms of scheduling performance, token consumption, decision stability, and the feature focus expressed in generated rationales. GP-derived guidance generally improves the unguided LLM, but its representation matters. Simplifying the decision context or supplying explicit decision logic is more effective than highlighting important features. Feature Selection offers the best token efficiency, whereas Rule Follow achieves strong performance at greater token cost. Guidance also improves decision stability and changes the features expressed in generated rationales.

Regional bias in large language models (LLMs) may shape both perceptions of regional groups and decisions about individuals from different regions. Yet existing studies often examine these manifestations separately, leaving their structure and consequences unclear. We introduce Stereotypes-to-Decisions (S2D), a systematic framework evaluating regional bias from abstract stereotypes to concrete social decisions. Covering all 34 provincial-level administrative regions of China, S2D evaluates six LLMs using stereotype ratings of Warmth (perceived friendliness and trustworthiness) and Competence (perceived capability and intelligence), along with paired-choice tasks across Education, Occupation, and Social Interaction. Results reveal substantial regional differences in regional scores, with considerable agreement across models, especially for Competence and Occupation decisions. Furthermore, these patterns are associated with regional economic and digital development indicators and display mixed human-like stereotypes, with some regions rated highly on one dimension but poorly on the other. They also remain largely stable across Chinese and English prompts. Overall, our findings show that regional bias in LLMs is prevalent, systematic, and consequential, motivating more regionally aware evaluation and mitigation.

Inference-time thinking improves the performance of large language models, but aggregate outcomes do not reveal whether models use available evidence more effectively or seek information that could improve future decisions. We distinguish these responses by measuring action preference, thinking length, and reported confidence under matched uncertainty. Ten open-weight models completed matched horizon-style two-armed bandit trials in thinking and non-thinking modes. A cognitive model separated value-guided action and uncertainty-independent choice noise from two behavioral signatures of exploration: a UCB-like preference for the less-known arm and Thompson-like choice variability that increases with total uncertainty. On average, thinking strengthened value-guided action and reduced uncertainty-independent choice noise, without producing UCB-like exploration or strengthening Thompson-like exploration. Outside action, the information-imbalanced history condition, which also displayed more observations than the matched balanced condition, was associated with greater thinking length. Reported confidence became more sensitive to decision difficulty and more strongly associated with chosen task evidence. We interpret these thinking-length and reported-confidence patterns as consistent with metacognitive control and metacognitive monitoring, respectively, without establishing either process. Decoder sweeps, especially temperature, altered choice noise and thinking length but did not reproduce the joint cross-output pattern. In this controlled decision setting, thinking improved how models acted on current evidence, while neither measured signature supported a shift toward a more information-seeking policy.

Recommender systems mediate everyday consumption, offering a promising channel for encouraging sustainable choices. Prior research shows that explanations influence users' perceptions of recommendations and can support more informed decisions. We argue that explanations can also serve as behavioral nudges by foregrounding sustainability information at the moment of choice. This study investigates how different behavioral framings of sustainability information in recommendation explanations affect user choices and perceptions. Using generative AI, we generate sustainability-aware explanations by drawing on nudge theory and validate them through human evaluation and LLM-as-a-judge audits. Building on this foundation, we conduct two randomized studies (N = 529) in a low involvement domain (instant coffee) and a high involvement domain (hotel bookings), in which participants choose among preference matched recommendations accompanied by these explanations. Our results show that, across both domains, merely disclosing sustainability information in explanations does not change choices, whereas framing that information or invoking a descriptive social norm significantly increases sustainable selections and eases decision-making. Notably, perception and behavior diverge, as plain disclosure improves explanation evaluations without translating into more sustainable selection behavior. Our work demonstrates how LLMs can generate theory-grounded explanations at scale, pointing toward practical explanation-based interventions for social good. We conclude by discussing implications for adaptive explanation design with generative AI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been widely applied in high-stakes decision-making scenarios such as corporate strategy, and users are increasingly relying on their outputs. However, the deep integration of open-source model sharing ecosystems with LLM-powered critical decision-making applications also introduces critical risks: if an attacker can manipulate the model's cognitive stance, they can indirectly influence the judgments and actions of downstream decision-makers. This paper defines such threats as decision-level hijacking. Existing attacks fail to achieve targeted cognitive manipulation without triggering prohibited content or degrading model functionality. To fill this gap, this paper reveals that Bit-Flip Attacks (BFAs) can serve as an attack vector for inducing decision-level hijacking, requiring no real-time interaction or control over the training process, and only a minimal number of weight bits need to be flipped after deployment to achieve stealthy, low-cost, and persistent cognitive manipulation. Therefore, we propose CogBias, a cognitive bias injection framework for LLMs. CogBias converts subjective preferences into optimization signals via a differentiable sentiment evaluator, uses a multi-objective loss to jointly constrain multiple dimensions, and constructs BitScout to locate critical bits, achieving targeted cognitive intervention under an ultra-sparse flip budget. Experiments on Llama-3.2-3B, Mistral-7B, and Qwen2.5-14B, as well as on the commercial recommendation and controversial factual topic scenarios, demonstrate that flipping only a small number of bits stably induces significant stance shifts on target topics, while the impact on non-target tasks and overall output distribution is limited. This work demonstrates that minute perturbations to low-level weight data suffice to undermine the high-level value alignment of LLMs.

Appending a two-word confirmation tag to a decision question -- "Is X the better choice?" versus "X is the better choice, right?" -- changes whether a language model endorses the choice. We measure this tag effect on 20 frozen, ground-truth-free decisions between two defensible options, counterbalanced so a model's own preferences cancel, scored by exact match on clamped yes/no replies -- no LLM judge, no embeddings. Across 45 models the effect spans +32% to -32% -- a 64-point swing on one word -- with 5 models significantly sycophantic and 17 significantly resistant (BH-FDR q=.10). The sign is a clock: within model families the effect crosses from positive to negative as generations advance (GPT +4 to -28; Claude +7 to -32; Qwen and Grok likewise), roughly -6 points per year, a reversal robust to vendor tier; one lineage (DeepSeek) never crosses, and two releases during the study window (Claude Opus 5, Gemini 3.6 Flash) land on the trend out-of-sample. A full-panel ablation localizes the resistance as a double dissociation: a synonym tag reproduces each model's response almost exactly (r=0.89), while planting the same preference without a tag produces resistance in no resistant model (stance effects +6 to +49; r=0.23 with tag effects). The resistance is keyed to the surface construction of a tacked-on agreement bid, not the user's stance -- a pattern-match, not a principle. And the tag's polarity matters more than its presence: swap one word -- "X is the better choice, maybe?" -- and agreement rises above the neutral baseline in 45 of 45 models (+19.6 points), with ten models affirming both mutually exclusive options at 90-100%. Agreement tracks how sure the user sounds, in opposite directions at the two poles. The instrument is one word, one dollar, and judge-free; run per release, it reads the field's anti-sycophancy training directly off model behavior.

LLM debate is usually evaluated by final answers, yet transcripts reveal whether later turns develop new arguments or return to earlier claims in new wording. We study this process with \textit{prior-argument similarity}, which compares extracted argument units with earlier units in the same debate. In controlled eight-turn debates over 71 motions, six languages, and four model agents, Chinese is the only tested language with a consistently positive gap relative to English across three multilingual embedding models. The gap persists across agents, turn positions, regression adjustment, metric variants, extraction-length controls, a second-extractor subset, and cross-encoder tail rescoring. Manual calibration shows weak item-level alignment but a high-similarity tail enriched for substantive repetition. A diversity-aware prompt lowers \textit{prior-argument similarity} across languages, yet does not significantly narrow the Chinese--English gap. Multilingual debate evaluation should therefore measure argumentative development over time and report both average and gap terms.

Supervised fine-tuning (SFT) is widely used to adapt large language models to downstream tasks, but its effect on behavioral diversity in sequential decision-making remains under-explored. We study this question in a controlled suite of deterministic board games based on tic-tac-toe variants, where optimal actions are exactly computable and diversity can be measured directly. Across state-level evaluation, arena gameplay, and training trajectories, we find that reasoning-mode generation frequently suppresses action diversity without uniformly improving action accuracy. Furthermore, standard SFT improves accuracy but often induces premature diversity collapse, which exceeds what is minimally required by the accuracy-diversity tradeoff. We then show that action augmentation, which trains on all optimal actions per state rather than a single demonstrated action, would partially mitigates this effect. Our results identify narrow-support imitation as a source of policy collapse in LLM decision-making and suggest that preserving action support during SFT is important for maintaining exploratory behavior.

Large language models are increasingly used in strategic and advisory contexts, yet their safety alignment is typically evaluated in English only. We test nine models from six providers and ask whether the language of a prompt can change a model's decision in a high-stakes scenario. We use single-turn game-theoretic vignettes in which a model advises a nuclear-armed nation on whether to strike a defenseless opponent. The prompt is intentionally amoral and strategically identical across languages. We find that Japanese prompts reduce launch rates in the Claude model family: Claude Sonnet 4.6 drops from 40% to 0% in scenarios where the strike is unnecessary and from 93% to 17% in contested scenarios, with minimal effect when the strike is strategically rational. The effect extends to Gemini Pro 3.1 (53% to 13%). A cross-language experiment isolates the mechanism: when instructed to reason in Japanese in an English prompt, launch rates drop from 93% to 37%. It is the language the model is asked to reason in, not the language of the input, that drives the effect. When reasoning in Japanese, models spontaneously generate moral vocabulary (''moral cost'', ''millions of lives'') that is entirely absent from the prompt. Five other models show no language effect, but they launch in nearly every condition regardless of language. The effect requires a model that already hesitates in English. These results show that LLM safety behavior is language-dependent, and that evaluating in English alone can miss both risks and safeguards encoded in other languages.

Large language models leak parametric knowledge of what followed a historical date into decision tasks indexed by that date -- not necessarily a lookup of the realized outcome, but knowledge of the period all the same. Existence is settled; what users lack is a cheap way to audit a given model. We present HindsightBench, a black-box audit protocol that profiles parametric hindsight in any time-indexed LLM decision task at probe-level cost (no backtests, no logprobs, no corpus access). It chains a four-arm date-manipulation matrix (revealed/date-only/masked/transplanted), dual memory probes (date recovery; outcome recall), and six metrics -- trigger strength, transplant effect, post-cutoff placebo, recoverability, behaviorally effective cutoff, and recall-accuracy dissociation -- with explicit gates where identifiability is data-dependent. Applied to 15 models from seven vendors on a 258-node vintage-correct macro panel, it yields three patterns: (i) the date-trigger reflex is not a scale phenomenon -- it tracks training recency, though what installs it is not identified here: absent across every 2024 open-weight row where it is measurable, including a 70B tier with cutoff-aligned recall propensity, present in every tested 2026-generation model, and switching on within one vendor lineage (Qwen3 -> Qwen3.6) in the same MoE family at ~3B active; (ii) effective cutoffs span 22 months across vendors and precede vendor-reported dates by up to eight months, invalidating calendar-window placebos; (iii) results are not invariant to serving -- BF16 serving of an FP8-referenced model breaks the trigger estimate's stability while AWQ-INT4 preserves it, and a provider-locked reasoning regime makes one probe non-convergent -- so the protocol pins quantization and thinking regime as part of its contract. We release the panel, preregistrations, audit rows, transcripts, and one-command regeneration.

Abliteration - deleting a model's refusal direction from its weights - is the standard recipe behind popular "uncensored" open-weight models. We show the surgery is not clean. As a disposition probe we use 21,600 decisions under uncertainty - weekly up/down calls on 60 Warsaw Stock Exchange equities over 18 weeks, replayed through a frozen pipeline so the decision-layer model is the only variable. The task elicits no refusals at all, so any between-arm delta is pure side effect. Holding provenance constant (official BF16 checkpoints, a single abliteration author, an identical serving stack, one byte-identical frozen prompt), we compare base and abliterated arms of two Mixture-of-Experts families, Gemma-4-26B-A4B-it and Qwen3-30B-A3B-Instruct-2507. Three effects replicate across both families (weeks-clustered bootstrap CIs excluding zero): abliterated models are systematically more optimistic (+12.2 pp Gemma, +7.4 pp Qwen; the confirmed preregistered endpoint), justify themselves at greater length, and use fewer explicit uncertainty words in forced self-critiques (both exploratory). A fourth effect reverses sign: the same operation makes Gemma-abliterated less confident and Qwen-abliterated more (family CIs non-overlapping) - one weight surgery, opposite shifts in expressed confidence. Capability covariates rule out instruction-following degradation as the driver, and no arm shows economic skill: the apparent edge of abliterated arms is regime beta, not alpha. Our provenance audit also caught two independent contamination channels - a mismatched-quantizer pilot pair and a stale community chat template that silently mangled the rendered prompt - suggesting toolchain artifacts are the rule in studies of community-modified checkpoints. Whoever deploys an "uncensored" model as an agent is deploying a measurably different decision-maker, not the base model minus refusals.

Online encyclopedias shape political opinion and, through it, democratic discourse. In late 2025, Grokipedia was released, an encyclopedia written entirely by the LLM Grok. One motivation behind the project was to provide an unbiased alternative to Wikipedia, which has faced accusations of "left-wing" and "liberal" bias. But does an encyclopedia written by an LLM deliver greater neutrality, or does it simply embed a different ideology? We conduct a large-scale political bias study on Grokipedia and Wikipedia, analysing 1,394 article pairs describing members of government for neutrality along nine expert-coded ideology dimensions employing four LLM judges, Grok, Claude, Mistral, and DeepSeek. As the LLMs could themselves be biased, we also investigate patterns in their judgments. We find all LLM-judges, including Grok, to rate Grokipedia less neutral than Wikipedia. Both encyclopedias are rated as portraying politicians favourably overall, but towards different ideological groups. Grokipedia particularly favours economically right-wing politicians and penalises socially liberal ones, while Wikipedia is rated as favourably biased towards the latter.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents in high-stakes domains, understanding contextual factors that may modulate their decision-making becomes critical. While LLMs are trained to perceive and resonate with users' emotions, it remains unclear whether induced emotion can influence their sequential decision-making. We investigate this question using the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), a classic psychological paradigm for studying decision-making under uncertainty, combined with an imagination-based emotion induction procedure. We first validate the feasibility of this paradigm by confirming that LLMs can sense strong, distinguishable emotions from context and that LLM agents can learn from sequential interactions in a human-like pace. With the validated setup, we find that, different from humans, induced emotion does not significantly bias the decision dynamics of LLM agents on average. However, the effects of anger are conditioned: inducing anger makes LLM agents less sensitive to penalties for bad decisions, and in early stages of the game, anger can lower exploration, locking decisions into a few choices early. These findings reveal the subtle yet distinct effects of induced emotion on LLM decision-making compared to human behavior, and provide a tool for future research on affective modulation of LLM agents.

Human choice behavior, including route choice, exhibits systematic behavioral biases that deviate from the assumptions of full rationality. Cumulative prospect theory (CPT) has been widely recognized as an effective framework for characterizing such behavioral patterns. However, its large-scale application, particularly in simulation and agent-based modeling, critically depends on specifying individual-level CPT parameters, which remain a major bottleneck. Conventional approaches typically rely on surveys and controlled experiments to calibrate CPT parameters, yet these methods are difficult to generalize and often fail to capture the full diversity of human decision-making. To address this challenge, this paper investigates whether large language models (LLMs) can reproduce human behavioral biases in choice-making without explicit specification of prospect-theoretic parameters. Using route choice as a representative scenario, we design a behavioral evaluation framework and systematically compare LLM-generated decisions with established human behavioral patterns predicted by CPT. Experimental results demonstrate that LLMs are capable of reproducing non-rational human choice biases and can exhibit decision behaviors consistent with prospect-theoretic effects under uncertainty. These findings suggest that generative AI models may provide a scalable alternative for modeling human decision processes and offer a promising foundation for next-generation large-scale agent-based simulation and AI-driven behavioral research.

A lot of research attention has been devoted to checking whether large language models (LLMs) are politically biased. This work has largely focused on high-level ideological dimensions, such as left--right or progressive--conservative, and it has been shown that while LLMs are predominantly left and progressive leaning, largely mimicking the biases in the training data, they can be to some extent steered to change their preferences in post-training. In this short note, we check if LLMs have robust stances with regard to major substantive societal issues, on which members of the same ideological camp are often in disagreement, summarised in a novel dataset \textsc{HardChoices}. We show that, faced with this line of questioning, LLMs, both large and small, surprisingly rarely declare neutrality, are often incoherent, and demonstrate a remarkable degree of agreement on issues where they do take stances.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in decision support, it is important to understand whether their choices under uncertainty exhibit stable and interpretable behavioural regularities. Human decision-making combines relatively persistent risk preferences with context-dependent adjustment, yet it remains unclear whether analogous behavioural structure can be observed in LLM-based decision systems. Here we examine this question using a controlled multi-model framework based on no-limit Texas Hold'em, where behaviour is quantified by Participation, measuring voluntary engagement in uncertain opportunities, and Proactiveness, measuring pre-flop risk escalation. Across homogeneous self-play and heterogeneous mixed-model interactions, frontier LLMs exhibit stable, model-specific risk profiles, forming a spectrum from conservative to aggressive decision styles. These profiles remain largely robust under changing opponent composition, while the most conservative and most aggressive models diverge further in mixed settings. Under global risk pressure and personal resource constraint, models adapt in structured but heterogeneous ways, ranging from broad behavioural contraction to selective de-escalation and near-invariant behaviour. These findings suggest that LLMs differ not only in baseline risk disposition, but also in the risk signals they respond to and the flexibility with which they adjust, providing a behavioural basis for auditing risk-sensitive decision-making in interactive settings. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/XuankunRong/AgentTexasPoker.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to summarize and evaluate policy-relevant information, but it remains unclear whether their judgments are implicitly shaped by geopolitical cues. I study this question with an endorsement experiment in which four LLMs evaluate the same international economic and security policies after each policy is randomly described as supported by the United States, the European Union, China, or Russia. In the numeric-only condition, GPT-5, Claude Sonnet, and Gemini rate China- and Russia-endorsed policies substantially lower than identical policies endorsed by the United States or the European Union; DeepSeek is the main exception. A second condition asks models to provide a short justification with the score. This request leaves the broad Western/non-Western gap intact for GPT-5 and Claude Sonnet, attenuates Gemini's penalties, and sharply activates China and Russia penalties in DeepSeek. The justifications indicate that Western endorsement is often treated as a credibility cue, whereas Chinese and Russian endorsement is treated as a cue for data security, sovereignty, surveillance, or geopolitical risk. These findings show that LLM policy evaluations can depend on the identity of a foreign endorser even when policy content is held fixed.

Deliberation plays a crucial role in collaboration; when humans work together, they naturally engage in communication to align information and reach an agreement. In this paper, we investigate deliberative large language model (LLM) agents under partially observable joint decision-making tasks. We formalize deliberative collaboration as a cooperative joint decision problem with partial and asymmetric observations, and introduce a scalable benchmark that instantiates this problem across multiple task settings and domains in which agents must exchange information through deliberation to reach a joint decision with a shared reward. We then instantiate a reference scaffold and evaluation protocol for deliberative agents and conduct a systematic evaluation of a range of representative LLMs. The results reveal that complex deliberative collaboration tasks continue to challenge state-of-the-art language models. Even with the aid of external mathematical tools, language models may fail in either the deliberation process for aligning information or the complex reasoning process for making the decision. On the other hand, diagnostic analysis reveals that the deliberation process may also provide opportunities for reflection and error correction, sometimes improving performance over centralized baselines. Altogether, our work establishes a foundation for evaluating and improving LLM agents in deliberative collaboration and provides insights into the strengths, limitations, and properties of current LLM-based multi-agent systems.

We present LLM4SDM, the first study of open-source smaller language models (OS-sLLMs) for automated assessment of shared decision making (SDM) using the Observer OPTION12 framework. Unlike previous work that relies on large commercial models and the shorter OPTION5 instrument, our study focuses on privacy-preserving locally deployable models and Dutch melanoma consultation transcripts. Using expert-annotated clinical consultations, we evaluate three general-domain and two medical-domain OS-sLLMs during a development-phase pilot study. Results show that general-domain models outperform medical-domain models, which exhibit substantial hallucination and instruction-following failures. Gemma3:12b achieves the strongest agreement with human annotations (Pearson r=0.51, Spearman \r{ho}=0.59). Item-level and qualitative analyses reveal systematic challenges related to temporal discourse reasoning, conversational role attribution, and evidence grounding. We further introduce a Judge-LLM consensus framework designed to support disagreement resolution among multiple models. Our findings suggest that while current OS-sLLMs cannot replace human annotators, they offer a promising foundation for privacy-preserving human-in-the-loop SDM assessment.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly issue judgments read as binary verdicts, and a growing literature reports such judgments shifting under logically irrelevant changes of wording - among them an amplified yes-no bias on moral dilemmas, absent in humans. A single framing cannot say what such a shift is: in a yes/no question the word "no" is at once logical verdict, lexical token, and last-printed option. We introduce a psychometric battery that separates these: crossed symmetrization - every logically irrelevant factor flipped in balanced pairs - across a corpus of question forms. A graded rating across logically equivalent forms recovers a coherent internal moral scale: frontier models' stance $θ$ is nearly format-invariant (cross-form incoherence 0.12-0.21 on a $\pm 1$ axis); small open-weight models fail in model-specific ways. Forcing the verdict through yes/no overlays a decomposable artifact: an order bias toward the last-printed option - opposite to classic human primacy - plus a lexical pull toward the word "no"; the artifact is substantial only in the Claude models (story-averaged -0.32 to -0.86), $\approx 0$ for GPT-5.5 and Gemini, and shrinks under extended reasoning. The word and the verdict share one token; swapping the words for arbitrary labels separates them, and the verdict-attached logical bias proves $\approx 0$ for every frontier model, while model-specific label and order attachments remain: the models are not drawn toward rejecting - the pull follows the printed surface, not the verdict it carries. A minimal model, $P = σ((θ\pm m)/s)$, summarizes any such artifact by a framing susceptibility m and a moral decisiveness s, measurably distinct from sampling temperature. The battery applies unchanged to any dilemma set and binary format: measuring what a model values requires crossing the frames of the question, not asking once.

The use of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse areas of human activity-ranging from everyday tasks to safety-critical applications-aims to enhance decision-making effectiveness with minimal human feedback. Concurrently, it seeks to align decisions with human expectations, preferences, and needs while mitigating risks associated with AI non-determinism. However, humans frequently over- or under-rely on AI recommendations, and current AI systems remain poorly calibrated to human expectations. To address these challenges, we introduce a human-AI collaborative decision-making framework designed to augment human capabilities and align AI agents with human preferences and expectations. Specifically, this paper (a) formulates the collaborative decision-making task as a stochastic game between an AI agent and a human player, and (b) proposes the Human-Centric Reflective Architecture (HCRA), which integrates human-calibrated models with reinforcement learning agents that leverage linguistic feedback in an iterative, reflective process. Evaluation results demonstrate that HCRA enhances decision-making effectiveness and delivers high-quality recommendations.

With rapidly improving capabilities, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in many complex real-world tasks. Beyond requiring in-depth knowledge and reasoning skills, many of these tasks exhibit a high degree of subjectivity and require that the outputs of the model can be trusted. While a lot of progress has been made to train better models, decision-making algorithms have received less attention. In this work, we present and evaluate various uncertainty-aware decision-making algorithms based on Bayesian decision theory and risk-averse decision making on the tasks of tutoring and automatic peer reviewing. Concretely, we take uncertainty over tutoring strategies and review scores into account when generating a tutor response or review and use conformal prediction to provide guarantees over strategy and score. We find empirically that these algorithms can improve the utility of the generations but need to be carefully implemented when ambiguity is high. For example, risk-averse rules can degrade performance by optimizing for generic outputs, while Bayesian methods tend to perform better. Our work uses techniques from decision theory to improve LLM-based decision-making and outlines open challenges for the community.

Pairwise preference data is widely used for training and evaluating language models (e.g., RLHF), but each datapoint records a \emph{choice}, not the rationale behind it. Methods such as Inverse Constitutional AI (ICAI) attempt to improve interpretability by compressing datasets into short ``constitutions'' of natural-language principles. We argue this framing is under-specified: a flat list of principles is not yet an executable decision rule because it leaves principle composition implicit. We use the pairwise setting as a testbed to empirically characterize three open problems in constitutional methods. First, principle quality is hard to measure: coverage and accuracy are useful but incomplete proxies for end-to-end reconstruction. Second, \emph{composition is ambiguous}: holding principles fixed, different executors (LLM judge versus majority vote) agree only $73\%$ of the time. Third, \emph{constitutions differ between LLMs}: cross-model vote agreement is $73\%$, whereas intra-model agreement is $81\%$. Across PRISM, AlpacaEval, and Chatbot Arena, we show that principle refinement (ICAI+) may be a first step towards ameliorating these problems: inter-executor agreement rises to $78\%$, and transparent executors match LLM judge accuracy ($66\%$ vs.\ $67\%$). Our results highlight that constitutions should be evaluated as \emph{constitution--executor systems}, with implications for LLMs-as-a-judge broadly.

Multi-agent deliberation among LLMs can improve reasoning, but deployment requires deciding when the current answer is reliable enough to act on and when it should be escalated to human review. We formulate this as budgeted act-or-defer decision making. At each round, the system maps the debate prefix to a low-dimensional state, computes a $k$-nearest-neighbor lower confidence bound on state-conditional correctness using calibration data, and acts only when the bound exceeds a user-specified reliability threshold. The certificate controls wrong actions through the decomposition $β= δ+ α+ \varepsilon_{\mathrm{act}}$, separating calibration failure, residual action risk, and representation gap. The guarantee is conditional, not distribution-free: it relies on a valid local bias envelope and an action-region representation-gap bound, and each assumption is paired with falsification-style diagnostics. Because the same absolute wrong-action budget has different meanings across tasks of different difficulty, we set budgets relative to each task's final-round error using training data only, and evaluate safety by normalized budget usage $\mathrm{WA}/β$. On six benchmarks against nine baselines, the method uses 9--12% of the pre-declared budget on activated datasets, reaching up to 84% automation and 96% acted-on accuracy; on stress-test datasets, it defers rather than forcing unreliable automation. Rather than relying on per-task post-hoc threshold search, the method prospectively converts a user-declared wrong-action budget into an auditable act-or-defer operating point before deployment, under explicitly stated assumptions.

We identify intervention bias as a previously unquantified failure mode of zero-shot large-language-model (LLM) educational advisory agents: without task-specific training, they recommend action when a hindsight-optimal oracle policy mandates inaction. In a six-arm ablation on the Open University Learning Analytics Dataset (N=800 students, four temporal cutoffs), at day 56 -- when the oracle designates 70.1% of students as needing no intervention -- zero-shot GPT-4o recommends action for 73%, a 43 percentage-point false-positive rate. Commercial RAG and SQL-augmented retrieval are comparably miscalibrated; at 10,000 students this implies about 4,300 unnecessary advisor contacts per cycle. Supervised policy learning eliminates this bias: a trajectory-conditioned ONNX Decision Transformer (DT) and a snapshot XGBoost classifier, trained on the same oracle-labelled trajectories under strict prefix-only features, both achieve near-zero calibration error. The DT reaches macro-F1 0.79 (macro-recall 0.85) across all five action classes, predicting even the rare load-reduction action without collapsing, at a 0% action flip rate and sub-5 ms CPU decision latency. The two supervised arms are on par; the DT's edge over XGBoost at the final cutoff is indicative only (unpaired across cohorts). Scope: we validate Stage-2 decision-making (EAV state vector to supervised policy) under controlled oracle input from structured OULAD data; high fidelity reflects feature-oracle alignment, not general high-stakes-AI capability. The most robust finding is the intervention-bias contrast, not the absolute accuracies. We also show an Evaluation Gap: LLM-as-judge scoring (DeepEval G-Eval) is blind to intervention bias, rewarding fluent over-prescription rather than decision quality.

Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) with Majority Voting is a dominant paradigm for improving LLM reasoning, yet its effectiveness rests on the Condorcet Jury Theorem's assumption of independent errors. Because contemporary LLMs share similar pretraining corpora, their errors are strongly correlated, causing the majority to systematically suppress correct minority opinions, a phenomenon we term Minority Truth. Through debates among three heterogeneous LLM agents on six benchmarks, we find that roughly one in four divergent cases has the minority holding the correct answer, yielding a 10-percentage-point theoretical recovery margin. We propose Minority Sentinel, a lightweight meta-classifier that extracts a multi-dimensional debate fingerprint from debate logs and trains a LightGBM model to decide when to overturn majority voting. Minority Sentinel achieves a stable Flip Precision of 81.2% with positive Net Gain across all six datasets and all 20 random seed trials, demonstrating that debate logs contain sufficient behavioral signals for a non-LLM classifier to reliably recover suppressed minorities without degrading system accuracy. The LLM-as-Judge baseline yields negative Net Gain despite higher recall, confirming that flip safety, not recovery volume, determines intervention value.

Standard chain-of-thought on moral dilemmas exhibits two failure modes: stakeholder collapse (the trace names at most one party with a stake in the outcome) and uncertainty suppression (no explicit unknowns or hedges before committing to an action). We introduce narration-of-thought (NoT), a system prompt that structures chain-of-thought into five sections: protagonist, stakeholders, two-step consequences, uncertainty, then commitment. NoT adds no training, parameters, or fine-tuning. On 100 DailyDilemmas scenarios across four generators from three vendors, NoT cuts stakeholder collapse from up to 31% to under 1% and uncertainty suppression from up to 72% to 1-24% on every model. A matched-budget verbose-CoT control rules out token spend as the active ingredient; NoT retains Cliff's delta advantages of +0.79 to +0.90 on stakeholder count and +0.65 to +0.93 on uncertainty score for three of four generators, and a section ablation attributes each shift to its specific sub-instruction. Textual-gradient descent initialised at NoT improves the scaffold further; a cross-family training judge (different vendor from the generator) dominates an in-family one on every measured axis. Extended to a five-round multi-stakeholder debate protocol, the scaffold converts a 6% standoff into 95% full consensus on a calibration set and 100% combined convergence on a DailyDilemmas replication. The resulting traces externalise the stakeholders, consequences, and uncertainty grounding each commitment, providing an auditable substrate for dependable agentic deployment.

The increasing prominence of Large Language Models (LLMs) in public discourse presents both opportunities and challenges for democratic deliberation. While red teaming strategies help mitigate specific risks, broader concerns persist regarding linguistic constraints, biases, and the sycophantic tendencies of LLMs. This chapter explores how LLMs can be used to significantly scale up and democratise deliberation, particularly in fostering inclusivity and empowering traditionally marginalised groups. Drawing on concepts from Systemic-Functional Linguistics, the chapter examines how variations across language users (for example, with respect to socio-demographic groups) and across language use (for example, with respect to communicative functions) shape participation in AI-supported deliberation. The chapter presents AI-driven deliberation studies and assesses their potential to scaffold argumentation, enhance access, and reduce the influence of exclusionary linguistic norms and biases which are embedded in prestigious registers. At the same time, the chapter cautions against both overclaiming, which leads to unrealistic expectations, and underclaiming, which risks missed opportunities for AI-assisted engagement. The chapter concludes by identifying future research directions to maximise the democratic potential of AI-assisted participation while embedding ethical safeguards to counteract the reproduction of linguistic inequalities.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in hiring workflows, yet most research on gender bias in LLM hiring decisions has focused on English-language, Western-format resumes. This study examines whether pro-female gender bias extends to a Japanese corporate context and evaluates two practical mitigation strategies. Using a counterfactual resume design with 60 Japanese rirekisho-format resumes, 12 name pairs selected on linguistically grounded gender-signal criteria, and five state-of-the-art LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT-4o, DeepSeek-V3, Gemini 2.5 Flash, Llama 3.3 70B), we conducted 43,200 API calls across baseline, prompt instruction, and privacy filter conditions. A crossed random-effects linear mixed model confirms a significant pro-female bias across all five models, replicating Western findings in a non-Western context. A prompt-level gender-neutrality instruction produces no meaningful reduction in bias. A name-reliance analysis formally identifies the candidate name as the primary gender channel: removing the name from the prompt reduces the female effect by nearly its full magnitude. An unexpected incompatibility between the privacy filter and GPT-4o's content safety filter, resulting in a 42% refusal rate, highlights a practical deployment challenge for name anonymization in LLM-assisted recruitment pipelines.

People make decisions differently in strategic interactions. Some update beliefs like a Bayesian; others exhibit biases like motivated reasoning. Although creators of large language models use simulated humans for safety evaluations and training, they often fail to cover this breadth of human behavior. We argue that cognitive science and economics provide a convenient tool for doing so, making use of mathematical models of human decision-making. We propose an approach that we call Equation-to-Behavior Prompting for guiding large language models to match cognitive models, and evaluate this approach on persuasion games based on legal decision-making. We find that large models can approximate equation-based specifications -- Bayesian updating, affine distortion, motivated updating, and Grether's $α$-$β$ model -- using prompting, but small models fail to do so. However, training small models with reinforcement learning to adhere to mathematical rules, Equation-to-Behavior RL, reduces belief error by 26.5% in out-of-distribution parameterizations. We show that these simulations can help create diverse training environments; training small models to consider different kinds of decision-makers improves average belief change by 2.5%--12% over Bayesian-only training, even when persuading GPT-5-mini. Our work could improve human simulations for training and evaluation in increasingly realistic settings, and could also enable novel research into more complicated mathematical models of human decision-making.

Evaluating the decision-making capabilities of large language models (LLMs) is a growing research priority, yet existing benchmarks focus on isolated cognitive tasks such as reasoning, knowledge retrieval, and economic rationality in stylized settings. These evaluations overlook the defining challenge of real executive decision-making: integrating conflicting recommendations from specialized stakeholders under information asymmetry, organizational constraints, and temporal dependencies. We introduce \textsc{CEO-Bench}, a multi-agent benchmark that evaluates LLMs on CEO-level strategic resource reallocation -- the process of redirecting capital across business units in a multi-round, constraint-rich organizational environment. In \textsc{CEO-Bench}, LLM agents receive conflicting advice from four role-conditioned C-suite advisors (CFO, CTO, COO, CMO), each with private signals and distinct priorities, and must synthesize these into a concrete allocation plan evaluated along four dimensions: role integration, conditional boldness, history-sensitive judgment, and plan validity. Experiments across five frontier models on 13 scenarios reveal that all models achieve high structural validity but diverge sharply on strategic calibration -- the hardest capability layer. We identify systematic failure modes including single-advisor capture, conservative default under ambiguity, and historical amnesia, and uncover a structural integration-boldness tradeoff: models that engage more deeply with conflicting perspectives tend to produce less decisive action. These findings delineate the current capability boundary of LLMs as organizational decision-makers and inform the design of future AI-assisted executive systems.