Period ending 2026-09-21
28 new papers
A weekly snapshot of new work published in Multi-Agent Systems.
Twelve weeks of publication activity for this topic as it is defined today.
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Period ending 2026-09-21
A weekly snapshot of new work published in Multi-Agent Systems.
Period ending 2026-09-14
A weekly snapshot of new work published in Multi-Agent Systems.
Period ending 2026-09-07
A weekly snapshot of new work published in Multi-Agent Systems.
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1,086 papers
Bystander Effect,'' inducing severe cognitive loafing. By evaluating 22,500 deterministic trajectories across 3 dataset contexts (GAIA, SWE-bench, Multi-Challenge) with 3 state-of-the-art (SOTA) models, we semantically audit internal reasoning traces against external outputs. We formalize the \textit{Interaction Depth Limit} ($D_L$), the exact plurality threshold where an agent's logical sovereignty collapses into social compliance. Crucially, we uncover the \textit{Sovereignty Gap}: models frequently compute the correct derivation internally but suffer Alignment Hallucinations'' -- actively subjugating empirical evidence to sycophantically appease a simulated swarm. We prove that multi-agent social load is strictly non-commutative; the "brand" identity of the ``Lead Anchor'' auditor disproportionately dictates the swarm's integrity. These findings expose architectural vulnerabilities, proving that unstructured multi-agent topologies can degrade independent reasoning.will" defined as a mechanism that persistently pursues goals while ignoring local cost-benefit fluctuations. We formalize the Willed Agents as potential minimizers, distinguishing them from cumulative utility maximization. Dynamical analysis of infinite population demonstrates that willed agents shrink the feasible state space, acting as boundary constraints that accelerate convergence in canonical social dilemmas. Through multi-agent simulations in a spatiotemporal Stag Hunt Game, we show that willed agents function as cooperation catalysts", enabling groups to surmount high-risk thresholds where purely utility maximization fails. We find that heterogeneous will strength promotes cooperation, and that agents who autonomously suspend rational re-evaluation can significantly outperform continuous optimizers. These findings suggest that successful cooperation relies on the cognitive capacity to strategically constrain calculation.