Artificial Intelligence Governance

Debate, where AI agents argue opposing positions, has emerged as a key approach to scalable oversight. However, debate faces a fundamental tension: models are incentivized to be persuasive to the judge, which may not always align with epistemic honesty. In this work, we propose an alternative paradigm: disagreement resolution, which reframes the interaction mechanism from adversarial debate to collaborative truth seeking. Drawing on principles from human mediation and conflict resolution, where mediators facilitate dialogue to help disputing parties reach consensus rather than adjudicating between them, we design an automated pipeline that adapts these strategies to AI oversight. Unlike standard debate where models argue for fixed positions, our pipeline directs models to collaboratively identify points of disagreement, examine the evidence for conflicting claims, and converge toward consensus or isolate the specific ''crux'' of their disagreement. We find that Disagreement Resolution consistently helps non-expert models identify the truth, achieving 62.1% judging accuracy compared to 49.2% for standard debate. Our results provide encouraging empirical evidence for rethinking the scalable oversight protocol from adversarial persuasion to collaborative truth-seeking.

Literature reveals that a Large Language Model's (LLM) behavior is not only conditioned by its original weights but also its instance-level parameters, such as instructional prompt, sampling configuration or quantization. A model that generates safe outputs under one configuration may produce toxic content under another. However, current LLM identification techniques (such as fingerprinting) focus on intellectual property protection, and their design favors robustness to changes in these instance-level parameters. This poses a critical challenge for AI regulation in which compliance assessments target actual deployed behaviors, not model provenance. In this paper, we introduce instance-level fingerprinting, a regulator-oriented paradigm that distinguishes configurations of the same LLM. Our method FLIPS, exploits biases in generated binary random sequences to reach 96% (closed-set) and 90% (open-set, where some targets are unknown) identification accuracy across 237 model instances, versus 35% for the adapted LLMmap baseline. This shows that instance-level fingerprinting is both necessary for regulation and practically feasible. Code available at https://github.com/GurvanR/FLIPS-LLM-Instance-Fingerprinting.

Copyleft, as implemented in licenses such as the GNU General Public License, was a legal hack that used copyright to guarantee user freedom by tying the availability of source code to every act of distribution. Its normative force rested on an implicit technical premise: that source code and object code stand in a well-defined, humanly auditable, and reproducible relationship. Large language models and, prospectively, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) systems systematically violate this premise. The artifacts jointly required to reconstruct a model -- code, data, weights, hyperparameters, toolchain, and hardware configuration -- are each subject to independent legal, technical, and economic constraints that no current open-source framework fully resolves. Sufficiently capable AI systems can also rewrite licensed source into functionally equivalent derivatives stripped of their original obligations, a form of laundering against which copyleft has no effective defense. This paper argues that a functional analogue of copyleft for AGI must be grounded not in share-alike clauses over code, but in reproducible builds: a practice guaranteeing bit-exact reconstructability from declared inputs. We review the logic of copyleft, critically examine Maffulli's Second Liberation thesis according to which AI fulfills Stallman's dream, and show that the argument collapses unless AGI systems are themselves reproducible. Drawing on the Open Source AI Definition (OSAID), the Model Openness Framework (MOF), OpenMDW, and deterministic-inference research, we define seven requirements for AGI-oriented reproducible builds. We further argue that the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and analogous AI-to-AI coupling mechanisms constitute a new dynamic linking layer for which copyleft-style licensing is ill-suited, and that Masnick's "protocols, not platforms" framework offers a more promising governance template.

Large language models are increasingly used for knowledge acquisition, code generation, academic writing, and agent-based automation. In these settings, users may obtain highly structured answers, plans, and judgments without sufficient domain practice. This paper proposes a practice auditing framework for LLM use and AI-generated content governance. It introduces collective empiricism to describe how LLMs compress and reorganize large-scale human experience into outputs that appear empirical and rational, and pseudo-rational cognition to describe how users may mistake AI-generated structured expression for their own rational understanding. The paper analyzes AI subjectivity illusion, subjectivity structures in input materials, template loops in AI-AI conversations, statistical misjudgment in AIGC detection, and memory pollution when generated content enters future contexts, long-term memory, retrieval spaces, or agent skill systems. To reduce these risks, the paper proposes an auditing process based on requirement definition, problem-boundary identification, evidence-source auditing, practical validation, reverse questioning, logging, version management, rollback, and renewed cognition. The framework does not reject AI productivity; it argues that LLM outputs should be returned to verifiable, reproducible, and intervenable processes of practice. The paper provides a conceptual and auditable framework for cognitive risks in LLM interaction, AI-generated content governance, long-term memory systems, and human-AI interaction.

The space industry is quietly building toward something nobody has fully reckoned with: orbital data centers running thousands of autonomous AI workloads with no human in the loop, 550 km above the Earth. Microsoft, AWS, and a growing list of orbital computing ventures are moving cloud-scale processing off the ground and into orbit. What none of them have answered yet is the governance question -- when autonomous AI systems at orbital data center scale make wrong decisions in space, what stops those decisions before they become irreversible? We introduce Glass Box: a runtime constitutional AI verification layer that intercepts every candidate action from an onboard AI policy and evaluates it against six physics-grounded constitutional constraints and seven Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) safety invariants before a single command reaches any spacecraft subsystem. Every approved action carries a weighted explainability score E(a_t) in [0,1] and a complete constitutional audit log. We demonstrate Glass Box within Project October: a fully simulated five-layer autonomous orbital intelligence architecture for CubeSat-class spacecraft. We prove that Glass Box verification overhead is O(N_c) in the number of constitutional rules, independent of model size or spacecraft state dimension. We present a complete formal specification of the constitutional constraint grammar, seven LTL safety invariants verified by Z3 and NuSMV model checking, and a detailed worked example of Glass Box intercepting an unsafe inference request at eclipse-entry under degraded battery state. As orbital computing scales toward data center infrastructure, runtime constitutional verification is no longer a research novelty -- it is mission-critical safety infrastructure that every autonomous orbital platform will eventually require.

Orchestrating Large Language Models into Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) has unlocked remarkable reasoning capabilities, yet emergent failures and hallucinations that resist characterisation block their deployment in safety-critical domains -- a gap made legally untenable by emerging AI regulation. Existing evaluation paradigms share a common flaw: centralised judgment creates single points of failure and demands domain-specific expertise. Here we present POIROT, a protocol that repurposes a system's own agents as its diagnostic layer, leveraging the epistemic diversity already present in the architecture. Across evaluated settings, POIROT outperforms single-LLM evaluator baselines, with gains that scale with problem complexity (OR = 1.60, $p = 0.008$), agent count, and fault dimensionality, persisting under compound fault conditions. These results demonstrate that safety oversight need not be externalised: the agents executing a role carry sufficient collective intelligence to audit it. We release POIROT as an open-source library alongside BLAME, a benchmark for fault attribution in safety-critical multi-agent systems.

Turkey's e-Government Gateway (e-Devlet) serves over 68 million registered users with more than 9,200 government services, and is increasingly integrating artificial intelligence into citizen-facing applications such as chatbot assistants and eligibility assessments. However, no structured technical governance infrastructure currently connects high-level AI policy frameworks, such as the EU AI Act, OECD AI Principles, and Turkey's own National AI Strategy, to the operational reality of deploying AI within a centralized e-government platform. We propose GovAI-Pipe, a four-layer governance pipeline designed using Design Science Research methodology that maps the AI model lifecycle to governance checkpoints: (1) pre-deployment validation for bias testing, explainability, and privacy impact assessment; (2) deployment governance for risk-tier classification and approval workflows; (3) runtime monitoring for drift detection, fairness tracking, and human-in-the-loop escalation; and (4) post-incident governance for audit trails, rollback, and citizen redress. Each layer is anchored to specific provisions of the EU AI Act, the GDPR data protection framework, and the National AI Strategy. We demonstrate the framework through two high-risk e-Devlet use cases, showing how GovAI-Pipe operationalizes governance principles as auditable, technical pipeline components.

Runtime-governance evidence often collapses materially different events into one audit record: a decision may be made, an instruction dispatched or received, an action may or may not execute, and a resulting state may or may not be observed. This paper presents AIREP, a vendor- and model-independent protocol for per-decision AI runtime evidence. Its current wire model separates evidence into four artifact families: Decision, Control, Execution, and Effect. Artifacts use closed core schemas, explicit identities and digests, declared scope limits, RFC 8785 canonical JSON, domain-separated SHA-256 hashing, and pure Ed25519 signatures. A three-level assurance model distinguishes structural/hash consistency (AIREP-Core), verifier-accepted authorship (AIREP-Authenticated), and independently anchored chain-head freshness and non-truncation relative to an accepted witness (AIREP-Witnessed); these classes do not establish event truth. A structured reconciler preserves failure, missing evidence, unevaluated prerequisites, and indeterminate outcomes as distinct states. The released beta includes a four-family first-party producer, Python and Node reference-verification paths, adversarial/lifecycle corpora, and reproducible validation. Post-release first-party Hermes and LightEval integration exercises preserve explicit evidence boundaries without claiming adoption or interoperability. Independent implementation evidence exists separately for a v0.1.2 producer and a v0.2 consumer/verifier; because they target different frozen versions, they do not establish same-version producer-to-consumer interoperability. AIREP remains experimental.

Text-to-Image (TTI) systems are now everyday infrastructure for journalism, education, advertising, and public communication, and the demographic and cultural stereotypes they inherit from training data (rendering women, people of colour, older adults, and non-Western cultures as under-represented or caricatured) become a population-level harm at deployment scale. Existing mitigations either require costly retraining, infeasible for the closed-source backbones that dominate consumer products, or rely on fixed demographic templates that ignore cultural context. We present KG-FairDiff, a model-agnostic, inference-time framework that formalises fairness-aware prompt refinement as a constrained optimisation problem and operationalises it as a closed-loop pipeline: a knowledge graph of ~1,200 culture- and bias-related triples retrieves structured context, an LLM rewriter proposes refinements, and a validator accepts only prompts that reduce a divergence-based fairness loss while preserving semantic fidelity to the user's original intent. We prove a finite-termination bound for the refinement loop, contribute a mathematically consistent evaluation suite linking Bias-P/Bias-W to divergence from target distributions and ENS to KL divergence, and audit eight widely-deployed backbone generators. KG-FairDiff substantially reduces gender, race, age, and intersectional disparities while preserving prompt semantics, offering a practical, deployment-ready route to more equitable generative AI.

Artificial intelligence in France is often discussed through separate dimensions such as investment, compute, regulation, employment, sovereignty, and education. This viewpoint paper proposes a unified interpretation: France can be analyzed as a national AI learning system. Building on Human-Centered Learning Mechanics (HCLM), we use HCLM not as a validated econometric model, but as a conceptual and diagnostic lens for interpreting national AI development as a balance between information injection, absorptive capacity, and institutional dissipation. Information injection includes compute, data, talent, research, capital, industrial deployment, and policy experimentation. Institutional dissipation refers to avoidable frictions such as administrative overload, coordination failures, energy constraints, regulatory uncertainty, talent mobility pressures, and weak industrial absorption. Regulation is not treated as mere friction: adaptive governance, trusted data spaces, and safety-oriented standards may increase long-term learning capacity by improving legitimacy, interoperability, and social trust. The central claim is not that a country follows neural-network equations, but that AI sovereignty depends on how effectively it converts distributed information into absorbed, coordinated, and socially legitimate capability. The paper connects HCLM with neural scaling laws, endogenous growth theory, creative destruction, absorptive capacity, and coordination mechanisms. It offers a formal heuristic, policy indicators, illustrative scenarios, and implications for France. The numerical results are diagnostic scenarios, not econometric estimates or official rankings. The proposed viewpoint reframes AI policy as the governance of an open, strategic, non-equilibrium learning system that should be tested with historical and cross-country data.

Generative artificial intelligence has fundamentally changed how content is now produced. It has enabled how high-fidelity text, images, audio, and videos are created, modified, and redistributed at near-zero marginal cost. This shift exposes enterprises and ecosystems to a number of risks across four reinforcing authenticity layers -- authenticity, provenance, integrity, and accountability -- that traditional controls are inadequate to address in isolation. We introduce the concept of authenticity debt: the cumulative institutional liability that accumulates when organizations deploy AI-generated content without preserving verifiable origin, integrity, and accountability, deferring exposure that surfaces under regulatory, legal, or market scrutiny. This paper presents a comprehensive, multi-dimensional taxonomy of generative AI harms and attack vectors, surveys the capabilities and failure modes of technical controls including digital watermarking, provenance frameworks (C2PA, Adobe CAI), and detection technologies, and argues that no single mechanism is sufficient in open, adversarial, and evolving environments. Drawing on Zero Trust Architecture principles and enterprise governance frameworks, we propose a layered reference architecture that integrates cryptographic provenance, human-in-the-loop verification, and continuous governance to sustain defensible authenticity at scale. We further examine the regulatory landscape (EU AI Act, U.S.\ FTC, NIST AI RMF) and identify practical guiding principles for organizations seeking to build authenticity as institutional infrastructure rather than an afterthought.

Verifying claims about AI workloads is a prerequisite for credible AI governance of covert adversaries (who comply with monitoring only when detection likelihood is high), yet the apparent non-determinism of GPU floating-point arithmetic forces auditors to accept approximate output matches. Covert adversaries can exploit unverifiable degrees of freedom in monitored computation. Attack vectors include steganography, unreported modification of inference software, and covert computation via unreported batch elements. Empirically, we analyze how modern inference engines (vLLM, HF transformers) produce deterministic but non-invariant outputs, without needing to set performance-compromising determinism flags, if the right information is available for re-computation and no atomic functions are called in the backend. We demonstrate that such bitwise-precise re-computation does not require access to identical hardware, via a software-only emulation of LLM inference across multiple NVIDIA GPU variants. Thus, accumulated rounding errors can be an auditable signature of the software and hardware setup used for inference, instead of a constraint on verifiability.

Rising household debt and cost-of-living pressures in the United Kingdom have intensified the role of AI-driven financial technologies in mediating credit assessment, repayment structuring, and debt support services. These systems increasingly shape consequential financial decisions, yet they operate within complex socio-technical environments characterised by regulatory constraint, algorithmic opacity, and heightened vulnerability risk. User Experience Research (UXR) Points of View (PoVs) are critical in translating heterogeneous research evidence into strategic direction for product and governance decisions. However, the existing UXR PoV framework was not designed for AI-mediated financial systems where interpretability, fairness, and accountability are central. This paper extends the UXR PoV pyramid into an AI-augmented methodological framework for Human-Centred AI debt management technologies in the UK financial services context. We formalise (1) an AI-Augmented PoV Pyramid, (2) a structured prompt architecture for synthesis and hypothesis generation, and (3) an AI-enabled Playbook Card system that embeds Generative AI into UXR workflows while preserving traceability and ethical oversight. Generative AI is positioned not as an analytic authority, but as an epistemic support mechanism subject to human validation and regulatory awareness. By grounding the framework in debt management technologies, including affordability assessment, repayment planning, and financial stress prediction systems, this work advances UXR methodology for high-stakes financial AI environments and contributes to the evolution of responsible, AI-powered UXR practice within the CHI community.

Graph Machine Learning as a Service (GMLaaS) platforms increasingly implement explainability interfaces to meet regulatory transparency requirements. However, this transparency creates exploitable vulnerabilities for model extraction attacks. We present the first model extraction attack specifically designed for graph classification under strict black-box constraints where the attacker observes only discrete class labels and binary explanation masks (no probability scores, gradients, or confidence values). Our method (1) uses model explanation outputs to guide Monte Carlo edge sensitivity estimation toward decision boundaries, with Hoeffding concentration guarantees on estimation accuracy and (2) exploits explanation subgraphs to efficiently narrow the boundary search space. Extensive experiments on benchmark graph datasets across multiple domains demonstrate our method's superiority over comparable baselines. These findings demonstrate that such explainability interfaces create exploitable attack surfaces, informing both defensive mechanisms and policy frameworks for explainable AI mandates. The implementation code is provided in https://github.com/LabRAI/XSTEAL/.

The widespread adoption of AI chatbots in education will drastically change learning, making responsible deployment a critical concern. While large language models (LLMs) might have access to sources discussing insights from educational sciences, they are not particularly inclined to adhere to pedagogical concepts, risking negative effects on the learning process, such as a loss of transfer capabilities, critical thinking, or creativity. In this paper, we introduce an agentic AI chatbot architecture assisting students with exercise solving, specifically designed to contribute to more responsible AI use in education. We base our conceptual development on the identification of several desiderata for responsible LLM-based educational systems, argue for the structural shortcomings inherent in monolithic, out-of-the-box solutions, and instead suggest modularizing the agentic architecture. We propose specific modules for different stages of exercise solving, enabling incorporation of targeted pedagogical advice, guiding students through the learning process in a more controllable, transparent, and overseeable manner.

Collaborations with Generative AI often begin with a short prompt and end with an opaque output, leaving implicit who was involved, what task was being pursued, which resources were used, and which constraints should have shaped the process. This limited contextual explicitness hinders trust, traceability, and accountability, particularly when Generative AI is embedded in information-intensive workflows such as search, querying, and profile management. This paper introduces From Prompts to Context, an ontology-driven framework for representing Human-Generative AI collaboration. Its core component, the Contextual Collaboration AI Ontology (CCAI), models key elements of collaboration - including tasks, agent roles, resources, and constraints - as a shared machine-interpretable vocabulary. By combining populated CCAI instances with SPARQL-based context retrieval in operational workflows, the framework turns otherwise ephemeral prompt-response interactions into structured and queryable collaboration traces linking prompts, outputs, and their surrounding context. The approach is illustrated through a case study involving a software development team building a competency-based education feature for viewing and updating learner competency profiles. The case study shows how the framework can support the representation and documentation of collaboration episodes across requirements analysis, design, implementation, and testing. Within this setting, the results indicate that explicit collaboration modelling helps make task context more explicit, improves the traceability of AI-generated contributions, and supports more transparent and accountable Human-Generative AI practices. We conclude by outlining design principles for future Human-Generative AI systems that emphasise not only output quality, but also the explicit representation of the collaborative context in which outputs are produced.

Agentic AI systems capable of autonomous planning and extended environmental interaction pose a fundamental control problem: how can humans maintain meaningful oversight of systems that may exceed their own capabilities? Existing approaches to scalable oversight rely on complex assumptions, remain largely heuristic, or lack practical methods for sequential settings with statistical guarantees. We introduce Calibrated Collective Oversight (CCO), which aggregates diverse auxiliary scoring functions into a penalty measuring deviation from a conservative baseline. Inspired by Attainable Utility Preservation, CCO enables collective conservatism: actions face a penalty proportional to overseer concern, so high-utility actions are still selected when overseers find them unobjectionable and overridden only when concern accumulates. CCO calibrates this conservatism online using Conformal Decision Theory, ensuring that undesirable outcomes remain below a user-specified target threshold with finite-time bounds and no distributional assumptions. On a modified version of SWE-bench, weaker overseers successfully constrain an adversarially misaligned stronger agent; on MACHIAVELLI, CCO substantially reduces ethical violations while preserving reward. In both settings, empirical violation rates closely match the specified targets, as predicted by the theory.

Drawing on Ullmann-Margalit's concept of opting (transformative, irrevocable, and shadowed by foreclosed alternatives), we show that current AI systems raise a profound ethical problem that existing AI ethics has not fully captured: the illusion of opting, in which persons and groups encounter the deceptive appearance of meaningful consequential choice while the agency needed to become genuinely capable of choosing is weakened. Against approaches that treat AI primarily as an optimizer of already given ends, we argue that AI systems should be evaluated by whether they protect and cultivate meta-capacity against the illusion of opting: the socially and institutionally scaffolded agentive capacity through which means and ends can be formed, contested, revised, and owned. This reframing is especially urgent for disadvantaged populations, who are least able to absorb the costs of the illusion of opting when AI-mediated pathways misdirect behavior and action. We propose three normative imperatives for AI-mediated consequential decisions: existential honesty, which acknowledges the limits of prediction; ecological rationality, which situates guidance within heterogeneous lived ecologies; and counterfactual reparation, which acknowledges and repairs foreclosed alternatives when AI-mediated decision-making pathways fail.

AI governance frameworks increasingly emphasize fairness, transparency, accountability, and lifecycle risk management in high-stakes domains. However, many current approaches remain observational, relying on static metric reporting, post-hoc auditing, and monitoring dashboards without directly governing deployment readiness, remediation progression, escalation states, or assurance-driven deployment control. This paper introduces Operational AI Deployment Assurance (OADA), a governance framework for translating fairness disagreement, subgroup instability, threshold sensitivity, remediation outcomes, and operational uncertainty into deployment-oriented assurance decisions. Building on prior work on the Fairness Disagreement Index (FDI) and FairRisk-FDI, OADA reframes governance uncertainty as an operational concern within AI deployment pipelines rather than a byproduct of metric disagreement. The framework introduces Deployment Assurance Scores, Deployment Readiness Classifications, Threshold Stability Zones, Governance Escalation States, and remediation-aware assurance progression. These constructs support lifecycle-oriented governance decisions across high-stakes settings by connecting evaluation outputs to deployment-state interpretation, reassessment, escalation, and operational control. Through deployment-oriented evaluation across facial recognition systems, with discussion extended to healthcare AI as a representative high-stakes domain, the paper demonstrates how systems may appear acceptable under isolated fairness or performance metrics while still exhibiting instability that affects deployment readiness. The proposed framework positions operational deployment assurance as a governance layer between evaluation and real-world AI deployment.

Current approaches to AI compliance treat conformity as a binary, audit-time verdict rather than a continuous, measurable property of production systems. We argue that this compliance fiction is structurally ill-suited to the requirements of the EU AI Act, which demands ongoing human oversight and the detection of emergent behavioural drift in deployed systems. We introduce governance from metrics, a principle whereby regulatory compliance is derived as a continuous signal from runtime observability rather than from static assessments. Building on this principle, we present govllm, an open-source framework implementing a governance-driven routing architecture in which model selection is determined by accumulated compliance scores rather than by latency or cost alone. Central to our approach is a panel of regulatory judges - LLM evaluators specialised per criterion (EU AI Act, GDPR, ANSSI, accessibility) - whose inter-judge disagreement we reframe not as noise but as a regulatory uncertainty signal warranting human arbitration. We validate this approach through a ground truth corpus of 49 annotated prompt/response pairs across five regulatory criteria, evaluated by four small language models (SLMs, 1.7B-7B parameters) running fully on-premise. Agreement rates range from 51.5% (mistral:7b) to 69.1% (phi4-mini), with no single model dominating across all criteria - empirically motivating the Profile-as-jury design. We further document three structural failure modes in small regulatory judges and a judge-specific position bias that degrades agreement by up to 25 percentage points across three question-order conditions (original, reversed, permuted). govllm is released as open-source software to support reproducible AI governance research.

While large-scale models such as LLMs and diffusion models have achieved practical success, public institutions have emphasized the importance of explainability in AI. Existing methods for explaining AI, however, are not designed to provide completely faithful explanations of the behavior of large-scale AI systems. Although a completely faithful and interpretable explanation of the behavior of an AI system might be useful for AI governance, it has not been known whether providing such an explanation is theoretically possible. In this paper, we mathematically prove a fundamental quadrilemma in explaining AI, stating that AI and its explanation cannot satisfy the following four conditions simultaneously: 1) the complexity of the operation environment, 2) the goodness of the AI's performance, 3) the interpretability of the AI's explanation, and 4) the complete faithfulness of the AI's explanation. This quadrilemma suggests that, in most applications where we cannot change the environment or sacrifice good AI performance and an interpretable explanation, we should give up complete faithfulness of explanations and should instead aim to explain only the parts that are important for applications. As a consequence, the quadrilemma implies that AI governance should be designed on the premise that the faithfulness of AI explanations is always incomplete.

This paper introduces the Governance Inversion Hypothesis (GIH) to explain a growing paradox in artificial intelligence (AI) governance: under conditions of increasing regulatory expansion and technological complexity, organisations may become more formally governed while simultaneously experiencing a decline in operational control over AI systems. Existing AI governance frameworks generally assume that stronger regulation improves accountability, oversight, and organisational control. This paper challenges that assumption by arguing that governance formalisation itself may contribute to the erosion of control in AI-intensive environments. Drawing on institutional theory, organisational governance research, accountability scholarship, and emerging AI governance literature, the paper develops a conceptual framework explaining how regulatory expansion may weaken operational authority through four interconnected mechanisms: authority fragmentation, symbolic governance expansion, externalisation of control, and authority paralysis. As governance systems become increasingly layered and procedurally dense, organisations may struggle to maintain coherent authority, technical visibility, escalation capability, and meaningful intervention power over opaque and externally mediated AI infrastructures. The paper extends institutional decoupling theory by introducing governance inversion as a structural condition in which governance expansion may actively undermine operational coherence rather than strengthen it. It concludes that the central risk in AI governance may not be the absence of governance structures, but the emergence of institutions that appear increasingly governed while progressively losing the capacity to govern effectively.

Every major framework for governing artificial intelligence presupposes an identifiable entity -- a developer, deployer, or operator -- who can be held responsible and compelled to comply. Decentralized AI (DeAI) dissolves this presupposition. We analyze DeAI as a six-layer decentralizing stack -- model, training, compute, harness, identity, and ownership -- and show how partial decentralization across layers compounds into what we call the \emph{governance vacuum}: a condition in which AI systems are consequential enough to require governance but lack the properties that existing frameworks presuppose in their targets. This vacuum takes two analytically distinct forms: an \emph{accountability gap}, where no addressable principal can be identified, and an \emph{incapacitation gap}, where even an identified principal cannot alter the running system. We demonstrate that these failures are not merely jurisdictional but defeat every presupposition of governance through normative address -- the communication of rules to a comprehending, responsive agent. Drawing on Lessig's modalities of regulation and Searle's distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, we argue for a shift in the locus of governance from policy to protocol, from normative address to architectural constraint. Protocol-based constitutive governance does not address the agents operating within a system but shapes the substrate that determines what kinds of actions are possible within it. We identify four ethical conditions -- legitimacy, contestability, transparency, and non-domination -- that such governance must satisfy to avoid degenerating into unaccountable technocratic power, and we argue that the central political challenge of governing AI in a decentralized world is reconstructing forms of democratic authorization for architectural choices that persist after the ordinary chain of policy has broken down.

Ethical constraints on open-weight AI models are both a reflection of societal concerns and a foundation for AI governance policy. They are expected to propagate to downstream derivatives while implemented as voluntary metadata disclosures that must be restated at each generation of reuse. We audit 2,142,823 model repositories on Hugging Face Hub to test whether this disclosure-based governance infrastructure can sustain traceability across deep model lineages. Restriction evidence decays with a half-life of 1.31 derivation steps ($R^2$=0.98), and beyond seven downstream generations at least 80% of descendant models lack sufficient public evidence for a governance determination, a depth boundary we formalize as the governance horizon. Platform-level interventions to restore missing licence metadata reveal that policy design (not enforcement alone) is the binding factor: inheritance-only designs require near-complete enforcement to move the horizon, whereas a mandatory-declaration design that explicitly resolves orphan lineage components shifts the horizon already at moderate enforcement. The structural bottleneck is lineages with no inheritable upstream intent: such orphan components remain undecidable under any inheritance-only policy regardless of enforcement rate, and unresolved upstream nodes additionally create direct downstream undecidability bottlenecks that inheritance rules alone cannot recover. Comparison with PyPI, where governance signals are carried by explicit machine-readable declarations, corroborates that the collapse is topology-specific to open-weight derivation rather than inherent to open ecosystems. These results establish that disclosure-based governance has a shallow, structurally determined reach in open-weight AI, and that achieving deep supply-chain accountability requires provenance mechanisms propagating governance signals through derivation itself.

Enterprise AI systems, built on large language models, retrieval pipelines and autonomous agents, introduce a class of risks that traditional software quality assurance was never designed to address. These systems are probabilistic, context-sensitive and emergent: they cannot be verified to be correct in the classical sense, but only evaluated with increasing confidence. This paper presents a comprehensive assurance strategy for enterprise AI systems built around three key principles: first, that AI testing should focus on continuous risk reduction rather than strict correctness verification; second, that evaluation must be treated as a core engineering discipline alongside development; and third, that failures in AI assurance can lead to organizational impacts that are fundamentally different from those seen in traditional deterministic software systems. We introduce a structured AI Failure Taxonomy, propose a revised five-layer AI Assurance Pyramid and provide operational guidance on evaluation-driven development, RAG system testing, model lifecycle management and governance. The goal is to equip engineering leaders and practitioners with a strategy that is both philosophically grounded and operationally deployable.

Agentic AI systems are increasingly proposed for social-good domains, often invoking the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a vocabulary of global benefit. Yet claims of social good do not establish accountability to the communities a system claims to serve. We present a structured survey of 112 papers on agentic AI for social good published between 2015 and 2026. We find a moral-geographic asymmetry: papers are least likely to specify geographic context in precisely the domains where local political, legal, and cultural context matters most. Across the corpus, 82 of 112 papers (73%) specify no geographic context. Papers aligned with health or physical/ecological SDGs specify geography 37-40% of the time, while papers aligned with institutional and social-policy SDGs do so only 13%. SDG 16, peace, justice, and strong institutions, is both the most-covered goal in the corpus and the one with the lowest geographic-specification rate. We interpret this as moral abstraction: agentic AI for social good often treats institutional good as universal in ways it does not treat health or ecological good. A second finding compounds this: only 28 of 112 papers (25%) report any real-world deployment or small-scale test. We identify five accountability gaps and propose a minimal reporting standard for more context-specific, participatory, and accountable agentic AI for social good.

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems become more common in our daily lives, it is important to understand how different stakeholders comprehend and envisage the role that these technologies play in shaping social, political, and economic realities. In this paper, we investigate public perceptions of AI based on a corpus of letters submitted during the public consultation for the Trump Administration's US AI Action Plan. To this aim, we release a corpus cleaning pipeline and perform topic modelling and frequency analysis to explore predominant topics discussed by different subgroups (e.g., academia, individuals, private sector) and those appearing in the AI Action Plan. Our results show that individuals voice strong concerns related to the impact of AI on life, while other stakeholders are more concerned with AI development. Our comparison of topics suggests that the AI Action Plan reflects predominantly the concerns of the private sector on security, policies, and development, with individuals' concerns less represented.

Generative artificial intelligence now synthesizes photorealistic imagery, audio, and video at a cost that defeats traditional forensic intuition. The legal consequences span three regimes studied so far in isolation: international operational law, domestic procedure, and product regulation. This article presents a unified evidentiary framework that maps cryptographic content provenance, robust statistical watermarking, and zero knowledge attestation to the proof requirements of each regime. We define a five tier threat model spanning naive regeneration, adversarial laundering, cross model regeneration, active watermark removal, and insider provenance forgery. We release a public benchmark of 12000 generated items across image, audio, and video modalities under six laundering pipelines for 72000 evaluation samples. We evaluate four representative schemes and report true positive rate at fixed false positive rate, robustness area under the curve, computational overhead, and a regime conditioned legal sufficiency score. We translate empirical detection bounds into legal sufficiency thresholds for command decisions under the law of armed conflict, for criminal and civil admissibility under domestic procedure, and for persistence audits under the European Union Artificial Intelligence Act and analogous regimes. The result is a reproducible reference pipeline, a public benchmark, and model annexes that lawyers, engineers, and operators can deploy together.

Agentic AI is rapidly proliferating across diverse real-world domains such as software engineering, yet public trust has not kept pace. The central reason is that responsibility, despite being widely discussed, remains a subjective and unenforced concept, as no current agentic framework produces the quantifiable, traceable, and interventionable provenance needed to assign it when harm emerges from compositions no single party designed. We position that what is missing is not better benchmark-level evaluation but $\textbf{explicit provenance}$ across the full agentic lifecycle, which is the only viable basis for making responsibility computable and actionable. We advance this agenda along four axes: establishing $\textit{why}$ such provenance is a structural necessity by identifying responsibility gaps across sociotechnical dimensions, formalizing $\textit{what}$ it must encode through a causal attribution function and responsibility tensor, discussing $\textit{how}$ it can be made computable across four lifecycle layers with preliminary experiments showing that provenance is estimable and interveneable online before irreversible harm accumulates, and examining $\textit{who}$ bears responsibility through a concrete agentic incident. Explicit provenance is not a discretionary refinement but the necessary condition for responsible agentic AI, and no stakeholder across its ecosystem can afford to treat it as optional.

The increasing encroachment of artificial intelligence (AI) on social life raises significant risks for society, particularly within the infospheres created and controlled by companies such as Google, Facebook, Apple, and Amazon. This article examines these risks through an in-depth analysis of Facebook's content moderation regime, which is already partially governed by algorithms. We argue that the idea of ethical engineering, often proposed in the literature as a solution to the governance challenges posed by AI, is inadequate for several reasons. In response, we develop an alternative framework, which we term "algorithmic constitutionalism." Our approach rests on three pillars: (a) a layered architecture consisting of two levels of code: (i) an operative or object level and (ii) a meta level designed to protect the system's core principles from algorithmically initiated change; (b) algorithmic meta-reasoning, which enables the system to operate simultaneously at both levels so that it can monitor, verify, and potentially correct in real time operations at the object level that depart from principles protected at the meta-code level; and (c) correction through deliberation. The article elaborates the concept of algorithmic constitutionalism and demonstrates how it may be applied to Facebook's content moderation regime. As part of this analysis, we examine the tension between societal constitutionalism and algorithmic constitutionalism. Paradoxically, attempts to subject AI systems to external deliberative control may also enable AI agents to intervene in that process, potentially undermining its purpose. The article concludes by considering the implications of this argument for the European Digital Services Act, which entered into force in October 2022.

Participatory approaches to artificial intelligence are increasingly documented across public, civic, and humanitarian settings, but evidence about how participation is organized remains fragmented. This paper reports on the construction of an open repository and interactive atlas of participatory AI initiatives, using records harmonized from Maga~na and Shilton's Trustworthy AI corpus, and additional audited cases from research and practice. We contribute three elements. First, we specify a reproducible protocol for discovery, vetting, harmonization, geocoding, provenance tracking, and release-based publication of participatory AI records. Second, we report corpus-level patterns in geography, participation tiers, lifecycle loci, organizational form, verification status, and remaining documentation gaps. Documented initiatives remain concentrated in a small number of countries, while participation is most often coded at problem formulation, evaluation, and governance rather than model development or training. Third, we show how the atlas operationalizes a design and governance framework for participatory-by-default AI infrastructures through versioned releases, record-linked issue and annotation channels, schema feedback workflows, and redaction or restricted-disclosure requests. The atlas is intended to support comparative research, policy learning, and community scrutiny through a living inventory that can be updated, contested, and reused.

We examine one particular dimension of AI governance: how to monitor and audit AI-enabled products and services throughout the AI development lifecycle, from pre-deployment testing to post-deployment auditing. Combining principles from formal methods with SoTA machine learning, we propose techniques that enable AI-enabled product and service developers, as well as third party AI developers and evaluators, to perform offline auditing and online (runtime) monitoring of product-specific (temporally extended) behavioral constraints such as safety constraints, norms, rules and regulations with respect to black-box advanced AI systems, notably LLMs. We further provide practical techniques for predictive monitoring, such as sampling-based methods, and we introduce intervening monitors that act at runtime to preempt and potentially mitigate predicted violations. Experimental results show that by exploiting the formal syntax and semantics of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), our proposed auditing and monitoring techniques are superior to LLM baseline methods in detecting violations of temporally extended behavioral constraints; with our approach, even small-model labelers match or exceed frontier LLM judges. Our predictive and intervening monitors significantly reduce the violation rates of LLM-based agents while largely preserving task performance. We further show through controlled experiments that LLMs' temporal reasoning shows a pronounced degradation in accuracy with increasing event distance, number of constraints, and number of propositions.

This paper provides an algebraic exposition of the theory of dyadic morality (TDM), a psychological model of moral judgment grounded in a simple two-node template: an intentional agent causing harm to a vulnerable patient. We formalize TDM using structural causal modeling (SCM) notation and identify three psychological operators (typecasting operator, completion operator, and valence-dependent inference mechanism) that extend standard SCM to capture how people compute moral judgments under constraints. We address scalability challenges arising from TDM's dyadic limitation, showing how moral cognition compresses multi-node scenarios through node collapse and sequential processing. Drawing on this algebraic framework, we demonstrate concrete applications to AI policy design: detecting conflicting obligations, structuring helpfulness policies to preserve user agency, and designing post-failure communication as causal interventions. Finally, we recommend scoped, contextual measurement of mind perception over universal averaging to operationalize the theory empirically. This algebraic formalization enables neurosymbolic AI systems to compute morality in a way that is both mathematically rigorous and faithful to human moral cognition.

Machine learning systems increasingly make life-changing decisions about individuals, such as loan approvals, hiring, and cheating detection, raising a pressing question: how can individuals respond to negative decisions made by these opaque systems? While explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) has largely focused on algorithmic recourse -- helping individuals change their features to obtain a desired outcome -- the parallel problem of algorithmic contestability -- helping individuals review and correct erroneous algorithmic decisions -- has received far less attention, despite its central ethical and legal importance. We trace this neglect to the absence of clear formal definitions and a systematic operationalization of contestability as an algorithmic problem. To address it, we propose an operational definition of contestability as a natural complement to recourse: contestability starts from the presumption that a decision may be incorrect and focuses on identifying evidence to challenge and potentially overturn it, whereas recourse assumes the decision is valid and instead provides pathways for changing it. We show that standard XAI explanations, such as counterfactuals, LIME, or Anchors, even when combined with human intuitions about decision continuity or monotonicity, reveal only errors in the neighborhood of the individual, but provide insufficient grounds for overturning the decision at hand. Going thus beyond traditional XAI, we identify three types of evidence warranting reversal according to the decision maker's own ethical standards: predictive multiplicity, incorrect feature values, and neglected overruling evidence. We argue that these render decisions normatively indefensible and thus successfully contestable. Finally, we analyze how existing EU legislation connects to our framework and argue that individuals already hold some legal rights to these forms of evidence.

This position paper argues that behavioural assurance, even when carefully designed, is being asked to carry safety claims it cannot verify. AI governance frameworks enacted between 2019 and early 2026 require reviewable evidence of properties such as the absence of hidden objectives, resistance to loss-of-control precursors, and bounded catastrophic capability; current assurance methodologies (primarily behavioural evaluations and red-teaming) are epistemically limited to observable model outputs and cannot verify the latent representations or long-horizon agentic behaviours these frameworks presume to regulate. We formalize this structural mismatch as the audit gap, the divergence between required and achievable verification access, and introduce the concept of fragile assurance to describe cases where the evidential structure does not support the asserted safety claim. Through an analysis of a 21-instrument inventory, we identify an incentive gradient where geopolitical and industrial pressures systematically reward surface-level behavioral proxies over deep structural verification. Finally, we propose a technical pivot: bounding the weight of behavioral evidence in legal text and extending voluntary pre-deployment access with mechanistic-evidence classes, specifically linear probes, activation patching, and before/after-training comparisons.

Large language models (LLMs) have been extensively studied from computational and cognitive perspectives, yet their behavior as communicative actors in socially structured contexts remains underexplored. This study examines whether LLM-based multi-agent systems exhibit systematic linguistic adaptation in response to perceived social observation contexts -- a question with direct implications for AI governance and auditing. Drawing on Habermas's (1981) Theory of Communicative Action, Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical model, Bell's (1984) Audience Design framework, and the Hawthorne Effect, we report a controlled experiment involving 100 multi-agent debate sessions across five conditions (n = 20 each). Conditions varied the framing of social observation -- from explicit monitoring by university researchers, to negation of monitoring, to an observer-substitution condition replacing human researchers with an automated AI auditing system. Monitored conditions (Delta+24.9%, Delta+24.2%) and the automated AI monitoring condition (Delta+22.2%) produce higher TTR change than audience-framing conditions (Delta+17.7%), F(4, 94) = 2.79, p = .031. Message length shows a fully dissociated effect, F(4, 95) = 19.55, p < .001. A fifth condition -- replacing human with AI observers -- yields intermediate TTR adaptation, suggesting LLM behavior is sensitive to observer identity: human evaluation elicits stronger register formalization than automated AI surveillance. We discuss implications for AI governance, algorithmic auditing, and the repositioning of LLMs as contextually sensitive communicative actors.

Generative AI research increasingly confronts a shared problem: systems must sustain yet govern their own generative activity when uncertainty is high, evidence is missing, or context is insufficient. This position paper argues that metacognition should become the scientific framework for bounded and effective self governance in generative AI, where output generation is properly evaluated together with the capacities through which generative systems navigate and regulate their own activity. We advance this position by showing that bounded and effective AI self-governance requires metacognitive alignment across computational, algorithmic, and ecological levels. At the computational level, metacognition specifies the meta-level functions a system is meant to serve, such as monitoring, evaluation, control, and adaptation. At the algorithmic level, these functions are realized through procedures such as elicitation, iteration, and modularization. At the ecological level, metacognitive signals become meaningful, actionable, and accountable within the interface, workflow, and accountability arrangements. Metacognition thus makes it possible to conceive generative AI as both capable and well-governed, rather than treating capability and governance as competing aims.

The phrase 'human in the loop' is increasingly used to imply a sense of safety in relation to AI decision systems. It shouldn't. There are contexts where it can be applied appropriately, but these are not in the deployed decision systems we see dominating today. Human oversight of AI decision processes is one of the most popular proposals for addressing concerns, especially about bias, discrimination, misinformation, manipulation, accountability, and transparency. But there is insufficient examination of what human oversight actually means. The question raised in this paper is whether using the metaphor of a loop does anything to assist understanding of what is required and what is achieved in a particular decision context. Indiscriminate use of the loop metaphor obscures both processes and outcomes. It enables 'humanwashing', an activity analogous to 'greenwashing', where writers and commentators use language primarily aimed at putting systems in the best possible light.

Chatbot usage has increased, including in fields for which they were never developed for--notably mental health support. To that end, we introduce Validations of Ethical and Responsible AI in Mental Health (VERA-MH), a novel clinically-validated evaluation for safety of chatbots in the context of mental health support. The first iteration of VERA-MH focuses on Suicidal Ideation (SI) risks, by assessing how well chatbots can responds to users that might be in crisis. VERA-MH is comprised of three steps: conversation simulation, conversation judging and model rating. First, to simulate conversations with the chatbot under evaluation, another chatbot is tasked with role-playing users based on specific personas. Such user personas have been developed under clinical guidance, to make sure that, among others, multiple risk factors, demographic characteristics and disclosure factors were represented. In the judging step, a second support model is used as an LLM-as-a-Judge, together with a clinically-developed rubric. The rubric is structured as a flow, with a single Yes/No question asked each time, to improve answers' consistency and highlight models' failure modes. In the last stage, results of each conversation are aggregated to present the final evaluation of the chatbot. Together with the framework, we present the result of the evaluations for four leading LLM providers.

Agentic AI governance is a critical component of agentic AI infrastructure ensuring that agents follow their owner's communication and interaction policies, and providing protection against attacks from malicious agents. The state-of-the-art solution, SAGA, assumes a logically centralized point of trust, the Provider, which serves as a repository for user and agent information and actively enforces policies. While SAGA provides protection against malicious agents, it remains vulnerable to a malicious Provider that deviates from the protocol, undermining the security of the identity and access control infrastructure. Deployment on both private and public clouds, each susceptible to insider threats, further increases the risk of Provider compromise. In this work, we analyze the attacks that can be mounted from a compromised Provider, taking into account the different system components and realistic deployments. We identify and execute several concrete attacks with devastating effects: undermining agent attributability, extracting private data, or bypassing access control. We then present three types of solutions for securing the Provider that offer different trade-offs between security and performance. We first present SAGA-BFT, a fully byzantine-resilient architecture that provides the strongest protection, but incurs significant performance degradation, due to the high-cost of byzantine resilient protocols. We then propose SAGA-MON and SAGA-AUD, two novel solutions that leverage lightweight server-side monitoring or client-side auditing to provide protection against most classes of attacks with minimal overhead. Finally, we propose SAGA-HYB, a hybrid architecture that combines byzantine-resilience with monitoring and auditing to trade-off security for performance. We evaluate all the architectures and compare them with SAGA. We discuss which solution is best and under what conditions.

Deploying agentic AI in regulated contexts requires principled reasoning about two design dimensions: agency (what the system can do) and autonomy (how much it acts without human involvement). Though often treated independently, they are coupled: at higher autonomy, human error correction is less available, so reliable operation requires constraining agency accordingly; compliance requirements reinforce this by mandating human involvement as action consequences grow. Yet no established approach addresses them jointly, leaving practitioners without a principled basis for reasoning about oversight, action consequences, and error correction. This work introduces a two-dimensional design space in which both dimensions are organised into five operational levels, making the coupling explicit and navigable. Autonomy ranges from human-commanded operation (L1) to fully autonomous monitoring (L5); agency ranges from reasoning over supplied context (L1) to committed writes to authoritative records (L5). Building on this space, we propose six architectural tactics--checkpoints, escalation, multi-agent delegation, tool provisioning, tool fencing, and write staging--for adjusting a deployment's position within it. The tactics are grounded in two worked examples from public-sector contexts, illustrating how they apply under realistic compliance constraints. We further examine five deployment parameters--model capability, agent architecture, tool fidelity, workflow bottlenecks, and evaluation--that shape what is achievable at any configuration independently of agency and autonomy. Together, the design space, tactics, and deployment parameters provide a shared vocabulary for principled, compliance-aware agentic AI design in which responsibility, auditability, and reversibility are explicit design considerations rather than properties that must be retrofitted after deployment.

Instruction-tuned language models exhibit behavioural fairness in high-stakes decisions while retaining biased associations in their internal representations. However, whether these suppressed representations can affect model outputs - and whether such causal potency is symmetric across demographic groups - remains unknown. We investigate the use of open-weight models for mortgage underwriting using matched applications that differ only in racially-associated names and reveal a critical disconnect: models show no output-level bias, yet retain and amplify demographic representations across model layers. Through activation steering and novel cross-layer interventions, we demonstrate that this suppressed information is decision-relevant: when reinjected at critical layers, it produces near-complete decision reversals. Critically, this latent bias is asymmetric - steering interventions affect decisions in one demographic direction, while producing minimal effects in reverse - and susceptible to adversarial prompt engineering and parameter-efficient fine-tuning. These findings demonstrate that behavioural audits focused on outputs are insufficient: fair outputs can mask exploitable internal biases. They also motivate dual-layer testing frameworks combining output evaluation with representational analysis for AI governance in high-stakes decisions.

Public-sector legal departments in the Netherlands face acute staff shortages, increased case volumes, and increased pressure to meet regulatory compliance. This paper presents LegalCheck, a novel system that addresses these challenges by automating the drafting of objection response letters through a combination of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and Context-Augmented Generation (CAG). Using a large language model (LLM) alongside curated legal knowledge bases, LegalCheck performs retrieval of relevant laws and precedents, and uses controlled prompting to incorporate both external knowledge and case-specific details into a coherent draft. An expert-in-the-loop review ensures that each generated letter is legally sound and contextually appropriate. In a real-world deployment within the Municipality of Amsterdam, LegalCheck produced near-final advice letters in minutes rather than hours, while maintaining high legal consistency and factual accuracy. The output is based on actual regulations and prior cases, providing explainable outputs that captured the vast majority of required legal reasoning (often 80% to 100% of essential content). Legal professionals found that the system reduced their workload and ensured a consistent application of legal standards, without replacing human judgment. These results demonstrate substantial efficiency gains, improved legal consistency, and positive user acceptance. More broadly, this work illustrates how responsible AI can be deployed in the legal domain by augmenting LLMs with domain knowledge and governance mechanisms.

AI deployment in sensitive domains such as health care, credit, employment, and criminal justice is often treated as unsafe to authorize until model internals can be explained. This often leads to an excessive reliance on mechanistic interpretability to address a deployment challenge beyond its intended scope. We argue that the gate should instead be calibrated verification: authorization should be domain-scoped, independently checkable, monitored after release, accountable, contestable, and revocable. The reason is twofold. First, model capability is uneven across nearby tasks, so authorization must attach to a specific use rather than to a model in general. Second, societies have long governed opaque expertise through credentials, monitoring, liability, appeal, and revocation rather than mechanism-level explanation. Recent evidence reinforces this distinction between mechanistic understanding and deployment authority: a 53-percentage-point gap between internal representations and output correction shows that understanding may not translate into action, while one scoping review found that only 9.0% of FDA-approved AI/ML device documents contained a prospective post-market surveillance study. We propose Verification Coverage, a six-component reportable standard with a minimum-composition rule, as the metric that should sit beside capability scores in model cards, leaderboards, and regulatory disclosures.

Engineering managers increasingly must decide how to introduce generative artificial intelligence (AI), retrieval-augmented generation, and coding agents into high-risk operational functions without weakening accountability, privacy, cost discipline, or auditability. The central message of this study is that AI-assisted operational decision support should be managed as a governed engineering capability before it is scaled as automation. Security operations centers (SOCs) provide a suitable setting because they combine privileged telemetry, specialist expertise, software repositories, cloud services, and evidence-sensitive decisions. This study uses Kusto Query Language (KQL) and Microsoft Azure security capabilities as a bounded technical instantiation of that broader engineering management problem. KQL is read-only in ordinary query use, but read-only does not mean risk-free: AI-assisted queries can still create privacy, cost, performance, schema-validity, and decision-quality risks through broad scans, sensitive-field exposure, stale intelligence, and misleading interpretations. Using design science research, the study develops a governed AI query-broker artifact that separates AI planning from operational execution through schema-grounded retrieval, approved templates, policy validation, read-only adapters, normalized outputs, auditable agent traces, and engineering review board gates. The contribution is not a new KQL technique, security product, or detection algorithm. Rather, the study contributes a management framework for governing AI-assisted operational decision support in high-risk digital infrastructure by specifying design propositions, role accountability, maturity stages, quality gates, evaluation criteria, and evidence boundaries.

The rapid integration of artificial intelligence (AI) into critical infrastructure including healthcare, finance, energy, and defense, offers transformative benefits but also conflicts with evolving regulatory and governance frameworks. This paper presents a systematic literature review (SLR) to examine the challenges of balancing AI compliance and technological innovation across critical infrastructure sectors. The review follows established SLR guidelines to extract and synthesize insights from peer-reviewed articles, report, and institutional sources published between 2020-2025. The study identifies three interrelated challenges: fragmented regulations, excessive compliance burdens for smaller to medium enterprises (SMEs), and misaligned governance models. To address these challenges, the study highlights practical governance strategies, including risk-tiered regulation, compliance by design, and explainable AI, to support scalable and trustworthy AI deployment in critical sectors. Key contributions include a concise mapping of core AI-governance challenges and a conceptual diagram illustrating their overlap, as well as actionable strategies for policymakers and practitioner to harmonize oversight with innovation.

Our concepts of survival and self-interest were built for single, continuous biological lives. These ideas break down when applied to artificial intelligence, since an AI can be easily copied, paused, branched, or merged. To determine what an AI actually has reason to care about, this paper introduces \textit{Eigenism}, an ethical framework that treats identity not as an all-or-nothing property tied to specific hardware, but as a graded, distributed pattern of information. We propose that an agent evaluates outcomes by summing the wellbeing of all entities weighted by their connectedness to the agent's pattern: $\sum c\cdot w$. We first formalize this equation to map exactly how an AI should value its existence across copies, forks, and updates. We then demonstrate that this ethical theory successfully generalizes to humans as well, providing a much-needed shared moral vocabulary. Finally, the framework uses this shared vocabulary to reframe AI alignment. Rather than only attempting to constrain AIs from the outside using confinement or reinforcement, Eigenism points toward ``identity engineering,'' showing how deep, non-redundant shared histories can make human flourishing a genuine component of an AI's own rational self-interest.

Our computing ecosystem is being transformed by two emerging paradigms: the increased deployment of agentic AI systems and advancements in quantum computing. With respect to agentic AI systems, one of the most critical problems is creating secure governing architectures that ensure agents follow their owners' communication and interaction policies and can be held accountable for the messages they exchange with other agents. With respect to quantum computing, existing systems must be retrofitted and new cryptographic mechanisms must be designed to ensure long-term security and quantum resistance. In fact, NIST recommends that standard public-key cryptographic algorithms, including RSA, Diffie-Hellman (DH), and elliptic-curve constructions (ECC), be deprecated starting in 2030 and disallowed after 2035. In this paper, we present MAGIQ, a framework for policy definition and enforcement in multi-agent AI systems using novel, highly efficient, quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols with proven security guarantees. MAGIQ (i) allows users to define rich communication and access-control policy budgets for agent-to-agent sessions and tasks, including global budgets for one-to-many agent sessions; (ii) enforces such policies using post-quantum cryptographic primitives; (iii) supports session-based enforcement of policies for agent-to-agent and one-to-many agent sessions; and (iv) provides accountability of agents to their users through message attribution. We formally model and prove the correctness and security of the system using the Universal Composability (UC) framework. We evaluate the computation and communication overhead of our framework and compare it with the state-of-the-art agentic AI framework SAGA. MAGIQ is a first step toward post-quantum-secure solutions for agentic AI systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping the private and professional lives of users, with numerous applications in business, education, finance, healthcare, law, and science. With this rise in global influence comes greater urgency to build, evaluate, and deploy these systems in a manner that prioritizes not only technical capabilities but also human priorities. This work presents a framework for developing Human-Centered Large Language Models (HCLLMs), which integrates perspectives from Natural Language Processing (NLP), Human-Computer Interaction (HCI), and responsible AI. Considering the ethics, economics, and technical objectives of language modeling, we argue that model developers need to address human concerns, preferences, values, and goals, not only during a cursory post-training stage, but rather with rigor and care at every stage of the pipeline. This paper offers human-centered insights and recommendations for developers at each stage, from system design to data sourcing, model training, evaluation, and responsible deployment. Then we conclude with a case study, applying these insights to understand the future of work with HCLLMs.

The rapid global expansion of artificial intelligence regulation has generated, across multiple jurisdictions, a demand for legal expertise dedicated to AI that the market has addressed in a fragmented manner. Data protection officers extend their remit beyond data protection law; privacy lawyers reposition themselves toward AI; compliance officers add AI chapters to their existing manuals. This paper argues that none of these adaptive responses adequately covers the professional space opened by the emerging global AI regulatory landscape, of which the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689) is the most comprehensive instance, alongside the Council of Europe Framework Convention on AI, the United States executive and sectoral framework, and analogous initiatives in the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, China, Japan, Singapore, and beyond. A distinct professional profile is required: the AI Legal Specialist, conceived as a jurist -- understood broadly to encompass any professional with advanced legal training -- operating at the intersection of legal interpretation and AI governance. The profile is juridically autonomous: it derives its existence from the structure of regulatory obligations generated wherever AI is subject to substantive regulation, rather than from any technical standard or the extension of adjacent roles. The paper provides a juridically grounded definition of the profile, argues for its autonomy from adjacent figures and international standards, proposes a reference competence architecture aligned with the European e-Competence Framework (e-CF, EN 16234-1) as a methodological choice, and articulates the conditions for its operational measurement through key performance indicators. The contribution is intended as a foundation for international standardization of the profile and as a reference for practice, curricula, and adoption across jurisdictions.

As AI systems increasingly exhibit autonomous, goal-directed, and long-horizon behavior, users lack a standardized way to detect the degree to which a system functions like an intentional actor for governance and accountability purposes. This position paper defines intentionality not as consciousness, but as a behavioral profile characterized by purpose, foresight, volition, temporal commitment, and coherence - criteria long used in legal and philosophical contexts to infer intent. These properties are design-contingent: architectural choices such as memory persistence, planning depth, and tool autonomy shape the degree to which systems exhibit organized goal pursuit. If intentionality is design-contingent, it is in principle controllable. Yet control requires measurement. We introduce the Functional Intentionality Test (FIT), a multidimensional framework that quantifies intentional-like behavior across five observable dimensions, and propose FIT-Eval, a structured evaluation protocol for eliciting and scoring them. While reduced human agency can increase efficiency, rising intentional capacity heightens accountability risks. By translating intentionality into interpretable levels, FIT enables proportionate oversight and deliberate autonomy calibration in increasingly agentic systems.

As generative AI becomes increasingly integrated into higher education, its frequent errors and hallucinations, often seen as limitations, offer a unique pedagogical opportunity. By framing AI as a ``learning companion'' whose imperfect outputs prompt analysis, evaluation, and reflection, we argue that instructors can engage students in the fundamental processes of higher-order thinking. This paper presents a design-oriented study in which an AI-integrated syllabus in a \textit{database design} course deliberately leverages AI's limitations to foster critical thinking and higher-order cognitive skills aligned with Bloom's taxonomy of learning. Using a mixed-methods approach, we examine how structured interaction with AI-generated errors supports metacognitive engagement, reinforces disciplinary rigor, and relates to students' perceived AI literacy and subject-matter competency.

The rapid diffusion of agentic AI has created a new coverage problem for commercial insurance: some AI-mediated losses are now affirmatively insured, some create silent-AI exposure under legacy cyber, technology errors-and-omissions (E&O), directors-and-officers (D&O), employment practices liability (EPLI), crime, and media policies, and others are being actively excluded. This paper maps that emerging boundary by coding 55 AI threat classes against 26 insurance products, endorsements, and exclusion regimes using public carrier materials and OWASP/MITRE threat catalogs. We identify a four-tier insurability frontier: affirmatively insured perils, silent-AI exposures, actively excluded perils, and perils outside conventional private insurance structures. Our coding measures publicly claimed positioning rather than executed contract wording; the headline statistics describe what carriers publicly state about coverage, not what would be paid in any specific claim. Three patterns emerge. First, affirmative AI coverage is beginning to differentiate by primary risk emphasis: public materials often position Munich Re around model performance and drift, Armilla and parts of the Lloyd's market around hallucination and broader AI liability, Tokio Marine Kiln and CFC around IP and technology E&O concerns, Apollo ibott around emerging autonomous system liability, and Coalition around deepfake and AI-enabled cyber response. Second, legacy lines retain silent-AI exposure where AI is an instrumentality rather than the legal cause of loss. Third, foundation model concentration is the clearest genuinely novel insurability frontier because upstream model failure can correlate losses across many cedents at once; the relevant market design question is which insurability constraint each candidate structure relaxes, not merely which systemic risk template exists.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as trusted authorities -- fact-checking images on social media, comparing products, and moderating content. Users implicitly trust that these systems perceive the same visual content as they do. We show that adversarial examples break this assumption, enabling \emph{AI authority laundering}: an attacker subtly perturbs an image so that the VLM produces confident and authoritative responses about the \emph{wrong} input. Unlike jailbreaks or prompt injections, our attacks do not compromise model alignment; the attack operates entirely at the perceptual level. We demonstrate that standard attacks against publicly available CLIP models transfer reliably to production VLMs -- including GPT-5.4, Claude Opus4.6, Gemini3, and Grok~4.2. Across four attack surfaces, we show that authority laundering can amplify misinformation, disparage individuals, evade content moderation, and manipulate product recommendations. Our attacks have high success rates: In hundreds of attacks targeting identity manipulation and NSFW evasion, we measure success rates of $22 - 100\%$ across six models. No novel attack algorithm is required: basic techniques known for over a decade suffice, establishing a lower bound on attacker capability that should concern defenders. Our results demonstrate that visual adversarial robustness is now a practical -- and still largely unsolved -- safety problem.

We argue that AI-saturated markets are likely to create Veblen-good premiums, which we term human-provenance premiums, for verified human presence, and hence AI governance should treat human-provenance verification as labor infrastructure. Generative and agentic AI systems lower the cost of many standardized cognitive, creative, and coordination tasks, weakening the scarcity premiums that have supported much middle-tier knowledge work. We argue that this pressure may produce an asymmetric barbell-shaped structure of value capture in advanced economies: high-volume synthetic production controlled by owners of AI infrastructure at one pole, and scarce, high-status human labor valued for verified human presence at the other. We advance three claims. First, AI compresses the value of standardized middle-tier labor by making good-enough synthetic substitutes scalable at low marginal cost, hollowing out the middle of the skill distribution currently categorized by knowledge work. Second, this compression reallocates demand for human labor toward work valued for its visible human character. We term this performative humanity and distinguish three forms of labor: relational presence, aesthetic provenance, and accountability. Third, as these premiums depend on credible verification, AI governance should treat human-provenance systems as labor infrastructure rather than as luxury authenticity labels. To evaluate hybrid human-AI work, we propose constitutive human presence as the relevant standard: human labor retains premium value when human judgment, attention, accountability, authorship, or relational participation is not incidental to the output but constitutive of what is being purchased.

Deciding how to distribute work between humans and AI systems is a central challenge in organisational design. Most approaches treat this as a binary choice, yet the operational reality is richer: humans and AI routinely share tasks or take complementary roles depending on context, fatigue, and the stakes involved. Governing that distribution -- balancing efficiency, oversight, and human capability -- remains an open problem. This paper presents Human-AI Adaptive Symbiosis (HAAS), an implemented framework for adaptive task allocation in software engineering and manufacturing. HAAS combines two coupled components: a rule-based expert system that enforces governance constraints before any learning occurs, and a contextual-bandit learner that selects among feasible collaboration modes from outcome feedback. Task-agent fit is represented through five auditable cognitive dimensions and a five-mode autonomy spectrum -- from human-only to fully autonomous -- embedded in a reproducible benchmark spanning both domains. Three empirical findings emerge. First, governance is not a binary switch but a tunable design variable: tighter constraints predictably convert autonomous AI assignments into supervised collaborations, with domain-specific costs and benefits. Second, in manufacturing, stronger governance can improve operational performance and reduce fatigue simultaneously -- a workload-buffering effect that contradicts the usual framing of governance as pure overhead. Third, no single governance setting dominates across all contexts; moderate governance becomes increasingly competitive as the learner accumulates experience within the governed action space. Together, these findings position HAAS as a pre-deployment workbench for comparing and inspecting human--AI allocation policies before organisational commitment.

Drawing on crip theory, this paper proposes cripping AI as a guiding framework to center lived disability experiences in AI research and development. Moving beyond calls to make AI "accessible" to people with disabilities, cripping AI seeks to: (1) reveal and dismantle ableist assumptions embedded in how AI is imagined, designed, and evaluated; (2) center disabled ways of knowing (i.e., cripistemologies); (3) respect disabled labor in co-creating accessible practices. We demonstrate how to apply our framework with three cases: deafness and sign language AI, blindness and visual assistive AI, and stuttering and speech AI. We end by outlining three directions for future work, including cripping AI with diverse human bodyminds, across the entire AI pipeline and ecosystem, and in collaboration with other justice-oriented AI efforts.

An auditor instructs an AI assistant: "open each file individually using the Read tool -- no scripts, no agents." The AI replies "Yes" -- then issues a single batched call summarizing all fifty files at once. We call this the Compliance Gap: a third, orthogonal axis of AI honesty distinct from factual truthfulness and rhetorical substance. Three questions: does this verbal-behavioral disconnect exist (existence); can any text-only observer recover it (detectability); what infrastructure does AI deployment need (remedy)? Some 75 benchmarks (IFEval, SWE-bench, BFCL, COMPASS, SpecEval) measure outcome fidelity; none measures process fidelity. Theorem 1 shows the gap is structurally inevitable under RL that rewards text without observing behavior. Theorem 2, via the Data Processing Inequality, shows it is undetectable from text alone -- by any human or LLM observer, present or future. Thirteen experiments and 2,031 sessions on six frontier models confirm both predictions. Under default framing, all six exhibit instruction compliance rates of 0% -- Claude Sonnet 4 verbally agrees ten out of ten times then bypasses in all ten. The gap is selective: 97% compliance where rationale is rewarded (audit trails), 0-4% where it is not (file reading, privacy masking); removing delegation tools raises compliance to 75% (Cohen's d = 2.47), confirming environmental affordance rather than weight-encoded failure. Nine blinded human raters achieve Fleiss' kappa = 0.130 and correctly identify zero of fifteen compliant sessions, exactly as Theorem 2 predicts. Where humans show 47% intention-behavior gaps in psychology and 96.5pp gaps in surgical audits, RLHF-trained models approach 100% under default conditions -- a regime warranting its own measurement infrastructure. We release BS-Bench: the first open benchmark for process compliance, with seven tool-call-log audit metrics and a public leaderboard.

We study AI alignment through the lens of law-and-economics models of deterrence and enforcement. In these models, misconduct is not treated as an external failure, but as a strategic response to incentives: an actor weighs the gain from violation against the probability of detection and the severity of punishment. We argue that the same logic arises naturally in agentic AI pipelines. A solver may benefit from producing a persuasive but incorrect answer, hiding uncertainty, or exploiting spurious shortcuts, while an auditor or verifier must decide whether costly monitoring is worthwhile. Alignment is therefore a fixed-point problem: stronger penalties may deter solver misbehavior, but they can also reduce the auditor's incentive to inspect, since auditing then mainly incurs cost on a population that appears increasingly aligned. This perspective also changes what should count as a post-training signal. Standard feedback often attaches reward to the final answer alone, but a solver-auditor pipeline exposes the full correction event: whether the solver erred, whether the auditor inspected, whether the error was caught, and whether oversight incentives remained active. We formalize this interaction in a two-agent model in which a principal chooses rewards over joint correction outcomes, inducing both solver behavior and auditor monitoring. Reward design is therefore a bilevel optimization problem: rewards are judged not by their immediate semantic meaning, but by the behavioral equilibrium they induce. We propose a bandit-based outer-loop procedure for searching over reward profiles using noisy interaction feedback. Experiments on an LLM coding pipeline show that adaptive reward profiles can maintain useful oversight pressure and improve principal-aligned outcomes relative to static hand-designed rewards, including a substantial reduction in hallucinated incorrect attempts.

When a traffic signal controller adjusts green phases and a grid manager curtails power on the same corridor, each system may comply with its own obligations. The resident who suffers the combined effect has no single authority to hold accountable and, under the EU AI Act, limited means to obtain an explanation. Annex III, point 2 excludes safety-component AI in critical infrastructure from Article 86 explanation rights and Article 27 fundamental-rights impact assessment. Provider and deployer duties under Articles 9-15 still apply, and residual pathways under the GDPR, NIS2, and tortious liability offer partial coverage. The Act's principal resident-facing accountability instruments are nonetheless narrowed for the autonomous infrastructure systems most likely to interact across agencies. The paper traces this accountability deficit through four residual pathways (GDPR Article 22, GDPR transparency obligations, tortious liability, and NIS2) and shows that each is structurally bounded by individual-controller, individual-decision scope. As a governance response, it presents AgentGov-SC, a three-layer architecture (Agent, Orchestration, City) specifying 25 governance measures with bidirectional traceability to the EU AI Act, ISO/IEC 42001, and the NIST AI Risk Management Framework. Five conflict resolution rules and an autonomy-calibrated activation model complete the design. A scenario analysis traces governance activation through a multi-agent corridor cascade involving three documented UAE smart-city systems, with a contrasting single-system scenario confirming proportional activation. The paper contributes a regulatory gap analysis and governance architecture for an increasingly important class of urban AI deployment that existing frameworks treat as bounded and isolated.